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ABSTRACT
The acquisition of the right to the revenue of 
Bengal by the East India Company in 1765 altered fundamentally 
the nature of the British connection with India. An 
important branch of Mughal government was now taken over by 
a trading corporation. But the change was not as dramatic 
as it might have been, for the British were content at first 
to work with the old Mughal system. Subsequently, they 
introduced a series of changes in revenue administration, 
but there was always a gap between policy as it evolved in 
Calcutta and practice in the districts of Bengal. This 
thesis seeks to examine the factors which contributed to 
create that gap with reference to one unit of the Bengal 
Presidency - Sylhet district.
The opening pages deal with the remnants of the 
Mughal system in Sylhet and the peculiar environmental 
characteristics of the district. The scene having been 
set, the main body of the thesis is devoted to a consideration 
of the influence on the nature of revenue administration in 
the district of a succession of district officers. The inter­
action of these local officials with the central authorities 
at Calcutta on the one hand, and with their Indian subordinates 
and Sylhetti society on the other, is fully explored. The 
importance of the process of revenue settlement has been duly 
recognized and the several revenue settlements of Sylhet in 
the period 1765 to 1 7 9 2 have been described.
This study is concerned with day to day revenue 
administration in a difficult and remote frontier tract in
a formative period of British, rule.. . ..British experience- in
11.
Sylhet had no recognizable impact on general policy, but, 
by the same token, plans or directives and resolutions 
emanating from the centre were not as influential in Sylhet 
as might be thought.
111.
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AUTHORT S NOTE
In quotations from contemporary sources the original 
spelling and punctuation have generally been preserved; 
capitalization has been modernized. Indian terms have been 
underlined when they first appear.
In footnote references to unpublished records, the 
date of the source is given followed by the Range number 
(where appropriate), the volume in Roman numerals and the 
page. Y/here the volume has not been paged, both the date 
of the source and of the relevant proceedings are given to 
facilitate reference.
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footnotes:
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BPCR ' Dacca Provincial Council of Revenue.
e n d . enclosure.
ext. extract.
HMS Home Miscellaneous Series.
JAS The Journal of Asian Studies, Ann Arbor.
JASB The Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal,
Calcutta.
JASP The Journal of the Asiatic Society of Pakistan
Dacca
JRA.S Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, London.
LCE Letter Copy Books of the Resident of the
Durbar at Murshidabad. (Firminger, Y/.K. ed.)
MGR Murshidabad Committee of Revenue.
MFR Murshidabad Factory Records.
nd. not dated.
np. not paged.
Pari. Coll. Parliamentary Collection, India Office Records
PCCD Proceedings of the Committee of Circuit at
Dacca, vol. iv (Pirminger, Y/.K. ed.)
Proc. Proceedings.
R Range.
Rs. Rupees.
SDR Sylhet District Records (in four vols.
Pirminger, Y/.K. ed.)
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CHAPTER I 
• INTRODUCTION
A number of Bengal district studies have 
appeared within the last decade designed to draw attention 
away from policy to practice, from the doer to the done to, 
from the perhaps rash or facile generalisation to the more 
exact and firmly rooted local detail. It is hoped that 
this work, by clarifying another individual trend, will 
contribute towards the emergence of a new synthesis of 
Bengali rural history in the first years of British rule, 
which is becoming increasingly possible.
Sylhet district invited attention for two main 
reasons. Firstly, on the surface Sylhet appeared to have 
been very different from what might have been thought of as 
a typical Bengal district. Though in truth there was no 
such thing since each district displayed a number of unique 
characteristics, Sylhet was nevertheless more unique than 
most. One expected, therefore, that a study of Sylhet would 
provide some kind of divergent trend in the light of which 
the overall picture might be re-examined and modified or
simply seen in better relief. At the least, it was thought,
such a study by concentrating on a remote frontier district
would demonstrate how the sinews of government responded when
the arm was fully outstretched. Secondly, the district had
been so patently ignored by historians. There is no history
of Sylhet comparable to the studies of Chittagong, Jessore or
1
Murshidabad districts; in fact Sylhet seldom figures even 
in the provincial works, ostensibly one of the hazards of a 
too rigorous specialisation. The district was at one time 
included in the old Kamrup empire and was later incorporated 
into the Mughal subah or province of Bengal; in 1765 as a 
part of Bengal it came under British jurisdiction. In 187U, 
however, Sylhet was transferred to the newly-created 
Chief-Commissionership of Assam. Then, in 1905 the district 
was included in the province of Eastern Bengal and Assam 
which was dismantled only seven years later; thereupon the 
district reverted to Assam. In 19U7 Sylhet was partitioned 
and about 553 square miles comprising the northern margins
1. Cotton, H.J.S., Memorandum on the Revenue History of
Chittagong:
Westland, J.A., Report on the District of Jessore; its
Antiquities, its History and its Commerce 
Walsh, J.H.T., A History of Murshidabad District.
remained in Assam while the core, some U, 785 square miles,
4
passed to East Pakistan. The district now forms part of the 
Chittagong division of Bangladesh,, occupying that north­
eastern horn which juts into Indian territory , and is
2
certain to "be of enormous importance to the new state.
This shifting of provincial Boundaries appear to have 
resulted in a juggling of responsibility. Except for passing 
references, usually of a general nature, historians of Bengal 
have left it to those writing on Assam to deal with the 
district and those writing on Assam have reciprocated the 
compliment.
Hence, a great deal of the districts past remains 
obscure. While included in the Kamrup Empire, the area was 
known as Srihatta - a fair market - of which the modern name 
is perhaps an abbreviation.-^ It would appear that under the 
Hindus the area was divided into a number of petty chiefships, 
the most important of v/hich Y/ere Gor, comprising most of the 
present central Sylhet, Laur in the north-west and Jaintia in 
the north-east.^" The local traditions regarding Sylhet 
during this period are scanty and deal mostly with the unusual 
birth and magical powers of the last Hindu raja of Gor, Gaur 
Gobind. He was said to have been the son of the god of the 
sea and a neglected wife of Gai Gobind, raja of Jaintia. His
1. Census of Pakistan, 1961, vol.2, sect.1,22.
2. Sylhet Y/as undivided Pakistan’s most important tea producing 
region; Pakistan Year Book , 1969* *+81. Tea estates
in Sylhet are spread over some 78,000 acres. The district 
has reserves of gas, estimated at 0.28 million cubic feet 
around Sylhet tOY/n and 1.28 million cubic feet at 
Habiganj. Ibid., 237. Coal deposits ]jave also been 
discovered.
3. De, S.C., Sylhet: what I have Seen, Heard and Read of It, 39.
U. Imperial Gazetter of India, xxiii, 191.
extraordinary powers, however, were not enough to secure
him from defeat at the hands of the Muslim general,
Sikander Shah, who was also reinforced with occult strength
■1
in the person of the fakir Shah Jalal. The date of the 
Muslim conquest is a matter of controversy; some historians 
prefer 1303 and others 138li-. The occasion for war 
fortunately raises less dispute, except in matters of detail: 
a piece of "beef from a cow killed hy a Muslim is picked up 
either,by a kite or other bird and dropped on the palace or 
with more telling effect on the house of a brahmin; the raja 
punishes his Muslim subjects who thereupon appeal to the
3
Sultan for redress. Gaur Gobind, it is said, built a magical 
fort of seven towers to which he retired on the approach of 
the Muslim forces, but each day Shah Jalal offered a prayer 
and one of the towers collapsed. The distraught raja 
surrendered on the fourth day.^-
During the reign of Fakhr-ud-din Mubarak Shah 
(1338 - US) The traveller Ibn Batuta, making a detour during 
his voyage to China, visited the Muslim-controlled part of 
Sylhet to see a holy man who had settled there. Ibn Batuta 
was impressed with what he saw. According to his account,
1. Allen, B.C., Assam District Gazetters: Sylhet, 25. Shah
Jalal became a focus of local tradition. See J. Wise, 
"Note on Shah Jalal, the Patron Saint of Silhat" JASB 
1873, 278 - 81.
2. For the controversy, as well as the vexed question of 
Shah Jalal1s origins, see M. Saghir Hasan, "Sylhet as a 
Centre of Islamic learning" JASP Dec.1965, 63 - 76.
3. Sarkar, J.N. (ed) The History of Bengal ii, 79 -.-80.
U. Allen, 25. The memory of this encounter seemed to have 
long survived. Blochman writing in 1873 stated that 
Sylhet like Kamrup was often spoken of as the land of
witches and lizards, and that the fame of its witchcraft
was still remembered, . H. Blochmann "Contributions, to. , . .
'the Geography and History of Bengal" JASB 1873, 209 - 278
the country was in a flourishing condition., rice was plentiful
and prices were low.
' v7e travelled down the /Surma/ river for fifteen 
days Che wrote J ..♦just as if we were going 
through a bazaar; on its hanks there are water- 
wheels, orchards and villages to the right and 
left.... 1
2In the sixteenth century the Mughals granted sanads 
relating to lands on the inner frontier of Sylhet, recognising 
that such lands had to he acquired hy force. Though Sylhet 
is mentioned in the Ain-i-Akbari the district was not in 
Akbar’s reign (1556 - 1605) under Mughal control hut divided 
among a number of Afghan chiefs; this probably explains why 
Ab’ul Fazl’s account of the area is brief and devoted largely 
to a description of birds. In 1612 a Mughal expeditionary 
force defeated Bayazid Karrani of Sylhet, the foremost Afghan 
chief in Eastern Bengal, who surrendered all his elephants and
was brought back to Dacca by the victorious general Shaikh
Kamal to render homage to the subahdar or provincial governor 
Islam Khan. Laur also passed into Mughal hands at this time. 
Gobind Singh, the last of its line of Hindu princes, 
judiciously changed his religion after being subjugated by 
Mughal arms and was allowed to remain in possession of his 
estates as a jagirdar.^ The Jaintia Kingdom in the north­
east, however, was never conquered by the Mughals and did not
1. Quoted in Sarkar, 103.
2. Documents conveying to individuals the state’s, rights to
revenue from land.
3. Sarkar, 281.
For an account of the campaign, see Roy, A.C. History of
Bengal, 1526 - 1765* 103 - 5.
U. Allen, 25. A jagirdar is the holder of a jagir or an
assignment of revenue.
£C1U
- I
<  Ui x O
Z  LU 
UJ =>
t2
►- <. X
O
UJs o 
o cc 
u.
6 .
form wart of the Sylhet district acquired from them in 1765
hv the British. The plains portion of the Kingdom, later
n-nowrn as the Jaintia Parganas and measured at I4.SI4. square
niles”1 to the north stretched along the "base of the Jaintia
hills from Thariaghat to the Cachar "border and was roughly
hounded hy the Surma river on the south: it continued to
exist as part of a separate kingdom until 1835 when it was
annexed hy the British in retribution for the kidnapping and
2
sacrifice to the Goddess Kali of three British subjects.
When Sylhet was wrested from the Afghan chiefs it
was constituted into a Mughal faujdari or military district,
mainly, it would appear, because of its remoteness. True,
the capital of Bengal was removed in 1612 from distant
Rajmahal to Dacca, which Islam Khan had made his base for
the subjugation of Cachar and his abortive incursions into 
•3
Ahom territory, . but an eight-day journey was still required 
to get to Sylhet town.*"*" (The distance between Dacca and
Sylhet town was measured in the 1780fs at 260^ - miles in the
dry season, and at 2 2 7x miles in the wet season when an inner 
route was navigable).^ Care was taken to remove the principal 
Afghan chiefs from the district; they were sent to the 
imperial court and the task of administration and of preserving
1. Assam Land Revenue Manual, xcvi.
2. Imperial Gazetter of India xxiii, 192. Upon the British
annexation of the plains the Jaintia raja surrendered 
his hill territory too.
3. Sarkar, 283.
Diary of \7illiam Hedges i, U3 - U-
5. Rennell, J., A Bengal Atlas, 37. The distance from
Calcutta to Sylhet was measured at around 630 miles in
the dry season and 5 9 7 miles in the wet season.
Ibid, 28-9. The route from Murshidabad to Sylhet,
through Dacca, was 536 and 530-g- miles in the dry and wet
seasons respectively. Ibid U5-
law and order in Sylhet was entrusted to one of Shaikh 
Kamal*s officers. But the district was never regarded as 
an important one for imperial purposes; it was considered 
merely as a source of elephants and eunuchs. Thus, after 
the first wave of expansion, Mughal dominance was allowed 
steadily to wane and during Shaista^Khan*s reign (1661+ - 77; 
1680 - 8) as Nawab of Bengal the district actually slipped 
from Mughal control. William Hedges in his Diary recalled 
that he witnessed the Nawab despatching officers at the head
tt 2of an army to regain those?, places, Sylhet and Asham /kssam/.” 
Apparently, the expedition was successful and thereafter the 
Mughal presence grew firmer though never firm enough totally 
to discourage the guerrilla-like operations of the neighbouring 
hill tribes.
Y7itfr the re-organisation of the administrative 
system during Murshid Quli Khan!s reign (1700 - 27) Sylhet 
was made into one of the thirteen Chaklas or sub-divisions of 
Bengal and together with Chaklas Islamabad and Jahangirnagar 
was put in charge of the Dacca naibat. Though by itself 
Chakla Sylhet corresponded rougri^with the old sarkar holding 
the same name, this was no indication that the district had 
grown out of a position of minorIsignificance for the 
government. Politically, of course, the district could only
1. Rayachaudhuri, T., Bengal under Akbar and Jahangir. 20.
2. Diary of William Hedges i, U1+. Hedges* audience with 
the Nawab took place on 29 Oct. 1682. Bhuyan, S.K., 
Anglo-Assamese Relations, 62.
3. Karim, A., Dacca, the Mughal Capital, 38. Naibat is 
the office of a naib or viceroy.
“be:; ignored at peril. Chittagong, as a frontier district 
too, also had something, of this quality; it had been vital 
from Shaista Khan’s day onv/ards as a bulwark against Magh 
inroads. Though the Khasis on the Sylhet frontier were 
less seriously regarded, a defence establishment had 
nevertheless to be provided. This was really a source of 
irritation in most years, especially as the public revenues 
of Sylhet were hardly adequate to meet the cost of defence.
The government came to expect little more 11 than a few choice 
elephants, some chunam, oranges, and birds of handsome 
plumage” from the district. To the fau.idar, however,
Sylhet was a prize posting. The district was considered
somewhat as his jagir and he was in a position to alienate 
lands to his clansmen, followers and dependents under rent- 
free tenures, no doubt in the process ensuring presents for 
himself on appropriate occasions from the profits off those 
lands. In fact it was mainly owing to the liberality of the 
several faujdars in bestowing grants, usually of lands of the 
best quality and least exposed to flooding, that Ithe public
2revenues were so disproportionate to the size of the district. 
The faujdar of Sylhet, like his counterpart in Chittagong, also 
enjoyed monopoly rights in the trade of certain articles such 
as beetlenut, chunam, saltpetre and wax. The only drawback 
to this lucrative post was its uncertain tenure. The 
faujdars were frequently changed, possibly from the need to
1. Lindsay -BOR, 2b Nov. 1787, SDR ii, 198.
Ibid. (Sylhet was one of the largest districts of Bengal 
in size and one of the smallest in terms of revenue yeld).
3. Gait, E.A., History of Assam, 278.
find appointments of higher status for mansahdars at each 
step in their promotion, or as a means of spreading the 
rewards of the post or of avoiding too much concentration 
of local power on the frontier.
It was the trade privileges of the faujdar, 
especially the chunam monopoly, which prompted Vansittart 
in 1760, "before he "broke with Mir Jafar and "began to 
negotiate with Mir Kasim, to reguest for the Company the 
faujdari of Sylhet. Mir Jafar, however, felt obliged to
A
refuse. Three years later the faujdari was on the verge
of passing outside Mughal control "by force and not "by gift.
The Jaintia raja threatened to attack the district and the
faujdar sought help from a British force consisting of five
companies of sepoys which was passing through southern
Sylhet on its way from Chittagong to Manipur, to restore
Raja Jai Singh who had been deposed by Burmese invaders.
Harry Verelst, commander of the detachment, suspecting that
the Jaintia raja not only had designs on Sylhet but aimed also
to harass his troops and cut off their provisions, responded
to the faujdarfs plea by diverting his march towards the small
2
town of Bhanga on the Surma river. The Jaintia raja, 
apparently taken aback by the appearance virtually on his 
door-step of so large a force, retreated into guiescence.
Within Sylhet itself by 1763 Mughal authority 
had broken down over extensive areas. The Nawab had to
1 . CPC No. 1+56. Vansittart had also asked for Chittagong.
2. Long, Rev. J., Selections from the Unpublished Records 
of the Government of Bengal 17U8 - 1767 i, 323.
admit, when the Resident at Murshidabad complained to him
on behalf of "the gentlemen of Chittagong, Dacca and
Luckipore /Lakshmipur/” whose boats had run into trouble
at various chaukis or toll-stations in Sylhet that he had
little authority over the "distant parts of the country”.
He himself preferred a complaint, however, against the
gomasthas or Indian agents of European traders, accusing
them of unfair and illegal practices in Sylhet, Rangamati
and Rangpur especially, where the East India Company had
”no government to restrain them, and his was too weak* to do 
1
so. The more powerful landowners in Sylhet were taking
matters into their own hands and the Khasi chiefs to the
north-west, emboldened by the recession of Mughal control,
were extending their influence outwards from the hills into
Mughal territory. As the maps of the geographer James Rennell
showed, by the late 1760*s the frontier tribes had acquired
about three hundred square miles of nominally Mughal territory
between the Khasi hills and the Surma river. For the most
2
part, this area was legally within the Laur jagir, the seat 
of .’which had been removed some twenty years earlier from an 
exposed position on the frontier to Baniachang in the south­
west of the district.
Despite the wavering boundaries of the district, 
Sylhet basically was a clear cut geographical unit. Rennell!s 
maps of north-eastern Bengal are rather bare of 1 detail. Had 
he had modern contour methods at his disposal, he could have 
shown that Sylhet district occupied most of the Surma valley?
1. Board - COD, 12+' . Feb 1763* Fort William - India House
Correspondence iii, Sethi, R.R. (ed.J, 2+73 - U*
2. Shaw, T. and A. B. Smart, Brief History of the Surveys
- • - - of - the • Sylhet -^ District-, -1....... .....................
a "broad plain a"bout 125 miles long and in places up to 
sixty miles wide, dissected "by myriad rivers and spotted 
with numerous hoars or depressions of silt and water. The 
level of the plain was irregular "but generally higher in 
eastern Sylhet, and around Sylhet town, especially to the 
north and north-east, the landscape was dotted with tilas, 
low hills of clay and sandstone. Except for these tilas 
and for six spurs hardly rising above eight hundred feet 
which extended from the Tippera ranges into the extreme 
south-west of the district, there were no real stretches of 
high ground. The Khasi and Jaintia hills on the northern 
border lay outside the district. To the north-west they 
contained no low outer ranges such as usually break the 
descent of a mountain system to the plain; the change was 
sharp and abrupt with the cliffs west of Thariaghat dropping 
four thousand feet and more from the plateau above. Although 
to the north-east there was no such sharp demarcation, for the 
Jaintia hills descended in an easy slope towards the plain,
u>aj>
the higher ground here in the eighteenth century part of 
the Jaintia rajafs domain.
The Surma valley its&Lf is part of the great low- 
lying embayment - the Meghna-Surma valley - which is 
bordered on the north by the Shillong plateau and on the 
west and south by the parallel ranges which extend just east 
of Comilla to beyond the Burma border.
This tract of land is similar to the active delta 
across the estuary, but it is backed by the 
Madhupur Jungle, a much dissected older alluvial
1 . Goswami, D.K.D., Geology of Assam, 9.
terrace rising some forty feet above the general 
level. This interruption of the slope down to the 
sea, the ponding back of local water by the main 
Ganges-Brahmaputra current, and the high rainfall 
combine to make the Meghna-Surma embayment perhaps
1the most amphibious part of Bengal during the rains.
From June to October the western half of Sylhet district,
called bhat-ta country from its lowness, is converted into a
sea of water. At first the ground adjacent to the river banks
which is for a few miles somewhat higher than the surrounding
area, serves to separate the waters of the inundation from
those of the rivers, but eventually this ground too is
2submerged. Usually the period of flood starts slowly with 
the advent of the monsoon in the middle of June and within a 
month the plains become a sheet of.hwater. Sometimes, hov/ever, 
flood conditions could begin before June and continue beyond 
September. In 1788, John V/illes, collector of Sylhet (1788- 93) 
reported that during two-thirds of the year all intercourse
3
even from village to village had been by water only; and in 
18Lj.O, Thomas Fisher v;ho earlier had surveyed large parts of the 
district, reported that the western areas which were in most - 
parts always marshy, were generally under water from April to 
mid-November.^ ’Jilles* predecessor in Sylhet, Robert Lindsay, 
recorded in his autobiography how on re-entering the district
1. Spate, O.H.K., India and Pakistan. A General and Regional
Geography. 2nd ed., 534 “ 5.
2. Ahmad, N., An Economic Geography of East Pakistan, 25.
3. Willes - BOR, 29 Oct.1788, SDR iii, 80.
U* T. Fisher, "Memoir of Sylhet, Kachar, and the Adjacent
Districts” JASB 18i|0, 808 - U3.
at the height of the floods after a trip to Calcutta, he
pointed his course towards Sylhet town as though he was on
an open sea. The homesteads "built on higher ground, usually
along the river hanks or on artificial mounds, seemed to him
forlorn and cast adrift. Fisher too commented on this in
the following words:
the houses are in clusters, huts for men, temples, 
mosques, and sheds for cattle, being huddled 
together in a manner that gives to them the 
appearance rather of the temporary abode of 
fugitives, t&an the settled residence of a people.
Normally the floods are almost at alstandstill for some days
during the middle and end of August, and then slov/ly begin
to subside. The water sinks hack into khals or creeks,
streams and the hig rivers, and
disappears partly hy seepage and evaporation, 
leaving the land covered with fertile silt and 
fit to produce the pivotal crops of winter rice 
and later on jute.
The very regularity of the floods, and the deposition of silt
which-yearly renews the land, perhaps explain the continued
adherence to long established methods of cultivation. For in
the eighteenth century as nowadays much depended on the
monsoon. Agriculture relied critically not only on the
quantity of rainfall hut also its timeliness and distribution.
Nice, hy far the largest and most important crop in Sylhet,
depended in this district directly upon the weight and quality
of the monsoon. And the semi-isolation of the district meant
that the cultivators in their turn depended to an unusual
degree upon the weight and quality of their rice output.
1 . Lindsay, R. et al., Oriental Miscellanies. 26.
2. Ahmad, 22.
The cultivator was not, however, the only one to 
look with an anxious eye at the monsoon sky and at the 
mirroring rice field: the fortunes of the revenue contractor
and collector also turned upon the rice crops. The Mughal 
faujdar or British collector might seek his private fortune 
in elephants or chunam, hut his public reputation turned upon 
securing to government a due share of the rice yield. And 
since what is known of the agricultural resources ofIthe 
district and of its landholding society is derived from the 
records of the revenue administration it seems proper at this 
point to turn to an examination of its structure.
The revenue administration properly fell in 
Mughal days under the jurisdiction of the diwani as distinct 
from that other major branch of government, the nizamat which 
was concerned with police and criminal justice. However, 
the distinction between the diwani and the nizamat must not be 
taken as having been alY/ays scientific or entirely rigid, The
Mughal principle of separate functions did not apply every­
where, and in any case it did not always extend to the 
provision of separate officers. In the orthodox administrative 
set-up as devised during Akbar's reign, revenue management 
at district level was the task of the amal-guzar and his
A
subordinate 3taff while the nizamat functions of maintaining 
peace, keeping the roads free from robbers and enforcing
2imperial regulations were the responsibility of the faujdar.
In addition, though, the faujdar was required to assist the 
amal-guzar in the work of revenue collection. A careful
1. Srivastava, A.L., The Mughal Empire 1526 - 1803 ♦ 192.
2. Ibid., 191.
check was kept on the fau4iar through regular inspection by 
officials of the central government and through the reports 
of spies and informers. At the level of the pargana, the 
lowest fiscal and administrative unit, both diwani and 
nizamat functions were performed by the Shiqdar, though he was 
sometimes joined by an amil who reported directly to the
A
amal-guzar. In Sylhet the faujdar had to execute in
addition to his usual nizamat functions the duties specifically
associated with frontier stations; these included watching
over the frontier, punishing rebellious chiefs for violating
Mughal territory and conquering whenever possible new areas,
as well as receiving visits from vassal chiefs and collecting
the revenues from such as had acknowledged imperial authority
and had agreed to pay a tribute. This payment was seldom
2
realised without recourse to coercion. Unfortunately there 
is but scant information available about either the civil 
establishment in Sylhet under the Mughals or the military 
strength at the faujdar*s disposal. In a brief mention in 
the Ain-i-Akbarit this is put at the level of 1,100 cavalry,
190 elephants and U2,920 infantry.^ It would seem that the 
full complement of district officers was not provided in 
Sylhet; perhaps, owing to the district*s meagre revenue 
yield and its jagir-like relation to the faujdar there was 
little inclination or noineed to set up the usual elaborate 
administrative apparatus. The first British official 
deputed to Sylhet encountered in 1771 an acting faujdar, a 
diwan,^ qanungos and other unspecified officers. Qanungos
1. Srivastava, A.L., The Mughal Empire 1526 - 1803* 193 - U.
2. Saran, P. , The Provincial Government of the Mughals 
1526 - 1658/ 2^6.
3. Allen, 27.
U. Chief financial officer.
were intended as a check on other officers in keeping records
and accounts; they corresponded directly with the two sadr
or head qanungos at Murshidabad, but in distant Sylhet they
seldom performed their proper function and were usually tools
of the faujdar. Under the later Nawabs and in the first
years of British rule, the faujdar of Sylhet, though
technically still an officer of the nizamat, was supervising
revenue collections in the same way as the amils who were
2employed in other districts.
The functions of the diwani were defined for the 
British in 1770 as follows:^
The appointing of aumils /amils/ into Muffussul 
/mofussil or Interior/;
The collections and whatever belongs thereto;
The settling a bundibust^ of the pergunnahs 
/parganas/;
The examining of dewanny sunnuds /sanads, which 
were issued/ under the signature of the Nazim for 
taloks /taluks/, charity lands and religious donat­
ions of Be rhame ter /ErsJiiLiltlLar/ and Deoter /Pevottar7. 
The investigating the districts and forming a 
hustabood /hastobud,or rent-roll/;
The uniting and separating one district from another.
1. P.J.Marshall, "Indian Officials under the East India 
Company in Eighteenth-Century Bengal", B P & P
Jan - June 1965? 95 ~ 120.
2. Under the Mughals, faujdars were responsible for the 
collections in other frontier districts too, such as 
Midnapur, Purnea and Rangpur. Sinha, U.K. Economic 
History of Bengal ii, 6 .
3. Muhammad Reza Khan!s statement, 3 Dec 1770, MFR i, U29.
I4.. Bandobast, adjustment of revenue to be paid by
■ - - -zamindars- and -renters................................
The placing and displacing the zemindars 
/zamindars/ with consent of the Nazim;
The cultivation of the country and whatever 
tends to increase its revenue.
The examining /of/ complaints against aumils 
and zemindars /about their/ making illegal demands. 
The limiting the boundaries of a zemindary and 
adjusting complaints not deserving of capital 
punishment.
The exan$.ng of taloks, and adjusting the rights 
of talokdars /talukdars/;
The writing of perwanas /parwanas or writs/ to 
inforce payment of revenue and the recalling of 
aumils from the muffussul on any complaint.
This list of "what belongs to the duanny /diwani/" makes it 
clear that revenue administration consisted of three distinct 
but related processes - assessment, collection and a third 
catch-all process of ensuring that those conditions were 
maintained which made possible and facilitated the realization 
of the revenues. Each of these will be examined in turn.
The first phase of assessing the jama or demand 
from the district was referred to variously as the formation 
of the settlement, the settling of the lands, or simply the 
settlement. This in itself consisted of two steps, - an 
overall assessment of the entire district, and the imposing of 
individual demands On zamindars, revenue farmers or other 
persons who became immediately responsible for the revenues.
It was not always necessary to carry out both these steps 
every year, as sometimes the overall assessment might have 
been fixed previously for a term of years, as in Sylhet 
between .1 7 7 2. t  .3 ■ and . 177U “ .5., .and.again between. 1.775 r .6. , . ,
and 1780 - 1. Deciding on the overall assessment was a
task of the first importance: as Thomas Munro perceived,
1 In India whoever regulates the assessment of the land, really
-1
holds in his hand the mainspring of the country.”
Some senior officials of the Company were very 
early aware of this. The corollary , they felt, was that 
neither junior civilians nor Indian officers, though they 
might he depended on for accounts of the state of cultivation 
and other related matters, could he relied on to assess the 
true value of the lands. More positively, especially 
during V/arren Hastings* administration, it was widely supposed 
that they would act in concert with the landholders to 
defraud the Company of its rightful share of the revenues. 
Hence, the first stage of assessment was usually carried out 
at provincial headquarters (Murshidahad, and after 1771, 
Calcutta), or hy central officers deputed from the capital as 
in 177"! and 1781, or hy senior officers from the provincial 
councils. The issues associated with this first stage - the 
duration of the settlement and its type, that is, farming or 
zamindari or a variation of mixture of hoth - all had profound 
implications and were usually decided at the highest level, hy 
the central revenue bodies or even on occasions hy the Court 
of Directors.
The individual engagements of the zamindars and 
other revenue intermediaries were settled and taken in an 
annual ceremony known as the punya, where the total demand 
due from each party and his kisthandi or list of monthly 
instalments v^ as fixed, as also the terms to which the party
1. Selections from Revenue Records of the N.W. Provinces iii,
was required to adhere and the functions he was to perforin.
There was, too, a symbolic, almost feudal side to the.punya 
- the attendance of the zamindars to render homage and fealty 
by offering nazrs or presents and agreeing to carry out 
specified duties, and the reciprocal gifts of dresses of 
honour, titles and distinctions by the emperor through his 
representative. Prior to 1771 the punya was held at 
LIurshidabad; afterwards the collector presided over the', 
ceremony in the district and apportioned the demand within 
the framework set by the total assessment and by a variety of 
local factors, such as the amounts previously paid, the state 
of the lands, and the relative strength or tractableness of 
the various landholders. For the individual district concerned 
this second step was of no less importance than the first; 
indeed, for individual landholders it was more crucial. But 
from the viewpoint of the centre, except where very large 
zamindaris were involved, the second.step seemed of secondary 
importance.
Revenue collection was simply the act of receiving 
or enforcing the payments from the parties 'who had signed 
engagements at the punya. But it was not a simple affair.
The payments were supposed to conform to the list of monthly 
instalments agreed upon and were made in cash or by bills of 
exchange. It was the concern of the zamindar whether he 
produced every month the requisite cash or bills by saving 
from the last harvest sales or by advances made at interest, 
by money-lenders, against the security of the next harvest.
If the zamindar did not pay either from his own or borrowed 
resources, coercion followed. This usally took the form of 
threats, of confining recalcitrant zamindars until they paid, 
and especially- after 1776•of•exposing a-portion-of ■ their- lands .
for sale. Some of the intricate negotiation and tangled 
bargaining which marked the punya were continued throughout 
the year and some landholders were adept at discovering or 
devising means to withhold the revenues. The landholders 
who collected the rents from under-tenants and the cultivators 
encountered the same kind of stratagems that they themselves 
employed in relation to the collector. While the collector 
was bound by regulations, the landholders were bound by 
custom (and sometimes, by written agreements), but both laws 
and usage could be bent or flouted. At the close of the 
collections, the balances were divided between those considered 
recoverable and those deemed irrecoverable, and sometimes but 
not without much heart-searching in Calcutta the latter were 
written off. This was more often than not, but especially 
where floods or famine had occurred, making a virtue out of
A
necessity, for the irrecoverable arrears, by definition, 
could not be collected. At the close of the collections 
especially if it had been a successful year, there was in 
the district headquarters something like euphoria but this did 
not take long to dissipate as the business of making arrange­
ments for the new year began to claim attention.
The third process of revenue administration could 
probably be thought of as pacification and settlement, in the 
orthodox use of that term. In a frontier district it 
naturally involved dealing with frontier chiefs but there was 
also a great deal of interior pacification - taking care of 
rebellious zamindars, protecting the roads and rivers, and the 
revenue shipments. Other matters were also involved, such as
1. As has been noted in the case of Mughal remissions. 
Habib, I., The Agrarian System of Mughal India. 250.
encouraging cultivation, fostering land reclamation by 
administering grants for bringing waste under cultivation 
and affording redress to the injured or exploited. Not 
surprisingly, there was a gap between formal accession to 
power and effective sovereignty, and this third process
A
would involve the closing of that gap.
This more or less general framework of revenue 
administration on closer examination v/ould hold true for 
each district concerned only with significant modifications. 
These have to do largely, as might be expected, witjfa. the 
environmental situation and the other peculiar characteristics 
of the district involved. For example, not all the Sylhet 
landholders had the means to attend the annual punya, even 
when it was held at Sylhet town; their engagements had to 
be taken by shiqdars sent into the mofussil. Again, it was 
not always possible in Sylhet to realise!the revenue due from 
obdurate landholders by confining them until they proved more 
amenable or by publicly auctioning a part of their holdings, 
and other measures had to be devised. Local circumstances 
were not always taken into account at the centre even when 
the collector made special and repeated representations. 
Regularity was devoutly desired; it made matters much easier, 
and indeed if the resolutions and directives of the central 
bodies are taken as always having been binding, some amount of 
uniformity would be seen apparently to have been achieved.
In fact, however, the effect of local conditions on the general 
pattern of administration could not easily be neutralised.
It is the effect of local factors in shaping the administrative 
system in Sylhet which is explored in the following chapters.
1 , f See Chapter 6.
Sylhet was a problem district and part of the 
problem was that both in Calcutta and in the district capital 
reliable information was scarce. It is true that in each 
district there were special conditions that demanded special 
attention, but initially perhaps less was known about Sylhet 
than any other district and it took correspondingly longer 
for the British to learn to make the necessary adjustments.
It is indicative of the general vacuum in which the British 
had to operate that they were unaware even of the true extent 
of the district. Their information was based on Rennellfs 
maps which a later survey, in 1823 - 5, found to be mis­
leading especially in the south-west of the district. Rennell
did not visit the south-west and here many of his positions
A
were from ten to forty miles too much to the north. Another 
example of unfamiliarity with local conditions was that in 
April 1771 and 1772 the Committee of Revenue at Murshidabad 
complained that huge arrears were due from Sylhet and had 
to be reminded that the new year in Sylhet began on 13 September, 
not 1U April as elsewhere in the province. The records at 
headquarters - those which were sent to Murshidabad and taken 
later to Calcutta when the Khalsa or exchequer was removed
4
there in 1771 ~ were not always trusted. Hence, inquiries 
were instituted from time to time into various aspects of 
the districts in Bengal but these did not extend always in 
practice to Sylhet: for example, Sylhet did not figure in 
the famous Amini Rfe'port of1777 for the commissioners did not 
visit the district. When local Indian officials were asked 
to provide information, they were not akways able or willing
1. Fisher, JASB 1 814-0, 808 - 2+3.
23.
to do so. The diwan of Sylhet, asked in 1777 for the 
revenue accounts of the previous ten years, could furnish 
records only for a couple of years, that is, from the date 
of his appointment: the other accounts, he argued, were not
in his possession.
If Chittagong "became a "byword for intricacy and 
complications, it really usurped an attribute more properly 
applicable to Sylhet. Admittedly, most officials were 
inclined to attest that their own local appointment was the 
most taxing in the Company’s gift. But others did not match 
the tone of near despair which sometimes escaped from the 
Sylhet collectors. In May 1787 Lindsay told the Revenue Board, 
"although my collections are small, the accounts are more com­
plicated and attended with more trouble than six other collector-
4
ships if united." In October the following year, Willes made-
the same complaint in the following words:
In this district, tho* the revenue is small, yet 
the collection is very troublesome and the number 
of divisions into small pergunnahs occasions so 
much writing that I find that a collector and 
assistant are not equal to the business. 2
Revenue administration was in fact a very literate (and
’numerate*) affair. The most detailed accounts were expected
and the central agencies often complained to the Sylhet and
other collectors that their reports were too general. It
is easy to imagine with the tight schedule which came to be
imposed on the despatch of revenue accounts (and which the
Sylhet collector usually failed to meet), the collector even
in distant Sylhet feeling the central authorities in Calcutta
breathing down his neck. The fury of letter writing sometimes
1. Lindsay - BOR, 10 May 1787, SLR ii, 119.
2. Willes - BOR, 16 Oct. 1788, SDR iii, 76.
caused letters to cross, though, remarkably, despatches 
hardly ever went astray. Close reporting, however, did not 
mean close control.
When the settlement was concluded the jamabandi or
statement showing the particulars of the public revenue of the
district would be submitted and throughout the year, the tauji
(literally, running) or monthly accounts together with treasury
receipts would follow. The monthly accounts would be
compared in Calcutta with the list of monthly instalments
agreed to at the punya. All deficiencies had to be explained
in an accompanying statement from the collector. The treasury
receipts would show how much money had been remitted or was on
its way to the Khaloa and how much on hand in the district
treasury. In the end the tauji accounts and the treasury
receipts would tally, and all balances on the jama would have
to be carefully explained. In the preparation of these
1
accounts and of the final jama wasil baki the collector was 
assisted by the district staff, which varied in size from time 
to time but which always included a number of Indian clerks.
The head clerk or Sarishtadar enjoyed a position of considerable 
importance, though nothing like that which his counterpart 
entrenched in Guntur district in Madras has been described as 
enjoying in the 18U01s. In the first decades of British rule 
in Bengal most civilians travelled not only with their 
banian - an Indian trader who managed their money concerns in 
a confidential capacity - but also with their own senior (and 
sometimes junior) Indian officers.
What accounted for the extreme volume and complexity
1. Statement showing wasil or receipts and baki or balances.
2, See Prykenberg, R.E.f Guntur District 1,76ft - IftkS, A
■y m
of the Sylhet accounts was the pattern of landholding.
In 1787 Lindsay reported that the district consisted of 
137 parganas. These were rarely compact units; they 
usually comprised disjointed parcels of land sometimes great 
distances apart. Lindsay estimated that generally around 
one-quart1 er of each pargana was held (upon the "most 
moderate computation") hy ahout ten zamindars and the rest
p
of the pargana shared among a number of talukdars. He
drew up an "account settlement" for 1786 - 7 which revealed
239 taluks, "the proprietors of which execute separate
engagements to government." Lindsay noted, however, that
there were many partners to these taluks.^ In 1791 V/illes,
who surveyed and separated the shares, reported that "in
the district of Sylhet there are 7*327 villages and
24,243 talooks.. . . The Account settlement" for 1786 - 7
gave the following picture for the first five parganas on the
rent-roll, the taluks being listed presumably under the name
5of the biggest talukdar:
Parganas (Total Jama) Taluks Jama
Lakai (14730) Nee j
Muktaram
14431
299
Kusiarkul (6795) Muhammad Ali 
Iluqtaram (?) 
Masud Nagar 
Ab’ul Masud
1521
1289
1087
2898
Egarsati (6206) Ab’ul Aziz 6206
Buran (1893) Masud Nagar 
Anandaram Qanungo
1531
362
Pratabgarh (6548) Karam (?) Muhammad 
Radha Ram
5673
875
1. Lindsay-BOR, 29 Mar 1787* Proc.27 Apr 1787*BOR R70,xxvii,np
2. Ibid.
3. CM 30/5/6 folios 15-22.
4. V/illes - BOR, 24 Oct 1791* SDR iv, 288.
5. Dated 20 Jun 1786, CM 30/5/6, f.15. Figures in kahons of 
cowries, (approx. b kahons make 1 rupee).
Asked to prepare a list of zamindars and talukdars in
Sylhet, Lindsay wrote on 1 April 1787 that it "would "be a
work of much delay” as there were between two and three
a
thousand such landholders. On 10 May he revised his 
estimate, saying that there were "upwards of 8,000 individuals 
under this description and many of their titles /were/ 
disputed.” The list was never completed and when the 
names of the zamindars of other districts were entered in 
the proceedings of the Calcutta Committee of Revenue the entry 
for Sylhet ran: "The whole is in possession of a variety of 
petty zemindars and talookdars of no note."
These small landholders may he described for the 
most part as primary zamindars, that is, they v/ere "for all 
practical purposes the holders of proprietary rights over 
agricultural as well as habitational l a n d s . ( A h m a d  Reza, 
descendant of the old Laur family, was described in 1791 the 
only real zamindar in Sylhet.) Some of the talukdars 
especially, but for "being too tenacious of their consequence 
to gain a livelihood by manual labour,"^ were scarcely 
distinguishable from some of their more prosperous ryots 
or cultivators. Bearing in mind that there were many 
proprietors to a pargana, the limited financial standing of 
the Sylhet landholders &ay be deduced from the following 
table, compiled from the rent-roll of 1771 ” 2 which listed
1. Lindsay - BOR, 1 Apr. 1787, SDR ii, 107.
2. Lindsay - BOR, 10 May 1787, SDR ii, 119.
3. S. Nurul Hasan, "Zamindars Under the Mughals" in
Frykenberg, R.E. (ed) Land Control and Social Structure
in Indian History. 17-31.
1+. Lindsay - Cornwallis, nd. 1786, CM 30/5/9 i/zf.22.
•1
11+2 parganas:
Annual Jama (Rs) 
under 100
No. of Parganas
35
500 66
" 1,000
1,000 -  2,250 38
89
over 2,250
H
5,000
10,000
7
1
In addition to revenue-paying landholders there was a 
considerable number of people who held rent-free tenures 
of various kinds. Lindsay estimated in 1779 that in all 
there were almost 1,500 individuals who held ”small portions 
of land /which had been/ allotted for particular services
p
done to government.” This estimate did not include a large 
group of people who possessed lands under charity sanads.
The large number of petty proprietors misled Hunter into 
claiming that under the LIughal s there were only two classes of 
people in Sylhet - officials and peasants-^ - and that the 
Permanent Settlement was made with the actual tillers of the 
soil.^ Such an error was understandable, especially if 
Hunter deduced too much from the pattern of landowning in 
Sylhet at the time he wrote. Holdings were continually 
fragmented from the time of the Permanent Settlement onwards. 
In 187U an Indian magistrate who had served in Sylhet noted:
1. Proc. of CC at Dacca 10 Oct 1772, R70, xv, 3^ +6 - 53.
2. Lindsay - LPCR, 11+ duly 1779, SDR i, 66.
3. Hunter, V,T.YI., The Thackerays in India and Some Calcutta
Graves, -9!+,
,U* . Imperial Ca-azetter of India xxiii, .199,.
...no other country in Bengal has so much lOY/ered 
the position of Zamindars and Talookdars as this 
strange land of peasant proprietors. Even the 
commonest man... finding it hard to live "by honest 
means...does not hesitate to call himself a 
Kirasdar /or landowner/.... I have come to know that 
there are very many Mirasdars here v/ho do not pay 
more than an anna to the Collectorate in the shape 
of revenue. •
By the end. of the nineteenth century, as the ’Introduction*
to the Assam Land Revenue Manual disclosed, out of 1+9>916
estates 20,285 paid not more than one rupee annually; only
thirty-three estates paid betv/een 500 and 1,000 rupees, and
2
only twenty-six from 1,000 to 3>500 rupees.
The roots of this tenurial structure have to he
sought in the Kamrup experience of the district, which also
accounts for the close resemblance betv/een the landholding
pattern in Sylhet and that in Assam. It would seem that
in the Kamrup empire the land v/as held by the village
community or bhaiyachara, and the tenure Y/as based on a
grant from the ruler to a body of proprietors v/ho Y/ere thus
formed into a corporation called a raj. The terms of the
grant bound the proprietors in joint responsibility for the
revenues of the Y/hole estate.^ As the Muslims advanced into
Sylhet grants of land v/ere made to Muslim chiefs and settlers
who found it in their interest to limit their titles to a
portion of’.what was the raj land instead of
having the Y/hole throY/n on their hands denuded 
of cultivators, who rather than remain on their 
heriditary estates in the reduced condition of 
Ryots, Y/ould emigrate to the eastward. 5
1. De, 90 - 1.
2. The Assam Land Revenue Manual, ex.
3. Prom the Sanskrit bhaiya, brother (also metaphorically) 
and achara, fraternal establishment.
h. ■ 'Fisher-, -JASB 18U0,-808 - U3. • .....................
5. Ibid.
The lands surrendered to the grantees would consist of
portions of taluks rather than consolidated blocks of land.
This would account for holdings being territorially dispersed.
The Raj system was undermined when the Muslims took engagements
for the revenues from individual proprietors. But a new kind
of corporation developed as the heirs of each proprietor,
according to the custom of the district, retained shares in
the ancestral land. The zamindars who held coparcenary
rights in the same estate were thus usually of the same clan
or ancestral line. The talukdars were in general people who
had bought lands from the zamindars. Some of them remained
in a subordinate station to the zamindars but others
2disassociated themselves altogether. Under the British 
some talukdars discharged their revenues through zamindars in 
the mofussil and others paid at the sadr or district head­
quarters without intermediaries.
After the Kamrup period the IJughals granted lands 
to settlers and to people who undertook to perform certain 
services. The garrison troops maintained for the protection
of Sylhet received their pay in small allotments of land, as
■3
in Chittagong and Rangpur, and became in effect small 
jagirdars. The practice of making grants of land revenue-free 
on terms of military service was carried to extremes in 
Sylhet: the lands so bestowed were known as Sega or mu.jrai
lands. By the first quarter of the eighteenth century, 
substantial tracts in Sylhet were assigned to jagirdars.
1. Fisher, JASB 181+0, 808 - b3.
2. Lindsay - BOR, 29 Mar. 1787, Proc. 27 Apr. 1787, BOR R 70,
xxvii, np. Murshid Quli Khan attempted to consolidate 
estates but was not very successful in this. Sinha, N.K., 
Economic History of Bengal ii. 17.
3. Firminger, 77.K., The Fifth Report i, xxiii.
30.
The assignments of service lands from Sylhet were usually 
combined with other grants from the neighbouring districts
and were made under a number of headings, namely jagir
1 2 3amla-i-ahsam. amla-i-nawara, amir-ul-umra, and
kheda-i-afiyal.^  Forty-eight parganas in Sylhet, rated
at 1,79,166 rupees, were assigned as fau.jdaran to whoever
occupied the office of faujdar. Half of this jagir was a
grant for which in exchange the faujdar was obliged to
defend the district against the incursions of the hill tribes;
the other half was bila sharat or unconditional, that is, it
did not involve the performance of any precise duties by the
faujdar. In addition, nine parganas assessed for 25,927
rupees were granted as salianadaran  ^or annual allowances to
some petty zamindars.
The several faujdars of Sylhet created still more
landholders by favouring their followers and servants with
lands which were made khari.j jama or exempt from the payment
7
of state revenues. As v/ith other grants, these were seldom 
consolidated parcels of land. (The jagir of a local doctor
1 , A jagir for the support of officers of the irregular 
militia under the LIughals.
2. "Naval establishment of 768 armed cruizers /sic7
and boats principally stationed at Dacca, to guard the 
coots of Bengal against the incursions of the I.Ioggs 
/Maghs/ and other foreign pirates or invaders." J. Grant, 
"Analysis of the Finances of Bengal" in Fifth Report ii, 
203.
3. A Jagir assigned to the commander-in-chief of the empire
for his personal renumeration,
U. To defray the expense of catching elephants.
3. For the renumeration of faujdars.
6. From salianadar, a pensioner.
7. Lindsay - CCIi, 18 July 1782, SDN i, 115.
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was a good illustration: he received.nine hundred kulbas
of land situated in seven parganas^). Other rent-free
tenures arose as zamindars alienated portions of their land
"for trifling considerations of ready money11 to persons
upon charity sanads which were afterwards validated hy the
faujdar or his diwan. So widespread had these practices
heen that in 1779 Lindsay formed the impression that not even
an eighth of the cultivable area of the district was revenue-
paying, "the rest being either jaghire /3agir7, burmutre
/brahmottra7, muddut moasah /madad-i-mafash/ etc, lands untaxed
under different denominations by government."^ Three years
later, in response to a query from Calcutta about the extent
of rent-free lands in Sylhet, Lindsay admitted that since no
register of such lands had been kept it would be impossible
without a general survey to state with any degree of certainty
what proportion of t&e district was rent-free. lie added,
however, though with obvious exaggeration:
there is not a person, even of the most inferior
rank, in Sylhet, who is not possessed of
lackerage /lakhirad or rent-free7 land of some 
denomination or other, and the best richest </sic/ 
lands in tjie province are exempt from the 
revenues. ^
Clearly, the extent of revenue-paying lands in 
Sylhet was seriously restricted by the profusion of rent-free 
tenures; but, the revenue yield of the .taxed lands was
1. Literally, a plough. In Sylhet, an area of 1,008 by 1i|l|. 
cubits.
2. For a copy of the sanad, see SDH iii, 17^ .
3. Lindsay-PCRD, 1 Oct 1779, DFR xxi, 76.
U. Ibid.
3. Lindsay-OCR, 15 July 1782, SDR i,115.
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limited in turn "by the extensive stretches of waste,
estimated in 1780 at half the area of the taxed lands
themselves. Efforts in the 1780s to encourage land
reclamation were to meet with almost no response from the
landholders, partly owing to disputes and anticipated
difficulties ahout legal rights to waste, and to the low
man to land ratio. Those estates which were taxed depended
almost wholly upon the sale of their rice to discharge their
revenues. There were three harvest periods during the year.
In the eastern half of the district ploughing "began in
mid-January in the low damp areas and ahout a month later in
the higher lands when the earth had "been softened hy the
first showers. Sowing was completed before the end of
March. The high lands were reaped in August (aus), and
sown again with transplanted rice to he harvested together
with the lower areas in November (aman). In hhatta
country to the west, the higher lands were ploughed and sown
when the floods begin to subside and usually before the end
of November; the harvest was gathered in April (boro) and a
2
second crop was produced by November or December.
The boro crop was the most abundant produced in
Sylhet but it was '.the coarsest in quality, even more so than
3
the aus, and was generally consumed) JLoc ally. Aman had the 
greatest significance for ithe revenues; however, it was the 
crop most exposed to destruction. Either too early or too
1 . ' Waste areas were particularly noticeable in parganas
bordering on Jaintia and Cachar. Lindsay - DPCR,
1 Feb. 1780, BR Cons R50, xxiv, 12+6.
2. Fisher, JASB 181+0, 808 -1+3.
3. Lindsay - OCR, UNIT. 1783, SDR i, 172.
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much rain could create local crises; too early and too much 
rain, as in 1781+ and 1787, resulted in disaster. Unfortunately, 
total production figures are lacking and there are no 
population estimates which would give a clue to the level 
of consumption. There is no statistical information either 
which would show how much surplus cash was generated "by the 
sale of a good harvest and how helpful that was in enabling 
the zamindars to meet their revenue obligations in less 
fruitful seasons. The only recorded estimate wras Lindsay’s 
statement in November 1783, compiled from "the most 
authentic!: /sic7 information" he could obtain, that apparently 
the district had not exported for some years past more than 
thirty thousand maunds of rice annually. At that time, 
however, Lindsay was trying to secure, for himself a contract 
to purchase and ship that quantity of rice from Sylhet to 
Nadras, then in the grip of a famine. G-iven that a revenue 
demand of two lakhs of rupees could be met in some years and 
that the selling price of rice as quoted by Lindsay himself
in November 1783, a fair season, was 1 J to 1j maunds per
• ■ g ...........................    ' ' ' 'rupee, it would seem that his estimate was far below the
mark. At the other end of the scale, the difficulty
experienced in making the collections whenever the crops
v/ere even slightly affected by untimely weather would suggest
that not much of a surplus was ever produced. This was
borne out by the following observation of Willes ih July 1788:
1. Lindsay - COR, U Nov. 1783, SDR i, 172. Lindsay did not
say what his information was. CCR had asked him to four
Sylhet to discover what quantity of grain was produced but 
Lindsay declined to do so, plausibly arguing that a 
circuit of the district would cause hoarding by giving 
the impression of famine conditions.
Lindsay - OCR, 23 Dec 1783, Proc. 5 Jan 178J+, CCR R68,
xxix, np.
2. Lindsay - CCR, 1+ Nov 1783, SDR i, 172.
3b.
In this district, whenever inundation or any other 
calamity occasions a loss of the crops of /sic/ the 
ground, the Company’s revenue will, of course, suffer. 
There is no accumulated wealth to supply the temporary 
deficiency or renumerate the exertions of the 
husbandmen. /Revenue/ Balances cannot, therefore 
in truth be recorded and whatever may be brought to 
account under this head will be fictitious and will 
be only a drain from the resources of the existing 
year.
Zamindars in south Sylhet supplemented the produce
of their lands by engaging in slash and burn cultivation in
2
the wooded Tippera hills. The right, known as jum, to 
practise shifting cultivation in this area was of long­
standing, and was a point in support of the British case when 
in the early nineteenth century the demarcation of the border 
with the state of Hill Tippera developed into a controversial 
issue. Rice and a small amount of cotton were the main crops 
raised by the jum cultivators but their labour was not always 
rewarded, as sometimes the standing crops were destroyed by 
roving bands of elephants or as.was the case in 1789 “ 90
3
stolen by the people of Tippera.
In the south-west some zamindars remitted the greater 
part of their.revenue in the form of elephants caught in the . 
Tippera hills. The method of elephant-catching was described
1. Willes - BOR, 5 July 1788 SDR iii, 57.
2. Defined in 1868 as the right to occupy a given quantity 
of land, generally not exceeding one hal Xaround five 
acres), wherever the cultivator might please within a 
certain tract of waste land, and to change the same from 
year to year, or whenever the occupier chose. (The 
land was abandoned in a year or two, and another parcel 
brought under cultivation. The same land came under 
slash and burn again after eight or ten years).
Report of the Commission appointed to enquire into the State 
and Prospects of Tea Cultivation in Assam, Cachar and 
Sylhet, 19.
3. 17ilies - BOR, 29 May 1790, Proc. 30 July 1790, BOR R71, 
xxvii, np.
as follows by a British official deputed to Sylhet in 
1771:
The zemindars of two or three pergunnahs join 
in sending seven or eight hundred men to the 
hilly and woody countries, and they travel five 
or six and sometimes twelve days before they 
meet with their haunts; then, surrounding them 
they, by keeping the animals in perpetual 
apprehensions for some days together by noises 
and fires, are enabled to dig ditches and throw 
up the earth around to confine them, and by 
means of tame elephant Sj. they are afterwards 
secured and brought in.
This account was based on second-hand information. Evidence
from the later 1770!s and 1780rs makes it clear that the scale
of operations was much larger. Willes in February 1788
gave the numbers involved in elephant-catching as the
zamindars of "six or eight1’ parganas with ’’two or three
2
thousand” ryots. Some zamindars, especially along the 
Cachar border to the west, specialised in the hunting of 
single elephants, as the "largest or finest beasts" roamed
7
by themselves. All the zamindars involved in capturing 
elephants depended on their rice crop for meeting part of 
their revenues. They were in a position to argue, though, 
that the hunting of elephants had affected the cultivation 
of the lands by requiring the ryots to be otherwise employed, 
and they usually made it "an excuse for their other revenue 
falling short".^ " The size of the elephant catch, like that 
of the rice crop, fluctuated from year to year. One report 
placed the number of elephants usually caught at around forty
1. Sumner - Kelsall, 18 Feb. 1771> SDR i, 3.
2. Willes - Cornwallis, 29 Feb. 1788, SDR iii, 13.
3. Sumner - Kelsall, 18 Feb. 1771* SDR i, 6.
h. Ibid, 3.
3. Ibid.
<«•
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1
in 1777 - 8, however, the number was 112, The Mughal
practice was for the zamindars to give an undertaking to
make up in a subsequent year for any deficiency in the
revenues arising from a poor elephant catch. Under the
Kughals the elephants were sent to the Nawab, and because of
this the British at first took the view that notwithstanding
that the elephants were revenue in kind, they should be
considered as nizamat business. Some amount of confusion
prevailed for the first few years of British rule, especially
over the responsibility for the upkeep of the tame elephants
used in the capture and training of others. By 1777 an
arrangement equally satisfactory initially to both the Nawab
2and the Company was reached. The Nawab appointed a
3
darogha^ of elephants at Sylhet who, as it turned out, super­
vised the entire operation. He advanced the zamindars such 
sums as he thought necessary from the Sylhet treasury, giving 
in exchange bills on the Nawab. The zamindars were credited 
11 for a certain stipulated amount according to the size of
each elephant” they had caught, and at the end of the year
the elephants were equally divided between the Nawab and 
the Company, the former "accounting to the Sylhet Treasury 
for one half the sums paid to the zemindars and the Company 
accounting in like manner to him for one half of the charges 
he has incurred.”^ " The Company, paying half the expenses, 
took half of the elephants which were turned over to a private 
contractor .at Dacca. Thus, for 1777 “ 8, the Company's bill
1. F 0<DPCR, 3 Nov. 1778, DFR xx, np.
2. P^PCR, 2 Dec. 1777, 222 *vii, 677.
3. A manager or superintendent.
h- ■ DPCR r .Board., .18 Aug. 1778,. DPR .xx,. np...................
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was as follows:
Charges for catching and feeding elephants Rs. 3,312
Paid to the zamindars for elephants received w 7, ^-63
Total " 10,775
Out of 112 elephants captured that year, the Company 
received fifty-six which were sold to the contractor at
p
two hundred rupees each.
This arrangement placed the darogha in a very 
influential position. His specific duties were never 
carefully defined and friction v/as "bound to occur betv/een 
him and the collector. The contractor himself was not 
always happy, either ahout the price he was called upon to 
pay or ahout the goods he received. In September 1778, for 
example, he complained ahout the underhand way in which the 
elephants had heen shared and petitioned for a fresh division 
as the Nawabrs agent had managed tc.secure all the larger 
animals.
There was one other curious though accepted way 
in which the revenues were paid, not indeed hy the zamindars 
to the Company hut hy the ryots to the landholders. This 
was hy surrendering oneself or selling one*s children as 
slaves to make up for arrears of revenue. Jahangir had 
promulgated an edict forbidding Sylhettis from making eunuchs 
of themselves or their sons\ hut he did not interfere with 
debtor slavery. There is no mention of this practice in the 
district records of the late eighteenth century and only one
1. Lindsay - DPCR, 1U Nov. 1778, Proc. DPCR, 1 Dec. 1778,
DFR xx, np.
2. Pro<DPCR, 3 Nov. 1778, DPR xx, np.
3. P'^DPCR, 22 Sept. 1778, DFR xx, np. 
l±. Gait, 278.
reference to slavery in Sylhet in this period: this
followed an incident on 15 March 1790 involving a slave 
hoy of a European trader who sought refuge hy sitting himself 
down in the grounds of the collectorate and refusing to
•j
return to his master. There is no reason to suppose, 
however, that the practice was suspended in the first years 
of British rule. On the contrary, the evidence speaks of,’ 
continuity. On 12 March 1813 in a letter to the registrar 
of the nizamat adalat at Fort William, the second judge at 
Dacca observed that trafficking in children had heen long- 
practised in Sylhet, that the trade was considerable, and 
that the number of slaves in the district was about one-sixth
p
of the total population. ‘ According to the traveller, 
William PI. Hamilton, debtor-slavery or mortgaged-labour v/as 
extensive in Sylhet in times of distress.^ The Indian Law 
Commission Deport of 1 8k1 noted that self-sale to liquidate 
revenue balances was of long standing in Sylhet, and in 1862 
the number of slaves in the district was estimated at 
361,2/j-O.^  Indeed, so numerous were the slaves in Sylhet and 
Lower Assam, that the high cost, of compensation, reckoned at
1. The trader, a John Marshall from Dacca, went into a
lengthy explanation of why he thought the boy had run 
away and asked Willes to ’return’ him. The Collector’s 
reply v/as terse: ’’Sir, As Government do not allow of 
natives of Bengal and Owde /Oudh/ being forcibly detained 
as slaves, I cannot oblige your boy to return to you. I
have advised him to continue in your service, but, as he 
refuses, I cannot afford you any assistance.” Willes - 
Marshall, 16 Nov. 1790, SDR iv, 2UA.
2.. R.K. Dick - M.Ii. Turnbull, 12 Mar. 1813* quoted in
Banaji, D.R., Slavery in British India. 5k.
3. Hamilton also noted the practice in other parts of
Bengal. Quoted in Banaji, 69.
k. Quoted in Banaji, 199. The population of the district at
the 1872 census was. 1,719*539. Imperial Gazetter of India 
• - -xxi-ii, • 192.............................................
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from thirty to forty lakhs of rupees for the two districts, 
v/as one argument against abolition.
This naturally raises the question of the condition 
of the ryots in the late eighteenth century. Like their 
counterparts everywhere, they were usually silent and 
information ahout them can only he obtained from what others 
wrote. Nevertheless, two points seem well-established; 
the ryots were in this period extremely mobile and their 
margin of existence was such as generally to provoke remarks 
about poverty and indigence.
After a decade in the district, Lindsay made the 
following comment about the ease with which the ryots 
migrated:
They have no hereditary habitations or /sic7 
are attached to there /sic/ native homes as in ' 
other parts of the country. Their dwelling 
consists of a wretched hovel which together with 
their family they move at pleasure, and a 
purgannah covered with small villages today often 
appears depopulated the next.
Though Lindsay added, "The inhabitants remove without
assigning any cause, often without other reason than to
...............   x............ •. . .
evade payment of their rents" both he and other collectors
1. Banaji, 280. The Draft Abolition Act of 181+3 elicited a 
petition from 580 Hindu landholders mainly from Sylhet in
v/hich it was argued that if the Act became law, "it would
lend to the ruin of all India, especially that of the 
respectable part of the population of Sylhet. Prom time 
immemorial slaves of both sexes were engaged in the services 
of respectable men and performed drudgeries: of various 
descriptions.11 The petitioners also said that since they 
were "men of poverty" they could not employ paid servants
to do the work ordinarily done by slaves. A similar 
petition was sent by about 700 Muslim landholders of 
Sylhet. The slaves "were alienable by sale, purchase 
and gift." See Banaji, 2+01 - 3.
2. Lindsay also referred to the "whim, caprice and unsettled
disposition of the ryotts.” Lindsay - BOH, 22+ Nov, 1787, 
SDH ii, 199.
-3; -Ibid.-
Uo.
noted that the impulse to migrate usually came from 
anticipated or actual Khasi inroads, and from abnormally 
severe flooding which had destroyed not only the cultivator!1 
homes hut also their crops and cattle. There were also 
some references to zamindars having "depopulat'ed" their lands 
hy had management and oppressive practices.!: The number of
ryots involved in these shifts of residence was not recorded 
hut the direction was usually away from the northern border 
and towards the east. The distinction betv/een khud-kasht 
or settled cultivators and paikasht or non-resident ryots 
v/as not mentioned by the Sylhet collectors and perhaps was 
not a meaningful one for Sylhet in this period.
Though it was certainly possible for individual
families to migrate with the purpose of evading revenue
payments, it must have been more difficult for whole villages
to do so, as Lindsay asserted sometimes occurred. But then
he was explaining revenue balances. It would have seemed
impossible to conceal any large scale exodus from the
landholders who doubtless would have made strenuous efforts
to prevent it. The general shortage of cultivators meant
that there v/as competition for their labour and there v/as
at least one recorded instance of a zamindar luring away
•\
ryots from his neighbours. This competition and the ryots* 
tradition or reputation of mobility must have given them some 
amount of bargaining pov/er in relation to the landholders.
In Sylhet as over much of north India the so-called 
tenants-at-will Y/ere not always in a worse position than 
their settled brethren. The Dacca Provincial Council of
1 . See page3Z2-
Revenue commented on this in July 1/77> in the following
remark which applied as a whole to the Dacca division
which then included Sylhet:
...all ryots do not hold their lands upon 
hereditary tenures; and tho* they often remain 
in the same spot, son after father cultivating 
the same piece of land, this is ovfing to the 
perfect agreement between them and the talookdar, 
to whom they can scarce be considered in any 
other light than a day labourer.... The ryot 
being the immediate cultivator of the land, the 
talookdarTs interest is intimately connected 
with his, since if he is oppressed he will 
immediately desert so that the talookdar or other 
hereditary under-tenant who, holding the actual 
proprietary of the lands is most concerned in 
the cultivation of them, is under a necessity 
of permitting him to enjoy his small rights.
How does one reconcile these "small rights" with
the general state of impoverishment of the cultivators?
The answer would lie in the fact that the proprietors
making concessions to their ryots were as a whole themselves
relatively impoverished in comparison to proprietors elsewhere
in Bengal. Also, apart from the limits imposed by the
precariousness of agricultural outturn owing to unstable
weather conditions, the ryot wherever he.went would
presumably have found himself having to support much the
same sort of group of petty landowners. As Lindsay put
it in 1779 2
A great difficulty attending the collector of 
the revenue is owing to the multiplicity of 
zemindars and proprietors to each purgunnah, 
who consume the rents collected from the ryots 
in the maintainence of themselves and family 
in all its branches, who though many generations 
removed from the original stock are, according 
to the custom of the province /Dacca division/ 
all considered as joint partners and as such,
1. DPCR - Board, 21 July 1777? DFR xvii, 1 Ub - 5.
1
claim their respective proportion.
In 1787 with over seven further years’ experience in Sylhet
he attacked the obnoxious system whereby minor landholders
who considered themselves of too great consequence to
condescend to participate in the actual cultivation of the
lands played the role of parasites and left the ryot just
2a sufficient pittance to maintain a v/retched existence.
The ryot would hardly be tempted to move into Y/aste areas 
on his own. In the first place, the outlay required to 
bring waste lands under cultivation usually would be beyond 
his means. But more significantly, uncultivated land was 
not necessarily not owned. The trouble, as a matter of 
fact, was that there were too many claimants. There was 
every likelihood that as soon as the cultivator began his 
labours, or rather Y/hen he was on the point of reaping their 
fruits, he would be confronted with a zamindar, accompanied 
by his retainers, claiming the land as his own and able to 
produce sanads to support his contention. The unfortunate 
cultivator might strike a bargain with his unwelcome caller 
but soon wrould be visited by another zamindar, also claiming 
to be the owner of the land and also able to produce title- 
deeds. Hot unnaturally, the landholding pattern in waste 
and in settled areas too bred a certain disincentive to 
industry, not only among the coparceners themselves but also 
among the actual tillers of the soil. For all these reasons, 
as well as because economic opportunities outside of 
agriculture were virtually non-existent, the Sylhet cultivators
1. Lindsay - DPCR, 1 Oct. 1779* DFR xxi, 76.
2. Lindsay - BOR, 29 Mar. 1767, Proc. 27 Apr.1787, BOR R70,
. . ,xxvii,.np...........................................
were pegged to a relatively lor; margin of existence.
During the wet season some ryots from the western
half of the district were employed as "boatmen and were
engaged in transporting grain from eastern Sylhet to Dacca.
Apart from rice and paddy, the only items of trade in-which
there was any kind of general participation were sukti or
dry fish and gazzies a coarse cotton cloth perhaps so called
from being a gaz in width. Under the Mughals the more
lucrative articles of commerce had been monopolised by the
faujdar. Chunam was a case in point; so too was timber,
which, thanks to the system of rivers, could be easily floated
down to lower Bengal and which, during the Nawabi period,
2was used in building the nawara or navy. The first British
collectors, perhaps patterning themselves on the faujdars,
cornered the more profitable branches of commerce. Some
amount of trade was carried on with the hill tribes but that
concerned the district or rather Sylhet town only as an
entrepSt and was mainly in the hands of a dozen or so
Armenians, plus two English brothers - William and Henry
Raitt - and a few Frenchmen.
The European merchants generally found means to
avoid the payment of duties on goods - wax, ivory and 
3
muga dhotis for example - bought from the hill tribes and
1. Lindsay - Hastings, 2b Sept. 178J+, SDR i, 195.
2. J. Beames "Notes on Akbar’s Subahs, with References to
the Ain-i-AkbariM JRAS 1896, 83 - 136.
3. Cloth spun from the silk of the muga worm (antheroea
Assamoea). It is brownish-yellow in colour and 
assumes a fine gloss after being washed. See Allen, B.C. 
Monograph on the Silk Cloths of Assam, 1Lu
from Cachari merchants. This evasion of taxes together with 
the small volume of trade within the district itself meant 
that the sair revenue, composed of levies at toll-stations 
and rents on stalls or shops in bazaars, was an insignificant 
item in the total assessment of the district. In May 1790 
Y/illes reported there were no less than six hundred ganjs and 
bazaars in Sylhet, "many of which do no yield above ten cowries 
per mensen and this received in kind." Hot much attention 
was paid to these ganjs; the larger bazaars such as those at 
Bhanga and Ajmiriganj, the former on the upper and the latter 
on the lower reaches of the Surma, were usually held in farm.
Ho doubt there was a great deal of truth in v/illes1 assertion 
that "it was impossible for any collector, however active and 
well-versed in the Bengal language, to enter into the minutae
p
of bazar /sic/ accounts." But the result of neglect was 
abuse of power even in Sylhet town itself. Here, the 
darogha of bazaar duties, by seeing that the tax on betel leaf 
was rigidly enforced and "that the clothes of every person 
were searched, and a fine exacted if only two leaves were
3
found upon them" became the sole purveyor of that commodity.
It was upon the administration of a district which 
was ’excentric1, half-mastered, not very productive, subject in 
more than usual degree to natural and man-made disasters that
1. ¥illes - BOR, 8 May 1790, SDR iii, 235.
2. Y/illes - BOR, 2k Oct. 1791, SDR iv, 288.
3« Ibid. Because of the relative insignificance of the
sair revenue - and the lack of information about it - 
this study will hereafter deal only with land revenue.
the East India Company entered in 1765. The change of 
political masters could not affect its frontier isolation, 
nor, very noticeably, the very individual quality of its 
society and economy. Indeed, it could almost be argued that 
Sylhet affected its administrators more strongly than they 
it: the first British resident in Sylhet was prudently
provided with an escort for the safety of his person, the
A
second escaped an assassin’s dagger and the last in our
period suffered the indignity of being forcibly parted from
the public seals of his office. Individual character, or
foibles, developed markedly in solitary Sylhet. And to the
young British official moving slowly up from Dacca by boat
across western Sylhet, more desolate than ever in the rains,
his posting must have seemed almost exile. About the
seventh day out from Dacca, with Sylhet town still thirty
miles away, the Khasi hills to the north with their waterfalls
would come into view, appearing at first "as a dark cloud
at a great distance, interspersed with perpendicular streaks 
2of white," and his spirits would rise. The character of 
the scenery changed, "vast sheets of cultivation, extending 
for miles along the banks of the Surma and other streams, 
intersected by splendid groves of trees and bamboos, forming 
shelter for extensive villages, and occasionally by low ranges 
of hills, and backed always by mountains either near or distant, 
form an endless succession of gratifying scenes on which the 
eye rests with pleasure". Whether that lifting of the
1. Lindsay - BOR, 11+ May 1767, SDR ii, 123.
2. Oriental Miscellanies, 27.
3. Fisher, JASB 181+0, 808 - 1+3.
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heart would survive the first view of his headquarters 
town as it rose ahove the muddy river hanks - 1 an 
inconsiderable bazaar...the houses of the inhabitants being 
fantastically built and scattered upon the numerous hills 
and rising grounds, so buried in wood as. to be scarcely 
discernible” - was another matter.
1 . Oriental Miscellanies, 27.
CHAPTER II
EARLY EXPERIMENTS 1765 - 1772
Sovereignty, like slavery, is a concept incapable
of compromise; there can he no half measures. , Though in 
the years immediately following the acquisition in
A
August 1765 of the diwani of Bengal .the East India Company , 
continued to wear the garb of a merchant corporation, that 
served only to drape the increasingly visible form of 
regal authority. But the Company were fully attentive to 
the effect which too dear a demonstration of governmental 
power might have on the activities of their European rivals 
in India; they also needed to maintain "the farce of the 
Country government so as to resist the British government’s 
claims to the territorial revenues of Bengal and the demand 
of the rival merchant groups within the City of London for a
o
free trade to India and the ending of the Company’s monopoly.” 
Hence, they endeavoured at first to exploit the diwani
grant through the established form of government and.........
through the agency of Muhammad Reza Khan, acting as naib
1. For the terms of the firman, dated 12 Aug. 1765? from 
Emperor Shah Alam to the Company granting the diwani, 
see Eanerjee, D.1T., Early Land Revenue System in Bengal 
and Bihar, 1 - 7.
2. Khan, A.M., The Transition in Bengal, 212.. They also 
wanted to conceal from Indian powers the magnitude of 
the change, and lacked sufficient experienced servants 
to assume direct responsibility. Mahmood, A.B.M.U., 
The Land Revenue History of the Ra.jshahi Zamindari,
1765 - 1793 (Unpublished London Ph.D. Thesis). 56.
For the slightly different question of the British 
government’s reluctance openly to declare its authority 
over Bengal - for political as wrell as practical 
reasons - see Marshall, P.J., Problems of Empire: 
Britain and India. 1757 ~~ 1813? 22 - ij..
hQ.
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diwan. A Resident accountable to the Select Committee 
was appointed to Murshidabad as a watchdog over Reza Khan’s 
administration. But progressively, through developments 
in revenue administration, the substance behind the cloth 
became clearer.
This gradual unveiling of where true power resided 
may be traced in Sylhet district, where in the period of 
tentative probing prior to 1772 three different systems of 
revenue management were tried in turn. Until his recall in 
1771 the faujdar of Sylhet was immediately answerable for 
collecting and remitting the revenues. Thereafter, immediate 
responsibility for the collections passed to the supervisor 
of Dacca and a new bandobast was settled when the Company 
through John Sumner, assistant to the Dacca supervisor, 
interfered in the actual mechanics of settlement work in 
Sylhet for the first time. Finally, in June 1771 the 
district was farmed by a senior servant of the Company on 
a one-year lease beginning from September of that year. The 
Company had assumed charge of the revenue administration in 
all but name.
In 1765 the faujdar of Sylhet was Syed Muhammad Ali
Khan, an elder brother of Muhammad Reza Khan by a different
mother. Previously he had served at Chittagong during
Reza Kharisfau3dari from 1760 - 1. The exact date of his
appointment to Sylhet is doubtful but it certainly occurred
during the years 1763 - 5 when his half-brother held the
naibat of Dacca from which the administration of Sylhet was 
2
controlled. The faujdar was assisted in revenue matters
1. Though never formally installed as such. See Khan, 103*
2. ' Khan, 1 Qh n.
"by Muktaram, a native Sylhetti holding the post of diwan.
Though discharging the functions of a revenue collector,
Muhammad Ali cannot he considered in the light of an
ordinary amil. Such amils, as Richard Becher from his
vantage point as resident at the Durbar at Murshidabad perceived,
were mere instruments, not members of the old Mughal governing
class. Often they had no connection or interest in the
districts to which they were appointed; they relied on the
punctual discharge of the revenue instalments as the best
means of ensuring their continued employment, and to this
end as well as to line their own pockets, they used their
2uncontrolled power while in office to rack the lands.
Muhammad Ali, however, was a member of an old service family,
and the faujdari of Sylhet v/hich he enjoyed was a highly
coveted appointment usually bestowed on a close relative of
■3
the nawab of Bengal. In fact, the faujdar of Sylhet was 
known locally as a nawab.^ Muhammad Ali himself impressed 
Becher as "a man of character and credit”. Despite the 
resident's serious reservations about amils as a class, 
dependence upon which he considered "destructive...for .the 
poor inhabitants”, he warmly commended Muhammad Ali to the
1. These amils_, said Philip Francis, v;ere "people of lower 
rank.../who/ executed a contract for a stipulated sum 
for the district to which they were appointed, and /who7 
in effect may be considered as farmers of the revenue.” 
‘Francis' Plan, 22 Jan 1776, Pari.Coll. 16A, 918.
2. Becher - President, Select Committee, 2h May 1769»
Pari.Coll. 16A, 932.
3. V/illes - Board, 29 Feb. 1788, SDR iii, 13.
1+. Gait, E.A., History of Assam, 277. (Coveted because
of the grant to the holder of exclusive trade privileges 
in beetlenut, chunam, saltpetre and wax).
1
supervisor of Dacca and left him much to his own designs 
in Sylhet.
Muhammad Ali’s rank, his good connections, the
favour he enjoyed at Murshidabad, together with his relative
isolation, saved Sylhet from "that period of delirium,” as
Francis labelled the first years of the diwani, "during which
it was asserted hy some and believed by many, that the
2
resources of Bengal were inexhaustible....” The need "to
answer the pressing demands from home, and to defray the
large expenses" in India, might lead the Select Committee to
squeeze what revenue they could from Bengal. But if they
looked for aid to Sylhet, they were soon disillusioned by
the poverty of the district. In 1768 the Court of Directors,
noticing that the Sylhet revenues were paid in cowrries, asked
for an explanation.^- The answer they received wras to condemn
Sylhet to the back of the stage for the next couple of years.
As the Board wrote:
The reason assignTd by Mahomed Desa Cawn for 
collecting the revenues of Sylhet in cowries, 
is that this district being a boundery /sic/ 
of the kingdom, and contiguous to the hills and 
an enemies /sic/ country is only inhabited by 
the poorer sort of people who without effects or 
property cultivate their grounds which produce 
grain merely for their subs Istance /sic/ and for 
procuring the necessaries of life, this grain they 
sell for cowries, and consequently are oblig’d to 
pay their rents in them.
ITothing of considerable value is produc’d in this 
country, nor do any merchants or people of property 
reside there, or maintain any commerce with the
Becher - Kelsall, 31 May 1770, LCB, 98.
Francis* Plan, 22 Jan. 1776, Pari.Coll. 16A, 913.
Becher - President, Select Committee, 2b May 1769  ^
Pari.Coll. 16A, 932.
CCD - Select Committee, 11 ITov. 1768, Despatches to 
Bengal B/U/619., .229..
1 . 
2 . 
3 .
U.
inhabitants so as to cause a circulation either of 
gold or silver....1
The remittance from Sylhet in fact never exceeded tr/o per
cent of the collections of Eengal as a whole.
The a sal or original jama made by Kaja Todar l,lal
in 1562 assessed the public revenues of the district at
1,67,000 rupees. Hoy; much weight should be attached to this
valuation as an accurate picture of the district’s revenue
paying capacity, is, however, not at all clear, since Sylhet
was still under Afghan domination. It is true that the sarkar
was described as comprising a few parganas only, which might
suggest that the Kughals had already gained a foothold on the
west bank of the Surma river; yet even so the area would have
been too recently conquered for a complete settlement to have
been formulated. In the a sal tumar jama'3 fixed in 1772
during the reign of LIurshid Quli Khan the total demand from
Sylhet, then consisting of 11+8 parganas, stood at 3,26,072
rupees; the net revenue payable to government, however,
amounted to only 1,27,618 rupees^, revealing that substantial
tracts in the district were assigned to jagirdars. In the
period of abwabs or general increases from Shuja Khan’s
rule (1727 - 39) onwards the most significant item of increase
for Sylhet v/as the faujdari abwab, levied by the faujdars
but brought to the public account by Shuja Khan: this abwab
amounted to almost a quarter of the total jama of 1+,85,611+
rupees. But in all not more than 1,23,000 rupees reached
1. Letter to COD, 30 Sept. 1769, quoted in Fort William -
India House Correspondence v, Sinha, N.K.(ed), 600.
2. Grant’s "Analysis" in Fifth Report ii, 178.
3. Original rent-roll as subsequently modified.
U. Grant ’s "Analysis" in Fifth 'He•port' ii,' 232 - ’3.
1
the imperial treasury in any one year.
n
Yshile the demand (though not the net collections) 
from the rest of Bengal went on increasing the jama of Sylhet 
was apparently reduced from 1,17,075 rupees in 1767 - 8 and 
1768 - 9 to 1,10,289 rupees in 1769 ~ 70.^ It is not 
known who ordered the reduction hut even the lower jama, 
hased on the private papers of Hari Krishen, faujdar of 
Sylhet during ITawah Kasim AliTs reign (1760 - 3 ), was thought 
to he an overrated assessment. Hari Krishen had made an 
"exaggerated statement to the Nabob with a view to emulate a 
rival in his masterfs favour” and to secure the Sylhet 
appointment.^ His personal papers were found to contain 
”a list of sundry extortions made from different people”; 
these levies 7/ere later made "established demands of revenue”, 
though the people so taxed were "not to he found". It is 
not surprising therefore that the public revenues were neve.r 
totally realized. Reza Khan was said to he acq.uai.nted v/ith 
the situation, and according to a statement made by Muktaram 
in January 1771 an annual remission of 16,500 rupees had been 
granted for the previous seven years.^
1 . Principal Heads of the History and Statistics of the 
Dacca Division. 292.
2. There are no clear figures giving the amount of the Sylhet 
collections in the early period. The net collections from 
Bengal fell from £2,550,09*4- (1766 - 7) to 2,1*51,255 (1767
- 8) to 2,*4-0 2,191 (1768 - 9) to 2,118,29*4- (1769 - 70/ and 
still further to 2,009,988 (1770 - 1) hut then recovered
to 2,380,165 (1771 - 2) Banerjee, Early Land Revenue
System, appendix A, 199.
3. General Abstract, Add.Mss.29086, f.52.
*4-. Sumner - Kelsall, 22 Jan. 1771 and 25 Feb. 1771. SDR i, 3
and 8.
5. Harris - KCR, nd. Oct.1771, MFR iv, 18*4-1.
6. Sumner - Kelsall, 22 Jan. 1771, SDR i, 2.
In so far as the Sylhet collections always fell
short of the assessment the district was in step with the
rest of Bengal. As Becher remarked on 2b May 1769> the
handohast settled for Bengal as a whole exceeded the
collections hy many lakhs of rupees every year and only
a small proportion of the arrears was ever recovered since
11 in reality the settlement.. ./was/ merely chimerical. "
Becher suggested that the jama for Bengal should he fixed
at the amount of the actual receipts of any one year
2
suosequent to the diwani. He was supported in his plea
for a reduction of the demand hy Keza Khan. At the punya,
in April 1769, demand was reduced hy something over two lakhs
Such moves in the direction of moderation were undone,
however, hy the demands of the Court of Directors, mulcted
of some £600,000 a year hy Parliament and pressed hy their
shareholders, for greater returns. The cry was taken up
hy many of the Company’s servants in Bengal who, seeking
freedom and opportunity for themselves, argued that
increased revenues could only he secured under British
supervision. As Francis put it in 1776,
'the resources of the country heing thought 
at that time much greater than they have since 
proved, and a strong prejudice operating 
against Mahomed Reza Cawn and his officers, 
who were suspected of concealing the true value 
of the lands, and perhaps might he guilty of 
some embezzlement, a general opinion prevailed 
that a greater revenue might he collected hy 7 
employing Company*s servants in the detail..., J
President Verelst, lacking the hacking of the 
Directors, had to give way to the majority on liis Council
1. Becher - President, Select Committee, 2b May 1769* 
Pari.Coll. 16A, 932.
1
and to a^ree to appoint Company supervisors in the districts.
In this Reza Khan could only acquiesce. Not wishing to 
yield entirely, he could only fight a rearguard action. At 
first he offered to make Bhagalpur district available for the 
experiment with supervisors, hoping to save Bengal "by 
surrendering the only Bihar district still directly administer­
ed from Nurshidabad." Then he presented "the dryness of 
the season" as grounds for postponing the innovation, and 
indeed it was the increasing seriousness of famine towards 
the end of 1769 together with the .adverse effect it was
having on the collections which were mainly responsible for
2the delay in the implementation of the scheme. There were 
other reasons too, such as "the administrative problem of 
demarcating the territorial jurisdiction of the super- 
visorships" and the question of "the status of the different 
supervisors vis-a-vis the Resident at Kurshidabad" in which 
the supervisor of Dacca especially was to be involved.^
But the die was already cast and the delaying tactics of 
the Khan could not, nor indeed were they intended to reverse 
a decision that had already been taken.
Verelst himself was not happy about the 
innovation; he "sponsored the scheme under pressure" and 
sought to restrict the scope of the supervisors’ activity 
to a programme of research, the terms of which he himself 
drafted.^" The supervisors v/ere commissioned to prepare 
a history from the days of Shuja Khan onwards of the important
1. For a detailed analysis of the debate, see Khan,
Chapters 7, 8 and 9.
2. Khan, 229 - 30.
3. ■ • Ibid. .................................................
U. Ibid., 200.
families in the districts for which they vere responsible, 
to report on the conditions and prospects of the lands, and 
to inform themselves about the amount of revenue that was 
paid, the method of collection, and the pattern of commerce 
and the administration of justice. Reza Khan could depend 
ultimately only on Verelst’s assurance that the supervisors 
would be concerned only with research. It was soon to 
become apparent, however, that those "who sought to extend 
the power and opportunities of the English in Bengal," in 
particular, the junior members of the service who regarded ■ 
the holding of governmental authority as the most effective 
way of monopolising trade, "were not content with so limited
A
a position."
Llore fuel was added to the v/hole controversy over
the powers with which the supervisors should be vested, when
in I'arch 1770 the first four of them were actually posted
2to their stations. Por the moment Becher reminded them 
that it was not the intention of the President and Council 
to alter the present form of government, but soon after, by 
the end of the month that is, he was changing his tune. 
Writing to the Select Committee, he professed he saw no 
necessity either of retaining the amils, a "severe scourge" 
to the people, or of settling the revenue demand annually 
at I.Iurshidabad since the supervisors could make arrangements 
locally. He visualized that an officer of the Mughal 
government might be necessary "nominally to conduct affairs," 
but thought that "the English gentlemen should.. .be /the/
1 . Khan, 231.
2. Har wood in Rajmahal and Bhagalpur, Rider in Nadia,
- - - -Rous -in Ra-jshahi -and- Stuart - in - Birbhum and. Biahnupur.,
1
spring of every action.11 On this point, the supervisors
themselves were at one with Becher and therein lay the
seeds of conflict Between the supervisors and their banians
011 the one hand, and the old I.Iughal order on the other.
Indeed, when in April the rest of the supervisors were sent
out to their respective districts, they soon began to clash
with I.'ughal officialdom or "those instruments of government
2
whom it vras their duty to support and maintain.”
The case of Dacca and Sylhet was one of especial 
significance since these districts had been so closely linked 
with the rise and prestige of T.Iuhammad Reza Khan and his 
family. YJhen Verelst had reluctantly agreed in August 1769 
to the appointment of supervisors, he had made them subject 
to the control of Becher, the resident at llurshidabad and 
a defender of Clive*s dual system. This proved the occasion, 
however, for a protest from Thomas Kelsall, chief of the 
Dacca factory since Kay 1767 and now supervisor-designate of 
Dacca and.Sylhet. . Kelsall was a prickly, difficult man, 
one of four I.Iadras civil servants brought up to Bengal in 
1765 to replace those civilians whom Clive thought to be 
either corrupt or incompetent. (As Clive had explained to 
the Court of Directors on 28 November 1765? "luxury, extra­
vagance and corruption together v/ith an independent way of 
thinking and acting have arisen to such a heigth /sic/ in
1. Quoted in Khan, 23U.
2. Although officially they were not yet intended to 
assume any active power. Khan, 237.
this settlement that the most vigorous measures are
-j
absolutely necessary.”) These Madras men were held hy 
Clive to he "a strong reinforcement of those necessary
2virtues which are wanting” in the Bengal establishment.
They Y/ere seen in Calcutta, however, most notably by the 
junior civilians, as intruders and usurpers who had taken 
the bread of promotion from their mouths. So strong was 
this antagonism that some Bengal civilians, "entering into 
associations unbecoming at their years and destructive of 
that subordination without which no government can stand”, 
even undertook to treat "the gentlemen called down...from 
Madras. . .with neglect and contempt.”'5 Under these circum­
stances Kelsall v/as particularly touchy and sensitive about 
his status as at once chief and supervisor at Dacca and a 
member of the Bengal Council. Go, when Verelst made all 
supervisors subordinate to Becher, Kelsall v/rote to Calcutta, 
flattering himself, as he put it, that the Select Committee 
would drav/ a distinction between him and the other super­
visors, and that he, as a member of the Council, "should act 
not otherwise than immediately subordinate to.. ./the/ Board," 
But- self-flattery proved a disillusioning occuijation. By 
1769 some of the Bengal civilians tie had superceded had 
arrived on the Board, and Kelsall found his pretensions 
sadly deflated. The orders transmitted to him in September 
1769 were, quite at odds with his own idea of his status and
1. Quoted in Srinivasachari, C.S.(ed.), Port Willjam - India 
House Correspondence iv, 362.
2. Clive - COD, 1 Feb. 1766, Port William - India House 
Correspondence iv, 392. (The Madras men were Kelsall
himself. William Alaersey, Charles Ployer and Claud
Bus sell).
5. Select Committee - COD, 31 Jan. 1766, Port William -
' India House' Correspondence 'ivy 388.' ' The 'Select......
Committee added: it ’^becomes a fair struggle v/hether we 
or the young gentlemen shall in future guide the helm 
of government.” Ibid.
58.
dignity.
Had the supervisors at once taken up their work 
the matter might have ended there. But the delays sought 
hy Reza Khan gave time to the Select Committee for reflection.
On 10 December 1769 they reversed the earlier position, 
declaring that Kelsall should not he subordinate 'to Becher at 
Murshidabad. This, as Majed Khan has argued, was "a covert 
attack on the influence of Reza Khan, exercised through 
Becher.” Becher clearly realised this and he protested 
that the CommitteeTs decision would overthrow the structure of 
the Dacca naibat which was linked with Reza Khan’s name. To 
this, in turn, Kelsall replied in a letter of 1 Llarch 1770 to 
Cartier and the Select Committee, pressing for a definition 
of his exact position. In the event the Committee when they 
handled the request on 29 Llarch supported Becher, directing 
Kelsall normally to act in accord with his advice. But the 
meeting of 29 March was made the occasion, by Charles Ployer, 
one of Kelsall’s former Madras colleagues, for an attack 
upon Reza Khan, the Mughal system, and any dependence of 
Kelsall or any other English supervisor upon Mughal officialdom. 
It was doubtless encouraged by this dissension within the 
Committee that Kelsall wrote again on 15 May, stressing that 
he could not see the force of the reasons which had moved them 
to place him under the resident. He thought 11 it an hardship... 
that any the least distinction should be made between servants 
of the same standing11, and he argued that it would be more
1 . Khan, 231.
2. Ibid.
3. Kelsall - Select Committee, 1 Mar. 1770, LCB, 58.
appropriate to his rank that he should treat "with Rajah 
Llah-Sing /Mahasingh of Dacca/ in the same manner in which 
the chief of Patna acted with Rajah Shitab-roy /Shitab Rai/”. 
He went on to signify that, mortifying though his position 
was, he would nevertheless act "with not less alacrity in
A
the discharge of the important trust committed” to him. Eut
these proved only pious words: Kelsall never got over his
resentment in spite of rejoining the board in Calcutta in
February 1771 and on 15 Hovember 1771 he sought permission to
2
retire from the service.
Prom the wider view-point, KelsallTs protest about
being made dependent upon Murshidabad, as developed by Ployer,
was the more significant, but Kelsall also opened an attack
upon the traditional structure of the Dacca naibat by asking
that Sylhet should be made a separate charge. Under Verelst1
■5
scheme Sylhet had not rated a local resident of its own, and 
the naibat structure had been retained. Kelsall argued, 
however, that the burden of work thus imposed upon him v/as 
too great and his responsibilities too vast to permit their 
efficient handling. Like all the supervisors he was faced 
initially with the problem of working virtually in the
1. Kelsall - Select Committee, 15 May 1770, LCB 59»
2. Firminger mistakenly states that Kelsall had ”a position
superior to the other supravisors, and in fact had a 
supravisor under his orders for Sylhet. Fifth Report i,
clxxxii.
5. Incidentally, this means that information concerning the 
first years of British rule in Sylhet is extremely scanty
There was no local official to submit the kind of
detailed accounts wThich were forthcoming from other 
districts.
1
dark. It is true that he enjoyed the advantage of some
past a-cq.uaintance, as chief at Dacca since 1767? with the
trade and geography of the district. But this was an
extremely limited advantage for what was now required was
expertise in revenue matters in which he had not "been involved
at all (unless covertly, through his "banian). And in other
respects he was at a comparative disadvantage. United, the
two districts of Dacca and Sylhet formed an exceptionally
unwieldly area - the dak or post from Dacca to Sylhet town
took six to eight days one-way, and "became even slower and
2
more irregular in the rains, Moreover the two areas - the 
one half-subdued frontier, the other distinctly more metro­
politan - differed vastly from place to place in their 
administrative arrangements. It could well have "been v/ith 
this dual charge in mind that the Board later wrote to the 
Directors in 1772 that "The lands subject to the same collectors 
...were some held by farm, some superintended by shicdars 
/shiqdars./ or agents on the part of the collector, and some 
left to the zemindars or talookdars themselves, under various 
degrees of controul." Certainly Kelsall*s dual charge 
exhibited every possible variety of revenue practice. Moreover
1 . Cf. "For most of the English officers sent out to the
districts to manage the. collection of the revenues, it was 
a journey into the unknown- in more than one sense."
Guha, E., A “Rule of Property for Bengal, 13.
2. Cf. "In this district /Sylhet/ there is no defined
measurement of distances. Dacca is said to be five 
munzil /manzil, a stage/ from hence, and the cossid 
/kasid, a courier/ employed in conveying letters are 
generally twelve days' absent, but, from the beginning 
of April or May, according to the season, there is no 
communication with Dacca but /by/" water, which as it is 
much affected by the -weather is very uncertain indeed." 
Y/illes - BOR, 29 Oct. 1788, SDR.iii, 80.
Board.-. COD, .3. Eov.. 1.772, Pari. Coll. 7.? .301.,
in Dacca, and to a greater degree still in Sylhet, land- 
holding was subdivided to an enormous extent, so that to 
variety was added a most burdensome quantity of revenue 
accounts for the supervisor to examine and settle. Since he 
continued to be charged with heavy commercial responsibilities 
as chief of the Dacca factory, Kelsall could scarcely be 
blamed for protesting, on 9 June 1770, that he failed to see 
how "the great and laudable ends... expected from the new 
system” of supervisorships could be attained unless he was 
given relief by ”a local residence /in Sylhet/ of some gentle- 
men.” The additional expense, he argued, would be "absolutely 
compensated for by the advantages that would result to the
p
country and to our employers." However, his protestations 
were ignored and the merger of Dacca and Sylhet was allowed 
to continue.
An example of the sort of saving which Kelsall had 
in mind occurred in 1770. lie was present at the Sylhet 
punya for 1769 - 70 but other than calling the parties 
involved before him in an attempt to assure himself that the 
settlements were fairly made, he did not meddle in the proceed­
ings.^ (lie had little information, in fact, on which he could 
have based any interference). As usual the public revenues
of .that year fell short of the assessed demand. But all 
Kelsall could do was to follow the customary proceedure of 
obtaining a parwana from Reza Khan to "stimulate” the faujdar 
to recover tine arrears. The failure of the collections for 
1769 - 70 was not due, as might be assumed, to the great
1. Kelsall - Becher, 9 June 1770, SDR i, 1.
2. Ibid.
3. Kelsall - Sumner, 21 Dec. 1770, CTR ii, 138.
1famine which had most of the province in its grip. On
the contrary in the first nine months of the Sylhet year
1769 - 70 conditions were ideal for the full realization of
the revenues of the district. For while Bengal as a whole
was severely distressed and some areas, such as parts of Hugli
district, were almost totally devastated, Sylhet and other
eastern border districts such as Chittagong were hardly
affected. According to Reza Khan, Sylhet and Dacca together
with Dinajpur, Rangpur and Silbaris suffered least of all
the districts and exported grain very profitably to the more 
2stricken areas. But the boom period for Sylhet ended 
abruptly with the breaking of the monsoon in June 1770 when 
flood waters began to rise suddenly and ominously in the 
district. In the following months the aus harvest was lost 
and the young- aman crop partially destroyed.
The natural calamity which had befallen Sylhet was 
not something which Kelsall could fail to see, even down in 
Dacca. YThat he did not knowr, and could scarcely have dis­
covered at that distance, was that the faujdar and his diY/an 
had managed to collect in all more than the whole government 
jama, and had then proceeded to use the floods and protest­
ations that the rent-roll was overrated as explanation for 
the considerable deficit in payments to the treasury. It
1. The famine seemed to have had no immediate effect on
the Bengal collections. Reporting in 1772,that the
net collections of 1771 .surpassed that of 1768 the Board 
commented that the influence of the famine on the 
revenues was as yet unnoticed. Board - COD, 3 Nov. 1772, 
Pari. Coll. 7*300. (Later figures, however, reveal the 
net collections of 1771 ~ 2 to be marginally less than 
that of 1768 - 9. See page 9 2n).
2. Proc. KCR, 13 Jan. 1772, KFR vi, kb.
3 .. . Sumner - Kelsall, .22 Jan. 1771,. SDR i,, 3.- - Parts of . . .
Rajshahi were also affected by flood. Becher - 
ilar wood, 2b July 1770, BOB 1+8-9.
was precisely this kind of thing that the supervisors were 
supposed to detect and prevent. The public revenues 
could have been totally discharged but this would have meant 
the faujdar surrendering a share of his kifayat or perquisites 
Strictly speaking, the faujdar was not guilty of embezzlement 
for collections on his kifayat, though drawn from the same 
resources and therefore made on occasions at the expense of 
the public revenues, were separate from the receipts on the 
government1s jama. But Muhammad Ali and the diwan had 
never reported how much they collected on their own account, 
and if they conspired to conceal the value of the lands, 
kelsall in Dacca was certainly in no position to do anything 
about it.
meanwhile in Calcutta important developments were 
under way. The Court of Directors had judged that the 
encouraging results which had been obtained in the jagiri 
districts of Bengal, as distinct from the diwani areas, were 
primarily attributable to direct British administration and 
had ordered the replacement of the Resident at I.Iurshidabad 
and his counterpart for Bihar at Patna by Committees of 
Revenue. The Directors had also instructed that as many 
junior covenanted servants as were required should "be sent 
into the several districts to correct abuses and maintain the 
intended reformation." The Directors were highly critical 
of the native establishment, "that immense number of idle 
sycophants who for their own emolument and that of their 
principals are placed between the tenants and the public
1 . There were in fact other reasons such as the migration 
of peasants from the adjoining div/ani lands which 
explained the results. See Khan, 22+8•
61+,
treasury, ■ and of v/hich every one must get his share of 
plunder, the whole mass of which must amount to an enormous 
sum." Such sentiments naturally gladdened the hearts of 
the members of the Council in Calcutta, and of the supervisors, 
their assistants and their banians and gomasthas: they saw
themselves gradually succeeding to that position from which
2
"the older agencies of.. administration were to be ousted."
The Calcutta Council on 3 July 1770 voted on the 
implementation of the Directors1 orders and on 27 September
1770 the Committee of Revenue at LIurshidabad met for the
3
first time. Before the new body wras a letter from the 
Calcutta Council to the effect that the supervisors were to 
be invested with controlling powers,^" Reza Khan was 
informed of this development on 1 October 1770 at the second 
meeting of the LIurshidabad Committee, and he was instructed 
to send out parwanas informing the amils and zamindars of 
the decision reached at Calcutta. Also on 1 October, the 
Committee relayed orders from Calcutta to \the supervisors to 
prepare reports on their districts. The subjects on which 
information was sought Avere for the most part within Verelst’s 
original terms of reference except for one significant new 
item which reflected how opinion on the usefulness of I.Iughal 
officialdom was moving: the supervisors were asked to judge
1. COD’s letter, 30 June 1769> quoted in Khan, 21+8.
2. Khan, 21+8.
3. The members were Becher as President, John Reed, James
Lawrell and John Graham.
1+. The Council had replaced the Select Committee as the 
preeminent organ of government. Khan 231.
3. LICR - Supervisors, 1 Oct 1770, LIFR i, 28 - 9.
how many of the amils and other officers "among whom
immense sums have been divided, may be spared."
The mole affair was carried a stage further
when on 29 October the LIurshidabad Committee considered a
letter from Robert V/ilmo t, supervisor of Jessore, in which
it was alleged that the amil there had been misappropriating 
2
funds. The Committee considered this "fresh and convincing 
proof of the defective conduct, and unprofitable services of
Government aumils" and on being informed by Reza Khan that in
case of a deficiency in the revenues, amils had neither the 
intention nor the ability to make themselves answerable, 
concluded that both the Company and the country would be 
better served by dispensing with the amils.^
The Committee informed the Calcutta Council of 
their views on the amils and on 10 December 1770 received 
a reply from the President and Council in the Secret Department 
empowering them to recall the amils from the various districts 
and to "discontinue any future appointment of them" except 
at Dacca, Hughli and other places where, there were European 
factories, "as we would have the appearance of the country 
government preserved whereever /sic/ it may have any 
connections with the other European powers."^ Reza Khan, 
sensible of the confusion which would result from uniting 
"natives and Europeans in the management of the collection" 
and of the adverse way in which the whole issue of continuing
1. I,ICR - Supervisors, 1 Oct. 1770, l.IFR i, 28 - 9.
2. Khan, 255.
3. Ibid.
h. . President and .Council in Secret Dept. . LICE,. 3. Dec. 17.70?. 
LIFE i, U80 - 1.
Clive's dual system had been resolved, prepared the necessary
parwanas to recall his officers. The parwanas v;ere sent out
on 13 December 1770 together with letters to the supervisors,
informing them that an. additional degree of confidence had
now been reposed in them.
heza Khan's recall of his officer from Sylhet
marked the emergence of that district as an administrative
unit really distinct from Dacca, and made the ultimate appoin
ment of a separate collector inevitable, Kelsall was told
by the Committee that nov; 1 our chief dependence for the
revenue of Sylhet is on you, and you will of course take
every measure for realizing it to the greatest advantage.”
But Kelsall was convinced that that was an impossible charge.
lie realised that the information called for in October could
2not be obtained but by a long residence on the spot, and 
felt that the recall of the faujdar vculd make the residence 
of a Company servant at Sylhet, which he had already urged, 
even more necessary. He therefore deputed.his assistant, 
John .Sumner,^  to Sylhet as an acting supervisor but 
uncertain how far that would meet with approval he confined 
Sumner's commission to a "few general heads." All the same 
he hoped that the Committee would confirm Sumner's appoint­
ment.^ However, the Committee, while sanctioning Sumner's 
deputation, refused to confirm him as supervisor of Sylhet:
1. LICK - Kelsall, 13 Dec. 1770, HKH i, 526.
2. Kelsall - LICK, 17 Jan. 1771, MFK. ii, 135.
3. Arrived in India as a writer, 26 Aug. 176U; first
appointed an asst, to the Sec. in the Secret Dept. In
1766 he was made an asst, at the Dacca factory and later
an asst, to the supervisor of Dacca. Afterwards he 
served as Collector of Birbhum and Panchet, and on the
• ■ 'Board of Trade -in Calcutta.- ■ Bengal Civilians, ■ 0/6/28-, - 
1625.
67.
that would mean "branching out the supervisorship,11 they
remarked, and an- alteration of KelsallTs own original
appointment. Paced with this logic Kelsall replied on
13 February 177*1 that while he was aware that it was not for
him to subdivide the supervisorship that had been committed
to his care, he had felt obliged to make a distinction between
Dacca and Sylhet. The frontier district v;as too distant for
his immediate inspection, he insisted, and that was why he
recommended that Sumner should be confirmed, in the office of 
2supervisor. The Committee did not budge and it was not until
October 1772 that Sylhet was made a separate collectorship
independent of Dacca.
On his deputation Sumner received the following
instructions from lie Is all:
You are in the first place to obtain an account 
of the collections for the last year /1769 - 707, 
that is to say, a hundibast or settlement for the 
year, a statement of the collections and balances 
outstanding, on the last day of Bhadun /August - 
September/, and finally, an account of the charges 
collections for the year.
You are in like manner to procure a compleat /sic/ 
bundibust for the present year /1-770 - 1/; showing 
in what manner the different purgunnahs or lesser 
districts have been farmed out; and these several 
accounts you will be pleased to transmit as soon 
as they can be collected.
Further; you will be pleased to furnish me a 
sebundy /sibandjj7 account or list of all officers 
and servants of every denomination, their different 
functions and salaries, or other allowances; and 
as the like abuses probably have crept into the 
charges of this as in most other provinces I desire 
you will after a convenient time give your opinion 
how far the number maintained may be requisite and 
whether you think they will admit of any reduction. 
This account I would have accompanied with a
1. MCK - Kelsall; k Feb. 1771, ii, 1U2.
2. Kelsall - LICK, 13 Feb. 1771, KFR ii, .276,
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particular account of all other charges attending 
the collections.^
These instructions revealed how little the Company knew of 
Sylhet and of the local administrative machinery which 
controlled it, and also how much they distrusted the inform­
ation which they did have. They marked at the same time 
the point at which the district "began to come under the 
general pressure for an increased revenue yield. The Court 
of Directors in their despatch of 11 November 1768 had noted 
with satisfaction the "good effects" obtained by retrenchments 
in the Dacca charges and had remarked that: "The reduction
of unnecessary charges is of all the most eligible mode of
pincreasing the revenues...." That was the formula Sumner 
was about to apply to Sylhet and it was already clear that 
he would be doing so at the expense of the LIughal officers.
As was evident from Kelsall’s instructions regarding the 
settlement of 1770 - 1 there was as yet no thought of enlarg­
ing the revenue yield from Sylhet by increasing the rate of 
taxation or by imposing additional demands on the bandobast. 
Though Kelsall had received no news' of the settlement, he 
believed that Sumner would almost certainly find on his 
arrival in the district that the punya had already been 
completed. If that was not the case, Sumner was to be 
guided by his superior’s proceedure the year before and 
was not to interfere unduly in the settlement.^"
1. Kelsall - Sumner, 21 Dec. 1770, KFK ii, 137 - 8.
2. COD - Select Committee, 11 NcW 1768, Despatches to 
Bengal E/A/619> 237. (The reduction in the Dacca charges 
had been the work of Francis Sykes, then resident at 
Llurshidabad).
3. Kelsall - Sumner, 21 Dec. 1770, 1IFK ii, 138.
A. Ibid.
Sumner arrived in Sylhet tov/n on 11 January 1771 
to discover that the punya had been held the previous 
October; hut only "the ceremony of it was carried through." 
The diwan had been ill and unable"to settle the rents 
throughout the Chuckla /Chakla/", and was now "busy in 
completing the Bundibust." Exercising his limited super­
visory duties, Sumner
recommended to him points of general encouragement 
to all ranks of people engaged either in the rents 
or collections, to stimulate the zemindar in his 
cultivation with assurances he shall reap his 
lawful advantage, to clear in its source any 
obstructed channel of the revenue, and to instigate 
every collector to be mindful of his duty both to 
Government and to the landholders.
In short, reported Sumner, he urged the diwan "to use all
caution against any future pretence to unlawful exaction
2
and every check to embezzlements of the established revenue."
In less than a month, though, Sumner’s restricted brief was
to be enlarged and it then fell to him to carry through his
own recommendations.
Sumner had some initial difficulty in procuring
the relevant papers for his researches and found it necessary
"to refer to five different cutcherries /kacharis or offices/
for the Bundibust of some purgunna, as there is /sic/ so
many cutcheries established here for the collections of this
3
small province." But in the end he did not collect enough 
information to induce James Harris, who succeeded Kelsall.
1. Sumner - Kelsall, 22 Jan. 1771, M S  3.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid., 2.
at Dacca on 28 February 1771 to write to the Murshidabad
Committee, "the clear view that will shortly he laid before
you will sufficiently evince this gentleman1s merit and
-}
recommend him to your future notice.” (Sumner evidently
had acquired by this time some Persian; it is not known
whether he was accompanied to Sylhet by his banian or any
other servant who could have helped him through the relevant
papers). Sumner also impressed Samuel Lliddleton, a senior
member of the Llurshidahad Committee, as having obtained "a
2thorough knowledge" of Sylhet. But neither Harris nor 
Hiddleton had any personal experience of the frontier 
district and it is to be wondered how much of the information 
acquired by Sumner, a relatively inexperienced (in revenue 
matters) officer on his first assignment in the mofussil, 
was thrust upon him by the pargana patwaris and samindars . 
who were only too anxious to frustrate any real enquiry into 
the state and potential of the lands and who were not averse 
to consenting to pay an extra sum if that would forestall an
3
investigation. As for the diwan, he certainly convinced 
Sumner that the district could pay no more even though his 
ability or need to indulge in the concealment of assets was 
severely curtailed half-way through the investigation by
1. Harris - MCE, 2U June 1771, iii, 1125.
2. Lliddleton - MCR, 18 May 1771* iii, 972.
3. See Oscar Lewis1 present-day attempts at an analysis of 
patwari accounts and his remark that government officials 
were dependent on the patwaris themselves for an explan­
ation of these accounts. Lewis, 0., Village Life in 
Northern India, 329. (Cf. "In everything except purely 
military operations the Englishmen in the districts had 
to depend on the native amils - on their local contacts, 
their familiarity with the language, their expertise in 
matters concerning the land revenue and agricultural
• - - practice.- - These* however, -were -a-precious- knowledge- - - 
which the amils were not keen to share with others." G-uha,
m).
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orders for his recall.
Sumner had begun cautiously: the Committee had
ordered that initially the supervisors should proceed with
circumspection so that the collections might not he affected,
hut that after mid-February, when the "period of heavy
collections would he over", they could he more enthusiastic
in their researches. As it turned out Sumner did not have
to wait guite that long. On 7 February 1771 he received
from Dacca Heza Khan’s parwana of recall, addressed to the
naih faujdar in the faujdar’s absence, with instructions for
Sumner to take upon himself the "whole charge of the revenues
2
as collector" under Kelsall. On 10- February he delivered
the parwana to the naih faujdar, and the document was read in
the presence of the officers employed in the revenue branch.
On the face of it that simple act was an important turning-
point in the revenue administration of the district. Sumner
was pleased to note that the Mughal officers immediately
acknowledged Kelsallfs authority, and as he reported to him,
"without hesitation.,.submitted to the full controlling
■3
powers vested in you." The several buildings in Sylhet 
town which housed the Company’s cowries, as well as the 
stores of arms and ammunition were quietly turned over to 
Sumner.^ But such simple resignation was perhaps carefully 
studied: the Mughal officers of Sylhet more than anyone else,
1. MCR - Kelsall, 21 Jan. 1771, KFK
2. Sumner - Kelsall, 18 Feb. 1771, SDR i, U. (in 
acknowledging this letter from Dacc.a Sumner recorded
his surprise at the v/ords "as collector". Kelsall was
being over-optimistic about the changes of his
recommendation of Sumner as collector of Sylhet bearing
fruit.)
• Ibid.,5.
u. Ibid.
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were aware that in the remote frontier district Clive’s
dual system could not he dismantled overnight.
Sumner then returned to his researches with what
seemed like added sest. At first he had heen prepared to
consider the annual remission of 16,500 rupees granted on
the handohast for the previous seven years as a dead balance.
The diwan had informed him that sometimes a portion of the
remission was collected; indeed for 1769 “ 70 about
2,000 rupees had been raised, but the diwan expected no 
1
more. However, with unimpeded access to the district
records now, Sumner was soon reporting that the ’’cutcherry
papers differ from their first accounts" and that
The deductions required by Hahomed Ally... appeared 
at first reasonable, but on a closer inspection 
I find that tho’ this sum of... /I 6,500 rupee§7 
has chiefly failed, there are two branches of 
collections made in the province unknown at . 
I.Ioorshedabad which more than make up for the 
sums that fall short.2
The collections Sumner referred to were made, firstly, under
the head of kifayat-i-faujdari, a part of which had been
brought to the credit of government by Kasim Ali Khan, and
secondly, on a private impost of the faujdar. Arrangements
like these whereby sums were being collected of which the
government was totally unaware were, as Becher suspected, in
1. Sumner -.Kelsall, 22 Jan. 1771 > SDK i, 3.
2. Sumner - Kelsall, 25 Feb. 1771? Proc. MCK, 6 Apr. 1772,
I.TFR vi, np.
A
force all over Bengal, and were in fact a natural part 
of the system the British had inherited. Host of the 
payments to officials in Iiughal India were not made from 
the central or provincial treasury hut were collected direct 
hy the official at the source - the hag of the samindar, the 
allowance of headman and patwari, the Qagir receipts of 
the mansahdar. In return officials were expected to provide 
their own staff, offices and office equipment, and local 
military forces if appropriate. Custom dictated what these 
officials should receive hy way of salary, and it was easy 
for a powerful official under weak central control to hend 
custom upward, in which case it was the government that was 
the loser. The revenue-payers themselves conspired with 
officials in this process, for as Sumner explained: "It
is known that a zemindar will rather consent to pay...sums.., 
on a private account than have them hr ought on the Ilustahood 
or Pent-Roll of his country.” The zamindar's attitude 
was hased presumably on his expectation that for any haq 
or perquisite incorporated into the rent-roll, another 
would soon he invented. In Sylhet neither of the two sums 
mentioned hy Sumner was ever collected in full, hut ”so large 
a perquisite” arose from them that the diwan ’'agreed to make 
up the whole balance due” for 1769 -* 70.^
1. See Becher's remark quoted in Banerjee, Early Land Revenue 
System, 18. Cf. ’’Europeans assumed that all officials 
accounted for less than they collected and that the 
illegal alienation of land, that is the exemption of land 
from paying revenue, nominally for charitable purposes hut 
actually for the official's profit, v/as very widely 
practised,” -P. J. Liar shall, "Indian Officials Under the 
East India Company in Eighteenth-Century Bengal",
BP & P Jan - June 1965, 95 - 120.
2. Sumner - Kelsall, 25 Feb. 1771, SDK i, 8.
3. Ibid.
The amount (not specified) hy which the first 
faujdari haq fell short was "near as much as the whole of 
the latter”, lea-ring Sumner to conclude that perhaps the 
district yielded as much revenue as was possible and suggest­
ing to him a ”scheme” which he offered ”upon the strictest 
enquiry into the state of the Pergunnahs.” This was to 
incorporate the entire kifayat-i-faujdari into the govern­
ment’s jama and to abolish altogether impositions on the 
faujdar’s private account. He could not recommend, he said, 
a plan mere necessary for the good of the district or a
”more eligible or cheaper purchase” of the good-will of the 
2inhabitants. He was convinced that both sums could not be 
collected and that it was impossible to add them both to the 
bandobast ”without totally dispfiting the raiyats and 
zemindars, who never paid more..,than private and public 
demands have, of late obliged them. Abolish the faujdar’s
private collections, he argued, and ”it will have the effect 
to annihilate the very name, and in time, ...the idea of 
private collections on the poor raiyats”, and give the 
zauindars ”even no pretence to exactions” from their ryots 
on that account. Sumner’s proposal had the advantage of 
being ”totally consistent with the plan of collection adopted 
by the Board” which was to. remove as far as possible all
1. Sumner - Kelsall, 25 Keb. 177*1* SDH i, 8.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
mrtliauts or arbitrary exactions, and it was approved by his 
superiors.
Sumner remained in Sylhet until April 177*1 to
supervise the collections on his bandobast. The final
returns were only marginally different from those of the
previous year when the faujdar was responsible for the 
2revenues, but for Sumner’s achievement to be judged fairly 
the difficult conditions under which he worked, as well as . 
the revenue short-fall in 1770 - 1 all over Bengal must be 
taken into account. Then the bandobast was ultimately 
adjusted about half the Sylhet year had already elapsed, 
and if other districts could point to the continuing effects 
of famine Sylhet could point to the partial destruction by 
flood of- the important November harvest.
The famine and flood problems of 1769 - 70 every­
where sucked British officials more quickly into interference 
in district affairs than might otherwise have been the case. 
They were required in their first year to report on the issue 
of granting remissions, to control grain movements, to prevent 
(or participate in) profiteering. Bitkin six months Sumner 
had passed from overseeing a Mughal bandobast to very direct 
interference.
Towards the end of 1770, the naib faujdar, fearing 
famine in Sylhet and justifiably alarmed at the large purchase!
1 . Cf. "The present destructive scheme of adding demand on
demand under the name of matute, has been a material cause
of the present distress’d state of the country and I wish 
the word could be abolished and never heard of more." 
Becher - Verelst, 21; May 1163, quoted in .Banerjee,
Early Land hevenue System. 31 - 2. The emphasis was 
more on arbitrariness than on the exactions, for if they 
represented a response to rising prices and to an 
extension of cultivation, they were in general acceptable.
2. The balance of 1770 - 1 was 64,350 kahons or about
As. 16,090 as compared with the customary remission of
As. 16,500.
of grain which were "being made in the district hy the 
gomasthas of Europeans had protested vehemently and had
•i
accused the gomasthas of oppressive conduct. He had told
Kelsall that the export of grain from Sylhet should he
prevented or there would he T!a considerable failure in the 
2
revenues." Kelsall, so far from the scene, was unable to 
assess the truth of this representation; hut at the same 
time he was aware that the price of labour was cheaper in 
Sylhet than in other districts, and that "if the necessaries 
of life.../were/ not in proportion the inhabitants must suffer 
h a r d s h i p . H e  therefore ordered Sumner in December to 
investigate the naib faujdarfs allegations and to apply in 
concert with that official "such remedies" as the exigencies 
required. The measures that Sumner might tahe were not 
specified but Kelsall warned him to proceed with caution, 
since though restriction of exports might relieve Sylhet, 
scarcity was almost general.*4- It is difficult to imagine 
what hind of action Sumner could have taken other than a 
partial or general embargo on the export of grain; but 
it was only on 17 January 1771 that Kelsall sought authority 
from the Board to prohibit the export of grain from Sylhet 
if it should appear necessary from his assistant’s findings. 
The delay in making this request suggests that Kelsall 
foresaw no difficulty in obtaining the authority he sought, 
but he was to be disappointed. Eor his part, Sumner was
1. Sinfra, K.K., Economic History of Bengal, i, 59.
2. KelsallKCE, 17 Jan. 1771, KEK ii, 136.
3. Ibid.
fr. Kelsall - Sumner, 21 Dec. 1770, HER ii, 1fr2.
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completely won over by the force of the naih faujdar’s
arguments, and hy observing that on his arrival in Sylhet
rice was "four times as dear as it was twro years ago,”
Like other supervisors, Sumner quickly came to argue for
his district and to defend its interests. On 22 January
he addressed Kelsall as follows:
The management of the rice crop is ever- the first 
object of every one who has an interest in a 
province: for on it depends primarily a great
moiety of every country’s revenue and secondarily 
of every rupee the Zemindar gives. It is that 
by ’which most of the raiyats pay their rent; and 
on it the entire food of every native more
immediately depends than in any country in the
world. The head of a country is obliged to 
watch over this, then, as his jingle hope, in 
policy as well as in humanity.^
As the head of the country, Sumner said, the diwan and the
naib faujdar had already expressed their apprehensions.J
Sumner then recounted the damage caused by the flood and
added:
...it has often wreighed with Government to send 
their Ferwannahs /parwana s/ in support of the 
Phousdars /faujdars/ here against exporters.
The reason is this - the country is almost half 
Surrounded by hilly countries inhabited by a
........ hostile people; there-is only one river /which/
communicates with the rest of Bengal...so that 
imports are not to be hoped for in this distant': 
and separated corner of the kingdom.; in consequence 
the raiyats would desert their habitation on an 
appearance of scarcity. -*■
Before Kelsall could submit Sumner’s assessment 
of the situation he received a letter from the Kurshidabad
Committee in -which they confessed themselves unable to
appreciate the diwan’s point of view: they c ould not envi sage
1. Sumner - Kelsall, 22 Jan. 1771, SDK i, 3.
2. Ibid.
5. Ibid.-
U. Ibid, h.
how the revenues could he possibly affected hy grain
exports. No doubt they believed that-the purchase of
grain from Sylhet would facilitate the realisation .of the
district's revenues, hut it is possible also that powerful
personal and commercial interests were involved. Thus, the
Committee ordered Kelsall to "suffer a free purchase and 
2
sale of" grain. It is not known what effect this order 
had on the situation nor, indeed, on the validity of the 
fears expressed hy the diwan and the acting faujdar. The 
absence of any report of severe hardship or of migration by 
the ryots in subsequent months, suggests either than any 
scarcity was minor and local, or that a good boro crop 
restored the food situation to something approaching 
normality.
There were other difficulties in making the 
collections of 1770 - 1, notably, the prevailing state of 
disorder and lawlessness. To some extent, scarcity was. a 
contributing factor to the situation. At the beginning; of 
1771 Kelsall found himself confronted with a roving band 
of about fifteen hundred fakirs and sanyassis in the northern 
part of Dacca district and on the borders with Kajshahi,
He applied for two companies of sepoys from Murshidabad, 
requesting one urgently, to supplement the two companies 
normally stationed at Dacca, so that he could deal with the 
raiders and "secure the collections". The Company replied 
that they could not spare the troops and advised Kelsall to
1. LICK - Kelsall, k Feb. 1771, MKR ii, 11+2.
2. Tbid.
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employ to the "best advantage the force which was attached 
-1
to the factory. Kelsall v/as reluctant, though, to engage
the marauders with a force that was insufficient to the task,
and he was understandably peeved when '
upon Captain Kennel1s /sic/ representation of 
the ravages they /the fakirs/ were committing 
in that part of the country where he was survey­
ing, you /the Committee/ have assembled from 
different quarters some Companies to act under 
thepOrders of that Gentleman independently of 
me.
Furthermore, it appeared to Kelsall Extraordinary that he was 
not informed of the detachment being supplied to Kennell 
especially since the troops v/culd probably operate chiefly 
within the districts under his jurisdiction. He could not 
but regard that as an ill compliment, and since he thought 
himself entitled to a greater share of the Committee1s
3
confidence, he could not avoid remonstrating on the occasion. 
The Committee were unmoved by Kelsallfs disquiet, and 
calmly though somewhat unconvincingly explained that they 
had cause to believe that the fakirs, when attacked, would 
have retreated into either Dinajpur or Hangpur, and that if 
they had contrary to expectations entered the Dacca districts 
instead, Kennell would doubtless have advised Kelsall of 
that development and of the orders he had been given. They 
also pointed out that the force assembled for Kennell was 
sent to Rajshahi, "which was bare of troops and in a manner 
defenceless" and there did not appear the same urgency to
1. LICK - Kelsall, 11 Feb. 1771, M E  ii, 235.
2. Kelsall - LICK, 21 Feb. 1771, M E  3^ 4-.
3. Ibid.
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despatch an additional company to Dacca where there were
A
troops already stationed.
Rennell was apparently successful in disbanding 
or at least compelling the raiders to move on, and Harris 
was able to report in March 1771 that all his districts were
p
"free from any depredations of the synassis at present."
Soon after, however, he was complaining about the activities
of dacoits and echoing Kelsall*s request for more troops.
"The dacoits have become so numerous and hardy in these
and other adjacent districts," he v/rote, "that we cannot
■5
trust a sum of money to an aurung,^  without an escort, nor 
do Europeans pas.s unmolested."^ He noted that the dacoits 
seemed to have an efficient spy network so that open measures 
against them could not hope to be successful. On 23 July 
1771 Harris repeated his request for troops, "or the Dacca 
province will be wholly plundered." \7hen it seemed unlikely 
that this request wrould be met, he suggested that he be 
allowed to raise a company of able-bodied men to serve under 
the officer then commanding the troops attached to the 
factory.^ This proposal, too, did not meet with favour in 
Murshidabad: the Committee informed Harris that they did not
have the authority to sanction an increase in his military 
establishment "or t change therein by his...forming an 
additional company of regulars." Like his predecessor, he
1. MCI - Kelsall, 28 Feb. 1771, ii, 3b5 - 6.
2. Harris - I,ICR, 8 Mar. 1771, MFR ii, bl9.
3. Aurang, a place where any afticle of trade 
and collected for wholesale or export.
is manufactured
k. Harris - MCE, 2b June 1771, MMR iii, 1123 •- u.
5.- - Harris - KGRj 23 July 1-771', 'HFR- iii,-1-355;
6. Harris - MCE, 5 Aug. 1771, HER iii, 1359.
Y/as advised to make the best use of the* forces at his 
1
disposal. The problem of disorder in the Dacca districts 
Y/as incapable of any easy solution and in Sylhet especially, . 
successive collectors had for many years to contend not only 
with dacoits but also with rebellious zamindars and trouble­
some frontier tribes.
Any contingency such as a dacoit raid naturally 
affected the receipts from the zamindars and ryots and 
also increased the charges of administration. Y/hich in Sylhet 
ran very high, approaching fifty per cent of the gross
•collections. The high level of expenditure is clearly seen
2
in the follcv/ing revenue account for 1770 ~ 1:
Gross Demand (rs) Charges (rs)
land 1,23,621 thanas etc. 33,133
zanindari ghats, office and
sair, etc. 51 »l|-2l[. collector 3U, 535
total 1,75,0li-5 total 87,523
deduct charges 87,523
net revenue 87,522
The principal part of the expenses was incurred in the defence 
of the northern frontier which was almost a hundred miles 
long. The Committee remained unhappy about this even 
though Harris informed them that a retrenchment in expenses 
was not possible in the existing conditions. He was 
certain that if any cuts were made in defence expenditure 
and part of the frontier force was withdrawn or disbanded in 
consequence, the ryots in the northern areas of the district
1. I.'ICH - Harris, 12 Aug. 1771, MFh iii, 1361.
2. Holland t DPCH, 1 Nov. 1775, DHl x, i.j.82.
82.
would desert the lands and the zamindars 11 would have a
plea for falling short of their rents.11 Even though the
frontier trihes might not make an incursion into the district,
yet the zamindars could present the constant threat of an
attack as an excuse for defaulting on the revenue. In any
case, as Harris submitted, the expense of keeping the frontier
force of 1,532 men was really very moderate; many of the
men ulio were peasants with a liability to serve when required^
were maintained at"the low rate of one sicca rupee and a
2
half, and one rupee four annas per month."
Though in the civil expenses, some savings arose 
from the recall of the faujdar and from "a strict scrutiny 
into the disbursements" of other officers, these were but 
little more than sufficient to pay for an additional 
writer, "an increased allowance of' 75 sicca rupees per 
month to the dewan and a few other inconsiderable charges."
Further savings were not possible, said Harris, 
because of the "prolixity in cowrie accounts."^- Cowries, 
as the Dutch traveller Stavorinus observed in 1770, were the 
medium of exchange of the mass of the people in Bengal.
Small money changers or potadars were to be found in all 
markets; in the more important ones, such as Chandpara hat 
in Llurshidabad district there were often one or more cowrie
1. Harris - l.ICH, nd. Oct. 1771, iv> 1&+0. (Harris
was making use of information which Sumner had supplied).
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid. 18U0 - 1.
U. Ibid.
shops permanently established. hrhen the market opened 
the potadars sold cowries for silver at the rate of about 
5,760 cowries to the rupee, and v;hen the market closed they 
bought back the cowries from the vendors and retailers at 
about 5>920 cowries to the rupee, thus making a profit of 
160 cowries on each rupee. But while cowries migM.be
ideal for small, ordinary transactions, it was a different 
matter when the entire revenues of a district were paid in 
that medium, as was the case in Sylhet. The cowries had 
to be counted, stored and guarded; handling them was a 
difficulty in itself because of the sheer bulk, that went 
to make up one rupee. For transporting them to Dacca, a 
fleet of boats had to be procurred, and there were numerous 
complaints from the supervisors about the scarcity of boats, 
and from the LTurshidabad Committee about the excessive charges 
for "boat hire”. Then, too, since it was impossible to 
conceal a shipment of cowries, armed escorts had to be pro­
vided, further increasing the charges on the collections. And 
as a final irritation, the cowries were collected at four 
ICahons to the rupee, a rate fixed according to custom in 
Sylhet, but. they could be converted into specie only at the 
rate of exchange then current in Dacca: since the dumping
of the Sylhet revenues on the Dacca market had the effect of 
lowering the price of cowries beyond the customary rate, in 
the process of conversion the Company incurred a varying but 
substantial loss.
1. llohsin, K., A Study of Hurshidabad District. 1765 - 1795
(Unpub1ished London Ph.D. Thesis) 190*
2. Hamilton, V/., Description of Hindostan i, 2+0 — 1.
3. On 20 L'ay 1773* eg. it was reported that the current rate
' ' of' exchange in'Dacca was 'W k'ahons' 8 pun 'to 1 'rupee.
Thackeray - Eoard, 20 Hay 1773> DFR vn, 53. (16 puns
make 1 kahon). The Company also lost seme cowries owing 
to chipoing and splitting: this loss was written off as 
"unavoidable wastage."
8U.
Speculation as to where the cowries originated 
hut ;.icre importantly how they came to he the only medium of 
exchange in a district ao distant from the sea was the subject 
of a lively exchange between Warren Hastings and Robert 
Iindsay, the Company’s resident in Sylhet from 1777 to 1787.
The Governor General thought that the cowries were imported 
into Sylhet from beyond the Khasi and Jaintia Hills for they 
differed in appearance from the shells in circulation in 
lower Bengal. Lindsay assured him that he was well acquainted 
with the goods brought to Sylhet from Assam and cowries were 
not among the^. he himself was inclined to believe that 
they came from the Maldives, especially after he had compared 
while on a visit to Calcutta a handful of cowries taken at 
random from the Sylhet treasury with some he found on board 
a ship which had recently returned from the Maldives and found 
no more difference between the two sets of shells that what 
was caused by age and constant friction. Like Reza Khan, 
lie believed that it was the poverty of the country and of the 
inhabitants in general which accounted for cowries being the 
sole currency in the district. As he explained, there was 
little apart from chunam to attract specie into the district: 
each ryot carried his produce to market by water and the 
buyers at the bazaars found it more convenient to deal in 
cowries than specie, ’’since the cargo of these poor people 
does not amount to more than two or three cawns /kahons/. ”
1. Lindsay - Hastings, 2h, Sept. 17Sd, SDR i, 195.
2. Ib id.
r> >—op.
The "multiplicity of landholders in all the subordinate
gradations" was also to blame, for some of the landholders
were assessed for such small amounts that they cculd pay
A
their instalments only in cov/ries. The collections 
perforce branched out in a number of kacharis and there was 
no way of cutting down expenses until the system could be
2"reduced to the compactness of one collecting cutcherry."
Hence, Sumner, who had been asked in December 1770 
to look into government expenditure in Sylhet was unable to 
make any significant retrenchment except in relation to the 
charges for elephant-catching. These charges were customarily 
part of the expenditure of the diwani but in 1770 the Court 
of Directors ruled that the Company should be put to no 
further expense for the capture and feeding of elephants.
Then kelsall was informed of this he sought directions about 
what was to be done with those elephants which were sent down 
to Dacca annually from Sylhet and Tippera and which formed 
"a part of the revenue" of these districts. At the same 
time he expressed concern about the adverse effects on 
conditions within Sylhet which could proceed from the new 
regulation. As an example of what he feared, he gave the 
case of the pargana of Bhowal where in 1763 some elephants 
kept in stockades by the I.Iughal government had since then 
multiplied and "depopulated" the whole pargana, causing the
1. Lindsay - Hastings, 22+ Sept. 1761+, SDR i, 195.
2. Harris - I,ICR, nd. Oct. 1771 > T.IPH iv, 181+1. (The revenues
of the district were paid in cowries until 1813).
3. Eelsall - ECR, 20 Dec. 1770, IH?R ii,. 11.
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area to revert to jungle. Kelsall!s graphic presentation
of the fate of Bhowal drew the following reply from the
LIurshidabad Committee:
as it appears that the revenue may he affected 
hy entirely discontinuing to catch these animals, 
and also that they may hy multiplying overrun 
and lay waste the province of Sylhet, we must 
desire you will furnish us with an account of the 
expenses incurred from the time of catching them 
until their delivery at Dacca and we shall 
endeavou^to settle it to he defrayed hy the 
ITizamaut.
But Sumner apparently worked on the assumption that the 
charges were still the liability of the Company and with cone 
deductions he continued them on the CompanyTs account."' The 
savings Sumner made amount^ ?'o 28,UU5 kahons or ah out 7? H O  
rupees and were added to the bandobast under the head of 
ciadat or surplus.
In Tarch 1771 with the Bengal year 1177 drawing 
to a close, the LIurshidabad Committee turned their attention 
to making arrangements for the new year and considered the 
usefulness of a tour of the districts. Reza Khan, when 
asked for his opinion, submitted that because of the recent 
famine the time was not right for such a circuit: if the
Committee went into the mofussil, he said, the ryots would 
desert their cultivation in order to present their distress
1. Kelsall - LICK, 20 Dec. 1770, IKK ii, 11 - 2.
2. LICK - Kelsall, 3 Jan. 1771, TKK ii, 12 - 3.
3. Apart from fil-khana (elephant stables) expenses there 
was some expenditure "for the destruction of straggling 
elephants, that wander into the plains,' and destroy 
the cultivated lands." Harris - LICK, nd. Oct. 1771,
87.
1
to the neuters. The Committee were not sufficiently
impressed by Reza Khan’s reservations to postpone their
tour, and they decided-that their Chief, Samuel Lliddleton,
should proceed as early as possible to Dacca where "an
investigation of the revenues, an equivalent settlement, and
many necessary arrangements" were thought to he urgently 
2wanted.
Lleanwhile in Calcutta a controlling Committee of 
lie venue was being set up, in accordance with the orders of 
the Court of Directors, for the regulation, inspection and
”7
control of all affairs, respecting the revenues.D The
establishment of this new committee swept aside the untidy 
arrangement whereby the revenue administration of the diwani 
districts was entrusted to the Select Committee and that of 
the pre-diwani areas to the Council. The friction betwreen 
the Select Committee and the Council was one of the factors 
which had "made the emergence of a unified policy almost 
impossible."^ The new committee were determined to keep a 
tight rein on affairs. One of their first resolutions was 
that a full and clear account. of .the. revenue.department as.it 
stood should appear on their proceedings in order that the 
members might have before them a clear and comprehensive view 
of that branch of business. This resulted in yet another
1. Proc. I/ICR, 11 Liar. 1771, KRR ii, U46.
2. Ibid.
3. Proc. 1 Apr. 1771? CGR R67? liii, 159. The members 
were Cartier as President, the four Lladras men - Aldersey 
FIoyer, Kelsall and Russell - and John Reed. The 
Committee first met on 1 Apr. 1771 arid continued to 
function until 10 Oct. 1772. See Banerjee, Early
Land Revenue System, 126-8.
U. Guha, 15.
request for information from the supervisors of the state 
of the country so that the Committee might "judge of its 
ability or inability to bear the weight of an enhanced 
revenue and.../be enabled/ to issue the necessary orders for
-i
the better government of this important department." The
Committee then ruled that monthly statements should be sent
to them "as early as possible in the ensuing month" shov/ing
the revenue instalment due from each district with the
2
corresponding receipts and charges. Also, while they
asked the subordinate committee at LIurshidabad for their ideas
on the settlement for 1771 - 2 they specifically forbade
them to conclude any arrangements or permit any of the super-
visors to make settlements in their districts.
Both the committees at Calcutta and LIurshidabad
were agreed that the best interests of the Company would be
served by farming the lands, though the former wished to
reserve to.themselves the option of deciding upon any final
settlement. To this end they made it plain that they
expected the supervisors to submit estimates for their
approbation before any settlement took place. This intended
approach astonished the LIurshidabad Committee who saw that
such a plan would serve to delay unduly the conclusion of
arrangements. Moreover, if the estimate expected was, as
seemed to be the case, the sadr bandobast or the settlement
made for come districts at LIurshidabad between the zamindars 
\
and government, then the very proceedure they had sought to 
abolish would be continued and their aims defeated. The
*. Proc. 1 Apr. 1771, CCP P67, liii, 159.
2. Ibid., 160.
Ibid., 160-1.
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LIurshidabad Committee fs objectives were plainly expressed
in the following address to their superiors at Calcutta:
In short, gentlemen, it has "been our v/ish to 
see the settlement effected as early and as 
advantageously as possible, and our plan was 
simply this -to adopt the farming system in 
its fullest extent, to explode the defective 
practice of settling the revenues with the 
zemindars at the City /LIurshidabad/, upon 
conjectural estimates so liable to error and 
deception, and to establish a real settlement in 
each district upon the produce of the lands, that 
is to say, the most they would rent for.1
If the Calcutta Committee approved of their plan
and therefore of ,Ta settlement of the lands being first
effected as the basis whereon to form the settlement with the
zemindars” (or farmers), then the officers on the spot had
to be invested with "the authority to settle the lands to
the best advantage and report the engagements they make."^
The obstacles to a policy of centralisation were already
beginning to emerge. As the LIurshidabad Committee plainly
stated:
the nature of the service absolutely requires 
that an authority be delegated arid a confidence 
be reposed in /the men on the spot/. . . , for as
......  the season of cultivation is short and precious,
unless the farmers are put in possession of the 
lands so as to reap the full benefit of it, they 
will infallibly recede from their first offers, 
or diminish their, in proportion to the delay 
occasioned_,by the reference for our approbation 
and yours.-5
The Calcutta Committee were still showing themselves
reluc tant ?even as late as mid-Hay that any settlement should
be concluded before they had had a chance to examine the 
terms, even for Satsyka district, under the supervisor of 
ITughli, which was in a state of- devastation following the
1. HCA - CCA, 9 Hay 177-1, CCA A67, liii, 388.
2. . HCA. - CCA,. 27 .Hay. 1771, /CA.KS7, . liii, U57.-. 8.......
3. HCA - CCA, 23 Hay 1771, CCA A.67, liii, b35 •
so.
famine and which the Murshidabad Committee considered ought
”to he let as soon as possible... to restore it from its
present state of decay and desolation.” They were displeased
that Lawrell of the Murshidabad Committee had farmed a part
of Dinajpur while on a tour of that district: however, ”as
the public faith was pledged” they decided that Lawrell’s
2settlement ought to stand.. By this time Middleton in 
Dacca had already received proposals which he considered 
satisfactory for farming Sylhet. His judgements were based 
on information supplied to him by Sumner who had been recalled 
from Sylhet early in April 1771 for that purpose. Middleton 
told the Murshidabad Committee on 18 May 1771 that he would 
have already farmed Sylhet had he hob been prohibited from 
doing so by their restrictions. Repeated arguments from 
Murshidabad concerning the 11 evil ccnseq.uen.ces that would 
result from delaying any longer the conclusion of the settle­
ments for the present year” finally forced the Calcutta 
Committee by the end of May to authorize Murshidabad to enter 
into engagements for the revenues on the best terns that they 
could obtain, with the proviso that the contracts must not 
exceed one year in duration.^
The Calcutta Committee made it plain that this 
delegation of authority was not to be considered a precedent 
and was only prompted by the exigencies of the situation.
1. MCR - CCR, 9 May 1771, OCR 367, liii, 386.
2. CCR - MCR, 20 May 1771, CCR R67, liii, 390.
3. ”...and ought not to be rejected by you on the part of
Government”. Middleton - MCR, 18 May 1771, CCR R67,
liii, U5h.
h. CCR - MCR, 30 May 1771, CCR R67, liii, U-63.
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They had hoped that the supervisors' would have reported the 
results of their research in tine for the Committee themselves 
to form a just and adequate settlement; that expectation had 
not "been fulfilled and they must now depend on their sub­
ordinate agency at Murshidabad !,for the execution of this 
important business...which we must always think should have 
ultimately been determined by us.” The one-year limit on 
the settlements for 1771 - 2 was specifically designed to 
enable the Calcutta Committee to discharge their proper 
responsibilities in the following year.
Sylhet was finally farmed by lliddleton for the
stipulated year on what he considered favourable terms. The
conditions were not disclosed in lliddletonfs report and except
for scattered and brief references dc not appear in the
proceedings. The farmer yias later revealed to be Shadrak 
2ul nur Ilanik but nothing is known for certain about him 
except that he was an inhabitant of Dacca. He consented to 
clear off the arrears duie for 1770 - 1 and by 5 February 1772
3
had already remitted a great part of it. He agreed also to 
meet defence costs from the gross collections, and it was not 
until September 1775 that the Company resumed responsibility 
for defence expenditure The gross bandobast went up from 
7,00,180 kahons or about 1,75,01+5 rupees in 1770 - 1 to 
8,03,150 kahons or about 2,00,788 rupees in 1771 - 2, but 
this does not reveal much as gross sums give but little clue 
to the total collections especially when farmers are involved.
1. CCR - I,ICR, 30 May 1771, MFR iii, 1021+ - 5.
2. Encl. in DPCR - Board, 22 Aug. 177^-t-, BR Cons Rl+9,
xlvii, 2366.
3.. . Harris - .MCR, .5 .Feb.. .1772,. KFR .vi,. 2.15.........
2+.. Holland - DPCR, 1 Hov. 1775, DFR x, 1+82 - 3.
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The net jama or the revenues payable to the Company after 
defraying defence and administrative costs stood at 
98,621 rupees in 1771 - 2, exclusive of Sumner's elephant
i
surplus of 7*110 rupees. Middleton therefore secured an 
increase of about twelve per cent over Sumner's net jama for 
1770 - 1.
It is difficult to follow the progress of the
Sylhet collections during 1771 - 2. The supervisor in
charge of the district could not draw up his accounts with
the despatch recommended by the Calcutta Committee and
2achieved by the other supervisors; hence, in the monthly
accounts entered in the Calcutta Committee's proceedings,
there are usually 110 entries for Sylhet. /aid though the
Hurshidabad Committee regularly complained that the collections
were behind hand, the accounts in the boohs at Murshidabad
did not tally with the Sylhet treasury accounts. This-was
because, as Harris explained, the revenues of Sylhet "must
unavoidably be outstanding beyond the regular periods of
payment merely from the length of time it takes to transport
■5
cowries, they being months on their way to the City."
Towards the end of March 1772 Harris said he had no reason 
to doubt that the farmer would fulfill his engagements. 
Murshidabad continual to urge Harris1 successor, Y.rilliam 
Lambert, who took over in April 1772, to use his best efforts
1. Abstract account, 13 July 1772, PCCD, l\2.
2. Harris was especially remiss; from Feb. 1771 to 
Mar. 1772 he communicated only infrequently with MCA.
On 10 Oct. 1771 he was■upbraided for "a want of that 
punctuality so essential for the success of the revenue 
system." His excuse was that he had "all the offices 
to regulate". Harris - MCP., nd. Oct. 1771* MFR iv, 
1838.
3. Harris - MCA, 27 Mar. 1772, Proc. MCA 6 Apr. 1772,
HFA vi, up.
to secure the revenues. In the end a balance of 36,977
A
kahonc, or about 9?2p0 rupees v as left.
The one-year farming settlement of 1771 “2 thus 
appears to have been more successful than Sumner’s settle­
ment the previous year when on the net revenue of 87?322 
rupees there had arisen a balance of 16,090 rupees. Uhether 
or not the better outcome in 1771 - 2 was simply owing to a 
short-term farmer exacting the most he could from his post 
and was therefore artificial, it did match the trend in 
Bengal as a whole. The net collections of the province for 
1771 ~ 2, just emerging from the ravages of famine, surpassed 
that of 1770 - 1 by almost eleven lakhs of rupees, an increase 
of some seven per cent. That this was the case, said the 
Board, was because the revenue was "violently kept up to its
p
former standard." As regards Sylhet district itself, when
it was being farmed in October 1772, Shadrak ul nur Banik was
not interested enough to make an offer.
Before 1772 was out, then, two important new
directions had been charted. Controlling power in the
districts had passed out of the hands of Heza Khan and his
officers, and it wras now7 generally held that farming the lands
was the best method for securing the revenues. A unified
approach to revenue management, the lack of which the Board
3
had been lamenting in November 1773? seemed possible at last. 
But if the clash at district level between British power and 
the upper levels of Mughal officialdom had been resolved, it
1. Barwell - Thackeray, 2 Dec. 1773? DBA vii, 21.
2. Board - COD, 3 Bov. 1772, Pari.Coll.7? 300.
3. Ibid.
was only replaced by a new kind of conflict, the true 
dimensions of which were obscured in Sylhet district by the 
personal friction between Kelsall and the Board. Local 
officials were not seeing eye to eye with their superiors at 
the centre. Differences of opinion over such issues as the 
export of grain, the need for more troops or the curtailing 
of administrative expenses were warning signs of the tussle 
ahead. The battle could be expected to grow more intense 
as more substantial moves were made towards centralisat ion.
95
CHAPTER III
THACKERAY AND THE SYLHET REVENUE -FARM.. 1772 - 5.
At first sight it would seem strange that the
Committee of Circuit’s settlement for Sylhet, instituted in
1772, actually worked for the two years it was allowed to
run, while the settlements made "by that same committee for
the other districts of Bengal were marked by recurring annual
•1
arrears and came to be considered generally much overrated.
Y/hen the settlement for Sylhet was discontinued, moreover, it 
was not because the terms were considered harsh or exploitative, 
but because it became necessary to remove the farmer. For 
the first time since the acquisition of the diwani, and indeed 
since many years before that, the jama of Sylhet had been 
fully realized. Yet the truth was that this had been made 
possible not because of wise leniency or assessment but 
because the Committee of Circuit, by combining the farmer’s 
authority with that of the collector, had imposed on the 
district a machinery for exacting the revenues more stringent 
than any previously known. Indeed, the new arrangement was 
worked so rigorously that, when considered in its wider 
implications and with reference to stated goals, and not 
merely with regard to immediate revenue yield, the settlement 
must be pronounced a total failure. Furthermore, the 
settlement produced administrative conditions the opposite 
of those intended. Instead of tending to centralize
1. For a general account of the farming system from
1772 to 1777» see Sinha, N.K., Economic History of 
Bengal ii, Chapter iv.
authority at Calcutta the Committee of Circuit left behind 
in Sylhet a situation in which the power of the local resident 
was increased and confirmed, so that William Thackeray, who 
held that office, was for more than two years virtually 
unchecked.
The discrepancy demonstrated in Thackeray’s career
between policy as it was conceived in Calcutta and practice
in the district, and the consequent gulf between aims and
results, prompts a reassessment of the role of the junior
servant of the Company. In the prevailing notion, he is
seen aa... one - and the least important - of three influences
that shaped the direction of early British rule. Noticeably
more attention has been paid to the other two forces, namely,
the policy makers, the senior officials of the Company,
anxious at first to secure as much revenue as possible and
later as much as could be obtained without injuring the prospect
of future yields; and the native officialdom, striving with
diminishing vigour after Reza Khan had recalled the amils, to
salvage such parts of the old system as they could. Conflict
has often been viewed as a clash between an emerging order
and a decaying one, personalized as the Calcutta Council on
the one hand and the great native officials on the other.
But the battle lines were not so simply drawn. Conflict, not
always open, also arose between the Company as the supreme
2authority and its junior servants in the mofussil, and 
sometimes the latter won the skirmishes if ultimately losing
1. See, eg. Khan, Chapter 10.
2. Especially when the Company tended to become a vehicle 
for the achievement of private ambition. See Furber, H., 
John Company at Work. Appendix A, 327 - 4^-2.
the war. The evidence suggests that in some circumstances, 
which obtained in special measure in distant Sylhet, the 
role of the junior servant could be so dominant and his 
influence and power so great as to preclude the Company from 
interposing any real directing hand in the affairs of the 
district. What mattered was not the revenue system itself 
but the way the Company official on the spot employed the 
apparatus oT that system in pursuit of his masters’ aims or, 
as it turned out not infrequently, in pursuit of his own.
In such a situation the substance of the Company’s central 
authority receded, although paradoxically the local official 
was the Company’s representative and sanctified his position 
with the halo that crowned every Company servant. Effective 
control by the Company was affirmed only by periodic commissions 
of inquiry. It will therefore be the purpose of this chapter 
to examine, for Sylhet, the third force at work in the Bengal 
countryside - that of the Company’s local representative.
The years 1772 - 5 may be seen as a test case in 
any argument about the location of power within the revenue 
system for to the ever present tendency to bureaucratic 
centralization was added the powerful influence of Hastings, 
who took over from Cartier as governor of Bengal in April 1772. 
His stand on this issue was conditioned by his well-known 
distrust of the supervisors and by his idea of what should 
be the structure of the Company’s government in Bengal. He 
considered the supervisors a ’’capital defect in our constitution” 
and was convinced that they were manipulated, to the detriment
1
of the country, “by their unscrupulous "banians. As for the
existing administrative system, it seemed to Hastings that the
Supreme Board in Calcutta exercised no efficient control
2over the subordinate functionaries. He wrote of the 
Government in Bengal as consisting of the supervisors in the 
districts, the Revenue Committees at Murshidabad and Patna, 
and the Council at Calcutta and ruefully commented: "the order
in which I have named them is not accidental, but consonant to
the degree of trust, power and emolument which they severally
■5
possess.'1^  He added that all trust, power and profit were ‘
in the hands of the Bengal government’s deputies and that
"the degree of each /was/ proportionate to their want of rank
in the service.11^"
As a means of asserting the authority of the centre,
the Calcutta Committee of Revenue which had only grudgingly
allowed the subordinate Committee of Revenue at Murshidabad to
settle the revenues for 1771 “ 2, decided in May 1772 that
they Y^ould make the new settlement themselves. They formed
themselves into a Committee of Circuit to tour the districts
in order to obtain a better idea of the capacity of the lands
*5and to farm the revenues on the spot. This was not the
1 . Hastings called the banians "devils11. Quoted in P. M.
Sachse, "Thackeray’s Apologia", BP & P Jan. - June 1931, 
k1 “ 50.
2. Gleig, G.R., Memoirs of the Life of the Right Hon.
V/arren Hastings i, 213.
3. Quoted in M. E. Monckton Jones Warren Hastings in Bengal
1772 - 177U 1U8.
Ibid., 1Z+6. cf. "Will you believe that the boys of the
service are the sovereigns of the country under the unmean­
ing title of supervisors, collectors of the revenue, 
administrators of justice, and rulers, heavy rulers of the 
people?" Hastings - Josfas Dupre, 26 Mai?-. 1 7 7 2, quoted in 
Gleig, i, 23k.
5.- - Resolution 3, May 1772,- CCR R67,- liv,- 253.' - .......
first time such a tour had been proposed; the year before 
the Murshidabad Committee had decided to send their members 
on a circuit of the districts to arrange the settlements 
locally but lack of time prevented the full execution of 
that plan. When the Calcutta Committee now put forward 
their proposals for a circuit a prime consideration was the 
desire to fix the revenue engagements after enquiry on the 
spot, and not as had been the case at Murshidabad, centrally 
to decide the demand for all the districts upon conjectural 
estimates of the value of the lands. It was specifically 
resolved in the proceedings that the members would make the 
individual district settlements at the sadr kachari of each 
district. But it was perhaps never seriously intended that 
all areas should be visited, and for some districts like 
Sylhet, therefore, the idea of a local investigation, the 
raison d’etre of the whole affair, was a dead letter from the 
start.
The Calcutta Committee’s deliberations on the
circuit and farming of the districts took them two months
into the new Bengal year, 1772 - 3. In April 1772 the
Committee at Murshidabad complained that although the new
revenue year had begun they had received no instructions
regarding the settlement and were fearful that a delay in
adjusting the revenue engagements would have an adverse effect
2on the collections. But the Calcutta Committee were deter­
mined to make the new settlements "upon a plan of greater
1. Resolution 3> 1U May 1772, CCR R67> liv, 253.
2. MCR - Supervisors, 16 Apr. 1772, IIFR vi, np.
100.
stability and duration than the settlements of late years
had been” and to proceed with “proper deliberation.” They
hoped that their new settlements when finalised would work
so well as to obviate any ill effects that might be caused by 
2a late start. The supervisors were in the meantime to 
encourage cultivation of the lands on which the rents depended 
but they were prohibited from holding the punya at the 
sadr kachari or from entering into any engagements for the 
new year. The intention was obviously to prevent the 
Company from being subjected to claims for preference from 
the incumbent farmers before it was ascertained whether more 
favourable terms might not be obtained for the Company.
That the system should be one of farming rather 
than of direct management was a decision already taken.
No one in the Calcutta Committee raised it as an issue.
Rather, the members simply restated, in May 1772, their con­
viction that farming the lands was the best course open to a 
Company, which could not itself enter into “the detail and 
minutiae” of the collections.^ If the Company undertook 
that task, then
the business of the service already so great 
that much of it is unavoidably neglected would 
be rendered so voluminous and the attention of 
the Board so divided that nothing would be duly 
attended to. The current affairs would fall 
into irrecoverable arrears, the resolutions upon 
them /might_7 be precipitate and desultory .the 
authority of the Government set at nought.5
1. CCR - MCR, 16 Apr. 1772, 1JFR vi, np.
2. Ibid.
3. CCR - MCR, 6 May 1772, CCR R67, liv, 172-3.
U. Proc. 1U May 1772, CCR R67, liv, 2kl.
-3. - -Ibid.-, .2I4.8-................................
But more significantly, the Committee considered that the 
power which the Company must necessarily delegate Y/ould invite 
abuses, and Mthe most pernicious consequences’* would ensue 
from the impossibility of finding time to examine and correct.
A
them. The point was well made. However, since delegation 
must occur v/hether farmers or other agents were employed it 
might be thought that in rejecting the use of supervisors the 
Company had merely been choosing between evils, but there is 
no evidence that the members thought in these terms. It 
would be fairer to deduce that under Hastings* influence the 
Committee as a whole were primarily concerned to restrict the 
scope of the junior civilians in the districts.
The main issue on which the members of the Committee 
had to make up their minds was that of the length of the 
farming leases. Their decision was in favour of long leases. 
The four main reasons advanced in support of such leases were 
cast for the most part in the form of objections to short 
leases. To let the lands on a long lease, it was stated,
2was for many reasons a necessary consequence of letting them. 
Firstly this was so because the farmer who held a one-year 
lease took what he could ’’with the hand of vigour” and in his 
dealings with the lesser talukdars and ryots was often 
’’necessarily rigid and even cruel” since the arrears after 
his lease had expired were ”at best a dbubtful debt if ever 
recoverable”. He was tempted to exceed ’’the bounds of right” 
and to ’’augment his income by irregular exactions”, for there 
was nothing to restrain him since he had nothing to lose if
1. Proc. 1/4- May 1772, CCR R67, liv, 2J+8.
2. Ibid.
the inhabitants deserted the lands and the crops v/ere
neglected. Secondly, some of the "richest articles of
tillage require/d/ a length of time. to.come to perfection”;
the outlay of one season was repaid by the crops of a
succeeding year, and no farmer would render either aid or
encouragement to ”a culture of which another is to reap the
fruits”. Thirdly, the annual transfer of responsibility
for the revenues was a source of discouragement to the ryot
since it deprived him of takavi, those government loans which
were necessary to enable him to buy seed, cattle and implements.
Fourthly, a short term farmer would do nothing.to reclaim
"the immense tracts of waste land” which were spread over the
country. The reverse of these arguments was taken as
truth: a long lease farmer would invest in reclamation; he
would not risk causing desertion of the lands by oppressing
the ryots; the cultivators would grow familiar with his
authority and that might breed a mutual or understanding 
2attachment. Nobody raised any question about v/hat v/as 
likely to happen in the last year of a long lease: that
would have raised the question of permanent settlements 
everywhere, a slightly premature consideration.
The Calcutta Committee of Revenue decided that the 
settlement should run for five years. Though the members 
were aware that from local considerations of soil and crops 
a quinquennial term might not be suitable everywhere, 
regularity was thought desirable, and it was instructed that
1. Proc. 11+ May 1772, CCR R67, liv, 21+8 - 50.
2. Ibid., 250.
3. Resolution 1, 1U May 1772, CCR, liv, 251.
where engagements had already "been entered into they should 
he extended so that “the whole leases of the province... 
/might/ fall /in/ at one time” The five-year term, it 
was thought, was long enough, to he immune from the many 
criticisms that could he levelled against a short lease hut 
not so long that the farmer might ‘'acquire an influence so 
great in the lands as to injure the rights or authority of his 
successor, or lest the knowledge of their value he confined 
to the present possessor and lost to others.”
The plan of farming the districts was cemented in
A
a number of resolutions-^ some of which hear a special 
relevance to the events which later unfolded in Sylhet.
These events were extraordinary, it is true, hut they almost 
certainly reflect something: of what was happening in the 
other districts. It was almost as if the members of the 
Calcutta Committee were endowed with the ability to prophesy 
and sought to frame regulations to belie their own portents. 
Resolution 7, for example, provided for a diwan, chosen by 
the Board, to assume a joint responsibility with the collector 
in superintending the revenues. The diwan was to keep 
separate accounts of the collections and to countersign all 
orders circulated in the mofussil, all receipts granted to 
the farmers and all invoices and accounts transmitted to the 
sadr.^ " In other words, the diwan was envisaged as a check
1. Resolution 1, 1U Hay 1772, CCR, liv, 252.
2. -thidV, '251 ■ ; . ' • ■ -■■ ■
3. Eor a list of the resolutions., see Banerjee, D.N.,
Early Land Revenue System in Bengal and Bihar. 157 - 6 9 .
U. Resolution 7, 11+ May 1772, CCR R67, liv, 253.
upon the collector. This, of course, was good Mughal
practice and might have been borrowed by the Committee as
a natural consequence of working with Muhammad Reza Khan
and other Indian officials of the old school. Resolution 9
forbade the collector or diwan to send sepoys, peons or other
persons “with authority” into the farms except where there was
a clear threat to justice or peace, and where the farmer was
unable or his authority insufficient to deal \7ith the
situation. Resolution 10 was a straight prohibition
against extortion. The farmer was to demand from the ryots
no more than the sum specified in their pattas or written 
2
leases. Resolution 16 was intended to prevent the collector 
from engaging in the grain trade on the justifiable assumption 
that if the collector were to trade in any article he v/ould 
create, either intentionally or otherwise, a monopoly in that 
article in his district. Hastings thought that this 
prohibition should apply to all the "necessaries of life” but 
it was confined for the time being to grain.^
Another resolution, the seventeenth, had an immediate 
bearing on what became Thackeray's practice in Sylhet. This 
stated:
That no peshcar, banian or other servant of 
whatever denomination, of the collector or relation 
or dependent of any such servant, be allowed to 
farm lands, nor directly or indirectly to hold a 
concern in any farm; nor to be security for any 
farmer. That the collector be strictly enjoined 
to prevent such practices; and that if it shall 
be discovered that any one under a false name or
1. Resolution 9, 11+ May 1772, CCR R67, liv, 25k - 5.
2. Resolution 10, 11+ May 1772, CCR R67, liv, 255.
3. Resolution 16, 11+ May 1772, CCR R67, liv, 257.
1+. Banerjee, D.N., 165.
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any kind of collusion hath found means to evade 
this order, he shall he subject to a heavy fine 
proportionate to the amount of the farm, and the 
farm shall he relett /sic/ or made khas; and 
if it shall appear that the collector shall 
have counternanced, approved or connived at a 
breach of this Regulation, he shall stand ipso 
facto dismissed from his collectorship. Neither 
shall any European directly or indirectly be 
permitted to rent lands in any part of the 
country.1
The Calcutta Committee were well aware that if collectors
were allowed themselves to farm the lands, they would obtain
them upon their own terms, as it was unlikely that anyone
2would compete with them. But their objections went further.
It Y/as not fit, the Committee said, that the servants of the
Company should be dealers v/ith their masters, adding:
The collectors are checks upon the farmers. If 
they themselves turn farmers what checks can be 
found for them? What security will the Company 
have for their property, or where are the ryots to 
look for relief against their oppress ion/?/3
The effort to forestall specific abuses contained
in these regulations reveals immediately the Calcutta
Committee’s awareness of the substantial problems that it
faced in revenue administration. Unhappily, at the same
time, it reveals no less clearly the Committee1s failure to
recognize that the framing of regulations was of little utility
unless there was some machinery to check that the responsible
officials in fact adhered to the regulations. This was the.
real Achilles’ heel of the Company’s government. Without
1. Resolution 17, 12+ May 1772, CCR R67, liv, 257 - 8.
2. Banerjee, D.N., 166.
3. Quoted in Banerjee, D.N., 166.
institutions to follow the regulations through to the point
of implementation,.the centre of necessity gave immense
opportunities to the local officials, both European and
Indian, to twist and thwart orders carrying the sanction
of the highest authority. For example, in Sylhet
resolution 7 was subverted and resolution 9 disobeyed;
resolution 10 was honoured more in the breach than in the
observance since it was only rarely that, pattas were granted
and resolution 16 more in the letter than in the spirit as it
did not prevent Thackeray from monopolizing the salt trade,
v/hile resolution 17 was honoured not at all.
The last of the twenty-four resolutions authorised
the Committee of Circuit to ’regulate” the structure of the
Dacca supervisorship. It was noted that the supervisorship
of Dacca ’’not only from the extent of its limits, and the
magnitude of its revenues, but also from its being entirely
composed of a multitude of inconsiderable zemindarrees”
was a charge too complicated to be handled by the chief of
Dacca. The subsidiary districts attached to Dacca were so
distant, said the Committee, ”as to be liable to...
inconveniences”. This point of view had been impressed
on the Committee by John Harris both during his term as chief
of Dacca writh responsibility for Sylhet and since April 1772
as a member of the Board. On 15 May 1772 he took up the
question again, saying:
...the Sylhett /sic/ collections are considerably 
in arrear, and subject to many irregularities from 
the want of a local resident, its distance from
Dacca rendering it impossible for the present
1. Resolution 22+, 12+ Hay 1772, CCR R67, liv, 261 - 2.
107.
supravisor to pay the necessary attention or 
constitute such regulations which might secure 
to the Company its full revenue; that the 
chunam contracts which are of such immediate 
and serious consequence to this government have 
very materially failed from the mismanagement 
and jealousies of the contractors; that it being 
a frontier province, wherein the nature of the 
Company and its rules of government are very 
superficially known, and scarce a rule for 
conduct exists, each zemindar considering himself 
as independant /sic/ is continually raising 
insurrections and committing all kinds of 
depradations /sic/ on his neighbour, by which 
the collections frequently suffer, and the chunam 
works are totally deserted.1
There is no report, incidentally, of Harris ever having
visited Sylhet while chief of Dacca. However, his bleak
but substantially convincing picture of conditions in the
district led the Committee to recommend that a servant of
the Company should reside at Sylhet though leaving it to the
Committee of Circuit to determine finally on the expediency
of such an appointment. In the meantime, in order to
provide evidence for the Committee of Circuit and to improve
matters in the district generally and at the chunam works
in particular, they decided to send Thackeray to Sylhet as 
2an amin. His specific brief was to
make the strictest enquiries...and furnish 
himself with every necessary material for the 
assistance of the Committee /of Circuit/ in 
forming a plan for the future conducting of the 
collections and the chunam business on the most 
advantageous and permanent footing and...prepare 
a rent-roll of the province to be laid before 
them on their arrival.../at Sylhet/.3
1. Harris’ representations concerning Sylhet, 15 May 1772, 
CCR R67, liv, 268 - 9.
2. Proc. 15 May 1772, CCR R67, liv, 269.
3. Ibid.
The post of amin was certainly less than Thackeray
had coveted and what John Harris, his brother-in-la?/, had
hoped to help him to secure. However, though less grand
than an up-country collectorship, it was as much as
Thackeray had any right to expect. His career in the service
had hitherto been distinguished only by his flair for moving
in the right circles, where he had no doubt found it an
-|
advantage to have two eligible sisters. Born in 17U9, the
youngest of sixteen children of the Archdeacon of Surrey and
the daughter of the Lord of the Manor of Butler’s Marston,
2
Warwickshire, his background was not markedly different 
from that of other aspirants to the Company’s service. His 
father died when he Y:as eleven and -a few years later his mother
■7
’’thankfully accepted” a writership in the Company for him.
At fourteen, Thackeray went through the usual step of 
enrolling with a writing-master to learn book-keeping. He 
graduated in 1765 with a lukewarm recommendation from his 
teacher that he had gone through ”a regular set of merchants’ 
accounts and the practical rules of arithmetic” and under­
stood what he had learnt ”as well as most young gentlemen 
of his age and experience”.^ He arrived in India in 
June 1766 and was first appointed to the secretary’s office.
The next year he was promoted to assistant treasurer or
1 . One married James Rennell, the surveyor, the other
John Harris.
2. Hunter, Y7. W., The Thackerays in India. 66.
3. Ibid., 67.
i+. Recommendation of J. Sharpe, ■ writing-master, Writers
Petitions, J/1/6, 56.
1
cash-keeper under* Verelst. His first real "break came in
1769 when Cartier employed him as a secretary, though he
2served more as a personal assistant to the governor. Cartier
had spent his whole inland service at Dacca and he knew what
opportunities existed there for a young civilian. In 1771
he appointed Thackeray a factor and fourth in council at
■3
Dacca with a monthly salary of 1+95 rupees.
An appointment as an amin, though hardly the summit 
of Thackeray's ambition,. placed him, as a one-man commission 
of inquiry, in a strong position. The Board had played 
straight into Thackeray's hands and he was too shrewd not to 
realise it. Y/hen he was called upon by the Committee of 
Circuit to present the result of his investigations into 
conditions in Sylhet, he did so in such a way as to emphasise 
the pressing need for a local resident at Sylhet and his own 
suitability for the post. The only check on what Thackeray 
had to say about Sylhet YJas Karris himself, and there was no 
danger that they would disagree too much with each other.
In fact, Thackeray's report read suspiciously like Harris' 
statement of 15 Hay 1 7 7 2.
On 1 October 1772 the Committee of Circuit arrived
r
at Dacca which was to be their headquarters for dealing with 
the settlement of Dacca, Sylhet, Lakshmipur and Sandwip.^
1. Hunter, 6 9 .
2. Ibid., 70.
3. Ibid., 83.
Previously, the Committee had sat at Krishnagar (9 June
’ ■ ■ - 28 June 1772) and' at -Kasimbazar (7- July- - 17' Septi 1772)w
The Committee was already'reduced in.numbers; Hastings
had returned to the Presidency two weeks earlier and with
the dissolution of the Murshidabad Committee of Revenue on 
1
8 September Middleton had also withdrawn, posted at
Murshidabad with triple duties as Resident at the Durbar,
chief of Kasimbazar and supervisor of the Western division
of Rajshahi. The remaining members, Philip Milner Dacres,
President, John Graham and Janes Lawrell, anticipated no
difficulty in following the pattern established at Kasimbazar
where a settlement had been made for Nadia; the proceedure
v/as to settle the revenues with the zamindars where they were
willing to agree to the terms the highest bidder had offered,
or else, to rent the lands to the highest bidder and grant
the dispossessed zamindar a percentage of the annual revenue
as an allowance.
But at Dacca the Committee immediately ran into a
stumbling-block. They had been preceded by an advertisement
inviting tenders for the farm of Dacca and of Sylhet but
2none had been received. Another notice was put out on 
their arrival requiring prospective farmers who could produce 
acceptable security to "deliver in seal'd proposals specifing
1. The MCR v/as dissolved on 8 Sept. 1772 as a further 
centralizing measure (Khan, 239); so too was its 
equivalent for Bihar, the Patna Committee of Revenue.
At the same time the Khalsa was transferred to Calcutta. 
(Hastings was not enamoured of the subordinate Committees 
at Murshidabad and Patna any more than he relished having
to v/ork through supervisors. He saw the Committees at
Murshidabad and Patna as "lords of those capitals, and of 
the districts annexed to them, .../disposing/ of the 
first offices of the state." Hastings - Josias Dupre,
26 Mar. 1772, quoted in Gleig, i, 235J.
2. Proc. 3 Oct. 1772, PCCP, 1.
the annual rent they /would agree tq7 give for each
pergunnah separately,1* the closing date for tenders "being
extended to the fifth of Kartik, that is, late October.
The Committee of Circuit then turned to the specific task
they had been commissioned to perform regarding Sylhet and
asked Thackeray, who had been in Sylhet since 26 July 1772
but had returned to Dacca to await their arrival, to produce
2the result of &is researches.
In his report, which the Committee considered on 
10 October 1772, Thackeray dealt with law and order generally, 
the revenue charges and collections, and the chunam works.
He paid special attention to the- last two subjects, knowing 
full well the importance the Board attached to them, and he 
took every opportunity to argue for a local resident.
He claimed that “heretofore neither regulations, 
law or equity.../had/ existed in this wretched province
•Z
/Sylhet/1*. It was not surprising, of course, that the 
district was in a state of disorder, for the decay of Llughal 
rule, which had never been particularly secure in Sylhet, 
had not been made good by the firm imposition of the Company’s 
authority. Some zamindars obviously had taken advantage of 
the power vacuum and as Thackeray complained, considered 
themselves “in a manner independent” and behaved as though 
the Company scarcely existed.^ This applied especially to 
Ahmad Reza, zamindar of Baniachang and Laour, the most 
powerful landholder in the district. To make matters worse,
1. Proc. 3 Oct. 1772, PCCD, 1.
2. CC - Thackeray, 3 Oct. 1772, PCCD, 2.
3. Thackeray - CC, 23 Sept. 1772, PCCD, 31.
U. Ibid., 32.
there v/ere even some zamindars, especially those whose lands
lay near the northern foothills, who though within the legal
limits of the Company’s jurisdiction regarded themselves as
subjects of the neighbouring Jaintia Raja or of the petty
Khasi hill chiefs instead. If this state of affairs were
not corrected, Thackeray said, these zamindars could only
1
become more troublesome.. As an example of the independent
2spirit of the zamindars, he recounted the case of a Garro 
woman whose land was apparently rich in chunam and was 
consequently despoiled because'' of the demand for lime. 
After appealing to the div/an at Sylhet for redress she was 
granted a new plot just south of the Surma river, but the 
zamindar of the pargana involved refused to allow her to take 
possession of the land. In retaliation the angry hill 
people stopped the chunam boats and only the presence of
3
the Company’s chunam agent prevented more serious conflict.
Further, Thackeray complained, even those v:ho 
acknowledged the Company’s presence distorted and misused 
their position: “Every man assuming the title of an English
gomasta comits /sic/ the greatest crimes with impunity1'. 
Thackeray reported that numerous complaints had been made to 
him on that score and that many more people had been deterred 
from complaining because they knew/ that he was only an amin.^ 
“From whence is justice to proceed but from a resident 
residing on the spot/?/” asked Thackeray. The poor natives
1. Thackeray - CC, 23 Sept. 1772, PCCD, 32.
2. Thackeray probably meant a Khasi or a Bengali-Khasi.
3. Thackeray - CC, 23 Sept. 1772, PCCD, 32.
U. Ibid., 33.
were subjected to the greatest oppression, he commented,
and he cited the specific example of a gomastha who had had
people confined for refusing to buy his salt and who had
forced others to purchase his tobacco at a price far above
-1
that current in the bazaars. Thackeray neatly concluded
that part of his report with the reflection, "this one
instance of many I could mention sufficiently points out
2the necessity of a local resident."
Thackeray’s picture of lav/lessness in Sylhet was 
meant to reflect no doubt on the poor capabilities of the 
diwan and in all probability he exaggerated a great deal.
The intractibility of some Sylhet zamindars is not disputable. 
But the story about the Garro woman is unlikely, for the 
chunam deposits were in the hills outside the Company's 
jurisdiction and there was no reason why a hill woman should 
have had to be compensated with a plot of land in Sylhet 
district; in any case, the authority of a diwan to alienate 
lands within a zamindari is guestionable. Thackeray, it
appears, also exaggerated the oppressive practices of the 
gomasthas; the day after his arrival in Sylhet, he said, he 
had had to release "several men who...had been long confined 
for refusing to purchase salt of a gomasta." As an amin, 
though, Thackeray had no authority to interfere if people were 
confined. One also wonders how Thackeray knew that because 
he was simply an amin many people were put off from submitting
1. Thackeray - CC, 25 Sept. 1772, PCCD, 33.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
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their complaints.
In setting out the revenue charges Thackeray once
again revealed his anxiety to advance his own appointment as
collector of Sylhet. The greatest expense, as has been
shown, was in maintaining the outposts on the frontier.
Harris had been adamant when he was supervisor of Dacca and
Sylhet that the charges though heavy were necessary. Thack- .
eray, however, asserted that the cost of running the thanas
had "swelled enormously to no purpose." Yet the evidence
rather was that more mud forts, were needed, the established
number being insufficient to contain the periodic incursions
of the hill tribes. The frontier, as Harris had said, was
a hundred miles long, and vast stretches were unguarded.
What was needed also was proper supervision of the existing
thanadars who were prone to turn a blind eye to the activities
of the invaders and even to act in concert with them. Thack-
eray, however, chose to argue that when proper laws were
established in the district, by a local resident, it would
be no difficult matter to keep peace v/ith the neighbouring
tribes, and if they still made trouble "a few seapoys would
strike more terror and more effectively suppress it" and at
2
less expense than the thanadars and their barqandazes. But 
sepoys, though they might be used effectively in an invasion 
of the hills, as indeed they were used two years later, were 
not suitable for policing the frontier and suppressing disorder 
there. In any case, the connection that Thackeray suggested
1. Thackeray - CC, 25 Sept. 1772, PCCD, 32.
2. Ibid.
■between good order in Sylhet and the good behaviour of the 
hill tribes was largely illusory; even fifty years after 
Sylhet had been under the Company*s jurisdiction and the 
district had been pacified it was still not as easy to control 
the hill tribes as Thackeray had imagined.
The papers relating to the collections which
Thackeray submitted to the Committee of Circuit included an 
1abstract tahud of Sylhet and a statement which showed that 
on 3 June 1772 the Sylhet collections were in arrears by 
38>938 rupees, some sixty per cent of the total demand up to 
that point. Thackeray*s intent was clearly to show the 
collections in an unfavourable light. But when the accounts 
with which he presented the Committee were drawn up the Sylhet 
year had not yet ended and the diwan,had promised that all 
outstanding sums would be collected. Thackeray did not report 
what had happened to the collections between June and September 
Instead he argued that it was unlikely that the diwan could 
have made good his promise since he did not have sufficient 
authority over the zamindars to induce them to pay the 
instalments at the stipulated times and since the zamindars 
were continually evading payment and on the look-out for 
"every opportunity which might serve to retard the collections" 
There was some truth in Thackeray’s assertions: some
1. An account of stipulated rent. The net jama v/as 
Hs.98,621.
2. This total demand v/as made up of Ps.67>913 (that part 
of the net jama due by June), Rs.10,069 (still to be 
collected for 1770 - 1) and a small sum which Sumner 
had added to the demand.
Thackeray - CC, 23 Sept. 1772, PCCD, 32.
zamindars were indeed beyond the authority of the diwan 
and reports of a new chief being appointed to Dacca and of a 
resident coming to Sylhet might have affected the collections. 
In fairness, however, it ought to be stated that the revenues 
of Sylhet never were paid in strict accordance with the list 
of instalments. Nor was it the case, as Thackeray implied, 
that a collector would easily succeed in establishing the 
Company’s authority over the zamindars where a diwan had 
failed.
Thackeray had made a special detour on first going'
out to Sylhet to inspect the chunam works at Laour in the
north-west of the district, and he reported to the Committee
of Circuit that the mismanagement of that branch of the
Company’s business v/as equally the fault of John Galloway,
the Company’s agent in charge of producing the chunam, and of
John Blair, a private contractor responsible since 1769 for
shipping the chunam to Calcutta. Thackeray had little cause
to invent: the two parties did not work well together and
blamed each.other for deviating from previously agreed 
2arrangements. Galloway charged that Blair did not produce 
boats, either in the number or at the time stipulated in 
Blair’s contract; for example, Galloway said, Blair ought 
to have ensured that by 20 November 1771 there were enough 
boats at the works to take on 30,000 maunds of chunam but 
the boats arrived only at the end of the month and. then only
1. Whether these reports would have been enough, as
Thackeray said, to put a total stop to the collections 
is debatable. Thackeray - CC, 23 Sept. 1772,. PCCD, 32.
2. See Blair's contract, dated 28 Sept. 1771> CCR R70, 
xv, U28 - 31.
*1
eight of them, all of small Burthen. Blair sent his Boats
not in a fleet, Galloway further charged, "but just a few at
a time which involved "a daily delivery, and ruffles the
temper of working people.'1 The contractor was also accused
of keeping the chunam for long periods at AjmiriganJ., a
town on the southern course of the Surma river, and of
causing Galloway to he Blamed for the late arrival of supplies 
■3
at Calcutta. For his part Blair maintained that the agent 
did not have the chunam ready for transport at the agreed 
time which meant that often the Boats had to Be sent out when 
the rivers were low; at that time only small Boats could Be 
used But it was still necessary to lighten the cargo two or 
three times Between the works and the depot at Ajmiriganj 
There can Be no douBt that Galloway worked under 
difficult conditions. lie did not have the means of 
enforcing the government monopoly in the production of chunam. 
Blair himself had Built a kankarkhana^ and offered more than 
the rate of 7 puns for 100 maunds of the raw stone which 
Galloway on the part of the Company was authorized to pay.^
The people who fetched the stone from the hills preferred to 
do Business with Blair and thus production at the Company’s
1. Gallov/ay - Thackerajr, 26 June 1772, PCCD, 3U.
2. IBid, 35.
3. IBid.
U. Blair - Thackeray, 1 July 1772, PCCD, 3 6 .
5. Chunam works, from Kankar, coarse limestone, and khana, 
a house or place.
6. Gallowray - Thackeray, 26 June 1772, PCCD, 35.
1
works suffered. Apparently, to add insult to injury,
Blair kept two gomasthas at the Company’s works who were
continually causing disturbances in Galloway’s absence, as
if, Galloway charged,- "out of spite and malice to annoy my 
2business." In addition, the local zamindars were at best
uneo-operative. Ahmad Eeza, in whose zamindari of Laour
most of the chunam was burnt, was especially troublesome.
Thackeray described his behaviour in the following words:
He exerts his utmost endeavours to make the people 
desert his /Galloway’s/ works, interrupts the wood 
cutters, will not admit of the establishment of a 
common haut /hat/ and in short puts every 
obstable /sic/ in the.way of the contractors and 
chundhasses...R
Even the thandars acted in concert with the hill chiefs to
disrupt the chunam trade. Eai Ram Khan, thanadar at Pandua,
for example, helped the Khasi chief of Pandua by levying
extraordinary customs dues at the passes. He had thus
contrived to stop eighty people from transporting stone from
the hills for five days in August and fifteen days in
September 1772 at the precise time when the raw chunam had to
be brought from the hills, the rivers then being at a
favourable height.^ "
As for the contractor, if he was less than efficient
in adhering to the terms of his contract, it was partly
because of his growing dissatisfaction. The renumeration
he received, he had complained to Harris,-was not equal to
1. Galloway - Thackeray, 26 June 1772, PCCD, 35.
2. Ibid.
3. Thackeray - CC, 23 Sept. 1772, PCCD, 31. Chundhasses 
were wood gatherers.
i+. Galloway - Thackeray, 26 June 1772, PCCD, 34.
1
the risk and danger involved in his work. At the end of
1 7 6 9* the first year of his contract, all his boats had been
rendered useless, their hulls having been eaten away by
worms and salt water. Nevertheless, the next yeai?, the
year of the great famine, he had managed to transport all
the chunam produced in spite of the dearness of boat stores
and the scarcity of provisions. At the beginning of 1771
he had built a number of new boats in the hope that his pay
2would be increased but he had been disappointed.
To remedy matters at the chunam works and to 
increase production, Thackeray offered his predictable 
solution. YJhat was needed, he pressed, was proper super­
vision and that could only come from a local resident. He 
assured the Committee of Circuit as follows:
...when I am properly confirmed in my station 
at Sylhet all these inconveniences will be avoided, 
and the Company might have_their present quantity 
/of chunam/ encreased /sic/ to 1 ,5 0 , 0 0 0 or 
1,60,000 maunds p/er/ annum, for I was an eyewitness 
that the materials are in the greatest abundance, 
and I am well.../persuaded/ that to prevent any 
future complaints or deficiencies in this article, 
there only wants proper encouragement and protection 
to the chundhasses with a proper influence over the 
jamindars, zanadars &c.3
Thackeray!s report contained an even more powerful 
'plug* on his own behalf. On his arrival at Sylhet, he 
said, he ordered Ahmad Reza to the kachari but the zamindar 
had taken a month to comply with the summons. Thackeray
1. Blair - Harris, 8 Oct. 1772, PCCD, 36.
2. Blair hoped for an increase of Rs.7 per 100 mds., i.e. 
from R s .38 to Rs.U5 per 100 mds. Ibid., 37.
3. Thackeray - CC, 25 Sept. 1772, PCCD, 31.
120.
surmised that Ahmad Reza acted "from a consciousness of
having nothing to apprehend from a want of full authority
in me..."; this news "naturally spread over the province" and
rendered his position "irksome". He did not see, therefore,
any point in his returning to Sylhet as an amin "without any
authority". To do so would he ineffectual; with his hands
so tied, he "could only hear, not redress...grievances;" and
furthermore, his presence in that capacity would furnish the
diwan with an additional excuse to explain why the collections
2were not up to date.
Y/ith no objective check on Thackeray’s statements,
it was hardly possible to resist the force of his arguments.
The Committee, considering the various points he had raised,
decided unanimously
that the nomination of a Company servant to reside 
in quality of collector at Sylhet will be eligible 
for the following purposes; first, to forward the 
regular payment of the collections, which owing to 
the distance of any immediate inspection appear to 
be extreamly /sic/ backward; secondly to investigate 
the exorbitant charges which it appears may admit of 
considerable retrenchment and produce an handsome 
increase of revenue. Thirdly, to establish a 
regular judicial authority to which the inhabitants 
may be amenable and have an opportunity to rely for 
redress of their grievances. Fourthly, to ingratiate 
thereby the affections of the ryats and bring them 
to a state of more civilized subjection to the 
Company’s government. Fifthy /sic/, to facilitate
and increase the provision of chunam an article so 
greatly wanted for the service of the Company...3
They nominated Thackeray as collector and asked the Board to
confirm the appointment.^" They also authorised a list of
1. Thackeray - CC, 25 Sept. 1772, PCCD, 32.
2. Ibid., 32-3.
3. Proc. 10 Oct. 1772, PCCD, k3.
U. Ibid.
public officers and appointed.a diwan to the district.
-1
Thackeray was given fresh instructions and 
ordered to return to Sylhet immediately. He was to "stimulate" 
the farmer’s agent to collect the outstanding revenue, and, 
since the Committee thought it likely that the district would 
pass to new farmers with the impending settlement, he was to 
ensure that no encroachments were made on the revenues of 
1772 - 3. Thackeray was ordered to undertake another 
inquiry into the revenue charges to see how much reduction 
was feasible: the Committee thought that the charges were
"extravagantly high" in comparison v/ith the jama. They 
wanted this report before the settlement was concluded in 
order to make the new farmers accountable for the revenue 
charges. Calloway was to act under the collector in the 
manufacture of chunam and they were to aim at maximum 
production. Thackeray was also empowered, prior to the 
establishment of a diwani adalat, to hear and redress 
grievances that required immediate attention and was asked 
to look particularly into the conduct of the gomasthas.
The Committee were insistent on this last point, returning to 
it on 3 November 1772 when they recommended to Thackeray 
the publication of "an advertisement enforcing a free and 
spontaneous purchase and sale in all articles of merchandise
1. CC - Thackeray, 10 Oct. 1772, PCCD, 1+3-5.'
2. They did not think it expedient, however, to radically
alter the defence arrangements as Thackeray had 
suggested.
3. There is no record of Thackeray taking up the case
against gomasthas, further proof perhaps that he overdid
their oppressive practices.
and notifying to the country that the court of adaulut will
"be open to grant redress and relief from all acts of violence
and oppression.”^
Six days after Thackeray had "been appointed collector
and while he was still at Dacca, he informed the Committee
that l,Dessyram and inhabitants of Sylhet" had submitted
2proposals to him for farming the district. According to the 
terms of the proposals, the prospective farmers would give an 
increase at the end of the first year of 20,000 rupees on 
the net jama of 1771 ” 2 of 98,621 rupees, an increase of 
twenty per cent, together with a rasad or accumulating increase
3
of 2,500 rupees for each of the four succeeding years. At
that rate the increase for the fifth year would be 30,000 rupee
on the jama of 1771 ~ 2, while the total additional payment
over the five years would amount to 1 ,25,000 rupees, almost
the equivalent of an additional year*s revenue. In addition
the farmers would bear the cost of the thanas^ " and would be
5
responsible for the arrears of 1771 -2.
The Committee of Circuit appear to have been 
delighted with these proposals, especially since they seemed 
to have been tendered by inhabitants of the district whose 
ties to the area might "bu expected to bind them to promote
1. CC - Thackeray, 3 Nov. 1772, PCCD, 9k.
2. Thackeray - CC, 16 Oct. 1772, PCCD, 65.
3. Thackeray - CC, 16 Oct. 1772, PCCD, 65. Sylhet had
been affected by the famine of 1770 only marginally: 
a rasad lease was therefore not strictly relevant.
k. CC - Board, 3 Nov. 1772, PCCD, 97.
5. This appeared to have amounted to Bs. 9,2k9. Barwell -
Thackeray, 2 Dec. 1773, DPH vii, 21.
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the prosperity and improvement of the lands and the welfare
1and ease of the reiats." The farmer of Sylhet in 1771 ~ 2
had been a resident of Dacca. The Committee accepted the
proposals hut made no investigation into the exact identity
of these inhabitants of Sylhet, a district noted for the
absence of men of wealth. The names of the prospective
farmers did not appear on the rent-roll of the district for
1771 - 2 which Thackeray had submitted, so it should have been
obvious to the Committee that they were neither zamindars,
nor erstwhile petty farmers, nor securities. Thackeray later
admitted that the names he had submitted were invented and
that he was the farmer. But in October 1772 either the full
implications of the proposals were lost on the Committee,
who seemed to have regarded Sylhet as a troublesome distraction
from the main business of dealing with Dacca, or the members
were too swayed by the additional revenue offered to ask
questions; or there was some collusion between Thackeray
and at least one of the members of the Committee. There
is some evidence of collusion; the proposals were not made
in the prescribed manner, that is, in sealed envelopes with
the revenue for each pargana separately specified; the contract
was concluded before the Committee received the report on
revenue charges for which they had asked; and Lawrell and
Thackeray, it was later revealed, were involved in business 
2together. The casual manner in which the Sylhet settlement
1. Proc. 20 Oct. 17?2, PCCD, 66.
2. See Sinha, N.H., ii, 81. Thackeray and Lawrell, as was
disclosed from an examination of the Khalsa books, were 
later involved in a deal in elephants. Thackeray had 
supplied elephants to the Company as the "farmer of Sylhet." 
He steadfastly refused to disclose the identity of his 
agent in Calcutta despite repeated questioning by the 
majority on the Bpard who were intent on discovering 
whether Hastings, ' who had accepted the’tender’of'elephants 
in Sept. 177U, knew at that time that Thackeray held the 
Sylhet farm. See Board’s Proc. 1L(-» 18, 21, 25 and 28 June 
and 2 July 1776, Bh Cons PJ+9, lxii, various paging.
12U.
was concluded is striking. The formula devised at 
Kasimbazar and which the Committee had proceeded to apply 
to Dacca was abandoned in the case of Sylhet. Instead, the 
entire district was treated as a single zamindari and let in 
a general farm. And even the Board asked no questions when
A
on 17 November 1772 they ratified the settlement.
The Committee of Circuit concluded their business
at Dacca on 27 November 1772 and the next day they moved on
to Rangpur. Meanwhile, towards the end of October, Thackeray
had arrived at Sylhet town to take up his new position as
collector. His first move was to get rid of Sainunderam, the
2diwan appointed by the Committee to Sylhet. That much is 
clear, though the dismissal was enmeshed in charge and 
counter-accusation. It was almost three years before Thackeray 
reported and attempted to justify his action. Samunderam, 
he then said, had offered him a bribe of 15* 0 0 0 rupees in 
exchange for "full ana unlimited powers’* in the mofussil.^ 
Thackeray explained that he recognized the true character 
of Samunderam and thought it best to remove him and entrust
1. Board - CC, 17 Nov. 1772, PCCD, 1^3.
2. It was vital that Thackeray should remove the diwan if he 
wanted a free hand: this is evident from Hastings1
description of the diwan as a person deliberately "charged 
with authority” and "placed nearly on an equality with the 
collectors, inferior indeed in name and appearance, but of 
superior importance in the actual direction of the collect­
ions." Hastings - Harris, 13 July 1772, Add.Mss. 29125* 
108. (No evidence is available regarding Samunderamfs 
previous career).
3. Thackeray - Board, 15 Jun. 1775* BN Cons 114-9* lv, 77.
1the collections to Shyarn Singh, the agent of.the farmers.
He did not explain his delay in reporting SamunderamTs
dismissal, which must cast more than a little doubt on the
truthfulness of the charge, but attempted to give his action
greater credibility by arguing that in any case when Sylhet
was re-annexed to the collectorship of Dacca in June 1773
the Sylhet kachari was ordered to be closed and the diwan 
2
removed. He failed to mention, though, that on his own 
representations that the collections would be impeded, it 
was agreed on 17 January 177U to "have the kacheri re-estab­
lished on "the former footing."^ Samunderam * s story v/as 
that he was never allowed to take charge of his office; he 
was confined by orders of Shyam Singh.^ But he too did not 
complain for nearly three years and his silence is inexplicable 
unless he was detained for that length of time. If that was 
the case, it was odd that for three years no one at Dacca or 
at Calcutta noticed that no papers were coming from the diwan; 
however, the forging of Samunderam1s signature on the relevant 
documents would not have been a difficult matter.
With the only institutional check in the district 
removed, Thackeray and his banian Raghu Halik proceeded
. 1. Thackeray - Board, 15 Jun. 1775? BR Cons R8-9? lv, 7o.
2. Ibid. In truth, it was not specified that the diwan should
be removed. The re-annexation took place in July when 
Richard Barvell, a member of the Board, wras appointed to 
the Chiefship of Dacca. Sec.Public Dept - Sec.Board,
2k July 1773, BR Cons Ri+9, xl, 2312.
3. pr°t)PCR, 17 Jan. 11lk, DPR vii, 126-7.
U. Petition nd, Proc., 15 Aug. 1775? BR Cons RU9? -iv, 6i+.
vigorously to enforce the collections, in which they had
1
a personal stake. Richard Barwell who took over from
Nicholas Grueber as chief of Dacca on 2l± July 1773 allov/ed
Thackeray a free hand, although the separate collectorship
of Sylhet was abolished and Thackeray was made an assistant
of BarwellTs. Barwell was a?;are of Samunderam1 s removal
and that Raghu I.Ialik was de facto diwan of Sylhet, hut he took 
2
no action. Indeed, it appears that Thackeray and Barwell, 
and Raghu Malik and his brother Hari Malik, diwan of Dacca, 
formed a close association and zealously supported each other. 
Meanwhile, in Sylhet Thackeray had further strengthened his 
own position. He employed an undisclosed number of armed 
retainers ostensibly to meet the threat of an attack from 
sanyassis in alliance with the Jaintia Raja. Y/hen the attack 
failed to materialize Thackeray ventured that the enemy had 
probably been deterred by the preparations he had made. One 
cannot but wonder, however, whether it was not contumacious 
revenue payers whom Thackeray had been seeking to deter. There 
is no evidence, other than the accusations of some zamindars, 
that Thackeray used his retainers to assist Raghu Malik in 
collecting the revenues; but none either to disprove that 
plausible charge. In any case, the entire jama for 1772 - 3
1. Cf. Ascoli, F.D., Early Revenue History of Bengal and 
the Fifth Report 1612,' R8 - 9. \.'h'ile ment ioning 
Thackeray, he says that there is no evidence that any 
servant of the Company acquired any fortune at the 
expense of land revenue.
2. ..."from my considei?ation to you, /the Diwan/ holds but 
a nominal office as Rageo I.'ullick Circal officates.” 
Barwell - Thackeray, 26 May 177U> (from Barwell1s 
letters) SDR i, 19.
3. Thackeray - Board, 20 May 1773> BR Cons Rl+9> xl, 2023.
*1
amounting to 1,13,621 rupees was collected, something* as 
Thackeray said later, that was never known to happen in 
Sylhet.2
But early in the second year of the farm, 1773 - b, 
Thackeray ran into difficulties. Hastings in Calcutta took 
a new initiative towards centralisation, the long-term aim. 
"being to ""bring the super intendency of the collections in 
their detail immediately to Calcutta." As an intermediate 
step he recalled the collectors^" and grouped the districts 
into six divisions, each under a Provincial Council of Revenue 
subordinate tc the Board. Barwell was named chief of the 
Dacca division v/hich comprised the districts of Dacca, Sylhet,
5
Attya, Cogmari a.nd Earbazu. Thackeray, who had remained in ■ 
Sylhet by Barwell1s leave, was,nominated in November 1773 
third on the Dacca Provincial Council and ordered to Dacca 
to take his seat. No doubt he regarded, the prospect of 
leaving Sylhet with dismay. It must have seemed to him that 
his plans were ruined for Y/ithout his presence in the district 
he could neither successfully exploit the farm nor effectively 
supervise the various trading ventures in which he had become
1. Thackeray - Board with encl., 15 June 1775* BR Cons Rl+9» 
lv, 88. For Bengal and Bihar as a whole, there was a 
balance of ten per cent of the jama at the end of 1 7 7 2 - 3.
2. Thackeray - DPCR, 3 July 111b, DPR viii, 819.
5. fastings - lSullivan, 10 liar. 177U> quoted in Introduction
to The Fifth Report, ccxxxvii.
24*. Said Hastings: "I have always considered the collectors 
as tyrants, because the local advantages which they 
possessed...made it difficult for the Council to restrain 
them effectually, especially as the same interests by 
which these offices were acquired, would be always employed 
...to protect them." Ibid., ccxxxviii.
5. Ibid., ccxxxvi.
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engaged. As an excuse to remain at Sylhet Thackeray
shrewdly raised the hogey of the Jaintia Raja's designs on
the district. Barr/ell of course would not press Thackeray
to return to Dacca and it was not until January 1775 when
Broughton Rous succeeded Barwell as chief, that Thackeray
first sat at a meeting of the Dacca Council.
One gets the impression that Thackeray exaggerated
the Jaintia Raja's threat to Sylhet and transformed what was
merely an annual occurence into a special event. On
4 January 1774 he wrote to the Provincial Council at Dacca
that he would leave Sylhet as soon as possible in accordance
with the Board's orders recalling collectors hut that the
farmers were much alarmed at the situation, the Jaintia Raja
2having marched a body of men to the border with Sylhet.
He confessed then that he did not know what lay behind the 
Jaintia Raja's action but he thought it his duty to remain 
at Sylhet until the farmers were "perfectly satisfied."^
Pour days later he informed Dacca that he‘was convinced that 
the Jaintia Raja was determined to plunder Sylhet and he 
requested a company of troops.^- Dacca immediately sent the 
troops and on 27 January wrote that he should remain on the
5
defensive. That order could not arrive in time to curb
1. Proc. DPCR, 31 Jan. 1775? DPR ix, 38.
2. Thackeray - DPCR, 4 Jan. 1774? DPR vii, 124 - 5.
3. Ibid, 123.
4. Thackeray - DPCR, 8 Jan. 1774? DPR vii, 125 - 6.
5. Proc. DPCR, 27 Jan. 1774, DPR vii, 160.
Thackeray*s ardour. The sepoys had arrived at Sylhet town
on 24 January and the next day Thackeray engaged them in
an inconclusive skirmish with the enemy in the Jaintia
Raja’s territory. He replied to injunctions to remain on
the defensive hy arguing that such a posture would avail
the Company nothing and that it was necessary to bring the
Jaintia Raja to submission or the Company would obtain ’’little
pbenefit" from Sylhet. . In a private letter to Hastings,
Barwell found it necessary to "acquit Thackeray of any
intention to inflame" the situation, and added that it was
in Thackeray’s particular interest to be on good terms with
the Raja. He further informed Hastings
...he /Thackeray/ has, and may, suffer still 
more from the incursions of the hill people, and 
can have no prospect of advantage in continuing 
the quarrel.^
But Thackeray was urging conquest and annexation of the 
Jaintia Raja’s territory in the plains. He prompted an 
invasion which took place in March 1774 and the Jaintia Raja 
quietly submitted. The Board had never had any intention 
of annexing his territory^4- and restored the Raja to his 
possession on the conclusion of a treaty in which he promised 
to pay 15>000 Arcot rupees to the Company and undertook not
R
to impede navigation on the Surma, Thackeray negotiated
1. Thackeray - DPCR, 27 Jan. 1774, DPR vii, 171 - 2.
2. Thackeray - DPCR, 21 Peb. 1774, DPR vii, 297.
3. Barwell - Hastings, 22 Peb. 1774 (from Barwell*s letters) 
SDR i, 12. (This also raises the question of how early 
Hastings knew that Thackeray held the Sylhet farm.)
4. Board - DPCR, 28 June 1774, BR Cons R49, xlvi, 1795.
5. Thackeray - DPCR, 12 June 1774, BR Cons JUj-9, xlvi, 1793.
The Jaintia Raja was well placed to interfere with shipping
on the Surma as he owned a tract of land on the southern
bank.
the treaty in April and L'ay, and in June 177U Dacca told
him he could remain at Sylhet until perfect tranquility T/as 
1restored. The Jaintia Raja died soon after the conclusion
of the treaty and Thackeray immediately began to question his
son’s good faith, or lack of it, as an excuse to remain at 
2Sylhet. He was, as Lindsay later suggested, following the 
practice whereby the official responsible for Sylhet used 
the Jaintia Raja and the other hill chiefs as a whipping-boy 
when things went wrong in the district. And’things were 
going wrong, for the revenues had begun to fail.
It Y/as possible that there had been some of the 
habitual looting of the northernmost parganas by the hill 
tribes and no doubt some of the ryots had deserted the frontier 
tracts during the troubles. Thackeray had reported on 
18 January 1 77U that Sylhet town itself was for some days 
’’almost destitute of inhabitants.” But with only Thackeray’s, 
testimony on which to rely, it must have been impossible to 
gauge the extent either of the plunder or of the desertion of 
the lands, since it was in his interests to make matters 
seem worse than they were. He despatched a petition signed 
by the ’farmers’ to Dacca on 3 July 177U> stating that for 
three months, from January to Llarch, ’’the hill people of 
Jaintia entered our purgannahs and by the depradations they
1. DPCR - Thackeray, 20 June 177U> DPR viii, 623.
2. There Y/as really no precedent for the attack on Sylhet 
which Thackeray had said he feared. Incursions into the 
district Y/ere made by roving bands, not by the Raja at 
the head of an army.
3. Thackeray - DPCR, 18 Jan. 1774> DPR vii, 136 - 7.
committed every /very?/ great loss has accrued to the
collect ions." The petition further stated that the
farmers found it necessary to maintain a force for their
defence, costing 21,000 rupees, which was defrayed from the
collections. The farmers requested that this sum should he
deducted from the jama, as had "been the custom in Sylhet,
adding that when they engaged to farm the district on an
increased jama, they "did not apprehend that during your
/the Company’s/ administration the like disturbances would
have happened." Thacker&y as collector wrote a covering
letter to the petition in which he naturally underlined fully
the plea for a remission. He affirmed that what the farmers1
had "set forth...is but too time" and added:
.../the/ expense in keeping a great number of 
burghundasses besides those employed at the 
different thanas...added to the number of villages 
which were burnt and plundered with the many
purghannas which were entirely deserted and the
total stop which was put to all business for some 
months must make it evidently appear that the 
farmers do not now complain /but/ with every just 
cause. 3
Thackeray concluded by assuring the Provincial Council at 
Dacca that if the ’farmers* were given some "encouragement” 
and granted some indulgence for what they had suffered through 
the "calamities of war" the future instalments of revenue 
would be regularly paid.^ In fact, the collector-farmer 
was in a dilemma for it was also not in his interests to make
1. Petition encl. in Thackeray - DPCR, 3 July 177U, 
BR Cons Ri+9> xlvii, 2366 - 7.
2. Ibid., 2367.
3- Thackeray - DPCR, 3 July 177U-f DPR viii, 819. 
Ibid., 820.
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the situation appear so desperate that the Board might he 
prompted to send someone to investigate or even to cancel 
the farm. He had nothing to fear from Dacca, though; the 
Provincial Council was entirely sympathetic and noted that 
since Thackeray had forwarded the petition, he must he
■\
convinced in his own mind that the plea was a just one.
The Provincial Council added that from the propensity of the
hill people to plunder "being hred up from their infancy to
thieving and frequently making inroads without the knowledge
of their rajahs.../it was/ more than prohahie that.../Sylhet
had/ severely suffered" and ordered Thackeray himself to
2report on the losses the farmers had sustained. As it
turned out Thackeray - for the moment - had nothing to fear
from the Board in Calcutta either for they left Dacca to deal
with the plea for remission.J
At the end of Octoher 177U Thackeray submitted a
report claiming that the farmers of Sylhet had lost 10,052
rupees through plunder and had spent 21,372 on defence. The
latter sum, said Thackeray, included payments to horsemen
with ten horses, 258 barqandazes v/lth gingalls,^  a further
1,380 barqandazes, 58 messangers, the cost of powder, copper
and paper for cartridges, and the wages of four clerks
5
employed to keep accounts relating to the force. Thackeray
1. DPCR - Thackeray, 22 Aug. 177U, BR Cons Ri+9» xlvii, 2 3 6 7.
2. Ibid., 2368.
3. Board - DPCR, 30 Aug. 177U, BR Cons Ri+9, xlvii, 2372.
i-l-. Long tapering guns, borne on the shoulders of two men
and fired by a third.
5. Encl. in Thackeray - DPCR, 28 Oct. 177U, DPR viii, 1103 - U.
suggested that the farmers should "bear a proportion of the 
losses, and commented that if they were allowed a remission 
of the increase for the second year, that is, 22,500 rupees, 
that would he adequate and "they ought to he well satisfied
-j
with it".1 The Provincial Council at Dacca was especially 
indulgent, and without questioning Thackeray's figures, 
replied:
From what you represent and what is set forth 
in the petition of the farmers we think the 
remission of the russud /rasad.7 of last year 
cannot he denied them. Ue therefore authorize  ^
you to allow them a deduction of srs. 22,500...."
The amount of the remission is suspiciously close
to the amount the ’farmers’ claimed to have used from the
revenues for the defence of the district, and in the revenue
accounts it is shown therefore that the total jama of 1 773 ~ U
3
was collected. Just how much the ryots paid will never he 
known, of course; the handohast agreed between the Company 
and a farmer gave no real clue to the amount the farmer 
actually collected. But if Thackeray could suggest that the 
’farmers’ should hear a part of the loss arising from the 
events of the year it is perhaps fair to assume that the 
amount he collected was in fact more than the stated jama.
But if in ordinary circumstances it was scarcely possible to 
collect the revenues of Sylhet without some form of compulsion, 
then the degree of force used in 1 7 7 3 ~ ^ must have been 
greater than anything the petty zamindars and ryots had
1. Thackeray - DPCR, 28 Oct. Mlh, DFR viii, 1102 - 3.
2. DPCR - Thackeray, 12+ ITov. 177U> DFR viii, 1105.
3. Encl. in Thackeray - Board, 15 June 1775> BR Cons
RU9, lv, 88. The arrears for the whole of Bengal and 
Bihar at the end of 1773 - h was about fifteen per bent 
of the jama................................... ,
experienced earlier. If any credibility is to be attached 
to Sumnerfs pronouncement in 1771 that Sylhet was over­
assessed, then it is hardly surprising that in 1773 - 4, 
with the operation of the rasad or accumulating increase, 
the petty zamindars Of Sylhet should have conformed to the 
pattern beginning to emerge in the other districts and made 
loud complaints. There was no question of poor harvests 
giving rise to special difficulties for the weather that year 
had been favourable. Nor did the zamindars complain about 
their inability to pay the agreed revenues. What they 
complained about, and not in a direct attack on Thackeray but 
by one upon his banian, was that sums were being demanded of 
them in excess of those they had agreed to pay. But their 
appeals to Barwell and the Council at Dacca went unheeded.
The zamindars thereupon tool: the only course left open to them. 
By February 1775, vakils were presenting their complaints 
directly to the Board at Calcutta.
It is possible that if Hastings and Barwell had had 
no opposition in the Board Thackeray himself might have been 
asked to investigate the complaints of the zamindars. But 
the whole affair came to be dominated by the internal politics 
of the Board where Hastings and Barwell faced a vigilant and
A
assertive majority in Clavering, Francis and Honson. On
1. See L.S.Sutherland, 1 Hew Evidence on the Nandakumar
Trial" EHR July 1937, no. CCLKXIV, i+38 - 65. Sutherland 
argues that in the in-fighting on the Board the majority 
did not lack for accusations against the regime over 
which Hastings had presided, and that though the plaintiffs 
were sometimes notoriously indifferent to truth, the 
complaints nearly always contained some element of truth.
8 February General Clavering laid before the Board three
petitions submitted by the vakils representing the Sylhet
zamindars. The first, entitled "Petition of all the
1 2zemindars, talookdars, senapattyans, sigdars &c of the
province of Sylhet" stated:
...that they have been greatly oppressed by 
Fagoo Liullick, banian to LIr. Thackeray ever since 
his arrival in the province of Sylhet. That 
Fagoo Liullick has increased and extorted from them 
a much more considerable revenue than w:as allowed 
by their pottahs, that this was effected with such 
Tigour and cruelty so as to leave them destitute 
and unable to pay the Government's revenue, which 
has been the cause of the country being depopulated 
and the inhabitants leaving it for safety. That 
Fagoo Liullick forces salt half mixed with sand and 
damaged tobacco upon them at a most extravagant and 
/sic/ almost double the rate at which the same might 
have been obtained good and merchantable in the 
markets. That on their refusal to comply with
these rates, severity is exercised, and for the
payment peons are put over them by which means the 
petitioners are utterly ruined.
The petitioners added that they had applied to Barwell for
redress but "by means of the influence of Burry Liullick. .. they
did not obtain any,"^ The second petition was signed by
Iluhammad Chaudhuri of pargana Dinajpur who claimed that his
brother had died after being assaulted by one of Faghu I.Ialik's
servants: his brother was a salt merchant to whom Faghu Llalik
had sold salt mixed with dirt at an exorbitant price and the
beating was administered to compel him to pay his debt.^ The
third was a petition from Samunderam appealing for redress
■1 . Senapati, a holder of land on condition of performing
military duties.
2. Sardar, a head-man.
3. Petition, Proc. 8 Feb. 1775? BF Cons Idj.9? 1? 5U6 - 7. 
1+. Ibid., 5bl.
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against Raghu Halik for preventing him from taking up his 
1post of diwan.
After considering the petitions the Board decided
to meet the petitioners’ request and to send a civilian from
Calcutta to investigate the complaints. (Provision had "been
made, on the establishment of Provincial Councils, for
deputing commissioners to conduct local inquiries.) The
2task fell to Harry Palmer. Whatever preconceived notions 
he might have had on the case and Y/hether or not he was at 
the outset inimical to Thackeray are not known, hut since the 
majority on the Board could have vetoed Palmer’s appointment, 
it seems safe to assume that he belonged to their camp rather 
than to that of Hastings and Barwell. Thackeray, meanwhile, 
had gone to Dacca at the end of January 1775 to he present 
when Broughton Rous succeeded Barwell as chief. On 15 February 
Dacca was informed of Palmer’s forthcoming investigation and 
Thackeray immediately ’disclosed’ that the Jaintia Raja was
3
stirring up trouble and his presence was necessary at Sylhet,
By the time the vakils had heard that Thackeray intended to 
return to Sylhet and had got the Board to send the necessary 
orders to Dacca to prevent him from so doing, Thackeray had 
already left. However, the Provincial Council sent an
1. Petition, Proc. 8 Feb. 1775, BR Cons R49, 1, 548.
2. Palmer had arrived in India in 1763 and was initially 
placed in the Accountant’s office. From 1770 - 2
he served as a supervisor in Bihar. At the time of 
his deputation to Sylhet, he was a member of the Board 
of Customs. Bengal Civilians 0/6/27, 1413.
3. Proc. DPCR, 15 Feb. 1774, DFR ix, 129 - 30.
A
express to Thackeray informing him of the Board*s orders,
and noted themselves that there was no confirmation of the
2threat to the district reported hy Thackeray. The express 
arrived at Sylhet on 13 March, the day after Thackeray 
himself, and the collector had no option hut to return to .
Dacca immediately.
Palmerfs inquiry began in March and lasted until 
the end of June 1775. Thackeray found himself in deep 
trouble, though not so much from the investigation as from 
another quarter. A complaint was made to the Board by 
Khoja Kaworke about the improper interest of some of the 
members of the Provincial Councils in salt farms and on 
7 April the following circular was despatched to all Provincial 
Councils:
Having reason to believe that extra advantages 
have been enjoyed by Provincial Councils exclusive 
of their salaries and that farms have been set 
apart, the profits of . which have been or were 
intended to be appropriated to the emoluments of 
the members of the Council, we desire and expect 
you will give us a fair state of any such 
emoluments if they have existed, or do exist, 
together with the names of the farms if any have 
......... been set apart for such purposes..3
Clavering was the chief instigator behind these proceedings
and his main aim was to discover to what extent Barwell when
chief of Dacca had been involved in the salt farm of Sandwip.
1. The Board said that any intention on Thackeray’s part
to return to Sylhet "will meet with out highest
disapprobation considering the ...circumstances.1*
Board - DPCR, 10 Mar./sic/ 1775, DPR ix, 199. (Though 
the Board’s letter is dafelined 10 March at Port 
William it is entered in the Dacca proceedings of the 
same date).
2. Proc. DPCR, 10 Mar. 1775, DPR ix, 200-1.
3. Board - All Provincial Councils, 7 Apr. 1775, BR Cons
Ri+9, liii, 12+8 - 9. Khoja Kav/orke was dispossessed of 
the salt farm of Dakhin Shabazpiur. by Barwell who then 
let'it 'to another'per son. ' 'See' Sinha,' U.K.,'79 - '80.'
On 20.April the Dacca Council sent a general reply stating
that no farms or extra advantages of any kind were set apart 
• 1for council members. The members also sent individual
letters affirming that they were unconnected with any farms:
all except Thackeray, that is, who replied:
...I...think it incumbent on me to acknowledge, 
that I have had an interest in the Silhet farm 
tho* I cannot at present state the advantages 
arisen therefrom as the accounts are not yet 
closed. ...2
At first the majority hot in pursuit after Barwell seemed to 
have considered Thackeray an insignificant catch: it was not
until 19 hay 1775? over Hastings* initial objections that 
Thackeray’s statement was confidential and tendered in reply 
to a query from the Board, the object of which was not to 
have civilians implicate themselves,^ that the Board summoned 
Thackeray to Calcutta to answer charges regarding the Sylhet 
farm.
Thackeray had been less than truthful in his 
statement of 20 April and seemed to have thought that the 
Board would overlook his involvement in the farm. As he had 
said:
I flatter myself I shall be less liable to 
reprehension for enjoying any benefits from the 
farm, since the settlement of the district was 
never made by me; therefore it was not in my 
por/er to have lessened the Company’s revenue 
by an attention to my own interest. Had the farm
1. DPCR - Board, 20 Apr. 1775, BR Cons RU9, liii, 59$.
2. Thackeray’s statement, 20 Apr. 1775, 3R Cons RU9, liii, 
600.
3. Hastings’ minute, 19 Hay 1775, BR Cons R/+9, liii, 19 ~ 20.
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been in any other hands the same advantages would 
have arisen to the tenants and the Company^could 
not in any greater degree have benefitted.
He must have been anxious, though, lest Palmer’s inquiry
point him out not as having had an interest in the farm but
as the incumbent farmer and the sole one at that. Banned
from Sylhet, he apparently tried to abort the investigation
by claiming, through a petition he sent in early May that
since Palmer’s arrival in Sylhet the farmers were unable to
collect any revenue and had ”it not...in their power to pay
2
the monthly kists." But Thackeray Yfas clutching at strav/s.
The Dacca Council, headed novi by Rous, simply asked Palmer to 
use his best efforts to secure the revenues. Palmer replied 
that he could only try to persuade the zamindars and ryots 
to resume payment of the instalments but they absolutely 
refused to deal Yrith the farmers* agent, Shyam Singh, whom 
they knew to be an assistant of Raghu Malik’s. The 
zamindars assured Palmer that if the rent-roll then in force 
was replaced by the settlement Sumner had made for 1770 - 1 
and if someone independent of Raghu I.Ialik were entrusted writh 
the collections they would willingly meet their obligations.^ 
Palmer considered himself unauthorized to accede to the 
zamindarb4 request,^ and Dacca, awaiting further instructions^
1. Thackeray’s statement, 20 Apr. 1775, BR Cons Ri+9, liii, 600.
2. Petition from the "Farmers of Sylhet,” Proc. DPCR, 8 May 
1775, DFR ix, U53.
3. Palmer - DPCR, 20 May 1775, DFR ix, 592.
k. Ibid.
5• Ibid.
6. In reply to their query of 25 May 1775, whether "to
absolutely persist in enforcing the payments...from the 
zemindars, leaving them to their claims upon the farmers 
for surplus collections...or whether an entire suspension 
must be alloYred, "until Palmer’s report v/as available.
• • 'DPCR-' Board,' 25'May 1775,'DFR ix, 552'3. ' The'Board ’ ' 
typically replied that Dacca" "should insist on payment.
Board - DPCR, 23 June 1775, DFR x, 3.
from the Board, decided to let the matter lie for the time 
being.
Having failed in his apparent attempt to foreclose
the investigation Thackeray wrote on 15 June 1775 a lengthy
explanation of his conduct in Sylhet. This letter was not
taken up by the. Board until 15 August 1775 when they also had
before them the major part of PalmerTs report. V/hen he
first went to Sylhet, Thackeray explained, he found he had
been "much deceived by the accounts...of advantages arising
from the trade in that district." His salary was only
150 rupees per month; he had served the Company for more
than six years "without having made the least progress
towards acquiring an independency" and he was about "to
sacrifice a further part of.../his/ life for their interest."
In those circumstances, when he heard that the district was
to be farmed, he thought it was an opportunity
not to be neglected to make myself some amends 
for being deprived of all soceity and friends, and 
living in an unhealthy place, without a prospect 
of ever returning to my native country, or even 
keeping out of debt...3
If he had not taken the farm, he added, it would have passed
to "black men" and he had reason to believe that that v/ould
not have been to the Companyfs advantage.^ He considered
himself "as much entitled as an individual, to the just
advantages to be made from the farm as any other person."
1. Thackeray - Board, 15 June 1775 /sic/, BP Cons 249 >
•v
>H
•
2. Ibid., 7 2 - 3
3. Ibid., 7 1 - 2
4. Ibid., 73.
5. Ibid.
Thackeray enclosed accounts of the collections to
show that in the first two years of the farm the Company had
secured the full demand from Sylhet as proof that the CompanyTs
•\
interest v/as in all points his "first consideration." He 
also argued, without giving figures, that through his
2influence, production at the chunam works had."been increased.
Thackeray had a special word for his attackers, and 
he tried to convince the Board that the complaints made in
Calcutta were merely part of a private vendetta in which he
was the victim. Those complaints, hg said, sprang from 
"the disappointments of two, or three men at Silhet," 
especially Samunderam, and it was these men who had presented 
their "pretended grievances" to Palmer. It was at this point 
that Thackeray levelled the accusation of bribery against 
Samunderam. He went further and charged Samunderam with the 
embezzlement of public funds. Thackeray submitted that 
Samunderam and his allies were so set against him that they 
were compelling people to complain and were presenting "the 
most trifling circumstances" as acts of "the greatest oppression. 
The charge of bribery was not substantiated and that of 
embezzlement*5 never proven . Palmer reported, though, that 
Samunderam had spread the rumour that he was still the diwan
1. Thackeray - Board, *15 June 1775 /sic/, BR Cons RU9> 
lv, Ik.
2. Ibid., 75.
3. In his defence Samunderam alleged that Thackeray had
given him verbal instructions to take money out of. the 
Sylhet treasury to pay clerks employed to prepare the 
bandobast papers. DPCR .decided that the "charge... 
cannot be fixed without a further explanation from 
Ur. Thackeray" but that vras not forthcoming. See 
P^DPCR, 25 Apr. 1776, DPR xii, 390 - 3.
of the district and that the Board had honoured him with a 
khilat or ceremonial dress and that he had "prompted many to 
complain that had no previous intention.. ."by menacing some 
with his approaching authority and feeding others with
jj
profound /profferred?/ promises of his favours." Evidently,
Samunderam was using the trappings of office to organise the
resistance to Thackeray and his Banian hut it was perhaps an
exaggeration to claim, as Palmer did, that he had forced
people to complain. It was unlikely that the zamindars would
have complained against Raghu Malik, situated as they were
almost at his mercy, without just cause. Indeed, Palmer
disclosed on 30 June 1775 that some zamindars, apprehensive
that Raghu Malik would he left in charge of the collections,
wished to withdraw their complaints fearing that he might
then "perpetrate such unwarrantable projects as may hest suit
2and satiate his present suffocated spirit of revenge."
All along Thackeray seemed to have had great faith 
in his connections on the Board and to have felt that if the 
revenues were in fact realized, that that would soften the 
majority's displeasure. His alternative strategy to securing 
an abrupt end to Palmer's investigation was an attempt to 
have the collections enforced; both plans were pursued 
simultaneously. The petition Dacca considered on 8 Hay 
had requested that Palmer should assist the farmer's agent in
1 . Palmer - Board, 8 June 1775> BR Cons Ri+9, lv, 59* At
the same time Palmer said he had received "great assist­
ance from Samunderam in procuring the several papers that 
were necessary" for the inquiry. See I^DPCR, 25 Apr. 1776, 
DFR xii, 390 - 3.
2. Palmer - Board, 30 June 1775> BR Cons RU9» lv, 68.
making the collections. On 15 May Dacca had to consider 
another petition from the farmers, alleging that they laboured 
"under many inconveniences from the English aumun's residing 
so long at Sylhet" and stating that they feared if they were . 
"not supported by Government and authorized to carry on their 
business as formerly" no further collections would be forth- 
coming. On 27 May Palmer wrote that Shyam Singh, "being... 
/he supposed/ instigated by the influence of the farmers to 
use forcible means,.../had/ lately seized upon some of the 
zemindars in order to bring them to a settlement." Whether 
the confinement of the zamindars was meant also to disrupt 
Palmer's inquiry was not clear but it certainly was "in some
p
measure...an impediment." In late June another petition 
from the farmer's agent was delivered to the Dacca Council; 
this time Samunderam was charged with obstructing the payments 
and the vakil who had brought the petition to Dacca argued 
at the council meeting of 3 July 1775 that if the former diwan 
v/as expelled from Sylhet the collections would be resumed.
It appeared, though, that while the vakil v/as presenting his 
case at Dacca, Samunderam was already in confinement in Sylhet
1. Petition signed by "Ramsunker", I^DPCR, 15 May 1775? DFR 
ix, 1+97 - 8. Ram Shankar, Thackeray's vakil, v/as 
apparently well-connected, ■When Thackeray left Dacca, 
the Eai Rayan, Raja Gurdass, requested that Ram Shankar 
be employed as his peshkar or cash-keeper and be invested 
with a khilat of four cloths. The Boat’d agreed. Board 
Proc. 12 Dec. 1775? BR Cons Ri+9? lviii, 239 ~ i+0.
2. Palmer - Board, 27 May 1775? BR Cons El|9, lv, 55.
3. Proc. DPCR, 3 July 1775, DFR x, 5 - 6 .
1
and some zamindars had begun to pay their revenues.
But Thackeray v/as not about to be let off lightly. 
Palmer’s investigation was not as rigorous as it might have
2been; the commissioner was plagued throughout with illness
and living in the mofussil he might have developed some
sympathy for what had been Thackeray’s aspirations and for
the way in which the collector had attempted to realize them.
The investigation never revealed Thackeray as the farmer.
Apparently, iiaghu Llalik had declined to disclose the farmer’s
identity. Palmer’s only remark on that question, contained
in his letter of 27 hay, was as follows:
Who these farmers are I am yet at a loss to know, 
but imagine if hr. Thackeray is called upon he 
will inform.3
Palmer’s inquiry did throw up certain charges, though. These 
were that Thackeray had been involved in compelling people 
to buy his salt and tobacco at unfair prices, and that he 
had caused an increased sum to be levied on the district 
exceeding the jama or the authorized amount payable. On 
15 August the Board informed Thackeray of these charges and 
asked for a statement.^-
Thackeray replied on 27 August 1775? and ill
1. Postscript, Palmer - Board, 30 June 1775? BE Gons Iii+9» 
lv, 69. There is no evidence as to when Saruunderam
was released from his original confinement or when he was 
re-confined. Eventually, in accordance with Dacca’s 
parwana of 20 July 1775 (in response to the vakil’s plea 
of 3 July 1775) Samunderam v/as sent down to Dacca.
2. On 30 June 1773 he reported that he was in ”a very weak 
and languid state."
3. Palmer - Board, 27 may 1773? BE Cons Pl+9? lv, 37.
U. Board’s Proc. '15'Aug. 1773? BE Cons HU9? lv, 89.
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repaying his banian’s reticence he declared that had he 
been fortunate to have good servants he would not have been 
subject to so much anxiety and uneasiness. He could not be 
held responsible, he ventured, for oppression committed by 
his servants without his knowledge, or by the under-farmers 
in the mofussil. He denied that he was concerned in the 
sale of tobacco and he enclosed a copy of a proclamation 
he had made regarding the salt trade to prove that he v/as not 
guilty of forcing people to buy his salt. He also submitted 
that the extra imposts he had added to the jama were trifling. 
He concluded by saying that he had often repented having the 
Sylhet farm as it had been a source of anxiety and trouble, 
and he hoped that his candid confession and the lamentable 
situation in which he was placed would induce the Board to 
grant him the favour of permitting his return to Sylhet for a 
few months to settle his private concerns.
The members of the Board delivered their judgement 
on 12 September 1775? with Hastings and Barwell on the one 
hand and Clavering on the other representing the two extreme 
views. Hastings and Barwell in their joint statement found 
Thackeray "innocent of oppression," described his conduct as 
moderate and noted that his collections were duly kept up.
His crimes, they said, were "the crimes of a deviation from 
the public regulations, and a violation of the rigid line of
1. Thackeray - Board, 27 Aug. 1775? BE Cons iib3, lv, 380 - 3b. 
Incidentally, Firminger notes that Thackeray "probably 
for technical reasons was exempt from the restriction 
made by the Committee of Circuit" regarding the holding 
of farms by civilians; if that was the case, Thackeray 
did not mention it in his defence. See Firminger’s 
introduction to The Fifth Report, ccxxvi.
propriety, crimes productive of no ill consequence in
•\
themselves, hut of a had example." Clavering v/as scarcely 
so generous. According to him, it v/as established that 
Thackeray had farmed the district, that much more v/as 
collected in the revenues of the district than the stated 
jama, and that under Thackerayfs authority people v/ere com­
pelled to purchase had salt and tohacco. In the General’s 
view what remained to he decided v/as how far Thackeray v/as 
immediately concerned or could he "held answerable for the 
conduct of his banian, whom he invested v/ith the power of 
collecting the rents after he had procured the recall of 
Samunderam." On this point Clavering maintained that the 
irregularity of Thackeray’s conduct could not "he justified 
nor extenuated by the improper conduct of Ragoo Mullick” and 
that Thackeray’s "ingenious confession" did not acquit him 
"of being answerable.for the conduct of his banian who was 
authorized by him to act officially as his servant."
The two other members of the Board v/ere more 
restrained. George Llonson was willing to believe that 
Thackeray knew nothing of the oppression carried out in his 
name but he blamed the collector for allowing his banian an 
"unrestrained authority". He added that Thackeray knew he 
was violating the regulations in holding the farm of Sylhet 
or he v/ould not have done so under an assumed name, and for 
that he deserved to be censured.-^ For his part, Francis
1. Llinute of Hastings and Barwell, Board’s Proc. 12 Sept.
1775, BR Cons R2+9, lv, 561.
2. Clavering’s Minute, Board’s Proc. 12 Sept. 1775, BR Cons
RU9, lv, 5 6 3 - 6 .
3. Monson’s Llinute, Board’s Proc. 12 Sept. 1775, BR Cons
. . . Bh9,. lv, 569.- Q................. ...................
considered Thackeray’s conduct "highly hiameable" and did
not doubt that the Directors would be much displeased. From
what he knew of Thackeray he was ready to accept that the
collector never gave "any direct countenance to the misconduct
of his servants," but all the same, added Francis, Thackeray
could not have been ignorant of the violence and oppression
which his banian committed. If his own banian had not been
involved, Francis.concluded, Thackeray would probably have
1
inquired into and redressed the grievances of the ryots.
The Board by a majority decided to remove Thackeray 
from the Sylhet farm and from the Dacca Council. They agreed 
to permit him a short return to Sylhet to tie up his personal 
matters and even asked the Dacca Council to assist him.^ 
Thackeray’s removal from Sylhet meant that his banian lost all 
authority there. However, no separate action was taken 
against Raghu Ilalik. The Board felt that he would have had 
to be tried at Calcutta and that it would be too much trouble 
to summon witnesses from distant Sylhet. Thackeray remained 
in India until the end of 1776 attending to his private concerns 
which included a successful suit for the recovery of a debt 
owed to him by the Company which he, as the farmer of Sylhet, 
had supplied with elephants. Apparently, Thackeray tried to 
secure a posting in the service after Hastings and Barwell 
gained control of the Board following Llonson1 s death in 
September 1776, but he was "put...off with promises.However,
1. Francis’ Minute, Board’s Proc. 12 Sept. 1775> BH Cons 
Hk9, lv, 592.
2. Board’s Proc. 12 Sept. 1775? BR Cons KU9, lv, 599 - 601.
3. See extract from the diary of Joseph Farington, entry 
datelined 16 July 1806 at New Lodge near Hadley (where 
Thackeray had retired) in H.E.A. Cotton, "The, Farington,
’Diary"' BP' A P Jan - Dec’. ’1922, 5 - 48.
his tenure as farmer of Sylhet and his private trade seem to
have "been more lucrative than he had given the Board cause
to suspect. Hhen he left India he had acquired about 
1
£20,000. He ras still only twenty-seven.
The kind of thinking which Thackeray demonstrated
in his defence v/as certainly characteristic of his colleagues
at a comparable level in the service. His career in Sylhet
v/as perhaps exceptional chiefly because of the peculiar
2circumstances of that district. For two years Thackeray v/as 
literally lord of all he surveyed. True, he v/as dependent 
on Indian servants but as his employees they could hardly 
constitute a threat to his position. He was verjr much a lav/ 
unto himself and the policy decisions of Calcutta Y/ere so 
many pieces of paper. The Board in Calcutta were disposed 
to comment only when the collections were in arrears and the 
powers that counted at -Dacca v/ere on Thackeray !s side. ■ The 
only danger to his position could come from native society in 
the district and that appeared disorganized and impotent.
Yet, when Thackeray went too far, that same native society 
was able to draw upon surprising resources of strength to
3
resist him and his banian.
1. See extract from the diary of Joseph Farington, entry 
datelined 16 July 1806 in H.H.A. Cotton, "The Farington 
Diary” BP & P Jan - Dec. 1922, 5 - U8.
2. There v/as one other notorious case of; a collector being 
involved in a land revenue farm - that of Nathaniel 
Bateman who held the farms of the parganas of Kharakpur
and Honghyr while collector of Honghyr. Sinha, N.K. ii, 81.
3. It was not only in the larger zamindaris such as 
Najshahi that the “procedure of farming v/as... stonewalled 
by the authority of the zamindar.” Guha, 60. The same 
kind of thing happened where small zamindars were involved, 
as in Sylhet and in Chittagong. Cf. Serajuddin’s study 
of Chittagong.
1U9.
In retrospect it is astonishing how the sources 
of Thackeray1s greatest strength also fostered the major 
weaknesses of his position. The remoteness of Sylhet, 
while keeping him away from the immediate scrutiny of the 
Board also kept him out of touch with events in Calcutta, 
and he seemed to have "been surprised that complaints we re 
"being made against his "banian at the Presidency. His 
possession of powerful connections on the Board, Hastings and 
Barwell, which many a junior servant would have considered 
a profound advantage, marked him off as an object for attack 
"by Clavering and his party. The dismissal of the diwan 
removed the only institutional check in the district on his 
authority "but created at the same time a focus for dissension 
and discontent. And the very widespread abuse of authority 
in the service which might have induced his seniors to take 
a lenient view of his irregular conduct and even perhaps 
altogether to disregard it, prompted the inquiry which forced 
him to admit that he held the Sylhet farm. Thackeray was in 
a very real sense hoist with his own petard. Yet, his 
greatest mistake was undoubtedly to under-estimate the depth
ft
of local resistance and the sources on which it fed.
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CHAPTER IV
HOLLAED TS ZAHIHDARI SETTLELIEET 1775 - 80.
After Thackeray’s dismissal from the Provincial
Council at Dacca the Board sent William Holland, another
member of that Council, to Sylhet to supervise the collections
of the Sylhet year 1184 (13 September 1774 - 12 September 1775)
which had less than a week to run and to form a new settlement
1
for the ensuing year. Holland probably owed his deputation 
to the inofussil, which carried a monthly allowance of 1,500 
rupees, to his friendship with Francis and therefore with the 
majority on the Board. It is possible, however, that he v/as 
chosen simply because the revenues of the district were 
comparatively so meagre that the Board considered the assign­
ment suitable for the most junior member of the Dacca Council. 
If Holland was appointed as a majority man, the local effect 
was unfortunate, for his departure for Sylhet on 8 October 1775
left Broughton Rous, chief of the Dacca Council, outnumbered
 2 .................
by Charles Purling and John Shakespear, .(second and fourth
respectively in the Council) who must be counted as Hastings
1. Board - DPCR, 8 Sept. 1775, DPR x, 287.
Holland arrived in India on 11 July 1767 as a writer;
appointed in 1768 asst, to the Secretary, in 1770 asst, 
to supervisor of Dacca, in 1774 fifth in DPCR. Bengal 
Civilians 0/6/24, 919. Appointed chief at Dacca,
15 Sept. 1780.
2. Arrived in India 16 July 1765 as a writer, appointed in
1771 supervisor of Rangpur, in 1773 collector of Coch Behar, 
in 1774 second in DPCR. Bengal Civilians 0/6/27, 1526.
3. Arrived in India 11 July 1767 as a writer, appointed in
1768 asst, to the Governor, in 1770 asst, at the Durbar, 
in 1772 sec. to Board of Inspection, in 1773 asst, at 
Dacca and in 1774 fourth in DPCR. Bengal Civilians 
0/6/28, 1702. Afterwards, in 1778, chief at Dacca..
men. The minority position of the chief was emphasised
further when John Hogarth, appointed to fill the vacancy
created hy Thackeray’s removal, took his seat on the Council
in November 1775. The polarization of the members of the
Dacca Council into two opposing groups had an unhealthy
effect on the working of that body. The Council was marked
throughout its existence by jobbing and intrigue, related to
2and reflecting the in-fighting on the Board itself. The
alignment of power at Dacca v/as a serious handicap to Holland,
engaged as he was in an inherently difficult assignment, and
his problems were not eased but rather complicated by the
vagueness and ambiguity of the orders transmitted from Calcutta.
But Holland was a peculiarly able servant of the Company, with
definite ideas about revenue management and a demonstrable
capacity to grow in office. In the end, and in the face of
much obstruction from his colleagues at Dacca, lie would complete
his work in Sylhet by substantially reducing the huge arrears
■5
amounting to one-third of the jama of 177 -^1- - 5 , the last year
1. Arrived in India 20 June 1766 as a writer, appointed in 
1767 asst, to the Secretary, in 1770 asst, to supervisor 
of Krishnagar, in 177U- fourth in Council at LIurshidabad. 
Bengal Civilians 0/6/2U, 91U.
2. Rous was supported by Philip Francis while Purling and
Shakespear were friends of Richard Barwell. See
Lis s. Pur. FU, 175 where Francis writes to Rous on 
11 Aug. 11ll 1 "You see what a special move has been made 
to take Purling out of your way. The other gentlemen I 
presume have received proper intimations not_to be trouble­
some. The power seems to be instructed /sic/ to you alone.11 
Purling!s removal took Rous by surprise. (l.Iss. Bur. Fh,
Rous - Francis, 19 Aug. 1777, 183). See also Kaye and 
Johnson, 358 where Francis writes in his Journal on 16 Jan 
1778: "Shakespear appointed chief of Dacca, in the room of 
Rous, who resigned a month sooner than he jieed do, to 
accomodate the Parties. I oppose it....So now Barwell 
has got Dacca in Fee simple.”
3. The jama for 177^ - - 5 on the rasad system worked out by
the .CQirjuijbt.ee of. Circuit .was. Rs, .1,.23,621. . .The. balance . .
for that year, according to accounts submitted bj
Thaeker%y, was 1 ,5 8,7 
third of the jama. '50 kahons or Rs. 39,690, over one- Proc. DPCR, 15 Jan. 1776, DFR xii, 7 3 .
of Thackeray’s farm, and hy devising a settlement which
his superiors at Calcutta would regard as just and equitable
and would consider a standard for subsequent revenue arrange-
-1
ments in the district. Holland’s settlement lasted for six
years until the revenue system v/as overhauled by Hastings1
"permanent plan” of 1731. In truth, however, except for the
first two years of its operation when the jama was almost
fully realized the settlement was by no means successful. In
the long run it was the first flush of success that proved the
settlement’s undoing as the Board continued to regard the
jama set by Holland as a realizable assessment and rigidly
refused to deviate from it even when circumstances v/ere
markedly altered. Consequently, as will be shown,by 1781 the? *
collections were in a shambles.
Holland’s achievement in overcoming the opposition 
of the majority oh the Dacca Council, and acting in Sylhet 
as he saw fit was nevertheless of great significance for it 
demonstrated, as clearly,as Thackeray’s career at Sylhet, 
how much influence and authority a junior official of the 
Company could possess and exercise. . Holland no less than 
Thackeray showed that in many essential details what mattered 
were the ideas and motivations of the man on the spot and not 
the policy directives emanating from Calcutta. The establish­
ment of Provincial Councils, while placing obstacles to 
independent action, narrov/ed in no significant way the scope
1 . Robert Lindsay, nearing the end of his ten-year experience 
as the local official in charge of Sylhet, pronounced 
Holland’s settlement "with a few alterations...the most 
equitable that can be formed.” Lindsay - BOR, 12 June 
1787? SDR ii, 130. It was a judgement he expressed on 
several occasions and v/ith which the Board would concur, 
though John Y/illes, Lindsay’s successor, would disagree.
which Holland’s predecessor in Sylhet, for example, had 
enjoyed for a time. The experience of Sylhet district as 
a unit of the Dacca division suggests that the administrative 
system v/as still like a line solidly connecting a series of 
power circles while leaving others only marginally integrated 
with the whole. Virtually unsupervised powers in certain 
spheres such as revenue policy or private trade or the exercise 
of patronage in certain geographical areas, therefore, were 
waiting to he picked up by the person able to.acquire the 
necessary local knowledge and contacts and prepared to take 
what amounted to calculated risks. The fact v/as that the 
junior official on the spot or on deputation to the mofussil 
was often the only person in any position to acquire or usurp 
those powers. Holland, for example, manipulated the system with 
great adroitness in carving out areas in which to operate.
/ifter him, Robert Lindsay who v/as also deputed to Sylhet, 
though only an assistant to the Dacca Council and the most 
junior one at that, showed a similar skill to the same purpose.
Prom the beginning Holland was aware of the 
complexity of his assignment. There was an irreconcilability 
betv/een his two main tasks, of presiding over the close of 
the collections and forming a new settlement. He v/as not 
inclined to embark on the latter step without a prior enquiry
1. Born 175U, the second son of the Earl of Balcarres.
Oriental Miscellanies. 5. Arrived in India 30 July 1772 
as a writer, appointed in 1773 an asst, to the Khalsa, 
in 1775 an asst, to the Burdwan Provincial Council and 
in 1776 an asst, to DPCR. Bengal Civilians 0/6/25, 1096.
15^ .
1
into the value of the lands, and while pursuing that
investigation he could hardly expect to collect any of the
sums outstanding on the past year’s account. As he pointed
out to the Dacca Council:
...an examination of the collections of a province, 
however unavoidable, must of necessity occasion 
obstructions in recovering the revenues thereof, 
every landholder’s time and attention being 
employed upon the examination while it lasts 
instead of being bestowed upon the means of paying 
their rents.
It was both impractical and inexpedient to pursue his two 
tasks simultaneously, especially in Sylhet where the land­
holders would clutch at any excuse to evade payments. But 
the problem was true of the whole of Bengal, and when from 
time to time the Company ordered an investigation into the 
state of the lands it had always to urge its servants to 
proceed cautiously and with circumspection so as not to 
jeopardise the collections. Palmer’s lengthy examination of 
the charges against Thackeray and his banian had brought the 
Sylhet collections to a standstill for more than six months
and had been primarily responsible for the heavy balance at
..............3 ............................ ........
September, 1775. Holland himself was now forced to report
on 2k November that his own enquiries had put a stop to the
realisation of the arrears.^-
Even in the best of circumstances, liquidation of
balances was difficult and the petty zamindars of Sylhet
scarcely needed the excuse afforded by an enquiry to withold
1. Holland - DPCR, 12 Dec. 1775, DPR x, 657.
2. Holland - DPCR, 2 Jan. 1776, DPR xii, 66 - 7.
3. Ibid., 67.
k. Holland - DPCR, 2k Nov. 1775, DPR x, 561 - 2.
payments for they v/ere in many cases genuinely unable to
meet their obligations. Once the payments fell behind, they
v/ere not easily made up, and if there were instalments or
portions of instalments still outstanding at the end of
the year, then, as Holland noted, those arrears might "almost
be considered as desperate and ranked under the head of
zemindar’s debts” which v/ere "scarce recovered.” This v/as
the case even with "responsible” zamindars owning large estates
and Holland invited the Dacca Council to consider how much
more difficult the situation was in Sylhet where the greatest
monthly payments of many co-partners of the largest parganas
did not exceed eight hundred rupees and where in general
2most instalments did not amount to a third of that sum.
"The compulsion of confinement might have been exercised”
upon defaulters- Holland admitted, but the landholders of the
district v/ere seldom prosperous enough to keep cash in hand
and the persons who.stood as: securities were hardly better off.
Hence, he said,
confinement would...have only obstructed them 
from making collections in the mofufsill. . .'./".It/ 
would /not/ have had the same effect as the • 
confining of the Dacca zemindars and securities,
many of whom have both money and credit as well
as a character to support.3.
A recourse in Sylhet to the public sale of lands to recover
debts v/as also no real solution for from the general lack
of men of substance in the district it was usually impossible
1. Holland - DPCR, 2 Jan. 1776, DPR xii, 67.
2. Ibid., 66.
3. Holland - DPCR, 12 Dec. 1775, DPR x, 657.
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to find buyers. For example, on 30 July 1776 Holland sought 
permission to sell the lands of Saibram, a salt merchant who 
had been involved in deals with Thackeray and who, observed 
Holland,
has such pressing demands upon him, by different 
people, that I can have no dependence upon him, 
or expectation of securing from him payment of 
the Company’s revenue.^
Permission was granted but Holland found it impossible to 
conclude a sale. Would-be purchasers were probably put off 
by the threat of harassment by the dispossessed zamindars 
and their followers, and from the government’s point of view 
the cost of maintaining new owners in possession seemed un­
likely to be covered by the land revenue received. Moreover, 
with almost all the landholders in arrears and unable to pay, 
it would have been necessary to put up most of the district 
for sale. However, in the circumstances, Holland appears to 
have disapproved of any widespread sale of lands to recover 
arrears. There seems little doubt that he sincerely believed 
that "from motives of justice and humanity" it would be wrong 
to subject lands to sale so long as it was uncertain whether
p
or not they were "valued beyond their fre/sources."
It was only in the closing stages of the 1780s 
with the advent of more settled conditions in the district 
that dispossession of landholders, the ultimate punishment 
for failure to liquidate arrears, became readily applicable
1. Holland - DPCR, 30 July 1776, DFR xiv, 235.
2. Ext. Proc. DPCR, Holland’s Minute, 27 June 1780,
BR Cons R50, xxv, 1121 - 2.
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to the district. In the 1770s moderation v/as more productive 
than the dispossession or confinement of proprietors. Thack­
eray, v/hom the Board had permitted to return to Sylhet in a 
private capacity to v/ind up his concerns quickly Became
converted to this view when he found it impossible to collect 
2
any money. As the farmer involved he was really responsible 
for the balance and v/as anxious to do all in his power to 
reinstate himself in the Board’s favours. He impressed 
Holland with his new-found conviction and suggested as a way 
out of their mutual dilemma that instead of insisting on 
read.v money Holland should accept bonds from the zamindars 
not for the amount to which they were indebted, as far as that 
could be ascertained from the farmer’s accounts, but for 
whatever sums that they might be induced to consent to pay. 
Thackeray promised to be answerable himself for the remaining 
amount not covered by the bonds."5 Holland proceeded to act 
on this.suggestion and .by January 1776 had taken bonds totalling 
1,Oh,000 kahons or 26,000 rupees. In effect he had adopted 
a device for extinguishing arrears forbidden by the Board’s 
explicit orders that the revenues of one year should not 
encroach on those of another. It was clear, as Holland 
himself informed the Dacca Council, that the zamindars could 
honour their bonds only from the surplus of 1775 ~ 6, the
1. Board - DPCR, 8 Sept. 1775, DPR x, 287 - 8.
2. He found ’’the collecting of debts...slow and tedious." 
Thackeray - Holland, 20 Dec. 1775, DPR xii, 70.
3. 'Ibid. , 70 - -1..-. .
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year then in progress. Neither the Council at Dacca, 
however, nor the Board themselves seemed to mind that Holland 
had acted contrary to standing regulations; questions of 
policy often disappeared Before considerations of revenue 
gain.
In September 1776 Holland was able to report that
he had collected 1,15*892 kahons on the balance account for
Jillb - 5* ov about seventy-five per cent of the original
balance. Iiore would probably have been collected, he' said,
but it was late in the year when the accounts had been
2finally adjusted. It is evident, then, that the zamindars 
more than redeemed their engagements although they were not 
able to liquidate the whole of the balance. Holland’s 
moderation and initiative, had been repaid by good weather 
and a good harvest.
Having evaded the pitfall of his double assignment 
by postponing the attempt to collect the arrears of 1 7 7U 5
Holland was able to concentrate on forming the settlement for 
1775 - 6. Here, for an official of Holland’s strong 
convictions, there could be no easy way out. Settlement 
work v/as difficult and intricate, as John Sumner, the first 
civilian to be deputed to Sylhet, had discovered in 1770 - 1 . 
The formation of a just settlement v/as even more difficult. 
Holland, like other collectors, had to contend with the
1 . By this arrangement Thackeray v/ould be responsible for 
only Rs.7*500 as from the original balance of 1,58,750 
kahons, 15*000 kahons had been paid at. Sylhet and 
300 kahons at Dacca from the four most southerly parganas 
of Sylhet district after the accounts were closed.
See Proc. DPCR, 15 Jan. 1776, DPR xii, 73.
2. Holland - DPCR, 18 Sept. 1776, DPR xiv, 398 - 9.
deliberate attempts of the landholders and the qanungos to conceal 
the extent and value of the lands. But what was certainly 
even more irritating was the constant interference of the 
Dacca Council. This contained elements of a clash of 
personality, an instance of job-hunting and intrigue, and 
possibly evidence, too, of the interestedness of some members 
of a Provincial Council. I/lore significantly for the develop­
ment of revenue policy, it was also the result of the opposition-, 
of different ideas on revenue administration and on what
•i
contributed to the public benefit. These policy differences
were pinpointed later, in June 1780, in the debate over whether
the cess from Dacca district should be reduced, when Holland
found it necessary to address his colleagues as follows:
It is scarce a good policy for the proprietors 
of an extensive kingdom to be influenced by the 
same confined principles with the proprietors of 
a petty state - the latter is entitled to the full 
produce of the soil, but the former should act upon 
a more enlarged and liberal plan - not only every 
gradation of landholders down to the tiller of .the 
soil, should be allowed to earn a comfortable 
livelihood, but the monied man also by means of a 
confidential intercourse established between him and 
the landholder, equally beneficial to each and to the 
prosperity of the country should be enabled to 
reap an income indirectly from the lands.
However, subordinate officials had to come to terms with the
orders from the Court of Directors and from the Board at
Port ’Jilliam wrhich if they mentioned "the welfare and ease
of the inhabitants” usually proceeded to stress ”the best
interests of the Company.1 And though, indeed, the two
should have coincided, more often than not the interpretation
of what consiituted the public good emphasised inordinately
1. Holland - DPCR, 12 Dec. 1775, DPR x, 658.
2. Rxt. Proc. DPCR, Holland’s Llinute, 27 June 1780, BR Cons 
RyO,.xxv, 1120-1,
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the Company’s interests. The majority on the Dacca Council 
v/ere typical in doing just that.
Holland, with Rous’ support, favoured a settlement
in Sylhet with the zamindars, or as he put it in reference
to the various small landholders in the district, with those
persons who held ”a kind of feudal tenure immediately of
Government.” He was firmly opposed to the farming system
2where it could he avoided. Cn the other hand, Purling, 
Hogarth and Shakespear preferred to farm the district to the 
highest "bidder, despite the' continuing failure of the Committee 
of Circuit’s settlements all over Bengal and the abuses which 
arose from the auctioning of farms, instances of which all 
the members of the Provincial Councils had certainly 
encountered. Doubtless, they believed that there was still 
much concealment of assets and that there was still a real 
surplus which could be safely and properly extracted, ’ and 
that an accurate survey by British agency being impossible, 
they must and could rely on the business-like shrewdness of 
the revenue farmer to set realistic targets and bring in the 
surplus. They were convinced that their plan v/as the most 
advantageous course that could be pursued and were properly 
indignant when Holland, who was inclined to take a less 
short-term view of things, suggested that that might not be 
the case.
In Holland’s view it was essential to ’’rate the
1. Holland - DPCR, 1 Nov. 1775, 213 x> ^80-
2. Ibid.
lands equitably and impartially,r; that v/as ’’the principal
-]
object...in the formation of a settlement.” He did not
believe that a fair assessment could be arrived at through
an auction since that would produce, as the Committee of
Circuit’s settlements had shown, only conjectural and mostly
inflated estimates. The ideal approach would have been to
carry out a general measurement, taking care to exercise a
strict supervision over the Indians employed in the project.
However, that method would have been tedious and expensive
and really feasible only if conditions had been more settled
and European officials less scarce on the ground; in any
case, the Board v/ere hardly in a mood in 1775 to consider a
general survey of the district. But the value of the lands
could still be assessed, though admittedly with less accuracy
than by a general measurement, through an examination of the
records of past collections and of the various accounts in the
possession of the qanungos, together with something like a
personal tour, an important ingredient in the formula. This
was how Holland proceeded in the end. He spurned the farming
system which could only provide an impressionistic estimate
from the top, in favour of a more painstaking measure which
would rate the lands from below. He argued that if a fair
assessment was reached the zamindars would be willing to
hold the lands on those terms for two reasons: firstly, in
ordinary circumstances they preferred to enter into engagements
instead of suffering a temporary loss of their lands, even if
2
they were granted their rusum, and secondly, they were aware
1. Holland’s Einute, 21 July 1777? DEH xvii, 152.
2. Perquisites.
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that if they rejected equitable terms the Company would have
•i
no difficulty in obtaining farmers on those same conditions.
Holland admitted that some zamindars might put up a show
of refusal even to terms which v/ere demonstrably just in
order to force a reduction in an assessment which, as they
knew from experience, would be taken as a precedent for
future settlements. But his experience v/as that these very
zamindars, faced with the farming of their lands, would make
this "the subject of loud complaints and they would gladly
recover them by engaging to pay an increase even upon the
2
terms offered by the farmer.” The conclusion was 
inescapable, Holland believed, that if the lands were rated 
fairly the landholders would be inclined to conclude 
engagements and to pay the revenues. If persistent arrears 
occurred, then, of course, these could be blamed on mis­
management and the Company would be morally justified in 
dispossessing the defaulters.
The majority of the Council, hov/ever, would not 
allow Holland the freedom to act■in the way he desired. From 
the first, Shakespear was piqued that the Board had not 
selected him for the task which they had entrusted to 
Holland; on 11 September 1775 he publicly recorded his 
hope that the choice of his junior was not based on any
3
adverse opinion of his integrity and on 8 Lovember, he 
admitted that the appointment was one to which he "had in
1. Holland’s I.Iinute, 21 July 1777? DFH xvii, 152.
2. Ibid.
3. ShakespearTs Hinute, 11 Sept. 1775? D7H x, 289.
-1
some measure preferred a claim.1 But the real trouble 
came vrhen Purling, who had been absent from Dacca when the 
original orders regarding Holland's deputation were received 
from Calcutta, returned to the Council. He arrived about 
ten days before HollandTs departure for Sylhet but chose 
to wait until 19 October, eleven days after Holland had 
left, to suggest that though the Board had sent Holland to 
the district, they did not mean to preclude the Council 
from taking any measures thought necessary for “the security 
of the Sylhet revenues.” He proposed that the Dacca 
Council should not allow Holland finally to conclude the 
settlement until it v/as ascertained whether better terms 
could not be secured from any “responsible“ person in Dacca, 
and that an advertisement should be published at Dacca 
inviting proposals for the farm of Sylhet district. It is 
possible that Purling had been put up to this by Shakespear 
■who did not want to appear as the prime instigator. Broughton 
kousT objections that Holland should have a free hand and 
that any such advertisement at Dacca would be a stab in the 
back^ were waved aside. Purling and Shakespear admitted that 
the implementation of their proposal might be "a control1' 
on Holland's action in Sylhet but they did not agree that that 
v:ould amount to a reflection upon Holland's abilities.
1. Shake spear's Ilinute, 8 ITov. 1775, DPH x, U87.
2. Holland himself had not proceeded immediately to Sylhet
on receiving the order of his deputation, but had
remained at Dacca until 8 October 1775? awaiting the 
arrival of Thackeray whom he considered “the only 
European that could furnish me with any lights that might 
enable me the better to execute my commission.”
Holland - DPCH, 1 Nov. 1775, DPH x, i+79-
3. Purling's Ilinute, 19 Oct. 1775, DPH x, J+1 6.
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Accordingly, it v/as carried, by a majority of two to one, 
that sealed proposals should he submitted to any member 
of the Council before 15 November 1775 for the farm of Sylhet 
for two years. The majority went even further to wrest the 
initiative from Holland. They informed him of their advert­
isement and ordered that any proposals he might receive in
consequence should be sent to them with his opinion thereon,
2and that he should await their "further instructions." This 
move threatened to reduce Holland to little more than a 
posting-box. The exasperated chief at Dacca, outmanoeuvred 
and outvoted, could only refer the dispute to Port William, 
but not before charging the majority with disobeying the 
orders of the Board.
The deep split in the Council caused some furious 
activity in the evening and night of 19 October, after the 
meeting had broken up. Purling' and Shakespear sought to 
replace the joint minute which they had delivered at the 
meeting, presumably because it did not answer sufficiently 
the accusation of disobeying- orders, with another statement 
stressing that they v/ere activated only by the interests of 
the Company. They could not recollect, they added, "one 
instance where a member of a body deputed from that body" 
had been "independent of its control,"^ and this was the 
assumption on which they were proceeding. Rous refused their
1. Hogarth was absent ill, but on 8 Nov. 1775 he entered a 
minute supporting Shakespear and Purling!s position. 
Hogarth’s Minute, 8 Nov. 1775? DPR x, 1+90 - 1.
2. DPCR - Holland, (Rous dissenting), 19 Oct. 1775? DPR x, 
1+19.
5. Purling and Shakespear - Rous, 19 Oct. 1775? DPR x, 1+21.
1
request to change the original minutes and. took the occasion
to reaffirm that he highly disapproved of the measures adopted
by the Council that day as they "set at nought the orders of
the Hon’ble Governor General and Council*" The majority
tenaciously held to their belief that a measure which would
benefit the Company could not be seen as defeating the-' Company ’ s
orders, especially since in any case the Board would have to
2approve finally of any settlement.
Holland’s reply to the Council’s orders of 
19 October was characteristic of the impatience of a nan 
suddenly interrupted in his work. Since the majority had 
acquiesced in Rous1 proposition that the dispute should be 
referred to the Board, Holland supposed that they v/ere actually 
in some doubt as to whether they were entitled to proceed as 
they had. He suggested that he too might be allowed some 
skepticism and though stating that he would follow the 
majority’s orders until the situation was clarified by the 
Board, he went on to impugn the disinterestedness of both 
Purling and Shakespear. He recalled that he had remained at 
Dacca for almost a:.month after receiving the order for his . 
deputation to Sylhet, and though the Sylhet year 1165 (1775 _ 6)
1 . Because the joint minute of Purling and Shakespear . was 
entered, he said, with his objections before them.
Pous - Purling and Shakespear, 19 Oct. 1775? DFH x, 2+21. 
The duo replied: "...in many and repeated instances we 
have seen every member of this Board /DPCl\/ permitted 
to alter and amend his minutes upon maturer reflection 
and*we cannot but think it a hardship to be denied it, 
in an instance of such material consequence as that of 
clearing ourselves from any assertion we are confident 
we could never intentionally deserve." Purling and 
Shakespear - Pons, 19 Oct. 1775? DPP x, 2+22.
2. Ibid., 2+23.
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had begun in that interval,
nevertheless no publication was issued for 
receiving proposals for farming the province 
nor any directions given me in that time 
concerning the settlement of it.-*
Shakespear had casually remarked once at the Council table,
recollected Holland, that he knew a person v/ho would farm
Sylhet at a high jama whereupon Holland had stated his
2objection to the farming system. But, Holland said:
Nothing further past /sic/ whilst I was at 
Dacca...nor was it thought necessary to give 
me any directions when I took my leave of the 
Board /the Dacca Council/ nor even any intimation 
that you would afterwards furnish me v/ith your
in struct ions. 3
However, no sooner has he arrived at Sylhet, he commented,
than directions are issued tc me and a publication 
made for proposals to be delivered for farming the 
Sylhet province, which measures, as it would have 
considerably expedited business...would have been 
with more propriety taken while I was at Dacca.
He was treated, he said, in a way he did not deserve, and he
was convinced that Hous had nothing to do writh it for the
Council’s orders were ’’directly repugnant to the sentiments”
5
the chief had expressed to him while he was at Dacca.
Purling and Shakespear both attempted to reply to 
this careful attack: the farmer lamely insisted that he had
returned to Dacca only about ten days before Holland’s
1. Holland - DPCH,
2. Ibid.
^ • Ibid.
k. Ibid. , i+81 .
3. Ibid.
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departure and had -"brought up the subject at the first 
convenient opportunity, but Shakespear was much more frank. 
After expressing his alarm that Holland had stooped to 
recount openly a private conversation (an example he would 
not chose to follow and no man was safe if the expressions 
of an unguarded moment were to be brought against him in 
public argument) Shakespear candidly admitted that he did 
not raise the matter earlier because he would have been 
outvoted by the Chief and. Holland, but that when Purling 
"thought it expedient to propose the measure" inviting 
tenders for the farm of the district he had of course lent 
his support.^
The vagueness of the original orders of the Board 
presented the opportunity which the majority in the Dacca 
Council exploited in an attempt to control Holland’s actions 
in Sylhet. Y/hy they did this is arguable. The most 
generous explanation would be that they hoped to guard 
against a repetition of the Thackeray debacle now that Sylhet 
was no longer an independent collectorship but under the 
jurisdiction of the Dacca Council. At the other extreme and 
more probably, they might have wished to secure the farm for 
one of their Indian dependents. Or it could be that they 
wanted to demonstrate their zeal and commitment to the service 
by ensuring that the Company secured the best possible terms.
The Board had failed to demonstrate the extent of 
Holland's authority. Purling and Shakespear could claim,
1. Purling’s Minute, 8 Nov. 1775? DPH x, U86.
2. Shakespear*s Minute, 8 Nov. 1775? DPB x, U87.
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therefore, that as a member of the Dacca Council Holland
was responsible to that body. On the other hand, Holland
seems to have taken the position that he had been personally
entrusted with the formation of the settlement and that the
powers necessary for settlement work had been delegated to
him by the Board. There was a similar confusion or
uncertainty about the duration of the settlement which
Holland was to make. The Board's original orders were
written on 8 September 1775 and they required Holland to
"take charge of the collections of the present year and to
form a settlement for the ensuing year." Holland■took this
to mean the collections for the Sylhet revenue year,
13 September 177U - 12 September 1775 and a settlement for
the ensuing year. The Dacca majority preferred to believe.
that the Calcutta Board had had the Bengali year in mind -
which began on 12+ April - and that they intended Holland’s
settlement to end when the Committee of Circuit's settlement
expired in the other districts of Bengal, that is, in 
1
April 1777. It is quite conceivable that the Board had
mixed up the date. It would have been easy for a hurried
and fully occupied Board, not much acquainted writh the remote
frontier district and apt to consider it of little consequence,
2to overlook its deviant dating system. Indeed, it would not 
have been the first occasion that a like misunderstanding had
1. DPCH - Holland (kous dissenting) 19 Oct. 1775? DPP x, 
U19.
2. Common to the province of Bihar and the Bengal districts 
of Bhagalpur, Hidnapur and kangpur.
-1
occurred. It permitted the Dacca majority, however, to 
argue that the Board intended simply to continue the Committee 
of Circuit’s method and strengthened their resolve to farm 
the district.
But if the Board at Calcutta had not made themselves
clear, the majority at Dacca were equally confused in their
turn. It was a confusion forced upon them by Holland as he
proceeded to manipulate the system to rid himself of their
interference. In reply to the Council’s letter of 1 9 October
1 7 7 5 * informing him of the decision to farm the district,
Holland'confronted Purling and his associates with a request
for clarification. His query was a simple one but he must
have realized that because of their unfamiliarity with conditions
in Sylhet the majority were not competent to answer it. Holland
ashed the Council to specify whether they would "chuse to let
all the purgunnahs in the province together with the sair in
one general farm, or whether /they/ would chuse to let the
several purgannahs in distinct farms and the different
2
gunges &c that compose the sair in distinct farms.” The 
proposed advertisement referred, of course, to the "farm of 
Sylhet district;” Holland’s game ¥/as therefore clear, 
especially as he went on to inform the Council about the 
dangers involved in letting the district in a general farm.. 
Holland pointed out that if they wanted to farm the district
1 . The Llurshidabad Committee of Revenue had made this error. 
See page x\ . Holland disagreed with the majority over 
the duration of the settlement which he thought the 
Board intended for 13 Sept. 1775 - 12 Sept. 1776 only. 
Holland - DPCR, 1 ITov. 1775, DPR x, h&k.
2. Holland - DPCR, 1 Nov. 1775, DPR x, U83.
170.
as a single unit the transaction would have to he carried
out at Dacca as there were only one or two persons in Sylhet
"I
who were capable of undertaking such a contract. But,
warned Holland, whatever proposals were tendered at Dacca
would be "of a desperate nature" and most likely would
ultimately be reduced to that of Samunderam, former diwan of
the district. There vras no one at Dacca besides Samunderam,
Holland argued, who could offer terms which were based on
2any real knowledge of the resources of the district. "So 
void are our offices there, both country and Europe, of 
papers relative to this province,11 he added, "that any other 
person who should give in proposals for farming it must do 
so upon the most wild conjecture.Holland’s case against 
a general farm had the desired effect;. the majority, thrown 
into disarray, were both reluctant and unable to decide on 
how to rent the district. A settlement with Samunderam was 
out of the question as he stood accused at that time of 
corruption and embezzlement while in office in Sylhet. On 
the other hand, as the majority no doubt recognised, their 
agreement to let the district in separate farms would be a 
concession of total victory to Holland as arrangements on 
that miniature scale would have to be made in the mofussil 
and could not be effectively supervised from Dacca.
Holland had calculated well, and in an unconcealed
1. Holland - DPCR, 1 Nov. 1775, DPR x, U83. He did not 
say who these persons might be.
2. Ibid. (Even Samunderam, Holland disclosed, had already
made offers to him privately which were unrealistic.)
3. Ibid.
though subtle prod, had ventured to assert that given the
general dearth of information about conditions in Sylhet
...the interests of Government will be equally 
well taken care of if it is left to me to make 
the settlement; as from my local residence I 
must be the best judge, tho’ perhaps very far 
from a perfect one, what assessment of revenue 
the province will bear.1
But the majority would not accede to Holland’s gentle 
suggestion.^. Obviously.stalling for time they replied on 
8 November that they could not choose between a general and 
separate farms until the proposals v/ere delivered! Further­
more, they insisted that:
With regard to Hr. Holland’s assertion that 
whatever proposals may be_made at Dacca must be 
of a desperate nature.../they/ have obviated this 
as much as possible by their publication which 
directs that none but principals and men of 
responsibility shall deliver proposals.^
And they added:
...it is well known that there are in Dacca many 
men of very large property and it is hardly 
probable if any such should'offer that they will 
risk their fortunes and characters in a purgunnah 
the sources of;the revenue of which they are 
unacquainted with, nor can they allow that even a 
person taking the farm who should be_only informed 
of the gross produce can detriment /sic/ the country 
or the collections since they /there?/ are estab­
lished sources upon wrhich only ’he must engage to 
collect.
It might be thought that confusion had here deepened into a 
startling naivete, but the truth was that the majority had been
1.. Holland - DPCR, 1 Nov. 1775, DEE x, i+63.
2. Proc. DPCR, 8 Nov. 1775, DFR x, U85.
3. Ibid.
l\-. Ibid.
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trapped in the peculiar strait-jacket of a system which 
stifled initiative by its uncompromising attitude to failure 
with the collections.
On 20 November the majority claimed that they
were convinced it would be more profitable to the Company
to let the entire district to a single farmer "of credit and
substance" rather than to parcel out the lands to a variety
of persons. Separate farms, they considered, would have the
effect of "only increasing the number of collectors and
multiplying extortions and abuses." Yet the majority, set
wavering by Holland’s letter, still would not decide firmly
in favour of one or the other. "We were cautious how we
instructed Hr. Holland," they confessed, "because had we tied
him down to a particular mode we might have laid ourselves
2
open to just censure had any failure happened." Purling 
and his two colleagues had elected to discount the culpableness 
of equivocation. The majority had claimed, as their 
perogative, the interpretation of the Board’s orders, since 
they were responsible for their execution.*5 Yet, faced 
with a question of signal consequence, affecting the whole 
basis of the settlement, they were crippled by fear of making 
the wrong decision and retreated into evasion and incon­
clusiveness.
The Dacca Council’s proceedings of 20 November 1775 
were taken up almost entirely with the now overdue settlement. 
The deliberations had begun with a remark by the chief that
1. Proc. DPCR,20 Nov. 1775, DPR x, 535.
2. Ibid.
3. rroo. 8.Nov. 1775, DFR x, 485-6.
the time set for receiving applications from prospective 
farmers had expired five days earlier; he had then surmised 
that no additional proposals were to he expected and had 
commented that it would he pointless to await any from Holland 
as the Council had never replied to his enquiry ahout a 
general or separate farms. Rous had disclosed that five 
proposals had heen submitted hut he was still unwilling to 
retract his support for Holland's position. He went on to 
suggest that it would he more reasonable to relay the 
proposals that had heen received to Holland with instructions 
to settle with the zamindars, if in that way more favourable 
terms could he obtained, and:':if not, to transmit his comments 
on the farming proposals to Dacca. Pious repeated his 
insistence that Holland was the most competent person to 
conclude the settlement, by reason of his local experience in 
Sylhet, and expressed his belief that Holland would secure 
better terras for the Company from the zamindars than those ■ 
terms which had been received in reply to the Council's 
advertisement. lious was sticking out his neck, but as he 
said, he was prepared to stake his own reputation upon Holland's 
professional abilities. It was evident that lious, like 
Holland, preferred a settlement with the zamindars but the 
way in which he cast his argument, with the implicit under­
taking to acquiesce in farming the district should the farmer's 
terms prove more attractive, demonstrated that he too was a 
prisoner of the dilemma that posed an option between the
1. Rous1 Liinute, 20 Nov. 1775, DPR x, 527 - 32.
1lb.
highest revenue and the most constructive settlement.
Though fearful of taking a decision themselves the
majority v/ere reluctant to permit Holland, who had no qualms
ahout accepting the consequences of his programme, to proceed
with a. zamindari settlement as from the outset he had intended.
They had gone too far to retire gracefully. They dismissed
H g u s 1 suggestion that Holland should he allowed to go ahead
with his zamindari plan hy maintaining that Holland could not
scrutinise the relevant accounts and papers and form a
handobast before the current heavy aman /November,)’ harvest was 
*1
completed; the implication was that by that time the
zamindars would no longer be able to pay. They then at once
contradicted themselves by saying that
/they/ have little apprehension that the delay 
necessarily arising in reletting the district can 
be prejudicial to Government since the usual mode 
upon these occasions is to collect upon the proceed­
ing /sic/ year’s jumma till the new arrangements 
can be made and perfected.
They went on to suppose that
Hr. Holland does and will continue to secure the 
revenues upog that jumma till a final settlement 
■ may be made...................
This was really more than a contradiction; if seriously
intended it was also ignorance and a lack of comprehension of
the revenue business. As Holland had to explain, there was
no existing government jama in Sylhet ("excepting what respected
the v/hole amount revenue /sic/ of the province") other than
Thackeray’s discredited jama and it was unrealistic to expect
the zamindars to pay on that assessment. Furthermore, as they
1. Proc. DPCH, 20 Nov. 1775, DPP x, 532.
2. Ibid., 55b - 5.
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should have laiov/n, it was usual practice to stop all collections 
while a settlement v/as being nade. Nevertheless, on the 
easy if unreal assumption that collections would somehow 
continue, they again stalled for time, hy extending the date 
for receiving tenders for the farm of the district.
They thus made plain that if they were not satisfied
with the five proposals received, they continued to support
farming as a system. The question whether that system was
not an invitation to exploitation of the ryots was raised,
but they managed to convince themselves that since the ryot
"doubtless now pays to the utmost" settling with the highest
2
bidder could not increase his burden. To set the issue 
aside so glibly might.have indicated naivete or lack of 
experience, but neither could easily be attributed to Purling, 
Shakespear and Hogarth, none of them a novice in revenue 
matters. It must be assumed that it was amour propre which 
drove them forward, and the wish to secure the greatest gain 
for the Company, and so to improve their own standing in the 
service, which blinded them to the possibility of extortion 
by the revenue farmers.
By the end of the meeting of 20 November, though, 
the majority had dealt aggressively with Rous and had 
ostensibly driven forward confidently v/ith their ov/n policy, 
they.... j. hr were really on the defensive. By then only the 
Board could rescue them from the situation in which they had 
too easily entangled themselves - and an urgent note was
1. Holland - DPCR, 12 Dec. 1775, DPR x, 657.
2. Proem DPCR, 20 Nov. 1775, DPR x, 535.
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accordingly sent reminding- the Board that they were still 
awaiting a clarification of the Board's original instructions, 
meanwhile they did what they could to avoid any blame which 
might fall.
If slow to assume the responsibilities of directing 
policy Purling and his colleagues were nevertheless quick 
in defence, a mark both of their embarrassment and of its 
natural outcome, their heightened sensitivity to criticism.
Uhen Holland wrote on 21+ November 1775 that the Council 
had not answered his query on the nature of the farm and 
that their silence on the matter was obstructing his work 
and causing delay, the majority swiftly replied that his 
protest had in it "more of petulance than reality"; they 
were more entitled to complain, they declared, since it was
Holland's witholding any proposals which he might have received
■ 1that was responsible for the drawback] They cautioned him
that the blame would rest with him should the Company suffer
any loss, and reiterated that their "measures...were calculated
2
...to procure a speedy and an advantageous settlement." But
as lious intimated in decling to add his signature to the reply, 
the majority were side-stepping the issue; their reply to 
Holland left his query still unanswered and they were simply 
repeating the old order that he should transmit to Dacca any
3
farming proposals delivered to him.
The stalemate continued until 11 December 1775 when 
the Dacca Council received the clarification they had sought 
from the Board, with an unsolicited expression of dismay that 
"so frivolous an occasion should have furnished so much debate
1 . DPCR - Holland, (Rous dissenting) nd, but Proc. DPCR 
. . .30 .Nov. .1775?-DPR x,. 561+.........................
2. Ibid., 561+ - 5.
3. Rous’ Hinute, Proc. DPCR, 30 Nov. 1775? D?il x> 565.
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and loss of time." The original intention, the Board 
explained, was that Holland should form the settlement and 
then submit it to the Dacca Council to be ratified. The 
Board directed that the five proposals which the Council 
had received should be sent to Holland with instructions 
to form the settlement as quickly as possible "in such a 
mode as shall be most consistent with the interests of the
-j
Company and the ease of the inhabitants.’1
These latest orders were a complete victory for 
Holland. The Provincial Council had retained the right to 
approve the settlement but that was merely an administrative 
nicety. The crucial point was that they were denied any 
interference in the formation of the settlement. The level 
of the demand and the kind of settlement, farming or 
zamindari, were to be determined by Holland.
As it turned out the Board's decision was a 
fortunate one for both the Company and the majority. Had.the 
decision gone against Holland and the majority had been able 
to overcome.their timidity they would, have had to select one . 
of the five proposals submitted. There was not much to
choose between them. Pour of the bidders were ready to farm 
the district according to the terms laid down by the Committee 
of Circuit and the fifth offered an increase of 2,000 rupees 
on the Committee's bandobast for 1776 - 7. But the
arrangements made by the Committee of Circuit for Sylhet 
and indeed for most of the other districts had already proved
1. Board - DPCR, 1+ Dec. 1775, DPR x, 621 - 2.
2. Por details of the proposals, see Proc. DPCR, 11 Dec. 1775,
DPR x, 621+ - 6. Hone of the bidders were known proteges
of Purling or Shakespear.
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unworkable and had provoked strenuous complaints of over- 
assessment from the zamindars. It is hardly conceivable that 
a settlement in Sylhet with one of the five prospective 
farmers would have proved successful. The inhabitants of 
the district would have regarded such a settlement as a 
reimposition of the system they had complained against and so 
effectively resisted, and most likely they would have conspired 
again to withold all payments. Holland unceremoniously put 
the proposals aside and concentrated instead on examining the 
accounts of previous years in order to gain some knowledge of 
the sources from which the revenue was drawn.
By 5 January 1776 Holland had completed his
1
investigations and had drawn up a rent-roll of the district.
The total jama was 6,00,101 kahons or 2,00,023 rupees, about
eighty per cent of which was to be paid from lands held by
zamindars; the rest of the jama was to be drawn from the sair
and other miscellaneous sources. The settlement aimed to
secure for the Company over 30,000 rupees more than the farmers
had offered or an increase of about thirty per cent on their
terms. The striking thing about the extra demand was that
Holland levied no additional imposition on the district. On
the contrary, he reduced the amount some of the zamindars
2
had been obliged to pay in the previous three years. Holland
had seemingly totally vindicated his position that it was
senseless to conclude a settlement, especially with farmers,
without first investigating the relevant accounts. ' His plan 
(
presented the Company with the prospect of a handsome profit
1. for details of Hollandfs rent-roll see Proc. DPCR, 
13 Jan 1776, DPR xii, 83 - 8.
2.- - Holland- - DPCR, -3-Jan 1776, • DPR xii,- 76--- 7. - ■ - •
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and the Provincial Council at Dacca had no option "but to 
approve of hie arrangements. Purling however could not 
remain totally silent and impetuously expressed his "doubts” 
whether Holland’s jama would be realized.
It was principally by reducing the excessive 
charges which had always proved a drain on the Sylhet 
collections that Holland was able to increase the Company’s 
profit from the district. Under L'ughal rule the expenditure 
on Sylhet, chiefly for defence, had exceeded the income from 
the district and the central government had been forced to 
remit money to close the gap. Before and during Sumner’s 
settlement, the charges had absorbed about half the revenues. 
During Lliddleton’s one-year farming settlement of 1771 - 2, 
the "established charges" defrayed from the collections 
again amounted to more than half of the gross jama. After 
1772 Thackeray,- as the farmer, undertook to bear the cost of 
maintaining the thanas 011 the frontier and v/hen the newly 
established Provincial Council at Dacca ordered the dismantling 
of the collector’s establishment at Sylhet in 1774 he willingly 
offered to meet the expense of continuing it. How that 
Holland had settled with the zamindars the Company was 
responsible once again for the charges of the thanas and the 
diwani kachari, and for other miscellaneous items of expend­
iture which included the following: the salaries of the
three vakils who were stationed with the hill rajas and of 
the officers of the faujdari adalat and the qanungo’s daftar, 
and the customary disbursements towards charity and food for
1. Purling’s l.Iinute, 15 Jan. 1776, DPP xii, 90.
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1prisoners.
Prom his investigations Holland discovered that 
the thanadar charges amount to 1,17*224-0 kahons or 29,3*10
o
rupees annually."1 He assumed that the defence establishment 
uould he cut drastically since the Jaintia Raja had pledged 
himself by treaty with the Company to keep the peace. By 
early November Holland had dismissed all the barqandazes 
retained by Thackeray and the guards in Sylhet town and had 
decided to abolish all the thanas. He was aware, though, 
that it would be unwise to proceed to dismantle all the thanas 
at a stroke since good relations with the Jaintia Raja did not 
preclude forays into the district by the followers of the 
other hill chiefs or even by the subjects of the Jaintia Raja 
acting without their ruler’s knowledge. nevertheless, by 
5 January 1776 only the two main thanas at Laour and Bangong 
were left; Holland thought it was necessary to retain these 
as the hill people in those areas were especially troublesome; 
they not only plundered the adjacent parts of the district 
but also 'harassed and robbed merchants trading in the vicinity.^ 
Holland limited the charge of the two remaining thanas, however, 
to a little under 10,000 rupees per annum, a sum equivalent 
to the revenue of the Laour pargana. This was a measure of 
pure expediency for it was impossible to make any collections 
in Laour. As Holland reported, the ryots of that pargana 
had never paid any revenues to the sadr but were "accustomed
1. For an abstract of the charges, see Proc. DPCR, 13 Jan 1776,
DPR xii, 88-9.
2. Holland - DPCR, 3 Jan 1776, DPR xii, 79.
3. Holland - DPCR, 1 Nov. 1775, DPR x, 2483.
U*. . Holland -r DPCR, .5. Jan. . 1776, DPR.xii, ,80..................
to pay them by maintaining a number of" armed retainers
at the two thanas. Actual disbursements from the Sylhet
2
treasury for defence r/ere written off. In the event,
though, Holland had gone too far and had dangerously exposed
the northern frontier.
Holland fixed the yearly expenditure on the diwani
kachari at 6,300 rupees. In his view that was the irreducible
minimum when one considered that
the revenues tho* small are collected from a 
greater number of principal...landholders than the 
revenues of the Dacca province and of consequence 
there is more writing and a greater number of 
accounts to keep; and there being an infinite 
number of partners to each purgunnah more attention 
and pains are required on every account...A
The sum of 6,300 rupees provided for the usual officers of
the diwani kachari in addition to a clerk whose special task
was apparently to write letters to the hill chiefs and a
vakil who was stationed at Dacca presumably to explain the
accounts of the district to the Provincial Council.
Holland did not tamper with the charity grants,
a total annual payment of 7?730 rupees divided between
Muslim maulvis and Hindu priests in the ratio of about two
to one. The Muslim recipients wrere concentrated chiefly
around Shah Jalal’s tomb in Sylhet town, an object of
pilgrimage and ceremony on three or four special days and
on the anniversay of the SaintTs death. Holland realized
that a certain amount of odium v/ould be directed at the person
1. Holland - DPCH, 3 Jan 1776, DPk xii, 61.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid. 79.
who interfered with the grants and that whatever little
saving might he made would not he worth the resultant uproar.
A comparison with expenditure in former years
would reveal the extent of the retrenchment effected in 1775.
In the revenue account for 1770 - 1 the amount of the charges
2
was shown as 87?523 rupees, and in the abstract tahud of
1771 - 2 as 1,02,167 rupees. There are no accounts to show
how much Thackeray spent. Holland reduced the amount to a
mere 22,033 rupees or ahout eleven per cent of the total
jama. It is true that the figures for previous years included
transport charges for which Holland made no provision, fil-khana
charges^ which were discontinued on instructions from the
Board, and punya charges which had heen cut to a token
100 rupees, again hy orders of the Board. It is also true
that had it not heen for the success of the expedition against
the Jaintia haja a severe reduction in the thanadar charges
5
could not have heen contemplated. nevertheless, Holland 
did make a conscientious if over-thorough appraisal of 
expenditure in Sylhet; he did so largely on his own 
initiative. The result was an increased profit to the Company 
notwithstanding a simultaneous reduction in the revenues
1 . Holland warned the Council that if they decided to
annul the grants, it had better he done "at Dacca, in 
the presence of the vakil of the objects of these 
charities, that the odium might he taken off the diwan 
as he would he the acting person that must stop the 
payment.” Holland - DPCH, 5 Jan. 1776, DBA xii, 81. 
The Dacca Council decided to continue the payments.
2. See Page *1;
3. PCCD, U2.
For catching and feeding elephants.
5. As Holland himself acknowledged. Holland - DPCH, 
5 .Jan. .1776.. DBA xii, 78.
payable by some zamindars.
The closure of the thanas enabled Holland to
impose an assessment on some of the service lands, both
sega and mujrai. These estates were distributed throughout
the district but were to be found in greater number in the
north. They had been granted under sanads from the
former faujdars to various persons on the condition that they
maintained a stipulated number of barqandazes and archers
1
for the defence of the district. These lands therefore
paid nothing to the khalsa; their revenues were utilised
in the upkeep of a defence force which manned some of the
thanas. Holland ascertained from the sanads that the value
of the jagirs was upwards of 1 ,5 0 , 0 0 0 kahons or 3 5 ? 0 0 0 rupees.
However, it seems that the jagirdars had never been compelled
to adhere strictly to the terms specified in their sanads;
many of them had not found it necessary therefore to occupy
the entire area allocated to their grant, and others who
received v/aste or jungle tracts had been under no pressure
to reclaim and cultivate them. Holland persuaded about, two
hundred jagirdars whose lands were widely dispersed in small
parcels all over the district to pay to the Company as
revenue twice the amount they spent on their retainers whose
3
services were now no longer required. The operation caused 
"a great deal of clamour” but it added 6 9 ? 101 kahons or 
1 7 , 2 7 5 rupees to the jama,^ (about eight per cent of the
1. Holland - DPCH, 5 Jan.1776, D¥R xii, 77.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid., 77 - 8 .
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total demand) and was the second significant way in which 
Holland procured an increased profit from the district. But 
the sega and nujrai lands remained unevenly rated in comparison 
to the rest of the district and there was some douht as to 
the neatness and justice of the operation. It was later 
pointed out that Holland had not really resumed the lands but 
had placed an assessment on the sanads , or in other words, 
that Holland had based the demand not on the amount of land 
actually held and cultivated but on the quantity mentioned in 
the grant.
Thackeray never submitted a rent-roll of the 
district for his years as farmer and when he left the district 
he took away most of the public records. Hence, it is 
impossible to gauge in detail the extent of the remissions 
Holland granted to various zamindars. However, the early 
success of the settlement made it clear that the level of 
Holland1s demands was based on his view of the "more enlarged 
and liberal plan” of government that allowed the poorest tiller 
of the soil a comfortable margin of existence. Holland’s 
notion of the amount the Company should claim as revenue 
contrasted sharply with the opinion held by the majority 
that the ryot must pay to the utmost. The majority believed 
that the ryot could only be freed from extortion by leaving 
him no surplus to attract the despoiler. Holland obviously ,
considered that an intolerable idea. The protection should 
come rather from a diwani court within easy access of the
1. VTilles - BCIi, 1 Sept. 1789? SDH iii, 161, and
Uilles - BCH, 23 Nov. 1789? SDH iii, 183. Y/illes agreed 
that Holland had created a confused situation wrhich, it 
is to be suspected, facilitated attempts to evade 
payment.
185.
inhabitants of the district. Holland thought that the
collections should be "blended with the administration of
redresses to the injured" and visualized the establishment
of a separate divani adalat for Sylhet as a matter of urgent
necessity. He raised the issue on 6 October 1775 Just
before he left for the district, and the court was established
on 1 February 1778 despite strenuous objections from Purling
and Shakespear who were opposed to Indian officers super-
2
intending the court.
The thinking behind Holland*s settlement was well 
in advance of the times, though of course there were a few 
officials who also thought like he did. Zamindari settle­
ments did not return to Bengal until 1777 and even then 
large sections of various districts were left under the 
management of farmers or made khas. Holland was quicker 
than most to see the writing on the wall. As early as 1775 
it was being discovered that the lands were overrated, that 
the bidders at the auctions had been prompted by the eagerness 
of competition to engage for a much higher revenue than the 
districts could afford, that they had racked the lands 
mercilessly and still had failed to meet their obligations 
to government. It was already evident that "far from 
discovering the real value of the lands, and providing
1. Ext. Proc. DPCR, • 6 Oct. 1775? BE Cons %h9, lviii, 2l\0.
2. For the debate on this, see Ibid., 2^0 - 5 6 .
3. Serajuddin, A.I.!., The Revenue Administration of the East 
India Company in Chittagong, 79. Bee the reports of 
Vanstittart, Middleton, Dacres, Lucarel, Hurst, etc. 
cited in Ramsbotham, R.B., Studies in the Land Revenue 
History of Bengal 1769 ~ 1787, 59 ~ 7U.
1 86.
any sound "basis for a future settlement of land revenue, 
the policy of the Committee of Circuit had succeeded only in 
breaking down the existing system and creating a chaotic 
situation.” Nevertheless, Purling and his associates were 
still wedded to the idea of farming the lands. They were 
prepared to ignore the lessons of the previous three years in 
the hope that a higher demand would still prove feasible.
Their chances of advancement in the service had priority over 
the welfare of the ryots over whose fortunes they presided.
But it was not altogether their fault. Revenue administration
was the pivot of the Company’s government and it is not
surprising therefore that the worth and abilities of an official 
were tested by how much revenue he could extract from a given 
area and how small the arrears from the region under his 
jurisdiction were at the end of the revenue year.^ The norm 
of efficiency and expertise was traceable in the revenue 
accounts; this was without doubt one of.the most objectionable 
features of the Company’s administrative system.
... . Holland’s, readiness to base the settlement on his
convictions probably had to do both with his disinterestedness 
and his sense of ’’high honour and principle.uJ He was not
a needy civilian out to gain an ’independency’; he already
possessed a considerable fortune which he had inherited from 
his father.^ ■ He believed that his plan v/as tie only sensible
1. Serajuddin, 79.
2. For example, Lindsay confessed that for the first nine 
months of his appointment to Sylhet, revenue affairs 
occupied his special attention, to. impress and win favour 
with the DPCH. Oriental Miscellanies, 33*
3. The phrase is Lindsay’s. Oriental Miscellanies, 22.
i).. Ibid.
and just one. He seemed to have had a deep understanding 
not only of the revenue "business hut of Indians also. His 
adversaries at Dacca were timid and vacillating, their 
initiative suspended not so much hy caution as hy fear of 
jeopardising their reputation in the service and hy ignorance 
of the real conditions in Sylhet. The chief at Dacca who 
shared Holland’s ideas on revenue policy supported him to the 
hilt; the Board at Calcutta were distant and turned no more 
than a cursory eye to the frontier district. In those 
circumstances the arena for personal action hy Holland was 
almost limitless.
Holland’s work in Sylhet, according to the account
in Lindsay’s autobiography, v/as held in derision hy his
adversaries on the Dacca Council. Purling had voiced his
reservations ahout the settlement hut Holland, upon returning
to Dacca ahout the middle of January 1776, vigorously defended
himself in the following statement:
It is difficult to fix the revenues of every 
division of land in a province in such exact 
proportion to the capacity of each as that some 
landholders shall not fail in their payments, 
and some small deficiencies may arise from 
accidents that could not he forseen, hut I will 
affirm that so much care has heen taken in 
proportioning /the/ revenues of the Sylhet 
province that they will not fall short either 
this year or in a course of; years in a sum 
exceeding twenty thousand cawns of cowries, that 
is five thousand rupees and even allov/ing of this
Oriental Miscellanies, 22.
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failure a vast increase comparing it with the  ^
former year’s revenue is obtained for Government.
He added that it was impossible to guard against deficiencies,
given even the most accurate settlement, unless one landholder
was forced to be ’'accountable for the losses occasioned by the
2
malversations of another.” Holland had mentioned the sum 
of 20,000 hahons not because he expected the revenues to fall 
short by that or any other amount, but lest PurlingTs remarks 
from ’’being so very general might appear just if iecL... should 
there be any the least deficiency in the collections....”
In July 1776 it seemed as though fate v/as being- 
partial to Purling!s doubts. Holland had to seek urgent 
permission to return to Sylhet when he learnt of the death 
of both the diwan+ and the head peshkar. He arrived at 
Sylhet at the end of July 1776 to discover that only 1,11)., 790 
rupees9 a little more than half the jama, had been collected. 
Though there were less than two months to the close of the 
revenue year,'Holland confidently forecast that the jama would 
be realised, ’’allowing for small balances” which would
1. Holland’s Hinute, 27 Jan. 1776, DFR xii, 128.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
U. Ivluktaram, 1 in whom I had the greatest confidence from the 
thorough knowledge he had of the revenue of that province 
/Sylhet/ which he acquired by the experience of his whole 
life.” Holland - DPCR, 11 July 1776, DPR xiv, 171. 
loiktaram v/as a native of Sylhet and had been employed in 
different capacities in the Revenue department, ’’and for 
about ten years back till the province was farmed as 
diwan.” Holland - DPCR, 5 Jan. 1776, DPR xii, 80. 
Holland had called him ’’the most able person to conduct 
the business properly” and had said he was ’’perfectly 
acquainted with the state and with the landholders of it 
who are very well pleased with him.”
’’unavoidably" arise in every settlement. In the end his
optimism proved we 11 -founded: out of the total jama of
6,00,101 kahons, 7? 86,101+ kahons ?;as collected, leaving a
1
trifling balance of about 3*500 rupees. kith the exception 
of the first two years of Thackerayfs farm it was the first 
time that such a small sum had been outstanding at the end of 
the revenue year.
The settlement was extended to September 1777* 
partly by a misunderstanding, and thereafter to September 1781 
through deliberate policy. Vtnen the Dacca Council informed 
the Board on 18 July 1776 that Holland had gone to Sylhet to 
supervise the collections following the untimely death of the 
two senior Indian officers, the Board replied on 16 August 
as follows:
He have received your letter... advising- of your 
having deputed Hr. Holland to form a settlement 
of that district, which we desire may not exceed 
the term of one year.
Clearly, the Board were not paying much attention. The Dacca
Council could only deduce that Holland was to form a
settlement for 1776 - 7 and they advised him accordingly.
The new ’settlement1 did not occupy much of Holland’s time
since he chose merely to make some minor adjustments. At
first he proposed simply to reduce the jama by the amount of
the arrears of 1775 ~ 6 but he then added that sum to the
assessment on the sega and mujrai lands so that the jama
1. Holland - DPCR, 18 Sept. 1776, DPR xiv, 398.
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remained at 8,00,101 kahons. From 1((( - 8 to 1780 - 1
Holland’s settlement was renewed annually in accordance with
the Court of Directors’ letter of 2b December 1776 which set
the guidelines for revenue arrangements on the expiration of
the Quinquennial Settlement. The Directors had indicated
that the time was not ripe to conclude arrangements in
2
perpetuity or for a term of years, hence the annual 
settlements. But the dominant theme in their instructions 
was that the zamindars should he conciliated and should he 
impressed with the idea that while they acted justly in 
regard to their under-tenants and ryots they would enjoy the 
Company’s favour.'' Since Holland’s zamindari settlement 
v/as hased upon these principles no alterations were thought 
necessary in Sylhet.
Having made his second settlement - in which he 
reaffirmed his faith that his judgement of the district’s 
capacities was well-founded - Holland then withdrew from 
Sylhet on grounds of ill health.^ It was left to another, 
therefore, to test the correctness of the demand upon the 
district. The person who contrived to have himself appointed 
to renew the settlement in 1777 was Robert Lindsay, a younger
1. DPCR - Board, 7 Oct. 1776, DFR xiv, U29. The following 
are examples of the minor adjustments which Holland 
carried out: he reduced the sair mahal hy 1,220 kahons,
the bazaar taxes in Sylhet town by. 1,000 kahons, and 
deleted an assessment of 1,230 kahons on some lands for 
which Muhammad Ali, the former faujdar of Sylhet, held
a sanad; these lands had been improperly resumed the
previous year because Muhammad Ali wras absent from Sylhet
and could not produce his sanad at the time of the
settlement.
2. Board - DPCR, 22 July 1777, with ext. from COD’s general
letter, 2b Dec. 1776, DFR xvii, 163.
3. Board - DPCR, 29 July 1777, DFR xvii, 187.
b. Oriental Miscellanies, 22.
son of the Earl of Balcarres and a junior assistant to 
the Dacca Council. He won Holland*s friendship, secured 
a promise of support from Rous, and arranged for Shakespear 
to nominate him .at a Council Meeting; in return, he pledged 
to assist two of Shakespear*s Indian dependents. Lindsay’s 
deputation was justified on the grounds that it was impossible 
to renew the settlement from Dacca because of the large 
number of landholders involved and that it was impossible to 
spare a member of Council since there was a heavy schedule of
p
business. Lindsay*s duties were officially confined.'to the 
taking of obligations from the zamindars as in the previous 
year, but he remained in the district to supervise the 
collections for the next decade.
Incidentally, Lindsay did not at first find his 
appointment a particularly arduous one. In the two'years 
1 7 7 5 - 6 and 1776 - 7 the only real recalcitrance in paying 
the revenue came from the Pandua lands on the northern border, 
which had been part of the 1resumed* sega and mujrai 
establishment. In 1775 ~ 6 G-obind Ram, the thanadar at 
Pandua, demanded on behalf of the Company the jama of 
3,i+00 kahons due from the Pandua lands but less than a 
quarter of that sum was forthcoming1. To enforce payment 
the thanadar seized some servants of Obo Singh, Raja of the 
Khasis at Pandua, whereupon the European traders in the area,
1. Oriental Miscellanies, 25.
2. Rous* Minute, 11 Aug. 17775 PER xvii, 1 S3-
3. DPCR - Lindsay, 11 Aug. 1777, PER xvii, ^ ^ b .  Lindsay
was also asked to work out in conjunction with the
diwan a suitable plan for the introduction of pattas 
in Sylhet (ibid., 195) hut no more was heard of that.
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fearful lest a reprisal should damage their business, paid 
the revenues. When calmer times were restored they asked 
the Dacca Council to return the money that had been forced
•i
out of them by the "precarious state of affairs," but the 
Council ruled that the traders had had no right to interfere
p
and threw out their request. The revenues of 1776 - 7 
were secured through the same strategy; in that year a 
relative of the Raja served as a hostage. The total 
balance at the end of 1776 - 7 was even smaller than that of 
the previous year, amounting to only 3,o77 kahons or about 
969 rupees.^
From 1777 - 6 onwards, however, slowly but with 
increasing clarity, a new trend began to emerge. It became 
more and more difficult to collect the revenues. The figures 
for arrears - 10,035 kahons, 1+0, 7U5 kahons, 26,1+81+ kahons and 
60,000 kahons for the years 1777 - 8 to 1780 - 1 respectively - 
do not give the whole story. Lindsay personally supplemented 
the collections of 1777 - 8 in a successful effort to retain 
his posting.to Sylhet. His.deputation was threatened by 
the arrival of George Hatch as a member of the Dacca Council. 
Hatch claimed the Sylhet posting on the grounds of seniority, 
and over Holland's strenuous objections he uas appointed to 
Sylhet on 8 September 1778. Heanwhile Lindsay, having
1. Proc. DPCR, 16 Hay 1776, DFR xii, 1+58 - 9.
2. Ibid. , 14.6 0 .
3. Lindsay - DPCR, 21+ Nov. 1777? DFR rvii, 6 3 6.
U. DPCR - Board, 13 Oct. 1777, BR Cons R50, v, 107 - 8.
1775 - 6 and 1776 - 7 were in the rest of Bengal
the last two years of the quinquennial settlement:
the total arrears for Bengal and Bihar were in both
years over 10-j of the jama.
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heard through, a friend in Dacca of Hatch’s hid for Sylhet, 
had balanced the district’s accounts though three revenue 
instalments were outstanding and had sailed for Calcutta
1where he was to argue that he was being unjustly treated.
The Board agreed with Lindsay and overruled Hatch’s
2appointment to Sylhet. The accounts for the subsequent 
years, too, were almost certainly not as straight-forward 
as they might have been. A truer picture must be constructed 
from Lindsay’s letters to Calcutta.
On 21+ November 1777 after the conclusion of his 
first puriya Lindsay recommended to the Council that they 
should consider a remission in the revenues payable by the 
Pandua lands.^ Presumably, Lindsay’s recommendation stemmed 
from the clear impossibility of collecting the Pandua revenues 
without forcible measures. It is likely that this was 
impressed upon Lindsay when the Pandua landholders failed to 
turn up to renew their engagements. However, the Council 
took the view, in which they were supported by the Board, 
that while Lindsay should not as a rule employ force in 
making the collections, the Company could not be expected 
to yield any part of its claim to the Pandua revenues.
By December 1777 the kedah mahal zamindars were complaining 
that they were in difficulties because of the Company’s 
insistence that their balances should be paid in ready money.
1 . The incident is described in Oriental Miscellanies, 3k - 6.
2. Hatch thereupon chose to ’decline’ the Sylhet appointment
since his health required he should have recourse to the 
Chittagong air. Hatch’s I/Iinute, Proc. DPCH, 5 Oct. 1778, 
DF'R xx, np.
3. For Lindsay’s padding of accounts, see page 6 7.
k, Lindsay - DPCH, 21+ Nov. 1777? DFH xvii, 6 3 6.
Hoard - DPCH, 12 Dec. 1777:, BH Cons,' 3,50, v, 379.
They had been accustomed, they said, to give an undertaking
to liquidate their arrears from the proceeds of the sale of the
-1
succeeding year’s elephant catch. As a solution to their
problem they requested that the Company should pay a higher
XDrice for elephants but the Dacca Council replied that no
2increased rate could be contemplated. Trouble also arose 
in another quarter during the year; the zamindars of Taraf 
pargana refused to pay the revenues levied on the sega and 
ruujrai lands which they held and Lindsay had to send in 
sepoys to enforce the collections."’ In July 1778 at the 
start of the period of heavy instalments some zamindars had 
already absconded.^ Admittedly, those who deserted their 
lands and went into hiding such as the zamindars of 
Barr aparrah, Cliauallis, It a and tlandarkandi pargana s were 
traditionally among the most defiant landholders in the 
district but their deviant behaviour, following a -period of 
quiescence during the first two years of Holland’s settlement, 
was symptomatic of the acute dissatisfaction felt by the 
Sylhet zamindars as a whole.
Some of the landholders had been distressed by the 
decision of the Board not to accept securities for the 
payment of the revenues and by the Board’s expressed intention 
to treat the lands as surety for the rents. Others perhaps 
had not been altogether unhappy to see the securities go, 
because of the way in which the system had operated. As the
1 . Petition of zamindars of parganas Chapghat etc. encl. in
Lindsay - DPCR, 21 Dec. 1777, SDR i, 2k.
2. DPCR - Lindsay, 17 Jan. 1778, DPR xix, Proc. DPCR,
17 Jan. 1778, np.
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Dacca Council explained to the Board:
The security considers all the zemindars /of a 
pargana/ as jointly and separately hound to him, 
and therefore collects from them agreeably to 
their abilities to pay him. Hence, a zemindar of 
one fourth of a' purgunnah, who has not only 
continued his zemindarry in a flourishing state, 
by refraining from making unlawful exactions from 
his under-tenants, but has also improved it by 
bringing waste lands into a state of cultivation, 
is often compelled to pay a third proportion of 
the revenues, in order to supply the deficiency of 
a zemindar holding another fourth of the purgunnah, 
who by having observed the very reverse conduct
has defaulted his share of itD
Yet even these industrious landholders must have been concerned
about the prospect of their lands being exposed to auction
upon any default. About two hundred had put their names to
a petition pointing out that as they were a "numerous body
of men” they could not discharge their instalments punctually
as prescribed 1 without the agency of some creditable and
2
respectful person." The Board, however, saw no reason to
make a special case of the Sylhet zamindars.^
A still more significant cause of dismay was that 
while there had been an abatement in 1777 in the standing jama 
of most of the districts of Bengal, as an adjustment of the 
acknowledged inflated demands of the previous five years, no 
such relief was extended to Sylhet. Holland’s settlement 
in 1775 had rescued Sylhet from the worst ravages of the
1. DPCD - Board, 21 July 1777, BPA xvii, 1UU.
2. Petition nd. Proc. 28 Nov. 1777, Bit Cons DUO, v, 113.
Some zamindars of Dacca had the same complaint, arguing
that it had been the custom since the time of their
forefathers to pay their revenues through a potadar and
stating: "...if that ancient custom is to be abolished
and discontinued your petitioners are apprehensive it
will be a hard and very difficult matter to pay their
cazana /Idiazana/ to the sircar by the zemindars
themselves..." Ibid., 115.
Ibid., 113.'
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Quinquennial Settlement Taut had also denied the district any 
participation in the moderate relief measures of 1777. This 
remained a sore point for almost the whole duration of 
Lindsay’s residence at Sylhet and one to which he returned 
time and again in his efforts to get the jama lowered.
Lindsay "began his second year in Sylhet by 
submitting a list of proposed deductions in the jama. lie 
said that he had been "fortunate” to collect almost the total 
demand for the past year and that some of the zamindars had
-j
been ’’much distressed to pay their rents.” He assigned
their difficulties to mismanagement and to the desertion of
the ryots as a consequence of the ravages of elephants and
o
tigers in some areas and of crop failures in others.4" Some
estates, he added, were in ”a very waste state” and could not
3
recover unless the level of assessment was reduced. The 
total abatement proposed by Lindsay amounted to only 25*000 
kahons; he believed that that sum, divided among the most 
afflicted parganas, would be of “considerable relief to the 
■country.—  But Lindsay's arguments did.not impress.the 
Board; he was informed by the Dacca Council in their letter 
of 17 November 1778 that the Board would not consent to a 
remission. The immediate result of the Board’s unyielding 
stand on the revenues was the refusal of the zamindars of
1. Lindsay - DPCR, 27 Oct. 1788. SDR i, kl.
2. Ibid.
j Ibid.
1±. Ibid.
5. DPCR - Lindsay, 17 Nov. 1778, SDR i, 51+.
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Barraparrah, Bhanga and Chauki to renew their engagements with
the Company. Thus, early in his second year Lindsay was
forced to "begin appointing sazawals in the mofussil.
The early onset of heavy rains in karch 1779 gave
Lindsay another occasion to seek a reduction in the jama.
The borO crop in the low-lying parganas adjacent to the •
town of Azmiriganj in the western half of the district was
2destroyed "by flood. It was not to "be expected that any 
revenues would "be forthcoming from much of the "bhatta country 
and "by the first week of April the shiqclars responsible for 
various tracts in that region, finding it not worth their 
while to remain in the interior, had returned to Sylhet town.'5 
But the Provincial Council at Dacca thought that Lindsay’s 
account of the ruinous effects of the flood was not detailed 
enough to warrant any easing of the revenue demand. Instead, 
while they did not mean that any extraordinary severity should 
be exerted over such zamindars as had actually suffered, they ■ 
urged the resident to aim at realizing the total jama.^ " Any 
such aspirations that Lindsay himself.might have entertained . 
had already been severely shaken and by the end of June 1779 
they were as good as buried. There had been a lull in the
1. Lindsay - DPCx^ , 1 Dec. 1778* DFA xx, Proc. DPCft, 8 Dec.
1778, np. DPCA approved of Lindsay’s move but told
i him that if the zamindars wished to resume the lands on 
the terms on which they held them, the sazawals should be 
recalled. DPCA - Lindsay, 8 Dec. 1778, DBA xx, Proc. 
DPCA, np.
2. The rains had set in on 20 L'arch and when Lindsay wrote
on 8 Apr. they were still falling. Lindsay - DPCA,
8 Apr. 1779, SDP i, 61 .
3. Ibid.
DPCA - Lindsay, 20 Apr. 1779, DPP xxi, Proc. DPCA, 
20 Apr. 1779, np.
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rains for about twenty days during which the ryots had
sown the high ground but the rains had then returned with
i
increased fury to v/ash away the seedlings. Added to that,
the cattle were succumbing to an ’’infectious disorder”;
apparently, the affliction was as widespread as it was sudden
and in some areas before June was out there were not enough
2surviving cattle to cultivate the lands. Presumably,
however, Lindsay1s superiors considered his latest reports
also too general; no relief was granted.
During 1778 - 9 Lindsay also found it increasingly
difficult to collect the revenues from the sega and mujrai
lands where numerous disputes over boundaries had arisen.-5
Before the Resumption1 of the sega and mujrai lands the
sanad holders had never bothered to ascertain the territorial
limits of their grants, and while some jagirdars had been
content to occupy only enough land for their own immediate
needs others had managed to encroach on and usurp lands
belonging to others.^ But Holland’s method of assessing
the sega and mujrai tracts, by imposing- a tax on the quantity
of land specified in the sanads without regard to whether
or not the land was cultivated caused each proprietor to
5
look for his rightful share. The problem was complicated
1. Lindsay - DPCH, 29 June 1779* SDH i, 65.
2. Ibid.
3. Lindsay - DPCH, 1U July 1779? SDH i, 66.
I Md . t 66-7.
5. Ibid., 67.
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by the suspicion held by the proprietors that the tax on 
the tankhaws was the thin edge of the wedge and that the 
Company intended to restore their "hereditary” lands to ' 
the zanindaris from which the lands had been separated.
■.Then he came to assess the prospects for 1779 ” 80
on 1 October 1779 Lindsay claimed that several of the
2
parganas were overrated. That he really meant was that 
conditions had changed to such an extent in some areas that 
what had been a moderate demand in 1775 “ 8 and 1776 - 7
had become an oppressive burden. The familiar circle
produced by the equally familiar chain of events which 
started with pressure being exerted on the zamindars by the 
Company and ended with the flight of the ryots in reaction 
to the shifting of the burden on to their shoulders was 
now tightly closed. The "exertions” employed in collecting 
the revenues in the past two years, Lindsay said, had forced 
many talukdars and ryots to desert their lands. And, as 
might be expected, the greater the number of ryots who moved
away the heavier was the burden on those who remained. The
1. Lindsay - DP CP, 14 July 1779, SDP i, 67. There seems to
have been some grounds for this suspicion. Towards the
end of 1779 - 80 the Board declared that the lands belong­
ed originally to the zamindars, acknowledged that.the 
sanad holders had some claims since they had been in 
possession for some time and had improved the state of 
the lands, and stated as follows: "They /the sanad 
holders/ should...be supported so long as they continue 
to pay up their revenues regularly, but in the event of 
their falling in arrears, or absconding, the Board are of 
opinion that the property of these lands reverts properly 
to the zamindars upon their making good the balance that' 
may be due at the time of obtaining possession.” Unci, 
in DPCP - Lindsay, 14 Sept. 1780, SDh i, 94.
2. Lindsay - DPCP, 1 Oct. 1779, SDP i, 76.
.3. Ibid.
jama which could he met with reasonable ease by estates 
reasonably well inhabited could not be realized from less 
populated lands without harsh treatment of the ryots. As 
for the zamindars, they were disaffected and a number of them 
were even "clamorous.11 Apparently, the latter group were 
convinced that the relief measures of 1777 had not been 
extended to Sylhet because Lindsay had failed to make the
r\
necessary representations.^ Lindsay again recommended a
remission of 20,000 to 25?000 kahons and was successful this
time in securing the backing of the Dacca Council. The
Council explained their turn-about by referring to Lindsayfs
long residence in the district and his assiduity in attending
to its affairs; he could not therefore be mistaken in his
recommendations.^ moreover, their "knowledge of his
character” gave them the "full assurance that he would not
recommend a deduction unless he was convinced that the
zamindars really required it.” "^ An attempt to make the case
attractive by emphasising that the recommended deduction was
■extremely small and that the•Company now obtained "a greater
5revenue from the Sylhet province than ever it did formerly" 
had not the slightest effect on the Board. On 17 December 1779
1. Lindsay - DPCP, 1 Oct. 1779, SDd i, 77.
2. Ibid.
3. DPCk - Board, 21 Oct. 1779? DPA xxi, Proc. DPCA 21 Oct. 
1779? np.
U. Ibid.
Ibid.
they affirmed once more that they would not allow any
1
reduction in the jama of Sylhet.
In October Lindsay had mentioned his apprehension
that some zamindars might not renew their engagements with
the Company and that farmers would not come forward under
2
the standing assessment. On 20 December 1779 hu reported
that his fears had been realized. The zamindars of Barraparrah,
fetal, Jayanshi, L'andarkandi and I.Iuscuri parganas had refused
to sign qabuliyats; farmers could not be procured and
Lindsay had to send in sazawals to make the collections directly
from the ryots.J , g,
The jama of 1779 - 80 was not fully realised for
other reasons apart from the overrated demand. In April and
hay 1780 the'Chamtala hill people on the north-western
border of the district carried out a number of raids in the
frontier parganas of Eelal, Chhatak, Dulali, Ichha-Kalas,
ITygong and Tetwah, which resulted in an irrecoverable balance
of about 5?000 kahons from those areas.^ Some parganas, such ■
5
as Bhanga and Ranigatch on the Surma suffered from floods
while the kedah mahal zamindars in parganas Dandi, Kusiarkul,
6Pratapgarh and Tuffergur had a poor elephant catch. Also, 
further difficulties were experienced in making the collections 
from the sega and mujrai lands.
1 . The Board did, however, remit the balance due from Sylhet
for 1776 - 9. See Ext. Board’s letter dated 17 Dec. 1779* 
SDR i, 8 6.
2. Lindsay - DPCR, 1 Oct. 1779, SDR i, 76.
3. Lindsay - DPCR, 20 Dec. 1779, SDR i, 80.
I4. "Particulars of balance..." encl. in DPCR - Board,
8 Sept. 1780, BR Cons R50, xxx, 51.
5. Ibid.
6 . Ibid., 50.
7. Ibid., 52.
By their refusal to consider an abatement in
Holland’s jama the Board had succeeded towards the end of
1760 in alienating a significant section of the Sylhet
zamindars. This development was not confined to Sylhet
district alone, as may he deduced from Holland’s declaration
in June 1780 that the revenues of Dacca district had been'
•\
extracted hy threats and the occasional sale of lands.
Holland stated:
In fact the Company have swallowed up the riches 
of every individual in the province, andpnow 
there is scarce a responsible man in it.
And he added:
Y;e may justly conclude that the province will not 
now yield a larger revenue than it did before it 
cane into the hands of the English, when it was 
indisputably in a far more flourishing state.3
He and Shakespear were able to sink their differences and
plead jointly for an abatement in the settlement for Dacca
for 1760 - 1. In their reply the Board indicated why their
stand on the collections was so firm. The Board said:
...vTe must remark that if a temporary failure 
shall in any instances be admitted as a ground 
for reducing the juimna and that it shall be in 
no instances augmented, the whole must necessarily 
sink to nothing in a long process of time by 
progressive abatements .*+
Ironically, howrever, it vras the reluctance to grant temporary
remissions which posed one of the greatest threats to the
collections in the end.
1. Holland’s Hinute, 27 -June 1780, Proc. 21 July 1780,
BA Cons H50, xxv, 1117.
2. Ibid., 1118.
3. Ibid. , 11 21 .
k. Board - DPCR, 21 July 1780, ’ BE, Cons, R.50, xxv, 1129.
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CHAPTER Y
ROBERT LINDSAY IN SYLHET!
1781 - 1787
Despite administrative changes directed at centra­
lizing power in Calcutta the years 1781 - 7 witnessed in 
Sylhet district the steady increase, following a brief de­
cline, in the authority and influence of Robert Lindsay.
The degree of independence achieved by and permitted to 
Lindsay was perhaps not matched in any district of Bengal 
during this period. The accumulated strength of his position, 
in itself a testimony to the gulf between the aims expressed 
in Calcutta and what really went on in the district, was 
used to subvert the policy directives of his superiors*
The intentions of the Board foundered on a false assumption 
and a fatal defect in planning. It was taken for granted 
that a general plan was workable, that something like a 
standard situation, a typical district cauld be discovered 
and kept in mind when general arrangements were being formu-. 
lated and that these arrangements could then be applied 
ready-made to the whole of Bengal. When confronted with 
regional variations the Board had no real option but to 
abandon their general schemes and fall back upon the local 
agent they were trying to curb. They would refer to the 
peculiar conditions in Sylhet when sanctioning deviations 
from standard practice in Lindsay’s case in the hope that 
the collections would be improved. The defect was in in­
stitutional machinery, or the lack of it; the Board never 
devised proper means to ensure that their policies were
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implemented. Lindsay therefore continued to consolidate 
his position even though at no stage could he be seen as 
delivering the goods.
Early in 1781 the Board decided it was time to 
proceed further with their declared policy of centralization, 
the cure perceived by Hastings for the afflictions of the 
administrative system. He had visualized the six Provincial 
Councils created in 1774 and charged with immediate res­
ponsibility for the districts as temporary establishments 
only, with the primary purpose in the overall plan of 
cushioning, as it were, the impact of change. The idea 
was that ultimately the collectors would be removed from the 
districts and the revenue business would be supervised in­
stead by a group of the Companyrs ablest servants, function­
ing as a Committee stationed at Calcutta with swift and easy 
access to the Board.1 The clue to the timing of this new 
phase in the strategy of centralization was to be found in 
the worsening state of the Company's finances. The average 
annual collections for 1 7 7 7 - 80 were less than those for 
the previous five years, the period of the quinquennial 
settlement; in Bengal as a whole, and the returns for 1780 - 1 
had given the Board no cause to expect an improvement in that 
trend. At the same time administrative costs had soared
and the Company was involved in war, and was being pressed
2
for remittances to England. In these circumstances an
1. See G-leig i, 383-4.
2. Cotton, 30.
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improvement in the land revenue collections seemed eminently 
desirable.
Towards this end the Provincial Councils were . 
abolished in Pebruary 1781 and their power transferred to 
a new Committee of Revenue,*1' As a stop-gap arrangement 
the chiefs of the defunct Councils were to continue at their 
respective headquarters. Immediate responsibility for 
Sylhet remained therefore with Holland at Dacca. Techni­
cally, Lindsay was on deputation from the Dacca Council 
and a member of Hollandrs subordinate staff; not yet a 
collector, he was nevertheless treated as one and permitted 
to remain at Sylhet instead of being ordered back to Calcutta.
The appointees to the Committee of Revenue were
2
indeed among the most experienced of the Companyfs servants. 
They decided to meet three times a week or more often as 
the volume of business dictated. Ih§ President was autho­
rized to issue in the intervals between meetings such orders 
as were necessary to ensure .‘efficiency; for instance, he 
might summon persons to give evidence before the Committee, 
or cause briefs to be prepared for the Committee*s investi­
gation. He v/as allotted a casting vote but where there 
was a division on an important matter the case was to be 
referred to the Board. To enable the Committee to cope 
the records of the Khalsa were deposited with them - but 
with these came also the functions and duties of that office. 
And presumably to cultivate zeal and secure their attention
1, Proc. 20 Peb. 1781, CCR R6 8 ,vi, 4.
2. David Anderson as President, John Shoire, Samuel Charters, 
Charles Croftes.
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to their task a* complicated commission system was instituted, 
with rewards amounting to two per cent of the collections 
of huzuri lands and one per cent of the collections of lands 
under collectors, in lieu of all salaries or other per­
quisites.1
The first task of the Committee was to draw up an
establishment for themselves. Their second - to draw up
one for the chiefs and collectors - showed that one aspect
of the lesson to be learnt from the previous seven years
was being ignored. Under Provincial Councils of Revenue
the collector*3 power had continued to increase, instead of
diminishing. To be sure, collectors had been recalled from
the districts when the Councils were first established but
by various means they had found their way back into the 
2
Eiofussil. LindsayTs posting to Sylhet in 1777 was only 
one example of an "invasion of the system of Provincial 
Councils for the gratification of some individual."^
Hastings was undoubtedly right to claim that the collectors 
had powerful connections both in England and in India. He 
could have deducted that if under the operation of Provincial 
Councils the objective of restraining the collectors and 
hence centralizing,: the administration had not been attained, 
then the next step - of rolling all the Councils into one 
distant Committee - could hardly of itself be more successful.
1. Por the functions and constitution of the Committee, see 
Proc. 20 Feb. 1781, CCR R6 8 ,vi 4-9.
2. For example, Gladwin was posted to Silbaris in Feb.1776, 
Purling to Rangpur in 1777, Peiarce of the Burdwan Pro­
vincial Council to Midnapur in 1778, and Graeme to Sarkar 
Saran, Champaran and Hajipur in 1779. Sinha, U.K., 185-6.
3. Board*s Minute, quoted in Sinha, U.K., 186.
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Instead, the opposite conclusion was drawn, namely, that 
tighter centralization was the answer* Here was a paradox 
of almost limitless possibilities, never seriously con­
sidered perhaps because of its 'sheer simplicity: the
more centralized the direction, the more decentralized 
did implementation have to be* What was being centralized, 
all that could be centralized, was the formation of policy; 
imp:leiB2mdrr£'tabhr :i remained a matter of local politics, of 
the collector threatening, persuading, defrauding or indeed 
retiring before zamindars and landholders of inferior rank* 
Even for policy-making the members of the Committee had no 
experience of Sylhet,: while at least one member of the
Dacca Council had toured and worked in Sylhet, none of the
Committee had done so* The wider the gap between decep­
tive centralization in Calcutta and real local control, the 
more scope was there for the official on the spot to exercise 
his initiative according to his own inclinations and the 
easier was it for the Committee, looking from the top, to 
delude themselves that they were supervising affairs.**'
The new set-up would guarantee quicker communication be­
tween the revenue authorities and the Board, but beyond a 
certain point speed was not a problem; tfre reorganization
might ensure the zeal of the Committee members but the
dedication of senior servants was not in question. What 
needed attention were the possibilities open to the collector
1. A delusion short,-lived in Shore, one of the more perci­
pient members of the Committee. He argued that immediate 
attention to detail which could not be provided by remote 
control was necessary for the success of the collections. 
See Shore!s Minute, 13 Jan. 1782, quoted in Serajuddin, 
A.M., The.Revenue Administration of the East India 
Company in Chittagong. 17bl-1785, 10b.
for abusing M s  position, and though it might appear that 
that was being tackled such was not the case.
The dislike of senior civilians for the junior
Ourr\
members of the service other than their^ dependents or 
protegds was. still intense. Cornwallis1 remark in August 
1781 that through their'.personal or indirect involvement 
in commerce collectors became nthe most dangerous; enemies 
of the Companyfs interest"^ summarised a sentiment that had
t**
pervaded the upper echelons of the service^more than a 
decade before he: pronounced it. Nobody in authority at 
the centre in 1781 would question seriously a plan intended 
to restrict the power of the local officials, but centra­
lization was proceeding along a path that led away from 
rather than toward the desired goal. The realities of 
power on the ground would not be upset.
Prom hindsight it can be seen that the whole:1 
drift of thinking in London and in Calcutta was misdirected.
It would have been more conducive to a sound administration, 
though difficult, to acknowledge the indispensibility of the 
man on the spot and to arrange for workable checks on him.
All that was forthcoming, however, was an admonition from 
the Board to the Collectors on 9 February 1781 that they 
should treat the CommitteeTs orders as if coming from the 
Board. This was accompanied by hints that the collectors 
migh^ . be removed soon; according to the Board, they would 
remain at their stations nduring such time as we may think fit”
1. Quoted in Sinha, N.K., 186.
2. Board v - all collectors, 9 Feb. 1781, OCR R68,vi,10
3. Ibid, 9
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according to the Committee they would stay "until recalled11 
Yet in one of their first proposals, regarding the settle­
ment for 1781-2, the Committee almost stood the whole scheme 
on its head by proposing to leave the details of the settle­
ment in some circumstances to the collectors*
The Committee wasted little time in attending; to 
the settlement, of 1781-2. Their overriding consideration 
was to secure an increased revenue yield. The ways in 
which they considered this could be done, as stated in 
their report, of 14 May 1781 on the settlement, were
first to reduce the expenses of collection with which- 
the revenue was encumbered, and secondly to restore 
the revenue wherever the circumstances of the districts 
could bear It, as nearly as possible to the former 
standard, from which it had in the course of years 
been gradually reduced by successive deductions 
and remissions. 2
In pursuing the objective of cutting down expenses 
the Committee reduced the number of Indian officials in­
volved in the collections and estimated that for Bengal 
as a whole the savings would amount, to tv/elve lakhs rupees. 
Bor Sylhet itself it was proposed to cut the revenue charges 
by almost: half, from 40,752 to 20,430 rupees.^ But the 
Committee envisaged that further reductions were possible, 
throughout the province and would arise in two ways.
Firstly, the Board had ordered that zamindars and farmers 
should be induced to make their payments directly to the
Khalsa; as soon as it was clear how far this was feasible
the Committee would consider a reduction in the establishment
1. Proc. 20 Feb. 1781, CCR R6 8 ,vi, 4.
2. CCR * Board, 14 May 1781, CCR R6 8,vii, 1038
3. It was proposed to reduce the collection and general 
charges from Rs. 29,966 to Rs. 11,396 and the ^amindari
charges from Rs. 10,511 to Rs. 9,034. HMS vol. 351, 158-9.
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of the chiefs and collectors involved.1 in addition, the
Committee noted that many zamindars whose lands had been
restored to them continued to withold a, sum equivalent to
ten per cent of the jama of their lands, which they had
been granted as an allowance when their lands had passed
to farmers. According to the Committee, such perquisites
had encouraged only extravagance and "by holding out an
apparent object of security to the creditors have perhaps
enabled them /the zamindars/ to involve themselves more
2deeply in debt." To counter this and increase the revenue
yield the zamindars were made responsible in the new settle-
■5
ment for the total assessment imposed on theiir lands.
Given the Committeefs overriding aim, three key 
questions for its implementation arose: from whom should.
engagements be taken, for how long, and who should make the 
settlement. The first two were easily dealt with. Engage­
ments would be taken where possible from zamindars and for 
one year in the first instance, with a guarantee of ex­
tensions for subsequent periods provided no balances were 
outstanding^ Where Zamindars refused to execute qabuliyats 
or were jjudged incapable of managing their lands, farmers 
were to be called in. This had been the practice during 
the past five years, but the Committee made a significant? 
alteration with special implications for Sylhet. They 
decided that where the landholders were no more than petty
1. CCR - Board, 14 May 1781. CCR R6 8 ,vii, 1040.
2. Ibid., 1041-2.
3. Ibid., 1043.
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talukdars the lands should he let in a consolidated farm,
so as to save themselves from having to attend to the
details of a number of small talukdars and farmers.^"
In general farming tenures were fixed for two years. As
for making the settlement the Committee decided that they
themselves should perform this task in as many cases as
they could, but added that "in some instances it will be
most expedient to leave the detail of this with the collector
2or the officer of. government." It was the detail that 
was crucial, though. The distribution of the jama among 
the landholders, in effect, the mofussil settlement, was 
a matter of no less consequence than the determination of 
the total jama. Indeed, considering that'-.an increase in 
the total demand from a district need not affect the entire 
district, the mofussil settlement could be of more im­
portance to the landholders than the sadr settlement* ,
The Board, possibly led by Hastings, perceived that the 
Committeers intention of delegating responsibility for the 
mofussil settlement to the collector would leave him with 
immense power in the district. Hence, though approving 
of the plan for the settlement of 1781-2 as a whole, they 
killed any suggestion of the collectors involvement in 
the distribution of the demand with the following dec­
laration:
1. CCR - Board, 29 Mar. 1781, HMS vol. 351, 176.
2 . Ibid., 176-7
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Of this we cannot approve in any case, as we 
conceive it to be inconsistent with the office 
of the person who is to have the collections 
of the settlement••.that he should have any 
connection in the formation of it, We there­
fore direct that yJor/ such Mhals /Mahals/ as 
cannot be immediately settled by you.,,, persons 
be expressly deputed from the proper offices to 
form the settlement upon the spot and these 
/settlements/ be...finally confirmed by 
yourselves, 1
It is to be regretted that the principle of separation of
powers contained in the Boardls statement did not surface
earlier, and now that it had done so, that it was destined
to be so short-lived. The Committee proceeded themselves
to make the settlement of all but the Dacca district, to
2
which they deputed one of their members. Where they did 
not actually make the mofussil settlement, as in Sylhet 
and Chittagong, they devised a formula by which that might 
be done. But so defective was that formula on several 
counts, as will be shown, that it is fair to claim that 
as far as Sylhet district was concerned, important details 
of the settlement were left, undetermined.
What the Committee did, in the attempt to restore 
the revenue to its "former standard", was to investigate 
all the records at their disposal, including those of the 
accountant-general relating to past settlements, receipts
3
and balances from 1771. They also examined all corres­
pondence relating to remission or abatement of revenues,
1. Board - CCR, 30 Mar. 1781, HMS vol. 351, 177-8.
2. John Shore was sent to Dacca with orders to look into the 
condition of Tippera district, which the Controlling 
Council understood might double its yield under proper 
management. CCR - Shore, 9 Apr. 1781, CCR, R6 8 / vi, 575
3. CCR - Board, 14 May, 1781, CCR R6 8 , vii, 1044.
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specifically to discover why they were made, whether they
were intended as temporary relief only and whether they
oo uld be resumed.^ They lacked, however, the detail of
local apatwari records as well as the personal acquaintance
with local conditions available to collectors in the districts.
Displaying an extraordinary amount of faith in the records
and other evidence submitted to them, they claimed:
...from these materials, arid the information of the 
most intelligent persons from all parts of the 
country, we believe we have in general been able
to judge with accuracy on the capacity of each 2
district and have proportioned our demand accordingly.
Settlements formed in this way had already been 
discredited, though not in the same degree as those made 
by exposing the revenues to public auction. If it was 
hard to achieve a just and equitable assessment of the 
revenue-paying capacity of the lands in the field, without 
accurate surveys, land mapping and records of rights, it 
was much more difficult to do so from inside an office.
The records on which an assessment could be based were often
highly inaccurate; the details of former settlements in­
cluded fabricated and contrived evidence. The ’’important” 
persons who testified before the Committee naturally placed 
their own interests or those of their constituents first.
The vakils of the Sylhet zamindars who agreed to an increase 
of 25,000. rupees,^ for example, could hardly claim to 
represent the inferior landholders, still less the ryo.ts. 
Perhaps they calculated that their principals could manage 
to shift the increase on to the smaller zamindars, or in
1. CCR - Board, 14 May, 1781, OCR R68,vii, 1044.
2. Ibid.
3. Holland - Lindsay, with ends., 24 May 1781, SDR i, 97.
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any case, on to their own ryots. Then, too, the CommitteeTs 
intransigent stand certainly affected the settlement pro­
ceedings. The Committee started with the aim of increasing, 
the revenue yi.Sld to its former standard without considering 
whether that level was fair or not. The fact that that 
level had once obtained was precedent enough for it to be 
insisted upon. In this situation many of the zamindars 
and their vakils might have considered it tactful to agree 
to an increase rather than risk losing possession of their 
lands; whether at the same time they intended to pay the 
increase was another matter.
The Committee disclaimed any intention of
heightening the burden on the people as a whole, "although
such a measure may be fully justifiable whenever the necessity
of the state requires; it.”'*’ Their aim, they declared,
was chiefly to bring into the coffers of government those
profits which have been enjoyed by the zemindars and
intermediate collectors" and the additional revenue that
2
might arise from an expansion of cultivation. A 
proclamation was issued to this effect, but this public 
declaration of the intention to tax new cultivated areas 
was a considerable obstacle to the growth of cultivation, 
even in a district like Sylhet with extensive tracts of 
waste. Apart from /.difficulties caused by disputed titles 
to waste and by a shortage of ryots;, there was a general 
reluctance to reclaim lands, when people believed, as 
Lindsay asserted, that the fruits of their labour would be
1. CCR - Board, 14 Hay 1781, CCR R68, Yii, 1056
2.. Ibid.
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appropriated, by government."^ In their announcement 
the Committee also made it clear that no new taxes were
p
to be levied on the ryots. But they did not follow 
this up with any safeguards to ensure that the increase 
they demanded came from the profits of the zamindars.
The experience of former years had shown that the zamindars 
would dip into their own pockets only as a last resort 
and would first pass on any new imposition to the ryots.
As a matter of fact many of the Sylhet zamindars had no 
pockets into which to dip. The Committeers declaration 
that the ryots should not be made to pay more coupled with 
the absence of any real attempt to prevent further extortion 
from the ryots suggests that the Committee were not con­
cerned to any significant degree with how the increase was 
met. To justify their existence they had to put up the 
level of the collections and that was what mattered most.
They declared that the country could "bear with ease" the 
additional assessment estimated at twenty-seven lakhs rupees 
for Bengal as a w h o l e t h e  reason they gave for this 
conviction in their final report on the settlement was that
they had "spared no pains" in studying the records of the
L
last ten years and deciding upon the increase.1
Having disposed of the question of the size of 
the revenue demand, the Committee turned, with equal
1. Said Lindsay: "...nor are the inhabitants of Sylhet who 
have hitherto had little communication with Buropeans 
and /frho are/ unaquainted with the .present system of 
government divested of the idea that their rents will 
be raised as agriculture is extended." Lindsay - DPCR 
1 Reb. 1780, BRQons &50, xxiv, 147.
2. CCR - Board, 14 Hay 1781, CCR EGO, vii, 1057.
5. Ibid.
4. CCR - Eoard, 19 Uov. 1781, Proc. 19 Hov.1781, CCR R68, xi,np
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confidence, again misplaced, to settle the mode of collection. 
On 23 April 1781 the Committee!s diwan reported that a 
number of Sylhet zamindars had requested that a settlement 
be made with a wadahdar or revenue farmer, presumably on 
the grounds that they were unable to make their payments 
directly to the Khalsa.'*' The Committee themselves had 
been thinking along these lines - of employing wadahdars - 
though their reasons were different. Writing on 9 April 
1781 about the numerous small zamindaris in Dacca, they had 
stated:
...an idea suggests itself that if these petty 
zemindars could be united into hoodas /Fiudas or 
estates^ either under a hoodadar /hudadar, or office 
holder/ or one of the zemindars, that the collections 
would be managed with greater facility and the govern­
ment obtain a: greater security of having their rents 
paid.
At that stage no definite instructions were given to Shore 
regarding the appointment of a Wadahdar for certain areas 
of Dacca, but two weeks later, following the diwanls 
report on Sylhet, the Committee were quite amenable to the 
idea of a wadahdar in Sylhet and decided to appoint someone
to that office. The Sylhet zamindars had requested that
the duration of the wadahdar»s tenure should be five years 
but the Committee decided on a term of two years to conform 
to the farming leases that had already been sanctioned.
On 19 November the Committee explained the appoint­
ment of a wadahdar to Sylhet by pointing out that the Sylhet
1. Proc. 23 Apr. 1781, CCR R68, vi, 783. (Wadahdar is derived 
from Wada, Hindi for an engagement or farm).
2. CCR - Shore, 9 Apr. 1781, CCR R68, vi, 576.
3. Proc. 23 Apr. 1781, CCR R68, vi, np
217
zainindars were a great distance away from Calcutta and 
that they paid small amounts;1 it would not do therefore 
to insrdst that they pay their rents directly to the Khalsa.
So much was true. At the same time, the wadahdar was
p
described as "nearly the same" as a farmer, but a more 
correct definition of his role was given in the Committee^s 
proceedings of 29 April 1781 where he was described as a 
mutahid or contractor. He was more than a treasurer or 
someone authorised to accept the payments of the zamindars 
in Sylhet and so save them from having to arrange themselves 
for ithe transmission of their revenues to Calcutta. However , 
he did not supplant the talukdars on their estates. He 
was "directed to receive the cabooleats /gabuliyats/ or 
written engagements of the zemindars...and transmit them
*5
to the Committee for their approbation"^ and he was made 
answerable for the total revenue. In other words, the . . 
wadafflar was responsible both for the mofussil settlement 
and for the collections. In receiving the engagements of 
the zamindars he v/ould be deciding whose rents, should be 
increased. It was not clear what Lindsay1 s function was 
to be, apart, from having to submit monthly accounts. That 
the wadahdar would be involved in a part of the settlement 
and would be the person making the collections, a position 
that directly contradicted the principle of separate functions
1. OCR - Board, 19 Hov. 1781, Proc. 19 Hov. 1781, OCR 
R68, Xi, np.
2. I b i d .
3. Proc. CCR 28 Apr. 1781; 97. There was no mention in 
the proceedings of the wadahdar*s remuneration. His 
counterpart for Chittagong got 3$ of the collections. 
Serguddin, 100.
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which the hoard had so recently espoused., was ignored*"^
The wadahdari scheme ran into difficulties from 
the start, as may be concluded from the mysterious circum­
stances surrounding the appointment'of a person to that 
office. On 28 April 1781, five days after the decision 
had been taken to appoint a wadahdar, the post was given
p
to a certain Chait Singh. By 20 Hay, however, Lindsay
was complaining that rumours hthat the district had been
farmed to one Gayaram Mitra were intensifying his.diffl-
■5
culties with the collections. Ten days later one
Ramshankar Sen appeared in the Committeers proceedings as
their choice as wadahdar of Sylhet and it was resolved
that the settlement with him should commence from September
1781, the start of the Sylhet year.^ On 11 July 1781 when
the diwan submitted the hando$ast for the coming year
Ramkrishen Sen was stated to be the wadahdar with Ramshankar
Ram as his security.^ On 6 August, however, Shore as
acting president of the Committee in the absence of David
Anderson delivered the following report:
I beg leave to mention to the Committee some 
circumstances, relating to the faimof Sylhet 
for their decision...: on enquiry I have reason 
to doubt the sufficiency of /Ramkrishen Sen’s_/ 
security who is in fact the son*., of the farmer.
The latter will give no other security. CyMaram 
Metre /G-ayaram Mitra/ is ready to take the farm 
on the same terms as Ramkrishen Sein. I consider
1. There was the same disregard of this principle in 
Chittagong too. See Serajuddin, 100.
2. Holland - Lindsay with ends. 24 Kay 1781, giDR i, 97.
5. Lindsay - Holland, 20 Hay 1781, CCR R68, vii, 1299.
4 . Proc. 50 May 1781, CCR R68, vii, 1302-3.
5. Proc. 11 July 1781, CCR R68,viii, 150.
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him as a much more responsible person and 
independent of this, he offers as his security 
Sirukant Banirjea /Srikant Banerjee/. The 
Committee will decide which of the two shall 
be put in possession.
The upshot of this was the replacement on 6 August of 
Ramkrishen Sen by Gayaram Kitra.2
Because the records do not reveal exactly 
who these persons * were, or how they were connected, it 
is not possible to ascribe reasons for the apparent in­
trigue surrounding the appointment. Shore*s testimony 
concerning the unsuitability of Ramkrishen Sen and the 
reliability of Gayaram Uitra can only be taken at face value, 
for if there was any debate on the issue it was not entered 
in the Committeers proceedings. In his autobiography 
written in 1822 more than forty years after the event 
Lindsay said that the farmer, whom he remembered as Gunga 
Govind, "was privately under the immediate patronage of" 
one of the members of the Committee of Revenue.^ It is 
impossible either to corroborate this or to identify the 
members involved. (Shore was still acting president when 
Gayaram was later dismissed from the Sylhet farm.)
While these developments were taking place in 
Calcutta, Lindsay was labouring in Sylhet with the collections 
of 1780 -1. The administrative changes of February 1781 had 
been intended to reduce the power of the collector in the 
district. This in Sylhet they did, but in ways unforseen 
by Calcutta though entirely predictable, given the histor­
ical experience of the district. News of the changes and
1. Proc. 6 Aug 1781, CCR R68, viii, 617-8.
2. Ibid. 618
3. Oriental Miscellanies, 101 and 106.
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of the appointment of a wadahdar were sent hack to Sylhet 
by the Vakils of some of the principal zamindars.^ The 
information naturally spread over the countryside, merging 
no doubt in the process with the rumour that the collector 
was about to be recalled, and seriously undermined Lindsay’s 
authority. As he explained on 20 May 1781, under the 
Mughals the zamindars of the district had reacted to any 
news of new appointments by retiring to the hills or other 
inaccessible places and witholding revenue payments. In 
this way, they had usually obtained from the incoming resi­
dent concessions, or abatements of revenue. The resident, 
instead of admitting the tenuity of his position which had 
forced him to make concessions would explain the ensuing
deficiency in the revenues by referring to the ravages of
2the hill tribes. Lindsay disclosed that during his three
years at Sylhet, the zamindars, acting on reports that he
was being replaced, had gone into hiding on several occasions,
and did not think it "proper to return to their duty, till
they found /that/ these reports were without foundation."^
Lindsay attributed this aspect of the behaviour of the Sylhet
zamindars to their meagre contact with Europeans and their
slender knowledge of the way government operated,^- and added:
At present many of the zemindars were in possession 
of delasha khuts /delasha khats7, or letters 
promising reddress /sic/ of all grievances from 
Groyaram Metre, said to be the farmer. It is not 
therefore surprising that the zemindars should
1. Lindsay - Holland, 20 May 1781, CCR R68, vii, 1299.
2. Ibid., 1300-1.
3. Lindsay - Holland, 20 May 1781, CCR R68, vii, 1301.
4. Ibid., 1300.
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embrace this opportunity of witholding their 
revenues, when upon much more frivolous oc­
casions they were used formerly to act in 
the like manner, not only with impunity hut 
with great advantage to themselves.
More often than not the amount of power the zamindars
thought Lindsay possessed was more relevant than the amount of
power Lindsay truly had. In fact the sum of Lindsay’s
authority depended heavily on the perceived notion of that
authority held by the aimindars. In the circumstances,
therefore, Lindsay was finding it difficult to deal with
the zamindars, and he applied to Holland at Dacca for a
2
parwana to reinforce his authority. In forwarding 
Lindsay's request to the Committee on 25 May, Holland 
supported Lindsay in his complaints by stating that "the 
Sylhet zemindars are a very refractory people" and were 
indeed able to abscond with facility to the hills.^ The
response of the Committee to Lindsay's appeal was predetermined. 
The power of the collector must be buttressed to guard against 
revenue deficiencies. The parwana was issued in Calcutta on 
30 May, immediately on the receipt of Lindsay's request,^- 
and was announced in Sylhet about a fortnight later. Hut 
it appears that the parwana had less than the desired effect, 
even though it was specifically stated that the wadahdar would 
not take up his post until September. Perhaps the credibility
1. Lindsay - Holland, 20 May 1771, CCR R68, vii, 1301-2.
2. Ibid., 1302.
3. Holland - CCR, 25 May 1781, CCR R68, vii, 1299.
4. Proc. 30 May 1781, CCR R68, vii, 1302-5•
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of Lindsay's position had been too seriously impaired to be 
mended by a parwana. On 6 August 1781 he wrote again of 
his difficulties, bemoaning that even those zamindars who 
had been punctual in their payments heretofore had now suc­
cumbed to the temptation of absconding and, he feared, would 
not reappear during the current year. Erom many of the 
parganas three revenue instalments were still outstanding, 
with only a little more than one month to go before the close 
of the revenue year, and Lindsay warned that unless an example 
was made and the lands of the ringleaders in default exposed 
to public sale, there was "the greatest possibility ... of a 
very unusual balance being outstanding at the close of the year."^ 
On receiving this news on 15 August, the Committee of Revenue 
again reacted swiftly and predictably. The diwan was directed 
to inquire whether there were any Sylhet zamindars in Calcutta,
p
and if there were, to order them to the mofussil. Through 
Holland in Dacca, Lindsay was authorised to issue a notice 
summoning the zamindars to the district headquarters on a 
fixed day to give reasons for their arrears and declaring 
that the zamindars absented themselves on pain of having 
their lands sold. This directive was to have unforeseen 
and major consequences for the structure of landholding in 
the district. Together with similar subsequent authorizations, 
delivered on Lindsay's request, it endowed him with an immense 
amount of power through which about half the district would 
change hands, ending up in the possession of his servants.
1. Lindsay - Holland, 6 Aug. 1781, CCR R68, ix, 904-5.
2. Proc. 15 Aug. 1781, CCR R68, ix, 907.
3. CGR £ollhnd~f -.15 .Aug. 1781 •- - CCR R6'8, 'lid, :9Q7. *■ •
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Before Lindsay could receive the Committee's 
directive of 15 August, he wrote again, on 20 August, reporting 
that arrears of revenue had accumulated to the tune of 17,000 
rupees. The problem of absconding zamindars was compounded, 
he said, by the approaching Bengali holidays. Eor the past 
five years these holidays had fallen towards the end of As win 
(September-October), by which time, said Lindsay, he had been 
"hitherto fortunate in realizing and rendering an account of 
almost the net revenue of the province.”^  But in the current 
year the holidays were scheduled to begin in early Aswin, and 
Lindsay argued that "a very great and unusual impediment will 
be thrown in the way of my business." He added that he had 
the "greatest reason" to believe that the sum of 17,000 rupees
p
would remain outstanding at the close of the year. In the 
end he managed to reduce the arrears for 1780-1 to 15,000 
rupees or about P©1* cent of the ;jama.^  This arouses sus­
picion that he exaggerated his difficulties with the collections 
in his letters of Ilay and early August in order to secure 
wider ranging powers. It is fair to note, however, that 
although it was always a good ploy to point out difficulties 
during the year as an insurance against the reprimands of 
the Calcutta authorities should difficulties arise, exaggeration 
was a tricky business for the collector must not present 
himself as inept, inefficient or not in control. It is 
possible that some of the zamindars, deciding that Lindsay
1. Lindsay - Holland, 20 Aug. 1781, CCR R68, ix, 40-2.
2. Ibid., 42.
3. Lindsay - Holland, 24 Sept. 1781, Proc. 5 Oct. 1781, 
CCR R68, x, np.
224.
was not going to be removed after all, paid up their out­
standing sums, and that others took the threat of the loss 
of their lands seriously and settled their accounts. Ho 
actual sale proceedings were recorded and it does not appear 
that Lindsay sold any lands at this stage.
T/hat Lindsay was careful to do - and this was 
important if he was to keep up the image of a good adminis­
trator - was to give detailed reasons why the jama was not 
fully realised. This he did in a letter of 24 September 
1781 in which he again mentioned the habit of the Sylhet 
zamindars of taking every opportunity, "even so trifling a 
circumstance as the appointment or removal of a public officer", 
to withold revenues. He referred again to the early onset 
of the holidays and said that it had caused the collections 
to be closed almost a month sooner than was usual. To these 
valid reasons he added that attacks by the hill-men on the 
lands along the Surma had caused the zamindars involved to 
withold their last instalment and he had felt unable to enforce 
payment because of the losses they had suffered. Then, he 
asserted:
The malignant distemper which lately carried off 
numbers of the inhabitants of Calcutta, is now 
raging with the greatest fury at Sylhet, many of 
the zemindars and naibs having fallen a sacrifice 
to this disorder. The others have in a body 
deserted the town and retired tottheir respective 
homes when-,their personal attendance was absolutely 
necessary.
Though some looting by the hill-men nearly always 
occurred during the course of the year, there were no other 
reports of the incident to which Lindsay alluded; perhaps
1. Lindsay - Holland, 24 Sept. 1781, Proc. 5 Oct. 1781, 
CCR R68, x, np.
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he was simply following the practice of erstwhile Mughal
residents, which he had described on 20 May, of using the
tribesmen as an excuse for revenue short-falls. Nor were
there any other references to disease in Sylhet town though,
admittedly, Lindsay's successor was to describe the place
as unhealthy.'*’ In any case not all the Sylhet zamindars
2
came into the town for the year's end and the mention of
naibs conflicts with Lindsay's own later statement that the
zamindars were too poor to afford them and so conducted their
%
business themselves.
Nevertheless, the Committee accepted Lindsay's sub­
missions without reserve; they were fully satisfied that he 
had "exerted every endeavour to realize the revenues of Sylhet" 
and could only recommend his continuing to do so.^ He was 
given permission and indeed urged to use "every means” to
5
realize the outstanding sum. No doubt the Committee were 
impressed by Holland's testimonial, when he forwarded Lindsay's 
letter of 24 September, that Lindsay had "from his first 
appointment to Sylhet, conducted the business of that province
1. TTilles - BOR, 19 Oct. 1789, SDR iii, 174-5.
2. The contention that arrears had arisen because the
zamindars had left Sylhet town could be turned around 
easily; it might be argued that the revenues failed 
because the zamindars had stayed at Sylhet t o m  and 
neglected their duties in the mofussil.
3. Lindsay - CCR, 1 Aug. 1782, SDR i, 117.
4. CCR - Holland, 5 Oct. 1781, SDR i, 102.
5. Ibid.
with great assiduity, ability and regard to the public welfare.
No doubt, too, they were fully aware that the reasons Holland
had abscribed earlier in the year for the then huge arrears
2in the collections of Dacca district were equally valid for
Sylhet. Holland had explained that in Dacca, a district of
so many parganas, a large number of which were divided among
"innumerable partners”, it was impossible to prevent arrears 
•3
in some degree.^ It was not in the interests of government 
to insist on the punctual discharge of instalments. Severe 
measures to extract payments on time led to disruption; for 
example, the sale of lands involved changes in ownership which 
created confusion and further delay in the collections.^ 
Payments were seldom voluntary, Holland remarked, and it was 
only to be expected that the measures which had to be taken 
in consequence should lead to further delay.^
The Committee had no other way to verify what 
Lindsay had said regarding the arrears from his district but 
to refer to Holland who was not exactly a disinterested party. 
Lindsay was operating with Holland’s settlement. Y/hen he 
formed it in 1775 Holland had declared that over a period of
1. Holland - CCR, 29 Sept. 1781, Proc. 5 Oct. 1781, CCR 
R68, x, np.
2. The arrears at the end of Phagun (mid-l.larch) ■ for D&cca 
were Rs. 3,32,604 or more than half the demand at that 
point. Proc. 4 Apr. 1781, CCR R68, vi, 476-7.
3. Holland - CCR, 2 Apr. 1781, CCR R68, vi, 517.
4. Ibid., 517-8.
5. Ibid., 518.
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years the collections would not fall short by more than
5,000 rupees;1 he had, perhaps precipitately, staked his
reputation on the success of the settlement. Moreover, on
7 March 1781 in a follow-up to the changes of the previous
month, the chiefs of the former Provincial Councils had
2
been entrusted with the choice of their assistants and 
Holland had retained Lindsay. It is not surprising, therefore, 
that Holland should concur with the reasons for the arrears put 
forward by Lindsay and back him to the hilt.
What the Committee had shown within the first nine 
months of their existence was that with the aim of securing 
a greater revenue yield they would champion and support the 
local official even though they were committed to a policy 
of centralisation. This was clearly implicit in authorisations 
to Lindsay to sell lands and use all other means to reduce 
arrears. In a sense all through their first months the 
Committee had demonstrated their reliance on the collector 
in the district. Yet they had made arrangements for a 
wadahdar to take over the collections of Sylhet from Lindsay 
and to render the collector largely redundant.
The promises from Gayaram Mitra which had inspired 
the Sylhet zamindars to withold their rents had probably been 
delivered with the aim of securing their support in his bid
to oust Ramkrishen Sen from the farm, but those pledges could
hardly be kept. It is difficult to see how the hope of redress 
of grievances which Gayaram held out could have been translated
1. Holland’s Minute, 27 Jan. 1776, DPR xii, 128.
2. CCR - all chiefs, 7 March 1781, CCR R68, vi, 190-1.
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into anything other than reductions in revenue demand, "but 
by the terms of his contract he had offered to c ollect an 
increase of 17 per cent upon the 2,00,101 rupee jama of 
1780-1, a sum which Iindsay had had great difficulty in 
realising. Moreover, Gayaram had accepted the -kistbandi 
which the diwan had prepared on the basis of earlier lists 
and delivered to the Committee on 11 July 1781. The list 
of instalments, about which Gayaram was later to complain, 
was as follows:^-
Rs. Rs.
Aswin (Sept. - Oct.) 795 Chart (Mar. - Apr.) 25,319
Kartik (Oct. - Nov.) 795 Baisakh (Apr. - May.) 25,319
Aghan •>o
&
- Dec.) 19,259 Jeth (May - June) 25,319
Pus (Dec. - Jan.) 19,259 Asarh (June - July) 25,319
Magh (Jan. - Feb.) 21,314 Savan (July - Aug.) 25,319
Phagun (Feb. - Mar.) 21,314 Bhadon (Aug. - Sept) 25,694
Total 2,35,025 rupees.
Caught between his promises on. the one hand, and 
his contractural obligations on the other, Gayaram produced 
a rent-roll that illustrated the worst aspect of farming, 
namely, the arbitrariness of additional impositions.
According to the formula laid down by the Board the increase 
of 25,000 rupees was to be distributed in proportion to the 
asal jama, the figures for which could be discovered, said 
the diwan, from the ganungos’ records. No great store, 
however, could be set by the papers: of the Sylhet ganungos who,
1. Proc. 11 July 1781, CCR R68, V'iii, 150. (Figures 
given to the nearest rupee).
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it had always been suspected, were in league with other 
landholders generally and thus went to great lengths to 
conceal the real state of the lands. To distribute the 
increase in proportion to the asal jama was not a satis­
factory way of proceeding: it would have been so only if
the relative capacities of the different taluks and parganas 
had remained constant since the formation of the asal jama, 
but during the intervening years of wars, floods and desertions, 
not to mehtion rack-renting, the relationship had doubtless 
been altered markedly. The Committee were prepared to admit 
that the manner in which they proposed the increase should be 
distributed left much to be desired but they stood by it on 
the grounds that it was more certain and expeditious than 
any other means which might be devised.'*' An analysis of 
the rent-roll gives the impression that Gayaram did not in 
practice relate his increases to the asal jama and that he 
did not inquire into the capacity of the various parganas 
to absorb an extra impost. Nor did he investigate the 
value of the various assets of the district, subsidiary to 
the revenues of the 137 established parganas. Appointed 
in Calcutta in mid-August he had no time to make a worthwhile 
investigation of the state of the lands before the start of 
the Sylhet year,? and it does not appear that he consulted 
Lindsay over the mofussil arrangements. A good indication 
of the arbitrary nature of his increases are the rounded 
figures by which the demand upon the secondary assets was 
raised: for example, the demand on the resumed mujrai lands
1* See ©erajuddin, 98
was increased by 14,000 kahons, on the chak lands - small 
estates not included in parganas - hy 6,000 kahons and on 
the Petty Mahals hy 400 kahons.'*' The haphazard formula 
of increase hy a rounded figure might he discerned in the 
assessment of the parganas too. The following figures 
extracted from the rent-roll are typical. (Figures for 
Holland*s subsequent years have heen included).
PARGANAS JAMA. IN KAHONS OF COWRIES
HOLLAND: 1775-81 GAYARAM: 1781-2LHLDSAY: 1784-7PEQP0SED: 1787-8
1 5891.11. 2.- 6891.11. 2.- 6794.11. 2.- 5794.11. 2.-
2 1893. 5. -.3 2393. 5. -.3 1893. 5. -.3 1700. 4. -.-
5 5548. 4. 9.1 6548. 4. 9.1 6548. 4. 9.1 5348. 4.-9.1
4 65.12. 7.3 75.12. 7.3 75.12. 7.3 10. 8.14.-
•5 72. 4.10.3 172. 4.10.3 172. 4.10.3 72. 4.10.3
6 88.15. 5.- 288.15. 5.- 288.15. 5.- 88.15. 5.-
7 l•1•
in.Hvj- 166. 5. -•— 41. 5. -.- 41. 5. -.-
8 120. 8.17.- 220. 8.17.2 120. 8.17.2 120. 8.17.2
9 -.11. 7.2 300.11. 7.2 300.11. 7.2 -.11. 7.2
10 3. -. 5.- 303. -. 5.- 303. -. 5.- 3. -. 5.2
This method of levying the increase naturally affected most 
those parganas which in Holland’s settlement had paid the 
smallest amount. For example, the demand on Indranagar and 
Gulachura parganas was increased hy a startling 300 per cent.
It is not surprising, then, that the wadahdari 
tenure of Gayaram Mitra was a dismal failure. Scarcely a
1. CM 30/5/6 folio 7.
2. Ihid., folios 3-7. Pargana 1 - Kusiarkul, 2 - Barran,
3 - Pratapgarh, 4 - Baghat, 5 - Khord Panchkand, 6 - 
Akbarpur, 1 - Ita Pansal, 8 - Havili Sona Ita, 9 - 
Indranagar, 10 - Gulachura. (Figures in kahons, puns, 
gandas, cowries).
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month had elapsed from the commencement of the Sylhet year 
when the Committee were presented with a petition from the 
wadahdar indicating that he was in considerable difficulties. 
Gayaram frankly acknowledged that not all the zamindars could 
bear an additional increase. Some had borrowed money to 
meet the balances they owed on the accounts of former years 
and were by this time heavily in debt.'*' The wadahdar 
shrewdly realized that if he were to have any chance at all 
of collecting the total jama he would have to make inroads 
into resources of the district hitherto untapped by the 
Company, and he would also somehow have to enhance his 
authority. Towards the former end, he sought permission 
to measure the lands, including kharij and bazi zamin 
holdings, of those zamindars whom he thought could be made 
to pay more; after measuring the lands he intended to 
grant the zamindars an allowance and appropriate the surplus
p
towards the increased jama. Similarly, he proposed that 
the assets of the Sylhet qanungos, including madad-i-ma'ash 
and nankar lands, should be resumed and that the proceeds, 
after the deduction of the allowances of fifty per cent of
the outturn settled on qanungos in the rest of Bengal,
•3
should be added to the collections. He also proposed that 
he be given a free hand to examine the sanads of various 
officers such as the darogha and the munsif of the adalat, 
and some other public officers whom he believed held rent-
1. Proc. 12 Nov. 1781, CCR R68, xi, np.
2. Ibid. (In Chittagong where landholding patterns were
similar and where a wadahdari settlement was also in 
force, collector Sumner, who had served briefly in 
Sylhet, was urging measurement as the only safe way 
of enlarging the demand. Serajuddin, 96.)
3. Proc. 12 Nov. 1781, CCR R68, xi, np.
free lands under false pretences He also suggested the
partial resumption of the tankhwah or assignment of revenue
to the Baniachang zamindars for equipping and maintaining
forty armed boats for the protection of shipping on the
Surma. All those boats were no longer needed, the farmer
2
said, as the river pirates had been dispersed. No im­
mediate decision was taken on any of the above proposals 
except that dealing with the tankhwah of the Baniachang 
zamindars, which was turned down. In the event, no 
further decisions were necessary.
In attempting to strengthen his authority, Gayaram 
solicited powers that would have made him as strong as 
Thackeray had been or as Lindsay was to become. He 
requested a party of sepoys under his immediate orders 
to protect his treasury and money convoys and to render 
further assistance from time to time.^ The Committee 
acceeded to this request in part: Gayaram could have the
services of the sepoys but Lindsay would determine when 
their use was necessary. Gayaram was less successful 
with his other pleas. He argued for the re-establishment 
of chaukis along the Surma on the grounds that the robbers 
had a free passage on the river, but the Committee noticed 
that he here contradicted his previous assertion that the 
pirates had been dispersed and turned down the suggestion.^ 
Gayaram also insisted that the jurisdiction over Sylhet of
1. Proc. 12 Nov. 1781, CCR R68, xi, np.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
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the diwani adalat at Sultansi would render his Job difficult
Since the gamindars would be called away to attend the court.
He therefore asked that all complaints should be referred to
him and that he be authorised to settle disputes relating to
land claims The Committee replied that they could not
interfere in the running of the adalat, nor could they allow
him to do so: if the parties to a dispute consented, Gayaram
might act as an arbitrator, but he could not be empowered to
2pronounce Judicial decrees.
Having failed either to appropriate previously 
untaxed assets to the collections or effectively to strengthen 
his authority Gayaram was in a hopeless situation. The only 
result of his appeal to the Committee was to be their order 
to Lindsay to assist the wadahdar. But Lindsay doubtless 
regarded Gayaram as his rival for control of Sylhet, and if 
the latter is to be believed, the collector actively conspired 
in causing the eventual failure of the farmc.:*' Gayaram com­
plained that Lindsay had put at his disposal an altogether 
insufficient force, consisting of one havildar and four 
sepoys, especially inadequate in view of the fact that many 
zamindars, as he said, never paid their rents until they 
were forced to do so/ He also charged that the collector 
made unreasonable demands on him, but in his defence Lindsay 
could claim that he was sticking to the letter of the Committee’s 
orders. Bor when the instalment for Aswin, the first month
1. Proc. 12 Nov. 1781, CCR R68, xi* np.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Proc. 27 Dec. 1781, CCR R68, xi* np.
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of the Sylhet year and the lowest rated, had not been
realized on time the Committee had urged Lindsay to put
pressure on the wadahdar to pay the balance.^ Prom his
own experience Lindsay no doubt recognized the vulnerability
of the farmer on this point. He knew that in Sylhet the
instalment of one month was never fully paid within that
month. As he wrote in July 1783? ,fthere are never any
collections made at Sylhet till the latter end of the current
month, or the beginning of the ensuing Compounding
the problem was "the great delays ^which7 attended the trans-
2portation of cowries from the mofussil.!t It appears, 
however, that Lindsay was less than sympathetic. In 
December 1781 in another petition to the Committee, Gayaram 
asked that Lindsay should "consider the convenience of the 
ryots and not insist on their rents to a day", but the 
Committee replied that it was up to Gayaram to suspend or 
enforce his demand upon the ryots for the revenue when it 
was due, but he must deliver the revenues according to the 
kistbandi.^
Only a revision of the jama and the feistbandi could 
extricate Gayaram from his difficulties. In his earlier
5
petition in November he had sought a revised wadabandi on 
the increase from April to September 1782, the months with 
the heaviest instalments. In December he asked that the
1. CCR - Holland, 29 Nov. 1781, Proc. 29 Nov. 1781, CCR 
R68, xi, np.
2. Lindsay - Accountant General, ncd. July 1782, SDR i, 114.
3. Proc. 27 Dec. 1781, CCR R68, xi, np.
4. Ibid.
5. An agreement, especially for the payment of money at 
a stipulated time.
6. Proc. 12 Nov. 1781, CCR R68, xi;, np.
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demand for November 1781 to February 1782 should be reduced 
to the instalments settled for those months in the previous 
year.*^  Clearly, Gayaram could not collect the increase but 
the Committee were adamant. They would not allow any variation
p
in the feistbandi.
In his second petition, in December 1781, Gayaram 
repeated his request that Matthew Day, the Magistrate at 
Sultansi, should not summon Sylhet zamindars to the court, 
at least uhtil they had settled their monthly accounts, and 
that chaukis should be re-established along the Surma. That 
he should make these demands at all indicate how little he 
knew of the working of the district before he applied for the 
farm. That he should repeat them after they had been flatly 
rejected indicate his deepening despair. It was a despair 
which embarassed and irritated the Committee, who had insisted 
in their final report on the settlement that they had spared 
no pains to rate the district according to its capacity.
It would not do for the Committee to admit, therefore, that 
the wadahdar’s problems were connected in any way with the 
defects of the settlement. Nor did they consider that some 
of his difficulties were inherent in the situation, even though 
Khosal Chand, the wadahdar in Chittagong, also applied for 
sepoys and complained too about the interference caused by 
the local court's .proceedings. As the Committee saw it,
Gayaram!s problems sprang from his personal incompetence.
1. Proc. 27 Dec. 1781, OCR R68, xi, np.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
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Lindsay continued to draw up and transmit his 
running accounts in strict accordance with the kistbandi 
and with a strict regard to the deadline set by Calcutta - 
the fifth day of the ensuing Bengal month. (When he had 
been responsible for the collections, it may be noted, the 
central authorities had complained repeatedly that his 
accounts failed to arrive on time and Holland had had to 
come to his defence.) Hence, on 3 January 1782 the Committee 
received the following account for Aghan (November-December) 
which Lindsay had drawn up in late December.^
Balance Outstanding Kist Aghan Total Demand Collected Balance 
Rs. 1,590 Rs. 19,259 Hs. 20,849 Rs. 1,625 Rs.19,224
Prom this it appeared that the arrears at the end of Aghan 
were almost equal to the instalment for that month. Noting 
the lack of progress in the collections and the many pleas 
Gayaram had put forward in his petitions the Committee con­
cluded that the farmer had engaged in an undertaking which
2
he found himself incapable of managing. The truth was that 
collecting the revenues was no easy task, even when the person 
involved was crowned with the halo of a district officer. As 
Lindsay remarked: ”it requires a man vested with authority
and who knov/s how to exercise it to collect any rents whatever.”' 
Without the aura surrounding a district officer, and saddled
1. Proc. 3 Jan. 1782, CCR R68, xii., np. (The account is 
entered in Proc. CCR, 21 Jan. 1782).
2. Ibid.
3. Lindsay - BOR, 24 Oct. 1787, SDR ii, 184.
237.
with a hastily and ill-imposed demand, success with the col­
lections was that much more elusive.^"
Although Shore and the Committee had considered
Gayaram1 s security reliable at the time of his appointment,
they now were concerned that mismanagement might result in
a larger balance than the security could discharge, and might
also jeopardise future collections. ”Yfe do not think it
advisable,” they declared, Mto run the risk of a loss in the
revenue by continuing the management of it in his^Gayaram*s/
2
hands.” Consequently, on 3 January 1782 Lindsay v;as 
directed to dismiss the farmer and to take the collections 
immediately under his own charge.
The brief, unsuccessful stint of Gayaram Mitra 
as wadahdar of Sylhet redounded substantially to Lindsay*s 
advantage. After the abolition of the Dacca Provincial 
Council in February 1781 Lindsay continued to communicate 
with Calcutta through Holland. Strictly speaking up to 
January 1782 Lindsay had never been a collector, though he 
had been so styled in the official correspondence; on a 
few occasions he had been addressed, more correctly, as the 
resident. In practice there was no real distinction between 
him and the other collectors but his salary was considerably 
less than a full collector’s pay.^ When Gayaram was dismissed, 
the Committee ordered Lindsay to communicate directly with them,
1. The wadahdari settlement of Chittagong also failed and 
Khosal Chand ended up in gaol. See Serajuddin, 107.
2. CCR - Lindsay, 3 Jan. 1782, SDR i, 105.
3. Ibid.
4. A collector’s monthly pay was Rs. 1,200; Lindsay’s only 
Rs. 500.
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thus rendering him independent of Holland in form as well
as in practice.^ To put him on the same footing as other
collectors the Committee sanctioned the addition to his
2
staff of a writer and some Indian servants and suggested 
to the Board that he should draw a collectors salary. The 
Board assented to these proposals on 22 January 1782.
Y/hen Lindsay assumed responsibility for the 
revenues in the middle of January 1782, 19,224 rupees were 
outstanding from a demand of 20,849 rupees. For the next 
five months - Pus to Baisakh - Lindsay remitted 25,000 rupees 
at a time, so that of the total demand from the beginning of 
the revenue year to the end of Baisakh of 1,33,374 rupees 
only 6,749 rupees by late May remained outstanding.^ But 
Lindsay then began to run into difficulties. The zamindars 
and their ryots as a whole were seriously affected at the 
close of the Jeth (May-June) instalment when they could find 
no sale for the first of the a us crop. An unusually good 
harvest throughout the province generally accounted for this. 
By June rice was being offered at the various bazaars in 
Sylhet town at the comparatively low price of three and a 
half matmds per rupee but even at that rate there were few 
buyers. ^ TherpPodue em of' the lahd r r ema ihed - unsold, Lindsay Y 
reported, and the ryots were unable to pay their revenues.
It appears that Lindsay had been pressing the 
zamindars too hard, and when problems arose over the sale of
1. CCR - Lindsay, 3 Jan. 1782, SLR i, 105.
2. Including 12 cowrie checkers with 6 coolies.
3. Proc. 14 Feb. 1782, CCR R68, xii, np; 14 Mar. 1782, R68,
xii, np; 24 Apr. ahcT“23 May 1782, R68, xiv, np; 19 Aug.
1782, R68, xvi, np.
4. Lindsay - CCR, 25 June 1782, SLR i, 112-3.
5. Ibid., 113.
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the aus harvest they began to resort to subterfuge to evade 
paying the revenues. The difficulties that Lindsay en­
countered in the succeeding months in realising the revenue 
suggest that though Gayaram was perhaps incapable the failure 
of the farm was caused chiefly by the haphazard assessment.
On 28 June 1782 Lindsay admitted that he was having 
more difficulties with the collections thah at any time during 
his previous five-year residence at Sylhet.^* The payments he
had extracted from the landholders had forced them into the
2
hands of money lenders who were clamouring for repayment.
The shroffs or money lenders were prosecuting the 3amindars 
in the diwani adalat at Sultansi and Lindsay now echoed 
Gayaram*s complaint that the interference of the court was 
a major obstacle to the realization of the revenues. In 
fact Lindsay labelled the court "the immediate cause of 
heavy balances arising in many of the pergannahs. Apart 
from cases involving shroffs and debtors, there were numerous 
proceedings involving land, stemming from the complex tenures 
of Sylhet, from patterns of inheritance which resulted in a 
"continual dissilition" Z^ic/ 0f family property, and from 
the uncertain boundaries of many holdings.^" Disputed 
property was apt to be left untilled and if the dispute was 
prolonged, the lands could revert to jungle; the collector 
was "in the meantime ... at a loss to determine fio/ what 
party to apply for the rents and the whole remains in a state
5
of confusion."
1. Lindsay - OCR, 28 June 1782, SDR i, 111.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid., 112.
5. Ibid.
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Apparently, the authority of the court at Sultansi
was not fully established over those parts of the Dacca
district which were theoretically subject to its jurisdiction,
so that the court was mainly concerned with cases relating
to Sylhet.'*’ As matters stood, the zamindars and ryots were
summoned to Sultansi, almost a hundred miles away, upon the
2
"most frivolous complaints." Since most of the zamindars, 
unable to afford naibs, conducted the mofussil business them­
selves no rents were forthcoming while they were absent from 
the lands. And when they returned they claimed that because 
they had been absent, they were unable to pay.
Matthew Day, judge at Sultansi, tried to assist 
Lindsay by getting cases involving zamindars under detention 
out of the way but the multiplicity and intricate nature of 
the disputes prevented speedy decisions.^ The combined 
energies of the collector and the judge were not sufficient 
to thwart the determination of the landholders to avoid 
paying the revenues. The zamindars, too, were capable of 
manipulating the administrative machinery. In exasperation 
Lindsay wrote that they had devised a scheme which was 
"perhaps not practised in any other parts, and which nothing
4
but a most litigious disposition could have invented." In 
reality, though, the plan was simple: the zamindars commenced
suits against themselves in the name of their talukdars or
Ej
ryots for "encroachments and other plausible pretences."-^
1. Lindsay - CCR, 3 Aug. 1782, SDR i, 118.
2. Lindsay - CCR, 1 Aug. 1782, SDR i, 117.
5* Ibid. (Matthew Day had been on the Dacca Provincial
Council but had not been a supporter of the Rous-Holland- 
Lindsay faction. Oriental Miscellanies, 18-9.)
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
241.
The court had no option but to summon the zamindars. On 
3 August 1782 Lindsay reported that the zamindars of Ita,
BeJura, Chauallis and other important parganas had been 
removed by peons of the court to answer complaints.^ The 
effect was the same as if the zamindars had absconded or 
gone into hiding; furthermore, they could claim that their 
absence was legitimate. This did not prevent Lindsay from 
putting up some lands for sale in order to break what he 
suspected was "a general combination to avoid paying the
increase.” However, "from the poverty of the inhabitants ...
2no purchasers appeared.”
The final accounts for 1781-2 disclosed a balance 
of 21,921 rupees, but that was to the end of April 1782, at 
which date Lindsay was ordered on 26 June 1782 to close his 
books. The demand for the preceeding seven months and 
twenty days was 95,227 rupees so about 22 per cent remained 
uncollected. The order to close the accounts at the end 
of April came from the office of the accountant-general where 
a new system ”for the better adjustment of the revenue books” 
was being instituted.^ Henceforth, annual accounts would be 
closed on 30 April. Lindsay at first thought that he would 
have to alter the entire kistbandi, and though on 5 August 
1782 the Committee explained that only his treasury accounts
1. Lindsay - CCR, 3 Aug. 1782, SLR i, 117.
2. A contributing factor, said Lindsay, was the ”low
estimation” in which lands were held at Sylhet.
(Lindsay - CCR, 1 Aug. 1782, SLR i, 117.) This 
should not be taken to mean that lands were not 
prized but that investment in land under the con­
ditions then prevailing was not an attractive 
financial proposition, especially as in most cases 
the purchaser would have to rely on the constant 
support of government, which could not be guaranteed, 
to retain his acquisition.
3. Lindsay - Accountant-general,, nd. July 1782, SLR i, 114.
4. Accountant-general - Lindsay,, 26 June 1782, SLR i, 113.
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were to "be affected and that the kisthandi was to remain as
formerly,'*" henceforth the Sylhet style of dating was dropped.
Lindsay later reported that the zamindars had
witheld a large part of the last or Chait (April-May) instal- 
2ment. The extent to which the zamindars did not meet their 
obligations from a sheer inability to pay is difficult to 
determine. Lindsay, like Gayaram, recognized that there 
were some landholders who were genuinely unable to pay their 
assessment; this he reported to the Committee in November 
1782, stating, "It is highly equitable to distinguish such 
as have not flhe/ ability to pay from those who have but will 
not . Understandably he Y/as chiefly worried about the
latter group. Whenever they resisted the collector's 
authority their standing in the district increased at his 
expense. As Lindsay ruefully commented, they "consider 
themselves, and are considered by others, in a light superior 
to the other landholders, from being able almost in every 
instance to evade the orders of government."^ Every successful 
evasion of Lindsay's orders blev7 progressively larger holes in 
his power image and rendered further resistance easier, on the 
part not only of the traditionally difficult zamindars but 
also of those v/ho vvere inclined perhaps to be more obedient.
The remedy for the situation, argued Lindsay, was to sell the 
lands of the defaulting zamindars, a proposal to which the 
Committee agreed on 11 November 1782, with the proviso that
1. CCR - Lindsay, 5 Aug. 1782, Proc. 5 Aug. 1782, OCR R68, 
xv, np.
2. Lindsay - CCR:, 12 Sept. 1783, SLR i, 166.
3. Lindsay - CCR, 2 Nov. 1782, SLR i, 122.
A. Ibid.
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zamindars who were distinctly unable to pay should not he 
dispossessed.'*'
BothcLindsay and the Committee had tacitly acknow­
ledged, then, at the close of the first year of the settlement, 
that the jama was unevenly distributed and in some cases 
burdensome. Yet no relief measures were taken apart from 
the Committee’s orders that indigent zamindars should not 
be dispossessed. It was up to Lindsay, however, to dis­
tinguish the impoverished from the recalcitrant and his 
discretion could be easily afeu5ed-
The Committee decided to retain for 1782-3 the 
demand that had been settled in 1781 but authorised Lindsay 
to make the detailed mofussil arrangements and to offset 
any reductions in the assessment of individual estates by 
proportionate increases on other holdings. This move the 
Committee reported to the Board on 11 November 1782. They 
justified the departure from the principle of separation of 
functions by referring to "the situation of the district, the 
turbulent and refractory state of many of the zemindars," and 
added that as it was already November it would be difficult 
and imprudent to summon the Sylhet zamindars to Calcutta, 
while it would weaken Lindsay’s authority if a member of the 
Committee were deputed to conduct the settlement, and it was
difficult to procure "any person of ability and responsibility,"
2
to act as f/adahdar. This last difficulty had been solved in 
the case of Chittagong where, after the failure of the wadahdari
1. CCR - Lindsay, 11 Nov. 1782, Proc. 11 Nov. 1782, CCR 
R68, xviii, np.
2. Proc. 11 Nov. 1782, CCR R68, xviii, np.
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system, the district was farmed for 1782-3 to Audhiram Das
Datta of Calcutta,^ In Sylhet, on the other hand, the
power of which the Committee had divested Lindsay in September
1781 and had conferred on G-ayaram Mitra had come full circle
back to Lindsay, and with added strength.
But Lindsay still found it difficult to collect
the revenues. In his Aghan (hovember-December) account,
he omitted any explanation for the arrears that had arisen
but at the close of the subsequent instalment he stated that
he could submit no reasons for the balance outstanding -
2considered by the Committee f,too considerable” to overlook -
other than the heaviness of the demand. The Committee
judged Lindsay's explanation inadmissable and directed him
■3
to sell the lands of defaulting zamindars. It is not clear
whether at this stage Lindsay sold any lands. In any case
the collections did not improve and Lindsay could only repeat
that the cause was the burdensome demand. The authorities
at Calcutta were not convinced, partly because other districts
were doing better than Sylhet. Towards the end of the revenue
year the Board told the Committee that they regarded Lindsay's
excuses as "mere words” and added:
... you will communicate to him that this is clearly 
our idea on the subject, and that we accordingly 
expect that he will find means speedily of realizing 
the whole.
Lindsay replied to the unyielding stand of the Board by
1. Serajuddin, 108.
2. CCR - Lindsay, 10 Mar. 1783, SDR i, 137.
3. Ibid.
4. CCR - Lindsay, with encl. 14 Apr. 1783, SDR i, 145.
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insisting that it was impossible for him to collect the
full demand.1 On 9 June 1785 he maintained:
... it is not in my power, without fabricating 
and excuse for the zamindars, to assign any 
other reason /for the balance/ than inability 
to pay more than they actually have done.
According to Lindsay's accounts the arrears for 
1782-3, computed from May to 30 April, stood at 58,353 kahons 
or about two per cent of the jama.^ But it would be mis­
leading to accept Lindsay's accounts at face value and it is 
certain that the arrears were in fact more substantial than 
this. Lindsay later admitted that throughout his term in 
Sylhet he had been in the habit of padding his accounts to 
retain the favour of the Calcutta authorities.
Apparently the greater part of the arrears of 1782-3 
arose in the parganas bordering Jaintia and Cachar. The ryots 
had migrated beyond the Company's jurisdiction as a reaction 
to the attempts of the zamindars, despite the injunctions of 
government, to levy new imposts in order to meet the increased 
demand.^ Lindsay confessed he was powerless to prevent 
either the extortion or the subsequent desertion of the 
lands by the ryots, given the number of zamindars- and their
5
inaccessibility. To induce the ryots to return, he 
requested a deduction in the standing jama in the approaching 
settlement for 1783-4 of 50,000 to 60,000 kahons to be spent, 
presumably, mainly on the border lands. This proposal was
1. Lindsay - CCR, 29 Apr. 1783, SLR i, 146.
2. Lindsay - CCR, 9 June 1783, SLR i, 153.
3. Ibid.
4. Lindsay - CCR, 29 Apr. 1783, SLR i, 147.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
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based on the bandy but hardly fool-proof formula of estimating 
an equitable jama which was to settle the demand for a given 
year by subtracting the amount that remained outstanding from 
the jama of the previous year. Doubtless, Lindsay would 
have liked to have suggested a more substantial remission, 
for the smaller the demand, the easier was his task, but a 
greater figure might have landed him in trouble with the 
Board.
One of the two basic assumptions behind the method 
that Lindsay followed for estimating the demand of 1783-4 was 
that whatever had been collected in any one year could be 
collected in the subsequent year. Depending on the ease 
with which the rents were paid an addition might be made to 
the jama for the following year. The zamindars were aware 
of the implications of this kind of thinking - no doubt they 
approached their own ryots with similar considerations in 
mind - and considered it good policy, not to pay with seeming 
facility or fully, provided they could get away with it, even 
if they could afford to liquidate their jama.
The second assumption, the obverse of the first, 
was that if deficiencies arose then the district must be 
overrated. On 29 April 1783 Lindsay wrote to the Committee 
in support of his proposal for a remission, pointing out that 
in 1777 and 1778, following the quinqennial settlement, 
several districts had received a considerable abatement in 
their jama while Sylhet "never experienced the smallest 
indulgence."1 In addition, Lindsay argued, the increase
1. Lindsay - CCR, 29 Apr. 1783, SDR i, 147.
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of seventeen per cent levied on Sylhet "by the Committee in
1781 was out of proportion to the general increase of ten
per cent settled on Bengal as a whole.^ The result, said
Lindsay, was that the Sylhet zamindars were saddled with an
increase which was twice that imposed on the zamindars in
2neighbouring districts.
In spite of Lindsay’s arguments the Committee 
preferred to keep faith with their assessment of 1781. Their 
view of the matter from distant Calcutta was that the 
deficiency in the collections was attributable to the 
oppressive conduct of the zamindars which had driven the 
ryots to flight. It was not necessary, in their estimation, 
to reduce the jama to prompt the ryots to return; that 
objective could be secured if Lindsay prevented the increase 
being passed on to the ryots, which could be accomplished, 
they insisted, by the collector paying ”a regular attention 
to complaints preferred, and by ^His7 making severe examples 
of offenders.It was overlooked that in many instances it 
was easier for the ryots to desert than to complain; those 
in the parganas adjacent to the frontier with Cachar always 
had a strong inducement to abandon the district.^" For ryots 
in remote parganas it was often physically impossible to 
complain to the sadr. The cultivators also had a keen 
awareness of the strong position of their own zamindars and 
recognised that it was only rarely the case that the collector
1. Lindsay - CCR, 29 Apr. 1785, SDR i, 147.
2. Ibid.
5. CCR - Lindsay, 19 May 1783, SDR i, 149.
4. If they settled in Cachar they paid no revenue for the 
first year. See Lindsay - CCR, 28 Sept. 1784, SDR i, 
197.
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could protect them. Finally, in Sylhet district the ryots 
were at a legal disadvantage in trying to prove extortion 
as they had never been given pattas or written leases. The 
Committee declined to sanction a lump sum remission such as 
Lindsay had proposed hut left the door open for specific 
reductions in particular parganas if a convincing case was 
presented.^ It is impossible to see, however, what more 
compelling or accurate reasons for a reduction of the jama 
Lindsay could have advanced than those he had already submitted.
Lindsay was not happy with the Committee*s response
to his proposal, especially as he was facing a collapsing
situation. One of the reasons he had given for his failure
to collect a larger amount than he had done for 1782-3 was
that for that year twenty-five per cent more had been collected
2
than in any previous year. This was not altogether true; 
none the less, the revenue yield of 1782-3 was impressive 
when compared with that of former years. Heartening figures 
had come from Chittagong, too, where the farmer liquidated 
the whole demand for 1782-3; he confessed, however, that 
the results had not been achieved without stem measures.
In Sylhet likewise the zamindars had viewed the situation 
with alarm and during the year a large number of them had 
asked Lindsay to manage their lands rather than risk the loss 
of their estates through sales to recover arrears. This 
Lindsay did, and found that in many cases the lands barely 
yielded a profit of ten or fifteen per cent which was "by
1. CCR - Lindsay, 19 May 1783, SLR i, 149.
2. Lindsay - CCR, 9 June 1783, SLR i, 153.
3. Serajuddin, 109.
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no means adequate to the charge of collections, interest of 
money /Borrowed by the zamindars/ and expenses, without 
making any allowance for the numerous proprietors." The 
poor yield of the lands was nevertheless attributed by 
Lindsay "to the bad management of the zamindars which has 
obliged many of the ryots to abandon the district.”^
Thwarted in his bid to secure a remission for 1783-4 
Lindsay asked for authority to by-pass the zamindars and 
collect the revenues directly from the talukdars and ryots.
This proposal was based probably on his experience in managing 
estates the previous year. He admitted that it would be an 
unpopular measure and would cause a general outcry, but stated 
that it would benefit the district "by obliging several 
thousands of indolent people to attend to cultivation of the
p
lands or to follow some other occupation to gain a livelihood.. .V 
On 16 June 1783 the Committee considered Lindsay’s proposal and 
agreed that it should be tried in Sylhet but limited the 
experiment only to such areas as were in arrears owing to 
the mismanagement of zamindars or "where they have forfeited 
their pretension to the management of their lands from the 
oppressions they have exercised."*^ Lindsay was to judge 
which areas fell within the scope of this remark and the
4
Committee urged him to exercise caution.
In acknowledging the Committee’s reply of 16 June 
fiindsay stated that it was never his Intention to make the 
entire district huzuri even though the Sylhet zamindars as
1. Lindsay - CCR, 9 June 1783, SDR i, 153.
2. Ibid., 153-4.
3. COR - Lindsay, 16 June ,1783, SLR i, 154.
4. Ibid.
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a whole '‘cannot he considered in any other light hut as 
the immediate servants of government, and were liable 
therefore to removal. He only wished !,to put the zamindars 
upon their guard” and did not want to make an example without 
Calcutta's approbation. On 12 July he reported that he had 
rendered some taluks huzuri where the zamindars had been 
making collections nin the most arbitrary and oppressive 
manner."^ This seemed to have had the desired effect of 
making the zamindars more heedful of their obligations to 
the Company. Por half-way through the revenue year 1783-4 
lindsay was able to calculate that two-thirds of the district 
had "been given by the proprietors in farm to individuals 
who are far better able to conduct the business than the 
zemindars, who have reserved to themselves certain portions 
of lands for their maintenance."^
In Bengal the calling-in of farmers usually suggests 
a comfortable rather than a narrow margin and the surrender by 
zamindars of part of their potential profits in exchange for 
gentlemanly leisure. The petty zamindars of Sylhet were not 
capable as a whole of such aspirations. The resort to 
farmers, as the approach to lindsay in 1782-3 to take over 
the management of estates, seemed to have proceeded from an 
attempt to avoid the loss of holdings. But throughout 1783-4 
the Committee maintained a firm line on the collections. As 
the monthly accounts came in and they noticed the parganas in
1. Lindsay - CCR, 12 July 1783, SDR i, 162.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Lindsay - CCR, 10 Sept. 1783* SLR i„ 166.
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arrears they took stringent measures. For example, on
25 September 1783 on receiving the Savan account the Committee
ordered Lindsay to instruct the proprietors of Doady and
Betal parganas to terminate their quarrels and pay their
outstanding rents, and required him to sell their lands
if they did not obey.'*' Again, on 10 November 1783 upon
receipt of the Bhadon account which disclosed a balance of
11,400 rupees the Committee instructed Lindsay to place the
estates of the zamindars of Mandarkandi, who were under
2
prosecution at Sultansi, under a sazawal.
This unrelenting approach was bound to have disastrous 
consequences. The figures for 1783-4 disclosed a final 
balance of only 46,765 kahons or five per cent of the jama, 
but when Lindsay came to deal w ith the settlement of 1784-5 
he was forced to admit that there were parganas "daily going 
to decay, because the revenue with which they are cessed is 
far greater than the zamindars can possibly afford to pay 
without ruining their talokdars and ryotts with exorbitant 
exactions." ■ This must have been a difficult confession 
for the collector of a district to make. It was probably 
all the more distressing for Lindsay who had been responsible 
for distributing the demand, especially as the following six 
parganas, which he considered "more immediately distressed 
than the rest", were ones in which he had increased the jama 
in November 1782 when he adjusted the settlement made with 
Gayaram Mitra.
1. CCR - Lindsay, 25 Sept. 1783, SDR i, 169.
2. CCR - Lindsay, 10 Nov. 1783, SDR i, 173.
3. Lindsay - CCR, 31 May 1784, SLR i, 183.
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JAMA IN KAHONS OP COWRIES 1
PARGANA GAYARAM LINDSAY PROPOSED
1781-2 1782-4 1784-5
Betal 4,721 5,221 4,421
Dinajpur 19,761 24,761 22,761
Chauallis 36,719 42,919 39,919
Langla 25,858 38,858 30,358
Chapghat 18,485 23,685 22,685
Bejura 41,719 47,719 45,719
Part of the reason for this gloomy picture was the
destruction by floods of the April or horo crop. This
lindsay had first reported on 18 May 1784, requesting at
that time a deduction of 3,000 rupees in the demand for
1784-5. The Committee agreed to this remission on 24 May
hut told Lindsay, *’in granting this indulgence, we expect
you will apply it with caution, and that you will inform the
ranters it will he again annexed in the jumma in the ensuing
2
or following year.”
The condition of the district deteriorated signi­
ficantly during the monsoon of 1784. The floods lindsay 
had reported in Hay continued to rise and hy 25 June 1784, 
when he was on leave in Calcutta, Vfilliam Hyndman, his 
assistant collector, was calling "the situation of the people 
... truly deplorable.*1 The Surma had broken its hanks and 
the waters had risen higher than the oldest inhabitants
1. To nearest kahon. Encl. in Lindsay - CCR, 31 May 1784, 
SDR i, 184.
2. CCR - Lindsay, 24 May 1784, SDR i, 182-3. (The jama 
for 1784-5 was fixed at 9,19,467 kahons.)
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could recall. The town of Bhanga on the Surma was almost 
entirely destroyed and in the district capital itself, 
situated on ’’one of the highest sites in the whole province” 
many of the houses were flooded with four to six feet of 
water.'*’ When Hyndman wrote in June it was too early to 
estimate the damage hut daily reports were being received 
of huge casualties to life and cattle. ’’Persons who come 
last from thence ^Ehe interior/” wrote Hyndman,’’describe a
2scene too dreadful for humanity to behold or words to express.”
On 10 July 1784 Hyndman reported that he had visited several 
parganas where he had found ”a very few villages left.” The 
scene was one of desolation; ’’there were scarcely any ryots 
to be seen,” those who had survived having retired to the 
hills. ^
The boro crop was lost in April; the murali, a 
variety of aus usually cut in May-June, and the aus harvest 
of June and July were also destroyed by the floods.^- Warehouses 
containing grain for seed and consumption had been washed away; 
in any case, the land was waterlogged and unsuitable for sowing, 
lindsay, on his own initiative, had placed an embargo on the 
export of grain from Sylhet but was ordered by the Committee 
to lift the restriction. In September when he returned to 
the district from Calcutta he reported that people were dying 
of starvation. He estimated that more than two-thirds of 
the inhabitants had already died of hunger and added,
1. Hyndman - CCR, 25 June 1784, SDR i, 184-5.
2. Ibid., 184.
5. Hyndman - CCR, 10 £uly 1784, SDR i, 186.
4. Hyndman - CCR, 25 June 1784, SDR i, 185.
5. Hyndman - CCR, 10 July 1784, SDR i, 186.
6. CCR - Hyndman, 5 July 1784:, j'SDR i, 186.
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I see but little prospect of saving the remainder 
as there is not a tuft of grass or smallest spot 
of verdure to be seen from the banks^of the 
Burhampoter ^ Brahmaputra/ to Sylhet.
The western half of the district was like an open sea; Lindsay 
commented that the misery was "grevious beyond description” 
and he related how the inhabitants were trying to save them­
selves and their cattle by diving into jhils or lakes for
2the roots of grass and weeds.
In early September 1784 Lindsay informed the
Committee that if one half of the year!s jama was collected
it must be done with inhuman rigour, and disclosed that
4 . ,since May the zamindars had paid nothing. The Committee 
reacted to this disastrous news by ordering that every 
indulgence should be made for real distress though of course 
with a caution against zamindars who might try fraudulently 
to exploit the situation. They advised Lindsay to make 
the collections according to the ability of the renters to 
pay without impairing their hopes of subsistence or future 
cultivation. To this the Board added the more positive 
injunction that he should not ’|press the inhabitants for the 
payment of more revenue than what they can easily afford, /but/ 
on the contrary, to contribute all he can to the relief of 
their distress....” On 6 December 1784 with the arrears 
continuing to accumulate the Committee told Lindsay they 
could only recommend him to enforce ”the payment of the rents
1. Lindsay - Board, 2 Sept. 1784, SDR i, 189.
2. Lindsay - CCR, 3 Sept. 1784, SLR i, 190.
3. Ibid.
4. Lindsay suspected a conspiracy to withold the rents. 
Lindsay - CCR, 6 Sept. 1784, SDR i, 191.
5. CCR - Lindsay, 23 Sept. 1784, SDR i, 193-
6. Encl. in CCR - Lindsay, 23 Sejpt. 1784, SLR i, 194.
as far as is compatible with the indulgence due to the 
circumstance of the renters.’1 This would seem to indicate 
a softening of the Committee*s position.
On 13 March 1785 by which time the arrears had
grown to about half the year’s Jama lindsay reported that
he had assembled the zamindars and "offered to relinquish
one-half of the demands of the government for the current 
2
year." To this the Committee made no demur. But Lindsay’s 
offer was of dubious help, given the scope of the disaster. 
Lindsay’s estimate was that in those areas of which he had 
personal knowledge two-thirds of the cattle had died and 
those that had not perished were so "exhausted" as to be 
of little use for purposes of cultivation. He reckoned 
that a quarter of the inhabitants of the lowlands in the 
western part of the district had didd from hunger or "un­
wholesome food," another quarter might have deserted the 
district altogether, while the survivors were so desperate
3
that they could hardly undertake any saving of the crops.
To abandon half the Jama, therefore, was merely to indulge 
in paper relief for there was no hope that the arrears could 
be collected. The Company was surrendering what did not 
exist. (The final returns showed that 4-,55,700 kahons or 
less than half the Jama of 9,19,407 kahons was collected for 
1784-5.)4
What would have been of more certain assistance was 
a triennial settlement, proposed by Lindsay on 13 March 1785.
1. CCR - Lindsay, 6 Bee. 1784, SDR i, 202.
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He was convinced that unless great indulgence was exercised 
for the next three years the district would he totally 
ruined. The basis of his plan was a deduction of 1,90,000 
kahons on about twenty per cent of the standing Jama for the 
revenue year 1192, beginning in April 1785, and for the demand 
to be raised by rasad in 1786-7 and 1787-8 to reach the level 
of 1784-5 in April 1788.^ At first the Committee was sym­
pathetic to this proposal but finally decided they could not
sanction it as a triennal settlement was against the orders
2of their superiors. On earlier occasions they had Justified 
departures from the directives of their superiors on the 
grounds of the unique circumstances of Sylhet but in early 
1785 the overall political situation was in a state of flux. 
Hastings had left India in February 1785 and the new regime 
under MacPherson was still awaiting instructions from England, 
about revenue policy. Moreover, MacPherson had made it plain 
on first taking his seat in the Council that he would "not
sign a remission of revenue, or agree to cancel a Company’s
balance, but on a ground of actual invasion, or a general
3
famine." In these circumstances the Committee played safe 
and eschewed innovation.
Prom the accounts of lindsay and his assistant of 
the disastrous monsoon of 1784 it seems clear that positive 
relief measures such as takavi loans and the kind of graduated 
settlement the collector had proposed were needed. All that
1. Lindsay - CCR, 13 Mar. 1785, SLR i, 207.
2. CCR - Lindsay, 14 Apr. 1785, SDR i, 209.
3. MacPherson - COD, 30 Mar. 1783, Pari. Coll. 21, no. 78, 5.
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was forthcoming, however, was permission for Lindsay to repair 
the embankments on the Surma and Kusiyara rivers, provided he 
spent no more than 8,000 rupees.1
Left with no alternative to working with a Jama of 
9,19,407 kahons (for Lindsay did not attempt to recover the 
remission that had been granted the previous year) the 
collector declined to press the lowland zamindars to renew 
their engagements for 1785-6. It would be absurd and un­
reasonable, he maintained, for him to expect the proprietors
of the lowlands to pay the amount of their cess according to
2
the Committee's settlement. Instead, with the approval of 
some of the zamindars he deputed sazawals to manage their 
lands. Though in 1785-6 the weather was extremely favourable 
only 6,78,350 kahons or less than 75 per cent of the Jama was
3
collected. Explaining the poor results, Lindsay wrote at 
the close of the revenue year, "I am again under the necessity 
of repeating the same reasons which have been invariably as­
signed at the expiration of each month for the balance that 
has continued to accumulate from the commencement of the year", 
namely, "The calamity the district sustained by inundation 
,/In 1784/, followed with all the destructive consequences of 
famine and loss of cattle."^, For 1786-7 Lindsay was ordered 
to observe as an "invariable rule" to accept no engagements 
from persons in arrears unless they had made reliable arrange-
1. CCR - Lindsay, 30 Dec. 1784, Proc. 30 Dec. 1784, OCR 
R68, xxxvii, np.
2. Lindsay - CCR, 20 July 1785, SDR i, 213.
3. Willes - BOR, 20 Apr. 1793, Proc. 24 Dec. 1793, BOR 
R72, xxiv, np.
4. Lindsay - CCR, nd. (but probably in Apr. 1786) SDR ii, 
19. Inexplicably, there are blanks in this leller and 
in the original manuscript copy where figures should 
have been.
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ments to liquidate their debts.^ By April 1786, however,
there were few landholders not in arrears or willing to 
execute f^buliyats. lindsay had to resort therefore to even 
more widespread use of sazawals, an option he did not particularly 
relish. An over-reliance on sazawals, Lindsay was aware, 
would threaten his own authority and place control at grass 
roots level further out of his hands. On 26 June 1786 he 
declared:
Bo person conversant In the revenue business can 
approve of making use of these temporary officers,
and the employing of them, for many well known
reasons, ought to be carefully avoided.
lindsay did not mention the objections to the appointment of
sazawals but these may easily be imagined. Sazawals could
not be adequately supervised and collusion between them and
the zamindars at the Company’s expense was almost impossible
to detect. As their tenure was temporary there was every
reason to suspect that sazawals were primarily interested
in feathering their own nests. These officers had nothing
to lose but their jobs and it was unlikely that they would
have been dependent on those jobs alone.
On 1 June 1786, less than two months after the start 
of the new revenue year, the Calcutta Committee was dissolved 
and replaced by a Board of Revenue. This alteration was 
ordered by the Court of Directors’ letter of 21 September 1785 
which stated:
1. CCR - Lindsay, 18 Apr. 1786, SDR ii, 20.
2. Lindsay - BOS, 26 June 1786, SDR ii, 35.
3. The Board of Revenue (BOR) or Revenue Board must not 
be confused with the Board, that is, the Governor- 
General-in-Council.
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Various plans have been devised and carried into 
execution within these fifteen years for the 
collection of the revenue ... /and7 the frequent 
variations of system which have occurred have 
been attended with much inconvenience and great 
expense. It is therefore full time to adopt a 
settled plan, and for that purpose we direct 
that there be a Board of Revenue to reside at 
Calcutta, to consist of one of the junior members 
of Council without any addition to his present 
salary, and four other of the most intelligent 
of the senior servants of the Company.
The change was not very substantial. Three of the appointees
to the Board of Revenue - Y/illiam Cowper, Thomas Graham and
John MacKenzie - came straight from the dissolved Calcutta 
2Committee. In matters of policy the new body was to be
guided by the regulations which had been laid down for the
Calcutta Committee. But the new arrangement might be read
as a further centralizing measure, for the Directors had made
it plain that to the Revenue Board was "to belong (subject to
the contrail of the superior Council) the whole administration,
settlement, collection and receipt of every branch of our
revenues, together with the controul of the several officers 
•5
therein.
In Sylhet Lindsay on 26 June 1786 drew up, more in 
exasperation than hope, an account settlement for 1786-7 
proposing a remission of 1,50,000 kahons or about fifteen 
per cent of the jama.^ If the Revenue Board relented the 
zamindars might be persuaded to engage for the rents and the
sazawals could be dismissed. But the Revenue Board adhered
1. COD's letter, 21 Sept. 1785, Proc. 1 June 1786, BOR R70, 
xvi, np.
2. The President was John Stables, and the other member 
John Evelyn.
3. COD's letter, 21 Sept. 1785, Proc. 1 June 1786, BOR R70, 
xvi, np.
4. Lindsay - BOR, 26 June 1786, SDR ii, 35.
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to the standing jama. The refusal of the Calcutta authorities 
to take any meaningful remedial measures led finally to the 
total collapse of the system. No settlement or Kisfbandi 
was formed with the zamindars of Sylhet for 1786-7 for 1 it 
was totally out of their power to execute engagements upon 
the original terms /ihose formed in 1781 and marginally ad­
justed in 1784/ with any hopes or intention of fulfilling them.”'*' 
By September,1786 not even the threat or exercise of force 
could exact payment of the revenue. The zamindars, lindsay 
reported, were ’’perfectly indifferent about the payment of
their rents”, and all he could do was to credit whatever
2
amount was paid.
It was only on 24 October 1786, when the system
had been in ruins for the seven months of 1786-7 that had
elapsed, that the Revenue Board agreed to Lindsay's account
settlement of 26 June 1786, adding, however, that they expetted
him to ’’restore the usual revenue as soon as p o s s i b l e . T h e
Revenue Board must have hoped that by easing the demand, the
zamindars would be encouraged to make an effort to pay the
revenues. But lindsay chose to keep the abatement secret,
fearing that if he advertised the remission of 1,50,000 kahons
the zamindars would throng out of the mofussil to Sylhet town
thus putting a stop to the revenue that was dribbling in to 
4the ka chari.
But in the remaining months of 1786-7 even if the
1. lindsay - BOR, 10 Oct. 1786, SDR ii, 61.
2. lindsay - BOR, 10 Sept. 1786, SDR ii, 56.
5. BOR - lindsay, 24 Oct. 1786, SDR ii, 64.
4. lindsay - BOR, 16 Nov. 1786, SDR ii, 77.
zamindars had the will to pay they had not the wherewithal.
True, the autumn crop in Sylhet was unusually abundant but
so it was in the rest of Bengal too, and while the harvest
ensured that the Sylhettis would not starve, their inability
to pay the revenues continued. As Lindsay explained on 2
October 1786, when there was a demand for rice in the rest
of Bengal, grain was exported from Sylhet and that facilitated
the collections. But so fruitful had been the autumn harvest
throughout the province that there were no buyers for Sylhet
rice, even though the price had slumped to 4-i maunds per rupee,
a rate that would "hardly pay the expense of coolie hire to
the bazaar."'*" Apparently, as far as the Sylhet revenues
were concerned, a good harvest throughout Bengal was almost
as disruptive as a flood. Lindsay reported on 2 October
that the collections were more troublesome then than at any
2
time during 1784-5, the year of the great inundation. He
was having difficulty in finding 200 rupees for the monthly
•3
wages of the public servants. By mid-October the situation
had deteriorated further. The traders Lindsay had hoped would
arrive did not come. "At this moment", wrote Lindsay on 19
October, "there is not a cowrie in Sylhet /town/"; he added
despairingly, "how the revenues are to be paid God knows for 
4
I do not." By the end of October the price of grain in
Sylhet had dropped to five maunds per rupee but still there 
5
was no sale.
1. Lindsay - BOR, 2 Oct. 1786, SDR ii, 59.
2. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
4. Lindsay - A. Burnett, 19 Oct. 1786, CM 50/5/9 1/2, f.14.
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The inhabitants could only look forward to the 
sale of the April harvest. But they were cruelly disappointed. 
The rains set in on 22 February 1787 and were still falling in 
mid-May, washing away the boro and leaving the lower parts of 
the district with ”every appearance of distress.”'*'
Apparently, lindsay too had put hopes on the boro, 
for dismayed at continuously having to explain substantial 
arrears Mwhen many other collectors were receiving the thanks 
of the Board for their punctuality”, he had credited to 
government sums he had not collected as revenue but which
p
presumably he advanced from his own finances. This, 
lindsay was later to admit, was a ’’highly irregular” practice 
but one he felt forced to indulge in to ’’save my credit at
■5
the Presidency.” He was in fact exploiting the loopholes
in the system and the pressures on him to do so were great,
especially in 1786-7. For in spite of the setbacks to the
collections in that year - the effects of the flood of 1784,
surplus grain and finally another flood - the Revenue Board
regarded the remission of 1,50,000 kahons as a ’’very liberal
relief” and had made it plain that they expected the remaining
rents to be collected.^ lindsay increased the remission to
2,03,188 kahons on his own initiative, as an encouragement to
5
the zamindars to pay as much as possible but that did not help. 
Squeezed between the inability of the landholders to pay and 
the Revenue Board’s already expressed hope that he would collect,
1. lindsay - BOR, 16 May 1787, SIR ii, 124.
2. lindsay - BOR, 14 May 1787, SIR ii, 122.
3. Ibid.
4. BOR - lindsay, 29 Apr. 1787, SDR ii, 116.
5. lindsay - BOR, 16 May 1787, SUM ii, 123. (Presumably
at this stage the remission w/ais made public.)
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Lindsay brought toe;account 2,89,299 kahons more than he had 
collected,^
In effect Lindsay had loaned the zamindars the
sum of 2,89,299 kahons which he expected to recoup in the
first three months of the new year when, according to usage
in Sylhet, there was no demand in the kistbandi. But when
the recovery of his "loan1 seemed uncertain because of the
loss of the boro and the poor aus prospects, Lindsay confessed
to Calcutta that he had tampered with the accounts. Doubtless
he hoped that the real balance would be allowed to stand, and
that he would not be called upon actually to hand over to the
Company the total amount recorded in his accounts. The
Revenue Board were appalled, for Lindsay was disclosing "A
2
further enormous arrear." Moreover, it had always been 
emphasised that the revenues of one year must not encroach 
on those of another, but that, as the Revenue Board saw it, 
was just what Lindsay had dohe. He had already accounted 
for a part of the revenues of 1787-8 which meant, to the 
Revenue Board's disappointment, that the restoration of the 
jama of 1781-2, the aim all along, would have further to be 
deferred. The Revenue Board were dismayed that Lindsay’s 
disclosure of his padded accounts had arrived hard on the 
heels of their orders of 27 April 1787, for these had contained 
directions for formulating the Kistbandi of 1787-8 which were 
"intended expressly to lessen the risk of arrears and to check
I
anticipation of the new year’s resources. They did not
1. Lindsay - BCR, 16 May 1787, SDR ii, 124.
2. BCR - lindsay, 25 May 1787, SDR ii, 128.
3. Ibid.
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expect that Lindsay should have become himself ’’the principal
agent in adopting a measure so directly contrary11 to the spirit
of their orders of 27 April 1787. Still less di& they expect,
they told Lindsay, that
as the representative of government ... you should, 
by giving it the sanction of your countenance, have 
fixed a precedent for perpetuating a practice, of 
all others in the revenue system, the most destructive 
that can possibly be encouraged to the real interest 
of the Company - in the present instance obviously 
involving a certain proportion of the governments 
assets for the current year to indemnify yourself 
for an unauthorised and unreasonable grant of 
credit tj the landholders for their past year’s 
revenue.
On 20 June 1787 Lindsay penned an elaborate defence
but was censured again by the Revenue Board before they
received his letter. His conduct, they said,
must be considered a most unjustifiable 
misapplication of the current year’s resources, 
and could we suppose so glaring an impropriety 
to have arisen from any other cause than error 
or judgement, we should deem it incumbent on us 
to represent your conduct to the Right Hon’ble 
the Governor-General in Council as disqualifying 
you for the important charge entrusted to you*
Lindsay, they argued, was highly blameable on four grounds:
he had submitted fraudulent accounts; he had indulged in a
practice prohibited to a collector, that is, advancing money
to zamindars; he had intruded on the revenues of 1787-8;
and he had already expressed his intention of disobeying the
orders for the formulation of the list of instalments by
proposing to continue the custom of inserting no kists for
the first three months of the year.
Lindsay sought to explain his conduct by claiming, 
firstly, that he was merely following Mughal practice in
1. BOR - lindsay, 25 May 1787, SLR ii, 128*
2. BOR - Lindsay, 22 June 1787, SLR ii, 138.
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looking to the first three months of the Sylhet year to
complete the collections of the previous year and, secondly,
that the sum totalling 2,89,000 kahons would not he recovered
from the resources of 1787-8.1 According to Lindsay, 80,000
kahons were due from the kedah mahal zamindars and that would
he received when the sale of their elephant catch was con- 
2
eluded. In addition, 59,000 kahons of the revenues of the 
hill zamindars in the north-east had heen received after the 
year’s accounts were closed: the payment was late because
the zamindars had wit held their rents during the course of 
a rehellion led hy Radha Ram, one of the principal zamindars 
of the district; after the rehellion was terminated, they 
claimed compensation for damages sustained and continued to 
withold their rents until their claims were investigated and 
settled. Thus, argued Lindsay, 1,59,000 kahons could not 
he regarded as part of the assets of 1787-8; and neither 
could the remaining sum, for that, he said, was covered hy 
pants A
Briefly, the pants system worked in the following 
way. Instead of remitting their collections to the district 
treasury every month, the zamindars or their securities or 
vakils delivered pants for the sums collected and deposited
1. lindsay - BOR, 20 June 1787, SIR ii, 155.
2. Encl. in lindsay - BOR, 20 June 1787, SDR ii, 157.
5. Ihid.
4. lindsay - BOR, 20 June 1787, SDR ii, 155.
5. Dor a slightly different version of the pants system as
it worked in Rangpur, see Dirminger, W. K. (ed.), Bengal 
District Records: Rangpur i, 16 and 25.
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in the pargana treasuries. Y/hen the pants were received at
the district headquarters the zamindars1 accounts were credited
accordingly, and ’’the payment realized hy the negotiating of
them in hills to merchants for the purpose of purchasing
grain, dry fish and other small articles, the produce of
the lands.” The hills tendered hy the merchants could not
he converted immediately and thus it was often two months
or more before the cowries of the current instalment were
realized.^" As the entire transaction could not he inserted
in the public accounts, Lindsay explained, ”the collector
must take the risk upon himself or appear inattentive to
2
his duty and negligent in his collections.” Y/hat taking 
the risk upon himself meant was his advancing sums to cover 
the pants that had not yet been realized so that it would 
appear from the accounts that the collections were up to 
date. Lindsay insisted that this practice did not intrude 
upon the subsequent year’s revenue in any way for as it was 
’’perfectly uncertain” when the zamindars would he called 
upon to redeem their pants they would not deliver pants 
until they had actually received the amount involved from 
their ryots.^ This was less than true, however; the likeli­
hood was that in the same way as the collector would credit 
sums he had not collected, the zamindars, to forestall the 
sale of their lands for arrears of revenue v/ould tender pants 
for sums they had not received from their ryots.^
1. Lindsay - BOR, 20 June 1787, SDR ii, 135.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. And, as the Revenue Board noticed, the zamindars were
seldom ”so provident as to keep money in deposit to 
answer demands at an uncertain period.” BOR - Lindsay, 
27 July 1787, SDR ii, 153-4.
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The necessity for the pants system in Sylhet arose
out of the distance of many parganas from the Sadr, the
smallness of the monthly payments and the bulkiness of the
currency. The monthly instalments of many zamindars were
for the most part so trifling that the expense of travelling
to Sylhet town and staying a few days every month, and of
transporting their cowries would often amount to "more than
the demands of Government*" Lindsay was convinced that
the pants system in Sylhet would have to be maintained until
the inhabitants became richer or a more portable currency was 
2
introduced. There was neither money nor money-lenders at 
Sylhet to pay the instalments when due, he explained, and if 
he insisted on punctual payments the zamindars would "double
X
their demands" upon the unfortunate ryots.
The indispensibility of the pants system did not 
concern the Revenue Board. They refused to retract any part 
of their censure and Lindsay’s explanation notwithstanding, 
they were still convinced that he had "indulged in the pernicious 
practice of anticipation."^ If the resources of 1787-8 had 
not been pledged already, they asked, then why did Lindsay
5
not enter instalments for the first three months?
The episode of the padded accounts of 1786-7 reveal 
in sharp detail the two dominating characteristics of the 
revenue system as it operated throughout Lindsay’s tenure of 
office at Sylhet. These two features - the heavy and unbending 
concern of the central authorities with realizing the largest
1. Lindsay - BOS, 20 June 1787, SDR ii, 135.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. BOR - Lindsay, 27 July 1787, SDR ii, 154.
5. Ibid.
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possible revenue yield and the immense scope allowed to the 
district collector - emerged together in June 1787 in clearer 
relief than ever before.
First, it is significant that Lindsay*s relationship
with his superiors at Calcutta reached its nadir precisely
when the arrears of his collections were at their highest
point. In his ten years of service, Lindsay said, he had
upon repeated occasions received the "applause” of his
superiors "but never their reprehension.Then in June
1787, facing the displeasure of the Revenue Board, he
wondered if he were to be held responsible for the fatal
effects of famine, earthquake or flood and asked:
what heinous offence have I been guilty of to
have merited such severe letters as I have
lately received from the Board? Have I in 
any respect ever been deficient in my duty, 
or is there a man in the Company*s service, 
who has laboured more assiduously than I have 
done?
The answer to Lindsay*s query was that he was responsible for 
deficiencies of revenue, however they arose, and that the 
heinous offence he had committed was to fail with the 
collections. He might judge, regarding the censure he had
received from the Revenue Board, that T,A more severe letter
never was penned to an innocent manu> but as far as the 
Revenue Board were concerned he had proved insufficient to 
the "important charge” entrusted to him.
1. Lindsay - BOR, 20 June 1787, SLR ii, 136.
2. Lindsay - Wm. Cowper, 20 June 1787, CM 30/5/9 2/2 np.
Lindsay was concerned too that in England he would be 
"numbered and marked among the first class of delinquents.” 
(in the margin beside this letter, Lindsay put the 
following note: "Write a letter to the same effect to
Richard Johnson Esq." Johnson, like Cowper, was a member 
of the BOR. Lindsay also wrote personally to John Shore.)
5. Ibid.
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Second, when Lindsay insisted that his real crime
"consists in the candid avowal of a practice which, otherwise
would have remained unnoticed,"^ he was close to the heart
of the matter. His practice of anticipating the revenues
had gone unnoticed by his superiors until he himself disclosed
it on 14 May 1787 when he wrote as follows:
... during the ten years I have resided at Sylhet,
I never in the period of collections have been in 
advance less than 30, or 40,000 rupees - that is 
I give credit to this amount more than was collected, 
and take the chance of reimbursing myself in the
months of Bysack, Jeyte and Assar, /Jpril-May to June-
July/ when there was no demand in the Kistbundee.
More significantly, however, what Lindsay also disclosed when
he wrote again on 20 June was that he could not follow the
general rules observed in other parts of Bengal and hope to
conduct the business of government with any degree of credit
to himself or satisfaction to his employers.^ Since no
specific rules were laid down for Sylhet district separately,
it followed that Lindsay's understanding of his position was
that he was left to his own devices to invent the rules as
he went along. Indeed, he almost said as much to the
Revenue Board in the following words;
If I deviate in any instances from the general system, 
my situation ought to be taken into consideration, 
for it would infringe too much upon the leisure of 
the Board, was I upon every trivial occurrence to 
await their orders before I take a decision apart.
This, and the nature of my situation being unknown,
I have hitherto been allowed a latitude that would 
have been inadmissible in other parts of the 
country more civilised.
1. Lindsay - BOR, 20 June 1787, SLR ii, 136.
2. Lindsay - BOR, 14 May 1787, SLR ii, 122.
3. Lindsay - BOR, 20 June.1787, SLR ii, 136.
4. Ibid.
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Earlier in the year Lindsay had written in a similar vein
to the Preparer of Reports in the Revenue Department:
It is well known to the Board that the station 
I held widely differs from every other in 
Bengal. On account of the great distance 
it lies from the seat of government and of 
its being surrounded by troublesome neighbours, 
a confidence must be placed on the resident and 
a latitude allowed to enable him to support his 
authority without having recourse to the Board 
upon every trivial occasion. Had not this 
confidence been placed in me in the fullest ..., 
believe me, I would long ago have resigned my 
troublesome charge....
The absence of comment by the Calcutta authorities on a claim 
by one of their subordinate officials that a large degree of in­
dependence was a condition of his continued service as a district 
officer was a mute acknowledgement on their part as to where 
control of district affairs resided. It also demonstrated the 
growing awareness in Calcutta, promoted by the arguments of 
John Shore especially, of the need for flexibility.
A good illustration of how Lindsay took advantage
of his superiors' preoccupation with the revenue yield in
seeking power was the process by which he obtained complete
judicial authority over Sylhet district. Hastings' judicial
reforms of 1781-2 were aimed against the combination of
judicial and revenue functions in the hands of collectors
2
and members of Provincial Councils; he separated those 
functions and transferred authority in judicial matters to 
Provincial diwani courts which were increased in numbers from 
six to eighteen in April 1781. The judges of the provincial
1. Lindsay - J. Duncan, 7 Feb. 1787, CM 30/5/9 2/2 np.
2. G-hosal, A.K., Civil Service in India Under the East
India Company: A study in Administrative development, 173-
3. Ibid., 175.
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adalats were invested with magisterial powers for apprehending
persons charged with dacoity or crimes of violence.^* In this
reorganized scheme Sylhet came under the jurisdiction of the
adalat at Sultansi. However, Lindsay was soon arguing that
the arrangement was unworkable and prejudicial to the interests
of the Company. The occasion for Lindsay's comments on the
judicial system was a communal riot in Sylhet town at the
Muharram festival of December 1782. The disorder existing
2
in the district, said Lindsay, was. a consequence of the 
arrangement for the dispensation of justice. The court at 
Sultansi was too far away, he remarked, and the journey between 
Sylhet and Sultansi could be dangerous. He did not have the 
smallest ambition to acquire judicial authority, he said, 
since his constitution might not bear the increased strain.
Yet, in his view, the collector of Sylhet could not "be 
vested with too much authority in order to keep the natives 
under legal control" and if the Hoard thought it expedient,
3
he would act as a judge at Sylhet for no additional pay.
In reply to this neat ploy, Lindsay was granted on 13 May 1783 
temporary magisterial powers similar to those of the judge at 
Sultansi.^
1. Grhosal, 176.
2. "... at present every man looks upon himself as un­
accountable to any for his actions; one sows the 
grain and the other reaps it; and ... there is an 
endless confusion through the district." Lindsay - 
OCR, 16 Dec. 1782, SDR i, 125.
3. Lindsay - CCR, 16 Dec. 1782, SDR i, 125.
4. Board - Lindsay, 13 May 1783, SDR i, 148.
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As for authority in civil suits Lindsay claimed 
that he was in a Letter position to make decisions than the 
judge at Sultansi since as collector he had in his possession 
the records of diwani business relating to Sylhet.'1’ He com­
plained repeatedly about the interference of the Sultansi 
court in his work and argued that the court had an adverse 
effect on the collections. At first Lindsay was informed 
that in order to alter the "public arrangement" the Board 
would need something more substantial than a general charge 
but by July 1784, in response to his perennial complaints, 
he was empowered to exercise within the limits of his district
a diwani jurisdiction concurrent with that of the adalat at
2
Sultansi. This did not satisfy Lindsay and he complained, 
that the court at Sultansi continued to interfere with his 
revenue work. The result was that on 13 September 1784 he 
was granted exclusive jurisdiction as judge and magistrate 
at Sylhet.^
The growth and consolidation of Lindsay’s power 
naturally produced a sharpening of the rigour with which the 
Sylhet collections were effected. This coupled with the 
disastrous floods of 1784 and early 1787 led to a situation 
in which by April 1787 more than half of the district had
5
been placed under sazawals, thus confirming the insolvency 
of the zamindars and petty talukdars. The impoverishment
1. Lindsay - OCR, 28 June 1782, SDH i, 112.
2. Board - Lindsay, 29 July 1784, SDR i, 187.
3. Lindsay - Board, 2 Sept. 1784, SDR i, 189.
4. Board - Lindsay, 13 Sept. 1784, SDR i, 192.
5. Lindsay - BOR, 12 June 1787, SDR ii, 131.
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of the ryots can only have been worse than that of the land­
holders. Hothing revealed the state of the district better 
than Lindsay's proposals for the settlement of 1787-8. The 
collector first suggested an assessment of 7,16,168 kahons, 
a reduction of some eleven per cent on a full jama. This 
he was forced to upgrade when the Revenue Board made it plain 
that they thought Holland's jama of 8,00,101 kahons could be 
realized in view of the general benefit which they conceived 
the district "must have experienced from the ample remission 
from the demands of revenue" in the two previous years In
2
his revised estimate Lindsay put the jama at 7,50,101 kahons, . 
apparently the most reasonable approximation to Holland's jama 
he thought feasible. The revised jama was approved by the 
Board; thus, the settlement for 1787-8 stood at 50,000 kahons 
less than what had been settled twelve years earlier.
It is remarkable that in his settlement for 1787-8 
Lindsay felt it necessary to reduce the demand from each of 
the 137 parganas. The jama figures for individual parganas 
give no clue as to the grounds on which the abatement was 
spread and there is no evidence as to whether Lindsay toured 
the mofussil. In those parganas where he had previously 
retained the demand set by G-ayaram in 1781 he now had to 
return to Holland's jama or to go lower. And even in those 
parganas where he had earlier reduced the Committee's demand 
in 1784 he made a further deduction. There was no record of 
Holland's jama for one of the 137 parganas of the district.
1. BOR - Lindsay, 29 Apr. 1787, SDR ii, 116.
2. Lindsay - BOR, 12 June 1787, SLR ii, 131.
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Of the remaining 136 parganas, Lindsay restored Holland's 
assessment in 79 cases and in 54 cases he reduced his 
predecessor's figures. In only three instances did Lindsay's 
demand remain above the settlement formulated twelve years 
earlier, namely, parganas Raydun, Havili Sutrasati and 
Igarsati, and the difference in the lost two mahals was 
marginal - less than 3.7 per cent and less than 0.3 per cent 
respectively. All Lindsay’s assessments on individual 
parganas were lov/er than the figures for Gayaram's mofussil 
settlement
Yfliile liindsay was forming the settlement for 1787-8
the district was experiencing another disastrous flood. It
had been raining incessantly since mid-Rebruary and by April
2
it was clear that the boro was lost. In those circumstances 
Lindsay knew that his revised jama was hardly lenient and that 
the deductions he had made in the assessment of individual 
parganas would have a limited effect only. The Revenue 
Board had not been convinced by his argument that a deduction 
of less than two lakhs of kahons from the standing jama of 
9,19,407 kahons "would defeat the objeect, for the inhabitants 
will continue to cultivate just as much as is necessary for 
subsistence," while "an abatement that is really felt will 
give a spur to industry and soon tend to improve the district."*^ 
The general reluctance of the authorities at Calcutta to dispense 
remissions created a situation in which when they did consent 
to an abatement of revenue, it tended to be ineffective and
1. See CM 30/5/6, folios 3-7.
2. Lindsay - BOR, 16 May 1787, SDR ii, 124.
3. Lindsay - BOR, 29 Mar. 1787, BOR R7Q, xxvii, np.
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did not produce that degree of incentive that would have 
made it possible for the remission to be resumed in fairness 
in subsequent years. That a remission of significant 
proportions was really an investment was perhaps appreciated 
but could not be a guide to policy in conditions of 
financial stringency. Hence, Lindsay felt compelled to 
warn his superiors even before the settlement had been 
instituted that the collections of 1787-8 would not be made 
without great difficulty.^"
The heavy hand of Calcutta, most evident at the 
formation of the settlement and manifested in the rigid 
determination to fix the highest possible jama emerges as 
the crucial characteristic of the system. But within the 
framework imposed from above; there was enough room to 
manoeuvre for local authorities. The mofussil settlement 
was executed by the collector; he distributed the demand 
as he thought fit, and as the play of power on the ground 
permitted. In addition, as already noticed, the goal of 
maximum revenue yield worked to enhance Lindsay's position 
in the district. It has been seen, for instance, how the 
principle of separation of functions was conveniently dis­
regarded, how Lindsay secured almost blanket authority to 
order land sales and to make lands huzuri, and how he came 
to exercise complete judicial power in Sylhet. Lindsay 
himself correctly summarised his position vis-a-vis his 
superiors when he remarked that he enjoyed a considerable
1. Lindsay - BOR, 12 June 1787, SDR ii, 131.
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latitude in his actions.
However, the powers Lindsay derived from Calcutta
and his relationship with the authorities at the centre
comprise only one dimension of his position, and it is
necessary now to examine the dealings "between Lindsay, the
officers of his establishment and the zamindars and small
talukdars. The question is, how did Lindsay use his immense
powers and to what end? And how did the zamindars respond?
Lindsay’s treatment of Bejura pargana provides a
useful case-study as to how he handled both a relatively
powerful zamindar as well as a number of lesser talukdars.
Bojura pargana, the largest mahal in Sylhet, was situated in
the low bhatta country about seventy miles from the district
capital.'1* The pargana was divided into two distinct parts -
the six-arma division of Tuppa JhilateH owned solely by
Gftulam Haidar, and the ten-anna share of Tuppa Be jura held
2
jointly by over fifty coparceners.
The zamindars of Be jura were none of them inclined
to be amenable to Lindsay’s authority. They regarded their
distance from Sylhet town and the difficult communications
with the capital as insulating them against the intrusion of
the Company’s jurisdiction into their affairs. They considered
themselves, according to Lindsay, in a great measure their own
masters and ”a thousand times set the orders of government in- 
•5
open defiance.” In what Lindsay termed their refractory 
nature they were typical of the zamindars of Sylhet as a whole.
1. Lindsay - J. Duncan, 7 Deb. 1787, CM 30/5/9 2/2 np.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
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Ghulam Haidar, though, was perhaps more troublesome than most,
and he was ready to demonstrate his independence by attacking
Lindsay's sepoys and assaulting his messengers. Ghulam
Haidar's relationship with the Company was really one of quiet
but open rebellion.
According to Lindsay, when the revenues of Tuppa
Jhilateli failed he did not hasten to sell the lands but
adopted a more lenient course.1 To sell the estates of
Ghulam Haidar was in fact a difficult undertaking; it would
have been Impossible to maintain the purchaser, assuming one
could be found, in possession. Lindsay therefore almost
pleaded with Ghulam Haidar to liquidate his balance, and when
that failed, he located the zamindar1 s relations - "at great
2
pains" - in order to persuade them to reason with him. In
the meantime Lindsay had put the case to the revenue authorities
at Calcutta as a matter of routine and had received 'additional*
permission to sell Ghulam Haidar's estate. Still Lindsay did
not proceed with the sale. His explanation was that "he felt
for the impudence of the man and avoided coming to such violent 
•5
m ea s ur e s . T h e r e  was, however, a point at which Lindsay 
would have to make a stand or risk material damage to his own 
position. Be jura was a test case, and what happened there, 
Lindsay knew, was likely to influence the behaviour of other
4
zamindars. li/hen Lindsay felt that that point had been 
reached he did sell Ghulam Haidar's portion of Bejura, but 
the transaction appeared to be in name only. J.ui ' ■ 5 j
1. Lindsay - J. Duncan, 7 Feb. 1787, CM 30/5/9 2/2 np.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. The zamindars of other parganas looked to Be jura "as a
general guide for their conduct." Ibid.
Lindsay's accouiit of the sale was that he ’’privately prevented 
any "bids for the taluk and the lands were sold to a ’’fictitious 
parson for the sum due to the Company. Lindsay insisted that 
his interference in the sale stemmed from the ’’most humane 
motives,” the idea heing to restore the land to Ghulam Haidar 
”bhe moment he returned to his duty.”^
Evidently, however, Lindsay was feeling h±& way
forward hy degrees. After the nominal sale, he sent a
party of sepoys to take over the taluk in the name of the
supposed purchaser hut they were effectively rehuffed hy 
2
Ghulam Haidar. There seemed to he no way in which Lindsay 
could deal effectively with the zamindar and recover the 
arrears due from his estate. In the end he summoned the 
much more amenable zamindars of the ten-anna division of 
Bejura and persuaded them to take the lands of Ghulam Haidar 
for a sum equivalent to the arrears due to the Company.
Lindsay himself advanced the zamindars the money, hut that 
theywere able to dispossess Ghulam Haidar seems unlikely 
for soon after they lost their own lands. As a last resort, 
then, Lindsay had in effect paid Ghulam Haidar's balances 
from his own pocket hoping to recover his money in the long 
run from more tractable sources.
The zamindars of the ten-anna division also had a 
history of unpaid balances. They were of the class of men 
Lindsay called indolent and oppressive and of whom he remarked
1. Lindsay - J. Duncan, 7 Feb. 1787, CM 30/5/9 2/2 np.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
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that though they were not rich they were too conscious of 
their status to work with their own hands. Yet Lindsay 
supported these landholders with loans. Their taluk continued 
to decline, however, from mismanagement and from the desertion 
of the cultivators. It also suffered heavily from the floods 
of 1784. According to Lindsay, he decided for that reason to 
farm the taluk, to prevent it from going totally to waste,^ 
but it is likely that he expected through the farm to recoup 
his loans. \7riting to the Committee of Revenue on 28 September 
1784 Lindsay disclosed that he had farmed the taluk to Ram
2
Rattan Tagore, one of the principal landholders of the district,
3
without the consent of the proprietors, though he later 
claimed that he had secured the approval of the zamindars for 
the transaction. In his letter to the Preparer of Reports 
dated 7 February 1787, to defend himself against the accusation 
that he had dispossessed the zamindars on the grounds of 
"pretended balances", Lindsay maintained that he had persuaded 
the zamindars to farm their taluk to "a respectable man" by 
writing off all their debts . As a . further Inducement he had 
loaned the zamindars 4,000 rupees - interest free, he insisted - 
for three years and left them "a reasonable portion of land ... 
for their maintain ence. Whether the zamindars willingly 
farmed their land or not does not affect the picture of local 
power. In addition to his role of collector, Lindsay was 
playing the part of a country banker to trap the petty zamindars
1. Lindsay - J. Duncan, 7 Feb. 1787, CM 30/5/9 2/2 np.
2. After Lindsay retired from Sylhet, a number of civil suits 
regarding land transactions were brought against Ram Rattan 
Tagore. Willes - Judge at adalat at Dacca, 24 Aug. 1789, 
SDR iii, 153.
3. Lindsay - CCR, 28 Sept. 1784, SDR i, 197-8.
4. Lindsay - J. Duncan, 7 Feb. 1787, CM 30/5/9 2/2 np.
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in a web of indebtedness and he used his financial strength 
as a lever to propel them in the direction of his choice.
Between the obduracy of Ghulam Haidar at the one 
extreme and the relative defencelessness of the talukdars 
of the ten-anna division of Bejura stood the bulk of the 
landholders of the district. There were a few landowners, 
notably the hill zamindars, who actively rebelled from time 
to time against the Company’s rule and who sided with the 
Khasis in their periodic incursions into the district. Contact 
bet ween the Company and these zamindars was limited to those 
occasions when a party of sepoys might be despatched;to enforce 
the collections (often with little success) or when a punitive 
expedition might be undertaken against their allies, the hill 
tribes. For the rest of the year these zamindars were left 
on their own. There were other landholders especially those 
whose jagirs had been resumed by Holland, in 1775, who, while 
never in open revolt aginst the Company, never paid their 
revenues until compelled to do so. But the bulk of the 
landholders were clustered at -the-lower end of the scale; 
like the talukdars of the ten-anna division of Be jura they 
Y/ere supported or discarded at will by the collector; they 
did not possess the means to resort to overt defiance; they 
farmed their lands or approached Lindsay to manage their 
estates when they found themselves in difficulties; and they 
v/ere at the mercy of unscrupulous kachari officers.
The ultimate response of a collector in his dealings 
with refractory zamindars was to alienate their lands. There 
is no reason to suppose that Lindsay was any more bound by 
official policy in land sales, which stipulated that only 
defaulting zamindars who could afford to pay should be dis­
possessed, than he showed himself in other matters. In his
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land sale proceedings he seems to have followed the more 
practical guideline set by the realities of power on the 
ground. For instance, he did not "rush" to sell the lands 
of Ghulam Haidar, who was by no means impoverished, while 
the indigent zamindars of the ten-anna division of Bejura 
lost their lands
Lindsay’s non-adherence to official policy apart, 
the sale proceedings were still not at all straightforward.
The accounts from which it was determined what raahals were 
in arrears were kept by the staff of the district &achari, 
more precisely by the sarisht^dar and the tahsildar, posts 
occupied by a certain Gaurhari Singh and his nephew 
Premnarain Bose respectively. Moreover according to Lindsay, 
he had to rely on persons whom he called his private servants 
to buy the lands when they were offered for sale since no
p
purchasers would come forward. But Gaurhari Singh and 
Premnarain Bose, whom Lindsay had inherited from Holland, 
were themselves the most important members of the collectors 
private entourage.^ The former was commonly spoken of as
1. Although Lindsay claimed he had farmed their land, the 
zamindars complained that he had sold their estates.
There is no conclusive evidence either way. Lindsay 
did not report any sale proceedings in this case, only 
a farming arrangement for six years. (Lindsay - OCR,
28 Sept. 1784, SLR i, 197-8.) This the Committee 
invalidated; they set a one-year limit with the 
possibility of renewal. (CCR - Lindsay, 7 Oct. 1784,
SLR i, 199.)
2. Lindsay - J. Duncan, 7 Feb. 1787, CM 30/5/9 2/2 np.
3. Gaurhari Singh came originally from Burdwan and returned
there after Lindsay left Sylhet, entrusting his Sylhet
lands to his nephew’s management. (Lindsay later claimed 
that he corresponded with Gaurhari Singh for thirty years 
after he left India. Oriental Miscellanies, 29.
However, no such correspondence was found among Lindsay’s 
privat e pap ers).
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Lindsay’s banian; bis nephew was a gomastha or agent of 
Lindsay's in the elephant trade. Quick to recognize and 
exploit the full advantage of their public and private 
positions they tampered with the accounts and engineered 
the sale and purchase of a number of estates. It is not 
surprising that by the time Lindsay retired in November 1787 
th^ controlled half the district, either directly as owners 
or as farmers, or indirectly through wadahdars or sazawals 
whom they had had appointed in the mofussil; they had also 
succeeded, with Lindsay’s backing, in obtaining a zamindari 
sanad from the Company.'1' Nor is it surprising that the 
estates they bought, such as those in Langla pargana, were 
among the most fertile and productive in the district.
There are reasonable grounds for believing that
Lindsay knew of the fraudulent transactions of his servants,
the fate of Langla pargana being a case in point. In June
1785 the zamindars of Langla complained directly to the
Khalsa that Gaurhari Singh had ”by artifice effected the
sale and thereupon purchased on his own account, a part of
their zamindary, by representing that they were in balance,
2when ... they were not.” Lindsay was called upon for a 
statement of the balance owed by the zamindars at the time 
of the sale but was unable to furnish the accounts requested.
1. Y/illes - BOR, 28 Nov. 1789, SDR iii, 189. For another
case study of the contrivances of Indian officials to
’’bring to auction those estates which were valuable ... 
and to acquire them for themselves” see B.S. Cohn, ’’The 
Initial British Impact on India: A Case Study of the
Benares Region” JAS vol. xix no.l, Nov. 1959, 418-31*
2. J. Duncan - Lindsay, 1 June 1785, SDR i, 211.
3. Lindsay - J. Duncan, 28 June 1785, SDR i, 212.
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The most relevant information he could provide was that the
jama of "the complainants* lands amounted in the year 1190
^1783-47 to 24,000 cawns ^Kahons/ or about 5,500 sicca rupees,
of which, from the commencement to the conclusion of the year,
they did not pay one single cowrie.”1 To this he added the
vague assertion that the taluk sold "was included in a list
I transmitted to the Committee of Revenue of lands under
heavy arrears, and I obtained their sanction to dispose of
2
them by public sale." lindsay also confused the issue by 
levying counter-accusations against the langla zamindars.
He charged,
These zemindars are by far the most litigious and 
turbulent of any under Sylhet, and in no one year 
did I ever know them to pay above one-half of their 
established rent to Government without borrowing 
and ruining the persons who lent. They are besides 
notorious for oppression, and their lands, which are 
the highest and best under Sylhet., ^Ead becomg7 from 
this alone a desert and overrun with wild beasts.
Dven more suspicious was the speed and resolution 
with which lindsay moved to defend his servants. From the 
first he held himself responsible for their conduct^ and later, 
apparently in an attempt to forestall further complaints, he 
tried to shield his servants with the full armour of his 
authority. For instance, in February 1787 he asked the 
Preparer of Reports to inform complainants when he questioned 
them or their vakils that "every vexation they suppose them­
selves to have laboured under had better be preferred directly 
5
against me." He defended the transactions regarding Langla
1. Lindsay - J. Duncan, 28 June 1785, SDR i, 212.
2. Ibid.. 213.
3. Ibid., 212-3.
4-. Ibid., 212. See also lindsay - BOR, 4 Sept. 1786, SPR ii, 54.
5. lindsay - J. Puncan, 7 Feb. 1787, CM 30/5/9 2/2 np.
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and other parganas on the grounds that it was necessary from
time to time to discipline the zamindars and convince the
inhabitants of the power and authority of government.1 QhLs
could only he done hy the alienation of land. His servants,
said lindsay, had no intention of taking part in the sales;
Gaurhari Singh, lindsay maintained, agreed to purchase a
2
portion of langla only on lindsay's insistence. As for 
the impropriety of the private servants of a collector buying 
lands under that collector's jurisdiction lindsay had no 
qualms whatever; he claimed, "it was fully justifiable in 
me nor do I think any apology necessary."
lindsay's attitude throughout threatened to render 
any inquiry into the abuse of power by his servants irrelevant. 
He would never permit lands bought by his dependents to revert 
to the original proprietors, he said in June 1785, as his 
"authority in the district, especially with the zamindars at 
the foot of the hills, must from that moment c e a s e . I n  
February 1787 he repeated that restoration of the lands to 
the former owners would tend to annihilate the authority com- 
mitted to his charge. According to lindsay, his servants 
were willing to surrender the lands they had bought, "from 
the conscious knowledge of their inability to defend themselves 
from the evil machinations and combination of the native 
landholder," provided they were refunded the purchase price.
It was he who insisted, said lindsay, that they retain their
1. lindsay - J. Duncan, 7 Feb. 1787, CM 50/5/9 2/2 np.
2. lindsay - J. Duncan, 28 June 1785, SDR i, 212.
3. lindsay - J. Duncan, 7 Feb. 1787, CM 30/5/9 2/2 np.
4. lindsay - J. Duncan, 28 June 1785, SDR i, 213.
5. lindsay - J. Duncan, 7 Feb. 17*87, CM 30/5/9 2/2 np.
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purchases.1 This was far from the truth, however, Gaurhari
Singh, whom Lindsay had described as eager to relinquish that
part of Langla he had bought together with his other acquisitions,
persistently pressed for a zamindari sanad and when Lindsay left
the district he waged a hard campaign, using every trick he knew,
to retain possession of the lands.
Lindsay also used his judicial powers in support
of his servants. Suits against Gaurhari Singh in the diwani
adalat were quashed. For example, a case brought by one
Anud Rao was summarily dismissed by the collector. The
substance of Anud Rao’s charges was that the sarishtadar
had fraudulently ousted him from his lands. Gaurhari Singh
had acquired the lands of Harikrishen Las, a former diwan of
Sylhet. Through false witnesses, who denied the evidence
of local inhabitants about the proper names of local hills,
rivers and lakes, Gaurhari Singh had then extended the bounds
2of the ex-diwan*s estate to include Anud Rao's lands. As a
subsequent investigation established, Anud Rao really had
substantial grounds for complaining to Lindsay, and the collector’s
dismissal of the suit was a miscarriage of justice. Anud Rao
and his family had been in possession of the lands he claimed
as his own for over sixteen years and he held a zamindari
■5
sanad from faujdar Muhammad Ali Khan to prove his point.
There was no hope of genuine redress for the zamindars 
while Lindsay continued in office at Sylhet, for concrete 
evidence of what had been happening in the mofussil surfaced
1. Lindsay - J. Luncan, 7 Feb. 1787, CM 30/5/9 2/2 np.
2. Willes - Cornwallis, 5 Oct. 1789, SLR iii, 171.
3. Ibid., 170.
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only after Lindsay’s retirement in November 1787. John 
Y/illes, Lindsay’s successor as collector of Sylhet, concluded 
from information that came to light during his revenue survey 
of the district in 1789 and from the position Gaurhari occupied 
in the district at the time of the sales that it was doubtful 
whether in a thorough investigation Gaurhari ’could make good 
his claim to one foot of land.”1 In the adalat at Sylhet 
Yfilles invalidated Gaurharifs purchases in Langla; this 
judgement was upheld by the sadr adalat but Gaurhari petitioned 
the Board. After an inquiry the Board declared on 27 April 
1792 that the order under which the sale was stated to have 
been made could not be found, either in the district or the 
Revenue Board's records, and that the sale was never reported
0to the Committee of Revenue. Moreover, the Board noticed 
a discrepancy between Lindsay’s letter of 28 June 1785 in 
which he stated that the zamindars had not paid a single 
cowrie of their 24,000 kahon jama of 1783-4, and his accounts 
for 1783-4 which were sent ten days before the sale and which 
showed a balance of only 7*704 kahons. In any case, said the 
Board, Lindsay had reported that the balance was to be added 
to the demand of 1784-5. The Board concluded that there was 
no ground for Lindsay ”to solicit or the Committee to grant 
an order” for the sale of the Langla zamindars' lands. And 
even if the arrears had been 24,000 kahons, the Board added,
’’the manner in which he has executed the order is of itself
■3
a sufficient ground for annulling the sale.” For, said the
1. Y7illes - Khalsa, 1 June 1789, SDR iii, 135.
2. Board - BOR, 27 Apr. 1792, Proc. 11 May 1792, BOR R72, i, np.
3. Ibid.
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Board, Lindsay
ought to have ascertained the balance due 
from each, individual, and to have sold such 
portion of his lands as might have been 
sufficient for the liquidation of it. But 
... it appears that the collector has sold 
one moiety of the lands of each of the 
numerous petty proprietors without any 
regard to the proportion of the public 
balance which was due from them respectively.
... The proceeds of the sale ... must have 
exceeded the amount of the balance due from 
some, and have fallen short of the arrears 
outstanding against others. There is 
ground to believe also from the proceedings 
of the diwani adalat that many of the land­
holders who were thus deprived of half their
estates had p|id up the whole of their quota
of revenue....
Bor all these reasons the Board upheld Villes’ judgement on
the Langla lands.
Y/illes1 view was that the sale proceedings relating
to Langla and other parganas had been informal throughout,
and he found on talcing up his post in Sylhet that the complaints
against Gaurhari and Premnarain for ’’unjust seizure of property” 
2
were many. Writing more precisely about the several parcels 
of land Gaurhari had grouped under the name of Chaitannagar
and for which he had secured a zamindari sanad, Willes stated
that the sanad had been obtained under false pretences and 
added:
When he bought these lands at the Company’s 
sales, he was pushkar ,/peshkar7 in charge of 
the collections of this district. He was 
waddadar for the several talooks, and he was 
also shroff. Prom this you will judge what 
oppressive modes were pursued to establish 
his zemindaree, and how little such a zemindaree 
is entitled to the protection of Government.
1. Board - BOR, 27 Apr. 1792, Proc. 11 May 1792, BOR R72, i, np.
2. Y/illes - BOR, 1 Sept. 1789, SDR iii, 161.
3. Y/illes - Khalsa, 1 June 1789, SDR iii, 135.
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The Board, said Villes, hinting that Lindsay had suppressed
complaints and had colluded with the Preparer of Reports to
the same end, could not have been aware of the fact of dispute
when they issued the sanad to Gaurhari.'*" Defending his claim
to Chaitannagar Gaurhari argued that it had been two and a
half years from the first application to his receipt of the
sanad and that during that time the Preparer of Reports had
investigated his titles and found them sound; in addition,
Gaurhari said, a proclamation inviting objections to the
sanad had been nailed for three months to the door of the
2district Kachari but none had been put forward. Gaurhari 
could not account, however, for the many complaints Y/illes 
had received.
Gaurhari’s insistence that there had been no com­
plaints regarding his zamindari sanad is highly dubious not 
only in the light of the objections subsequently raised with 
Willes in office, but also in view of the fact that the 
zamindars had been complaining heavily about other matters 
during Lindsay’s collectorship. To complain was a prime
response or defence of the zamindars when confronted with
the formidable combination in the district office. During 
his entire term at Sylhet lindsay was continuously assailed 
with accusations and charges. In 1783 he confessed that had 
he been ”a public robber more severe epithets could not have 
been more QLberally bestowed” on him, and the next year he 
remarked to his mother that he was ”incircled /sic/, harassed
1. V7illes - BOR, 1 Sept. 1789, SDR iii, 162.
2. Proc. 7 Jan. 1790, BOR R71, xx, np.
3. Proc. 19 June 1783, OCR R68, xxiii, np.
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and perplexed “by black people and their litigious complaints."'1'
In 1786 he drafted a letter to Cornwallis in which he tried to
2show that it was normal for Sylhettis to complain.
Charges levelled directly at the collector and 
addressed over his head to Calcutta had initiated an inquiry 
which had led to the recall of Thackeray from Sylhet in 1775.
But the conditions had changed; the Board were no longer split 
into factions and there were no rival groups trying to dis­
credit each other. There was, therefore, no one on the Board 
seriously inclined to take up the case against Lindsay though 
the accusations of mismanagement and corruption directed at 
him were probably as serious and certainly more persistent 
than those that had been levelled at Thackeray, The matter 
was left to the Khalsa but Jonathan Duncan, the superintendent 
who was also the Preparer of Reports to the Revenue Department 
v/as a good friend of Lindsay's. They were both interested In 
the careers of Y/illian Hyndman, Lindsay's assistant collector, 
and another mutual friend, Y/illiam Dow. This is not to say 
that there was no inquiry but it is apparent that the investi­
gations were not pursued with that impartiality and tenacity 
that were indispensible for a just conclusion. For instance, 
Duncan asked Lindsay on 29 September 1783 to send the Sylhet 
qanungos to give evidence at the Khalsa, an order Lindsay 
conveniently ignored and when after a lapse of three years 
he was gently reminded^" he again managed to avoid complying.
1. Lindsay - Lady Balcarres, 30 June 1784, CM 30/5/5, folio 12.
2. Lindsay - Cornwallis, nd. 1786, CM 30/5/9 1/2, folio 22.
3. This is quite clear from Lindsay's private correspondence
with Duncan. See for example, Lindsay - J. Duncan, 27 
Oct. 1786, CM 30/5/9 1/2, folio 15.
4. J. Duncan - Lindsay, 24 Oct. 1'786, SDR ii, 65.
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The earliest focus of agitation was Rajaram Sen who, it 
appears, had acted as the chief vakil of the Sylhet gamindars
during the settlement of 1781-2,^ and who came from pargana
2Chauallis in Sylhet. There was a strong personal interest 
•5
involved^ and he overreached himself, a fact that lindsay was 
able to exploit in his defence. The agitation took the 
customary form of a petition to the Khalsa ’’purporting to be 
presented on the part of a great number of the landholders 
of Sylhet complaining on various grounds” of Lindsay's 
management and soliciting his recall.^ Lindsay was accused 
specifically of extorting from the zamindars with the aid of 
his officers 2,85,000 rupees exclusive of the collections and 
of declining to accept arrears when tendered and proceeding 
instead with the sale of lands, Duncan sent a copy of the 
petition to lindsay and invited the collector to make a 
statement, prior to any inquiry. lindsay denied the two 
specific charges out of hand and laid his own general accusation 
against the petitioners who he said gained their livelihood
by creating trouble.^ .......................................
It was really, however, on Rajaram Sen's claim to 
represent the zamindars of Sylhet that the agitation fell 
through. Rajaram Sen possessed a declaration ostensibly 
attested to by the qanungos of Sylhet to the following effect:
1. lindsay - J. Duncan, 31 July 1787, CM 30/5/9 1/2, folio 28.
2. Proc. of Preparer of Reports, 24 June 1783, SDR i, 158.
3. According to lindsay, Rajaram Sen had undertaken for a
price to secure the appointment of a group of ’’ignorant 
people” to positions in the Sylhet kachari; he could 
only accomplish this by effecting the removal of lindsay
and his servants. See Proc. 19 June 1783, CCR R68, xxiii,np.
4. J. Duncan, - lindsay, 21 May 1783, SDR i, 150.
5. Proc. 19 June 1783, OCR R68, xxiii, np.
6. Ibid.
291.
On account of the oppression of the former 
aumils /amils/ we have given you full power 
and appointed you on our part to proceed to 
Dacca and Calcutta with the Accounts of the 
collections and attending at the durbars of 
these places you will present our arzee /arzi7 
or petition to the gentlemen and having 
procured the dismission /sic7 °f former 
amila Mr. Lindsay, the dewan Manick Chund, and 
the mustaddies /mutasaddis or clerks/ Prem 
Narain and Gour riory, whoever you shall get 
appointed for farmer and mustaddie we approve 
of and hold valid.
This document bore in addition a considerable number of
signatures which belonged, said Rajaram, to zamindars of
Sylhet. Questioning the validity of Rajaram’s vakalat-nama
or power of attorney, Lindsay sent Duncan an affidavit from
the qanungos stating that their signatures had been forged
by Rajaram Sen and his "body of calumniators /who7 are heft
2
kulmee or can write or imitate sundry different hands.” The 
qanungos insisted that though the deed possessed by Rajaram 
Sen was dated Baisakh 1189 (April 1782) and signed by qanungos 
Raghunandan Rai and Ram Rai among others, "it is seven or eight 
years since they died, and their sons ... have now succeeded 
them.M • Rajaram insisted that the sons of qanungos Raghunandan 
Rai and Ram Rai had been forced to declare that their fathers 
were dead but the Committee of Revenue judged that the power 
of attorney was forged and th.t Raja ram Sen did not represent 
the zamindars.^-
Through the mesh of charge and counter-charge the 
fact seems to emerge that in order to present a solid front
1. Proc. of Preparer of Reports, 24 June 1783, SDR i, 157*
2. Ibid., 159.
3. Ibid.
4. Proc. 22 Sept. 1783, CCR R68, xxvi, np.
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to the Calcutta authorities, Rajaram had overplayed his hand. 
However, considering Lindsay's reluctance to send down the 
ganungos to testify in person, he had perhaps not indulged 
in very much fabrication. As a matter of fact, Lindsay 
freely admitted that "some disaffected persons" had put their 
names to the petition entered "by Rajaram.^ He conceeded, too, 
that he was "highly disliked "by the natives in general, and 
that independent of any other cause of complaints, they would
willingly unite their endeavours to effect" his removal from
2
the district. Lindsay argued, though, that the widespread
dissatisfaction with his collectorship stemmed not from
extortion or corruption in the kachari but from the tendency
of the inhabitants to regard the collector "as immediately
responsible for any misfortune that befalls the district or
themselves individually." Accordingly, said Lindsay, though
he had nothing to do with it he was blamed for the increase
of revenue levied by the Committee and for the deteriorating
state of law and order resulting from the closure of the
■5
faujdari adalat.
Rajaram Sen persisted in his efforts to secure 
Lindsay's recall from Sylhet and the campaign later became 
so heated that neither Lindsay nor his servants could visit 
Calcutta without fear of being harassed. G-aurhari Singh 
was followed and jeered at in the streets of Calcutta^" and 
Lindsay had to bribe some of Rajaram's servants to escape
1. Lindsay - J. Duncan, 8 July 1783, Proc. 22 Sept. 1783, 
CCR R68, xxvi, np.
2. Lindsay - CCR, 12 July 1783, SDR i, 162-3.
3. Ibid., 162.
4. Lindsay - BCR, 4 Sept. 1704, SDR ii, 54.
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a similar fate.^ " But although the Committee did not regard
the official investigation of 1783 as the end of the matter -
for Lindsay was asked to send the ganungos to Calcutta to
testify regarding the signatures attached to Rajaram Sen's
vakalat-nama and a few other persons to give evidence regarding
2the death of ganungos Raghunandan and Ram Rai - the enquiry 
for all practical purposes was terminated. In Sylhet the 
floods of 1784 diluted the energies of the zamindars and each 
passing day confirmed their growing weakness and Lindsay's 
increasing strength. Significantly, in 1787 when Lindsay 
faced the displeasure of the Revenue Board over his anticipation 
of the rents, Rajaram Sen tried once more to mobilise the 
zamindars but by that time their energies were spent.
Bor his part Lindsay appeared to have regarded the 
agitation for his removal as nothing more than a considerable 
nuisance. The only significant threat to his position in the 
district occurred in February 1787 by which time he was already 
thinking of returning to England and it was not connected in 
any way-with Rajaram Sen's campaign. On the Board's orders 
the Rai Rayan had devised a plan for the reorganisation of 
the districts into collectorships each with a jama of not 
less than five lakhs of rupees; as part of the scheme it 
was proposed that Sylhet should be combined with Mymensingh.
1. Lindsay - BOR, 4 Sept. 1784, SDR ii, 54. This would 
seem to suggest the sort of caste faction fighting 
that was uncovered in Guntur district, where collectors 
were attacked and discredited so as to open the way to 
seizure of subordinate posts by rival caste groups.
(See Prykenberg R.E., Guntur District.) There is no 
evidence, however, that in Sylhet the rivalry was 
organised along caste lines.
2. Proc. 22 Sept. 1783, CCR R68, xxvi, np.
3. Appendix to Proc. 20 Mar. 1787, BOR R7G, xxv, np. The 
original orders -for the reorganiT^TEion came from the Court
Directqrs; see Proc. 20 Peb. 1787, BOR R70, xxiv. It
is significant that the reorganisation was to be based on the 
size of the nama.
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On deliberation, however, the Board thought it more expedient
to retain Sylhet as a separate unit and to retain Lindsay as
collector.'*’ Even in February 1785, when MacPherson had just
succeeded Hastings and change was in the air, Lindsay did not
expect to be dismissed from Sylhet. As he wrote on 1 February
1785 to his friend Richard Atkinson:
Within these few days the greatest alterations 
have taken place in our system of government - 
deductions, retrenchments, abolition of posts 
Innumerable, which ought to have been carried 
into execution long ago. How far they will 
affect me I cannot say, but I am told that no 
partiality is shewn to any person whatever.
I am therefore prepared for whatever may happen 
with humility and resignation. To lose my 
station I do not expect, as the collections of 
my district cannot be enforced without the 
assistance of a Resident upon the spot. If 
they let me remain quietly but a couple of years 
longer I willingly would make way for any other 
person they thought proper to nominate who may 
appear more worthy of the charge.
Lindsay was certainly more adroit than Thackeray 
had been in handling his attackers. He vehemently denied 
all accusations and at every conceivable opportunity levied 
counter charges of extortion, mismanagement and oppression 
against the zamindars. As for the inhabitants generally it 
was their superstition that gave rise to complaints. For 
example the floods of 1787, said Lindsay, were "as usual ... 
attributed to the ... evil fortune of the Resident, and his 
character must answer for it.n^  In addition he spoke 
repeatedly of the poverty of the inhabitants; their indigence 
(and their turbulent disposition), he believed, "will always
1. BOR - Lindsay, 10 Apr. 1787, SDR ii, 108.
2. Lindsay - R. Atkinson, London, 1 Feb. 1785, CM 30/4/351 np.
3. Lindsay - Colonel Ross, 7 Apr. 1787, CM 30/5/9 2/2 np.
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screen them from the hand of oppression and ought to silence
complaints respecting pecuniary exactions - a crime repeatedly
laid to my charge.”1 The picture of deep poverty he painted
in his defence did not stop him from claiming also in his
defence, ”upon the whole I "believe there is not a tract of
country in Bengal where they /£he inhabitants/ enjoy more
ease than Sylhet, or where they have so little cause of 
2complaint.” His constant involvement in disputes during 
his entire term at Sylhet was evidence enough that complaints 
were normal and that the inhabitants were prone to litigation. 
Lindsay never stopped hammering at the litigiousness of the 
Sylhettis.*' The fact that they complained became part of 
his defence for that only showed how litigious they were.
It still seems, though, that Lindsay’s confidence 
in his position under Hastings and Cornwallis was nurtured 
less by his ability to defend himself than by other factors. 
Under Hastings it was his perception of the system that 
convinced Lindsay of the security of his tenure. Writing to 
his cousin James Duff in August 1785 Lindsay described the 
administrative system under Hastings as one in which corruption 
flourished and was taken for granted. Hastings had ’’extra- 
ordinary abilities” as a statesman conceeded Lindsay, but 
added:
1. Lindsay - Cornwallis, nd. 1786, CM 30/5/9 1/2, folio
22. Also letter dated 20 May 1786, (Lindsay - J. 
Duncan?) Lindsay’s India Papers, CM 30/4/352 np.
2. Letter dated 20 May 1786, Lindsay’s India Papers, CM 
30/4/352 np.
3. Lindsay was fond of calling the inhabitants of Sylhet 
the most litigious people in Bengal - see e.g. Lindsay - 
CCR, 28 June 1782, SDR i, 112 - but it is fair to note 
that they had a long acquaintance with courts of justice, 
Sylhet town having been the seat of a faujdari adalat 
under the Mughals.
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to a most conspicious degree he enjoyed the 
talent of glossing over the ... most outragious 
/sic7 acts of his administration whether founded 
upon ambition, caprice, thirst after unlimited 
power, avarice, revenge, and desire of entrenching 
his favourites at the expense of the public with 
the most plausible reasons and ostensible proofs 
of his own integrity, and of showing that so far 
from being actuated by interested or selfish 
motives the Patria and success of the Company were 
the only springs that regulated his conduct.
It is not necessary to establish the soundness or otherwise
of Lindsay’s judgement of Hastings’ aptitude as an administrator.
T/hat was significant was that Lindsay believed that Hastings
was corrupt and that ’’nothing but the most venal and corrupt
administration that ever existed could have supported him
for so long contrary to the dictates of reason and common 
2
sense.” No doubt Lindsay assumed that a tainted administration 
would excuse his own shortcomings and that if he exercised some 
care and did not indulge in too much excess hardly any notice 
would be taken of ’’deviations” in his distant corner of 
Bengal. He certainly thought that no impartial observer 
would condemn him for abuses committed on his part and 
would appreciate that in fact the pressure was on him to 
become corrupt; for, as he put it, ’’when the source is 
troubled subordinate streams will of course become still more 
so as they flow along into smaller channels.”  ^ Lindsay, 
perhaps unconsciously, patterned his conduct much more than 
he would have liked to admit on what he conceived to be the
1. Lindsay - James Duff, 1 Aug. 1785, CM 30/5/5, folio 16.
2* Ibid. Lindsay’s unflattering remarks on Hastings were
attributable partly to the fact that he was a member 
(though by no means an active one) of the Clavering 
faction. See Oriental Miscellanies, 15.
3. Lindsay - James Duff, 1 Aug. 1785, CM 30/5/5, folio 16.
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lines followed by Hastings and what he judged the general 
concensus to be regarding the stretching of regulations.
With a little modification his caustic comments on Hastings’ 
administrative practices would read as a description of his 
own performance as collector of Sylhet.
Under Cornwallis Lindsay relied on his long experience,
his dug-in-ness' and his links with Cornwallis to retain his
position. He was ”certain of having more real interests”
with Cornwallis* than with ’’the late glorious administration.”1
He had hastened to write to Cornwallis, congratulating him on
his safe arrival, and adding:
My friends in England inform me that they had
been at some pains in having my name mentioned
to your Lordship by people of distinction.
I am obliged to them for their kind 
intentions, but do not expect, or wish to 
avail myself of such recommendations as there 
are more certain and honourable means of 
ensuring your Lordship’s patronage and 
protection.
Lindsay was referring to a letter of introduction from his 
younger brother who had served under Cornwallis in America.
He felt so secure in his connections that he did not doubt
he could remain at Sylhet as long as he wished or that he
could arrange for William Hyndman, his assistant, to succeed 
him as collector of Sylhet.^
Lindsay was able in fact to use his position and 
connections to create his own obligation network. For
1. Lindsay - J. Duncan, 27 Oct. 1786, CM 30/5/9 1/2, folio 15.
2. Lindsay - Cornwallis, 8 Oct. 1786, CM 30/5/9 1/2, folio 11.
(Lindsay had had no such choice vfcsre“Hastings was concerned. 
On his arrival in India he had presented Hastings with 
letters of recommendation from his "friends, General Carnac, 
Mr. Sullivan and Commodore James.” Lindsay - Hastings,
28 Dec. 1777, SDR i, 24.)
Lindsay - Cornwallis, 8 Oct. 1786, CM 30/5/9 1/2, folio 11.
4. Lindsay - J. Duncan, 27 Oct. 1786, CM 30/5/9 1/2, folio 15.
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instance, it was on his representations that the limited posting 
to Sylhet of William Davidson, a naval surgeon, was extended, 
thus allowing Davidson to remain in Bengal and continue his 
commercial transactions ."** Lindsay also secured the replacement 
of Ensign Yfilliam Troop "by Lieutenant James Davidson to command 
the Sylhet defence establishment, and an elephant contract for 
William Dow. What specific advantages Lindsay hoped to gain 
from this are unclear, hut in a relatively closed service it 
was doubtless good policy to acquire as many contacts as 
possible.
If Lindsay had established his position partly by 
a shrewd appraisal of what was possible under Hastings and 
by his use of connections and family influence, he knew that 
his position was best sustained by success in revenue 
collection. The full range of the powers he sought and 
secured was therefore devoted to getting in the revenues.
He concurred in the extensive changes in landholding in 
the district effected by Gaurhari Singh and Premnarain Bose 
not only because such alterations benefitted his servants, 
and helped, too, to create a supporting structure of Indian 
officers, but also because he was convinced that the collections 
would be facilitated: lands owned by one or two persons,
he knew, were often more thriving than lands held by many
1. Naval surgeons found it profitable to remain in India 
thus causing ships to return to England without medical 
personnel aboard. The Board took steps to ensure that 
surgeons accompanied the ships; hence, Lindsay's re­
presentations on Davidson’s behalf became necessary. 
Lindsay - Richard Atkinson, 20 Sept. 1784, CM 30/5/5, 
folio 4.
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partnersHowever, while the realization of the revenues 
was the goal of the authorities at Calcutta, for Lindsay 
success with the collections was merely the means to an end. 
Like many contemporary civilians he was primarily interested 
in acquiring a fortune as quickly as possible and assumed 
correctly that the more successful he was with the collections 
the more unfettered would he be in the fulfilment of his chief 
ambition.
Lindsay, unlike Thackeray, was shrewd enough to
perceive that in a district like Sylhet no substantial wealth
could be acquired from plain extortion or from an interest
in real estate and he left such financial sources to his 
2
servants. The real value of a posting to Sylhet, as the 
Mughal faujdars of the district had realized, lay in the 
"wide field of commercial speculation" afforded to the 
resident, which Lindsay from the first had "contemplated
X
with delight." Also, unlike Thackeray, Lindsay proceeded 
to exploit every commercial opening in the district and must 
be rated highly as an energetic and inventive businessman.
It is unlikely, however, that his commercial transactions 
would have been wither so wide and varied or so successful 
and profitable had he not been vested with the office of
1* On 16 May 1787 Lindsay claimed: "All the pergunnahs that
have become the property of one person by public sale are
highly cultivated, while the others managed by a multi­
plicity of zemindars are almost a desert." Lindsay - 
BOR, 16 May 1787, SDR ii, 125.
2. The post of collector of Sylhet, said Lindsay, would be
a disappointment to any man unless he had "commercial 
ideas.** Lindsay’s India Papers, letter dated 20 May 
1786, CM 30/4/352 np.
3. Oriental Miscellanies, 37.
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collector of Sylhet. He was frequently attacked by other
European traders in Sylhet, notably the Greeks, for using
his authority as collector to corner the trade of the district
and to frustrate their ventures; such accusations were not
without justification. Also, as collector and as the holder
of the cowrie contract,"^ " the entire collections of the district
passed through Lindsay's hands and were utilized to advantage
in his commercial enterprises.
The two most significant exports of Sylhet were
elephants and chunam. The trade in these commodities had
been monopolized under the Mughals by the resident and
Lindsay achieved a similar stranglehold. He bought
elephants from sources within the district such as the
Langla and Chaitannagar khedas but also from sources outside
the district such as the Caehar Raja; he also maintained
khedas of his own and advanced money to other khedas for
2
catching and feeding elephants. Lindsay sold the elephants 
at a net profit of around 100 per cent, chiefly to the Company
1. It was always difficult to convert the Sylhet collections 
into rupees; the method of exposing the collected cowries 
to public sale at Dacca left much to be desired, as far as 
the Company was concerned, for there was no insurance 
against price fluctuation. A certain Michael Derozio, 
who was apparently a prot£g€ of Charles Croftes, then 
accomptant-general, offered to enter into a contract
with the Company for the conversion of the Sylhet cowries 
at a fixed rate but Lindsay secured the contract from 
under Derozio's nnse. Dor Lindsay's coup, see Derozio - 
CCR, 29 May 1783, SDE i, 151-2; Lindsay - CCR, 20 June 
1783, SDR i, 155; “and SDR i, 152-3.
2. CM 30/5/4 1/6, folios 75-7 and CM 30/5/4 5/6, folio 32.
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■but also to a few private individuals His "business papers 
show the increasing volume and profitability of tlie elephant 
trade: for example, his outlay on the purchase and feeding
of elephants and on other contingent expenses went up from 
13,183 rupees in 1783 and 1784 to 26,041 rupees in 1785 and 
to 34,258 rupees in 1786; his net profits climbed from 10,187 
rupees in 1783 and 1784 to 26,411 rupees in 1785 and to 35,928
p
rupees in 1786. The profits lindsay secured in the elephant 
trade had much to do with his monopoly position for he managed 
to squeeze the Nawab’s darogha of elephants out of the market.^ 
It is likely,though, that a contributing factor was his ability 
to exert pressure on the zamindars of the kheda mahals to sell 
their elephants dheaply to him. Since these zamindars relied 
mainly on the sale of their elephant catch for the discharge 
of their jama it would not have been difficult for Lindsay 
by insisting on the prompt payment of the revenues to obtain 
their elephants at a low price. Certainly, a comparison of 
the rate at which Lindsay bought elephants from Langla, for 
example,.with the rate at which he subsequently sold them, tends 
to reinforce the suspicion that the kedah mahal zamindars were 
not free to set their own price when dealing with Lindsay. As
1. CM 30/5/4 1/6, folios 75-7.
2. Ibid., and CM 30/5/4 1/6, folio 20 and CM 30/5/4 2/6, 
ToXTo 6.
3. The Uawab’s agent complained about Lindsay’s interference 
but Lindsay denied all accusations. See Mubarak-ud- 
daulah-DPCR, 16 Aug. 1779, SLR i, 71 and Lindsay - DPCR,
8 Sept. 1779, SDR i, 72-3. In 1788 Willes informed 
Cornwallis that" "whatever rights the darogha had "has 
now laid dormant several years.” "fillies - Cornwallis,
29 Feb. 1788, SDR iii, 1J.
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for the chunam trade, that was thrown open officially in
November 1777 on the expiration of John Richardson's contract
with the Company and a number of traders, both European and
Indian, entered the field.^ It was Lindsay, however, who
quickly emerged as the only chunam dealer of consequence.
To general complaints that he used unfair tactics to monopolize
the chunam trade he replied by claiming that he succeeded while
others failed simply because of his greater care, his more
considerate treatment of his employees and his understanding
of the hill tribes who controlled the raw chunam deposits.
But the case against Lindsay of sabotaging the trade in chunam
of the Greek merchants in particular was well documented and
2
Lindsay found it difficult to reply to it. From the trouble 
the Greeks took in substantiating their case and presenting it 
to Cornwallis personally, as well as from Lindsay's silence on 
the issue^ it does seem as though the charge was not without 
justification.
Lindsay's money-lending lias already been mentioned; 
so too has his speculation in cowries. He also traded in 
mugga dhotis, the distinctive silk cloths imported from Assam, 
and in taffetas. He was also a wholesale dealer in salt and 
a timber and wax merchant.^
1. Lindsay - J. Duncan, nd. June 1783, CM 30/5/9 2/2 np.
2. For a detailed account of the case, see SDR ii, 96-101.
3* Lindsay did not reply to the Revenue Board’s first letter 
dated 23 Feb. 1787 on the subject of the Greeks' complaint 
nor does it seem he replied to their second letter dated 
13 Apr. 1787. See SDR ii, 110-1.
4. See Lindsay's "Indian Accounts, 1782-7", CM 30/5/4, 6 vols
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Among his more spectacular though less successful
ventures was his shipbuilding and associated attempt to export
grain from Bengal.^" Lindsay built six ships in 1783, taking
advantage of the abundant timber supply and the relatively low
wages in Sylhet and then applied for and obtained a contract
to deliver one lakh maunds of rice to Iladras which was then
facing the prospect of famine. During the wet season the
vessels made their way to the Bay of Bengal and by November
1783 were loaded and ready to sail to Madras when because of
the threat of scarcity in the eastern districts of Bengal the
2
Government banned the export of grain from the province. In 
December 1783 Lindsay complained to a friend that his vessels 
were so narrowly watched that he did not see any possibility 
of eluding "the vigilance of government."^ By April 1784 
he was apparently still thinking of evading the embargo but 
a party of sepoys v/ere specially detailed to prevent his ships 
from sailing.^- Lindsay resorted to bribery to resolve his 
difficulties and he tried to pre-empt future rice contracts 
by sending the competent authority "a basket containing seven 
bottles of most excellent orange flower honey" and by offering 
him, if he wished to oblige any of his fair acquaintances in 
Europe with an uncommon present, "a piece of Sylhet workmanship 
in ivory which is no inconsiderable ornament to a lady's 
toylette."^ Lindsay did not elaborate on the nature of his
1. See Lindsay - Robert Hunter, 6 Nov. 1784, CM 30/5/5, 
folio 5 and SDR ii, 139-43*
2. Lindsay's Indian Papers, letter dated 16 Dec. 1783,
CM 30/4/347 np.
3. Ibid.
4. Lindsay's Indian Papers, letter dated 16 Apr. 1784,
CM 30/4/348 np. 
5. Ibid.
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ivory piece and it does not seem that his presents had any 
effect on the distribution of contracts* He was indemnified 
for the cancellation of the original contract he had secured 
from the Company but he did not consider the compensation 
adequate.^
Taken as a whole, Lindsay's commercial activities
were highly successful. In July 1783 when he had been in
the district for six years and had established a wide trading
2
base he claimed that his fortune accumulated daily. On
8 December 1783 he wrote as follows:
The profits I have lately derived from my commercial 
concerns in cloth and lime ... have been very con­
siderable and have enabled me to remit home much 
larger sums than I expected, and if I continue 
equally successful a very few years will enable me 
to return home to Europe with a very independent 
fortune..
Apparently, his profits continued to surpass his expectations
and on 8 August 1785 when he extended financial aid to James
Duff, his cousin and former employer, who had incurred losses
in America, he wrote:
... the ficicle Goddess has been far more indulgent 
and liberal in her favours than I ever had reason 
to expect or even wish for, and I now only wait to 
wind up my concerns and flatter myself I shall be 
able to leave this country early in '87 with a 
fortune /of/ no less than £50,000.
In Hay 1787 he asked for three months leave prior to retirement
but was told he would have to wait until he had concluded the
settlement for 1787-8. On 4 July 1787 he wrote to the Board
1. Lindsay - Duff, 1 Aug. 1785, CH 30/5/5, folio 16.
2. Lindsay’s Indian Papers, letter dated 29 July 1783, 
CM 30/4/346 np.
3. Lindsay's Indian Papers, letter dated 8 Dec. 1783, 
CM 30/4/347 np.
4. Lindsay - Duff, 1 Aug. 1785, CM 30/5/5, folio 15-6.
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o- Revenue:
As my health does not permit me to continue that 
attention to business which the duties of my 
station require I^request your permission to 
resign my charge.
Permission was granted and in late July Lindsay departed for
Calcutta on pre-retirement leave after handing over charge
of the district to his assistant. He returned to Sylhet in
mid-Gctober and finally resigned his station on 16 November
1787. He left India in December 1787.
Lindsay’s success in his private enterprises stood
in marked contrast to his admitted failure as a public officer.
He claimed that he deserved praise for keeping the district in
a state of tranquility that the area never had experienced 
2
before. But he also confessed that though from the
beginning he saw/ what was wrong in the district and was
uniquely placed to do something about it, for ”A thorough
knowledge of the country languages, of the nature of the
collections, and the abilities of each individual, acquired
from the experience and unremitted attention of ten years,
have given me more advantages than many /any?/ European ever
possessed before or perhaps will ever be again”, he had ’’failed
•5
in every attempt to remedy it.”  ^ Lindsay v.as not really con­
cerned with measures of reform and reorganisation in the internal 
administration of the district. Although he had ideas about
1. Lindsay - BOR, 4 July 1787, CM 30/5/9 2/2 np.
2. Lindsay - J. Duncan, 7 Peb. 1787, CM 30/5/9 2/2 np.
3. Lindsay - BOR, 20 June 1787, SDR ii, 135-6.
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what was needed he did not act upon them, apparently fearing 
that any attempt to introduce change would prejudice the 
collections. It will he seen, however, that this was a 
misreading of the situation. Lindsay’s successor was able 
to carry out substantial reforms in the district which improved 
and increased the collections.
307.
CHAPTER VI THE FRONTIER LANDS OF SYLHET
At least since the work of Irfan Habib and Bernard
Cohn it has been the fashion to see revenue administration 
as a three-sided contest between the imperial authority,
Hughal or British, the intermediary zamindars and brotherhoods 
and the cultivating ryots for the agricultural surplus. 
Particular attention has been focussed upon the zamindars 
who, if too weak proved inefficient instruments of the state, 
if too strong a threat to its collections. Assuredly, in 
Sylhet district this kind of contest was present; but the 
IJughals and the British had successively to contend with a 
further claimant for a share in the land revenue, for being 
a frontier district it lay open to the pressures of the Khasi 
Hill tribes across its border. The contest was not always
overt; it was not just a matter of armed clashes. This
makes it difficult to estimate the revenue lost to the 
Company through the activities of the frontier tribes. Never­
theless, the Khasis usually figured prominently in the reports 
concerning arrears due from the district. Indeed, it would 
appear that next to the vagaries of the monsoon and the rigid 
though understandable stance of the Calcutta authorities with 
•respect to revenue remissions - two issues treated in the 
previous chapter - the Khasis were the greatest obstacle to 
the prompt and full realization of the revenue demand. This 
chapter examines the responses to the problem posed by the 
Khasis and discusses how the need for strong action was ‘sold9 
to the central authorities by the collector.
While the impact of unpredictable weather conditions, 
albeit more marked in the eastern than in the western tracts, 
and the influence of official attitudes extended over the 
district as a whole, the Khasis affected only the more northerly
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mahals. These areas suffered from spasmodic and sometimes
prolonged outbreaks of looting. The various small tribes
inhabiting the lowlands between the Surma river and the Khasi
Hills to the north, an area which the geographer Rennell
called ’’Cossyah Country” and described as being wooded and
almost impenetrable in parts,^ v;ere more prone to raiding
than their hill brethren. Lindsay seemed to have thought
that their inclination towards ”acts of depredation” was
rooted in their origins; intermarriage between the plains
inhabitants and the hill tribes had produced the Bengali-
Khasis, ”a most degenerate people with the views /sic7 of 
2
both united.” The Chamtala raids of April and May 1780
were the first serious outbreaks that Lindsay witnessed.
Apparently the target of the attackers was the boro crop
and they claimed that their forays were justified by the
mistreatment handed out by some Sylhet zamindars to their 
•3
people who had presumably settled in the district as culti­
vators. The raids were ’’happily terminated” by 11 June 
1780.^ Troop reinforcements from Dacca, in an operation 
carried out largely in boats, had managed to surprise the 
raiders’ headquarters and to take six hostages. In the 
process a few of the raiders’ hamlets were also burnt.
1. Rennell - Barwell, chief of DPCR, 4 Feb. 1774, DFR vii, 
195. Rennell’s remarks on the area occupied by the 
Khasis were contained in a report he wrote to Barwell, 
at the chief’s request at the time of the Thackeray- 
inspired Jaintia expedition, and were based apparently
on the knowledge he had acquired in the late 1760*s.
Rennell thought that ”Cossyah” was the word for freebooter 
in the Sylhetti dialect.
2. Lindsay - BOR, 14 Dec. 1787, SDB ii, 205.
3. Lindsay - DPCR, 11 June 1780, BR Cons, R5Q, xxv, 1091.
4. DPCR - Board, 27 June 1780, BR Cons, R50, xxv, 1086.
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Another serious flare-up occurred in August and September 
1781 when the inhabitants of Haharam,^ whom Xindsay designated 
as "a set of freebooters”, destroyed a mud-fort on the Surma, 
hilled a havildar and his five sepoys, the thanadar, his - 
attendants and twenty barqandazes and then crossed the river 
to loot and plunder. This raid brought home to Xindsay how 
dangerously exposed the district was and he immediately began 
to take strong defensive measures. He built a fort at 
Pandua and errected thanas at Solaghar and Ichham&i on the 
Surma to replace those which Holland had dismantled. Finding 
that the company of sepoys stationed at Sylhet was often below 
strength, unsuited to the climate and indisciplined, Lindsay 
raised a local corps of two hundred barqandazes, out of which 
he created a company of troops armed and dressed like sepoys 
and secured a European officer to lead them. By March 1783 
Lindsay's corps were deployed at the various thanas, at Sylhet 
and on "temporary commands" throughout the district. The 
Board sanctioned an expenditure of 1,200 rupees per month
p
on the corps. These measures seemed to have had some effect.
The floods of 1784-5 further deterred the raiders since the
crops, the object of their forays, were destroyed. Early in
•3
1786, however, the situation on the frontier seemed tense^ and
though in that year nothing came of it, in October 1787 the
/
district was again hit by serious attacks.
1. nominally part of the jagir of Ahmad Reza, zamindar of 
Baniachang, and situated in the extreme north-west of 
the district.
2. Lindsay - Military Sec. to Governor General, 29 Oct. 1786, 
CM 30/5/9 1/9, folio 18.
3. Lindsay - Board of Ordinance, 7 Jan. 1786, SDR ii, 1.
4. Xindsay - BOR, 26 Oct. 1787, SDR ii, 184.
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The hill Khasis whom Lindsay considered "Upon the
whole, a good set of people with principles far superior to
the inhabitants of the lowlands'^* also took up arms from time
to time. Usually, they resorted to force to revenge indignities
2offered to members of their tribe. Such was the case in 
November 1783 when the Khasis laid siege to Pandua fort because
a havildar in the Company’s employ had insulted a hill Khasi.
•5
The siege lasted for five months. Some hill men doubtless 
accompanied the Bengali-Khasis in their infoads into Sylhet
A
but Lindsay was convinced that only a small number did so.
The collector apparently defused potentially dangerous
situations involving the hill Khasis by tact and diplomacy.
As he recorded in his autobiography:
The Cusseah though honest and open in his dealings, 
is extremely jealous in his honour and apt to take 
umbrage upon trivial occasions where no offence is 
intended, and an affront to any one individual is 
resented by the community at large. I had there­
fore carefully to study their disposition, and sometimes 
to wink at an occasional burst of passion on their 
part, or apologise for the like behaviour which 
frequently occurred from the petulance of my own 
people, - even serious disputes were thus occasion­
ally compromised without stating the case in a 
formal manner to government.
In activities more insidious than armed raiding, 
amounting to a creeping encroachment on the Company’s territory, 
the Khasis whittled down the collections from the district.
Some lands legally within the Company's jurisdiction were
1. Lindsay - BOR, 14 Dec. 1787, SDR ii, 205.
2. But the Khasis also created trouble when they suspected
that they were being defrauded by the Bengali traders, 
especially those whom they employed as accountants. 
Barooah, N.K., David Scott in North East India: A Study
in British Paternalism, 1^ 2.
3. Lindsay - CCR, 1 Mar. 1784, SDR i, 177.
4. Lindsay - BOR, 14 Dec. 1787, SDR ii, 206.
5. Oriental Miscellanies, 54-5. This self-approbation is 
not corroborated.
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alienated to the Khasis as protection money: as an example
the Board were told of the machinations of Ganga and Basant,
two Khasi chiefs who had "received lands several times from
the real zemindars as a reward or fee for their protection
against their "brethren, the hill pepple."1 Other tracts
were "either forcibly seized by the Cosseahs, or obtained
... at a very inadequate price" by playing upon the fears
of the original proprietors; while the Khasis held these
2lands no revenue was paid to the Company. Still other
lands were rented by the Khasis from Sylhet zamindars at
terms not materially different from an outright transfer of
ownership. Not unexpectedly, the greatest trespass took
place north of the Surma in the difficult and remote areas
around ladur and Pandua which were nominally subject to the
Company as part of the Mughal legacy. As the Revenue Board
were informed on 18 December 1788:
There are now eight or nine places inhabited 
by Bengallee Khasis ... within the Company’s 
limits which yield no obedience to any 
authority within this district ... These are 
in the pergunnah of Iahore/Laur7, the zsmindary 
of Amed Rajah, to whose authority also they are 
contumacious.-5
For six years Ahmad Reza, once the most powerful landholder 
in Sylhet but now an old and incapable man, had met the 
demand assessed on Laoxir without collecting anything from 
the ryots, but in 1789 he declared himself "unable to make 
further payments on that account" as the pargana was not in
1. \7illes - Board, 3 Feb. 1789, SDR iii, 120.
2. Bareh, H., The History and Chlture of the Khasi^People,
3.06-7. :
3. T/illes - BOR, 18 Dec. 1788, SDR iii, 87.
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his possession and as he was ”so much reduced in his circum­
stances as to he incapable of satisfying his creditors.”^*
The progressive loss of his lands was partly Ahmad Reza's 
own fault: like other holders of service lands he did not
stick to the terms expressed in his sanad. As the principal 
jagirdar in the district, he was responsible for a force 
consisting of 48 boats which were to be replaced annually, 
with five chief officers and over 1600 other officers and 
men, 288 shield makers, 96 musketeers, 48 archers and an 
equal number of artillery-men. By 1775, however, he kept
only twelve boats, some of which were worn out, without their
2full complement of men and with scarcely any arms. The 
emasculation of Ahmad Reza’s defence establishment had 
repercussions on lands other than his own. In some years 
no attempt v/as made to collect the revenues from the resumed 
lands of Pandua, where Khasi influence had taken hold, for 
fear that "an inforcement /sic/ of the Company’s authority 
might involve the collector in a dispute for a small revenue 
with the Cosseah, which might be prejudicial in a great degree 
to the Company’s collections.” Some portions of the un­
resumed lands of Pandua had been purchased and others seized 
from the Senapattis, ’’who were talookdars under Sylhet and 
/who/ held them rent free for the protection of the district 
against the Cosseahs.”  ^ This had resulted in a situation 
where to the Company’s embarassment a couple of Khasi chiefs 
actually held ’’lands under the Company for the protection of
1. Willes - BCR, 1 Sept. 1789, SDR iii, 159.
2. Palmer - Board, 8 June 1775, BR Cons. R49, iv, 60-3•
3. ’ITilles - BOR, 18 Dec. 1788, SDR iii, 87.
4. V/illes - BOR, 3 Feb. 1789, S£)R iii, 1 1 9 ,
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the district against themselves ...” the profits arising 
from these lands were appropriated mainly hy Bengali managers 
retained hy the Khasis whose interests led.them ”to keep up
2a mutual jealousy” between their employers and the Company,
The general unsettled conditions in the noi^ th of
the district could hardly have facilitated the collections.
In 1774 Thackeray had more or less settled the boundary
between Sylhet and Jaintia but westwards all was confusion.
The legal line was obscure and the line: of control was always
shifting to the Company’s disadvantage. In addition the
Khasi chieftains could exercise some influence in parts of
the district which were not under their control but where
their people had settled as ryots. Some Sylhet zamindars
even owed a kind of allegiance to the Khasis who in return
could be relied on to impede the collections by providing a
haven for absconding landowners or assistance to more rebellious 
■5
zamindars. The Khasis could also be used in other ways by 
the zamindars of Sylhet at the expense of the collections.
For example, the zamindars could stage or encourage Khasi 
incursions and ’’obtain on that pretence remission for /a number 
of7 years” which they could split between themselves and the
1. \7illes - BOR, 3 Feb. 1789, SDR iii, 119.
2. Bar eh, 107.
3. For example, the Khasis aided Radha Ram, a zamindar of
pargana Pratapgarh in Sylhet when in October 1786 he 
’’laid ... under contribution” six other parganas. . The 
affair was not terminated until March 1787 when Radha 
Ram was captured after being pursued for two months 
through the north-eastern hills. During the chase, he 
received unexpected help from the Khasis who staged an 
attack in the north-v/est. Lindsay - John Shore, nd.
CM 30/5/9 2/2, np; Lindsay - Lt. Davidson, his corps
commander, nd-1786, SDR ii, 72; Lindsay - BOR, 3 Mar. 
1787, SDR ii, 105.
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Khasis"^ : or they could claim that the threat of Khasi inroads,
whether they materialized or not, had driven their ryots to 
flight and had left them incapable of discharging their instal­
ments.
Viewed frop Sylhet sound revenue administration
seemed to demand that something should be done about the
northern border, but to the authorities at Calcutta the
situation was far less clear. Indeed, from the viewpoint
of the central authorities sound policy dictated that the
border should be left well alone. There was in Calcutta
a distinct bias against any kind of military operations in
Sylhet; the Board were wary of involving the Company in any
venture where the risks were thought to be greater than the
possible financial regards. Y/hen talk of pacification or of
any forward push in Sylhet cropped up it was usually mooted by
men on the spot. For example, Samuel Middleton during his
visit to Dacca in 1771 recommended the stationing of two
companies of sepoys in Sylhet to bring the lowlands north of
2
the Surma under cultivation; Thackeray proposed the annexation 
of territory held by the Jaintia Raja in the plains and in 1780 
Lindsay raised the question of expelling the Bengali Khasis 
from the lowlands. IJiddleton's recommendation was ignored, 
Thackeray’s was turned down flatly, and Lindsay was told that 
action along the lines he had suggested would not be in the 
Company’s interest; the Bengali Khasis, if driven from the
1. Villes had the "strongest grounds” for believing that 
some Sylhet zamindars behaved in this way. Y/illes - 
BOR, 18 Dec. 1788, SDR iii, 87.
2. Middleton - KCR, 18 May 1771, MFR iii, 972-3.
3. DPCR - BRC, 20 Apr. 1780, BR Cons, R50, xxv, 596.
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lov/lands, would be forced to take to the hills and to rely
on raiding the plains for their livelihood and that would
"subject Government to a greater loss and expence, than any
advantage arising from a country so deserted could possibly
r eimburse .So me of the European traders at Pandua would
also have welcomed an extension of the Company’s authority:
in 1779 they appealed for protection claiming that they hada
2
been forced to sell their goods at unfair prices, and they
were always eager to offer their services for action against
the Khasis. But the Company, with more pressing matters on
its hands, was content to proclaim its determination not to
relinquish any part of its Mughal inheritance although nobody
in Calcutta knew where the territorial limits of that legacy
lay. In so far as it paid any attention to the border, the
Company was committed to defence, and by the cheapest means
possible. As the Dacca Provincial Council made plain to
Lindsay: "Your object must be protection to the inhabitants
of Sylhet, without the necessity of continuing an established
■3
and heavy expense to Government."
Lindsay generally adhered to a defensive posture 
towards the Khasis of both the hills and the plains, though 
against the latter who v/ere more accessible he sometimes
1. DPCR - BRC, 20 Apr. 1780, BR Cons, R5G, xxv, 597.
2. Lindsay - DPCR, 26 June 1779, SDR i, 63.
3. DPCR - Lindsay, 20 Apr. 1780, SDR i, 88.
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ordered retaliatory measures.^ He had a good reason for
maintaining cordial relations with the hill Hhasis, though,
for they c ontrolled the limestone deposits on which his chunam
"business was "based. But even if he had wanted to take punitive
measures against the hill men, that would have been difficult.
As Lindsay wrote years later: "To retaliate was impossible
for you might as well attack the inhabitants of the moon as
2
those on the mountains above."
The raids of October 1787, during which the tribesmen 
went further south than was usual and even plundered some of 
the Dacca parganas, stirred the authorities at Calcutta out 
of their relative unconcern with the frontier. But even then 
it did not appear to the Board that there was a case for urgent 
or strong action. Lindsay, who was on the point of retiring 
as collector of Sylhet, was asked merely to write a report on 
the Khasis, their customs and their country and to say "whether 
they might not be induced by lenient measures only to conform 
in an orderly manner to gegular Government."^ Y/hat the Board 
had in mind was the non-violent approach by which collector 
Augustus Cleveland had pacified the hillmen of Bhagalpur and
1. For example, the burning of the Chamtala villages in 
1780; in 1787, too, he ordered the burning of villages 
and the driving off of cattle. Lindsay - Lt. Davidson, 
29 Oct. 1787, SDR ii, 190-1.
2. Oriental Miscellanies, 56.
3. Board’s resolution, 28 Bov. 1787, BR Cons, R51, xiii, 362.
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Rajmahal.1 In M s  report Lindsay, who seemed totally unaware 
of how Cleveland had been treating his hill tribes, stated that 
"lenient measures had no effect" on the Bengali-Khasis. Never­
theless the Board, obviously considering the whole issue some­
thing of a nuisance, resolved on 18 January 1788 as follows:
Although it does not appear ... that the 
situation of the Cosseahs is sufficiently 
similar to that of the inhabitants of the 
Hills /of Bhagalpur7, to admit to the same 
mode of civilization which was so success­
fully adopted by the late collector of 
Boglepore, ... that it should be attempted 
as far as possible by the collector of 
Sylhet with respect to the inhabitants of 
the tract of low country ..., by encouraging 
the principal people to such a familiarity 
of personal intercourse with him, as may 
gradually lead to the introduction of an 
influence that may prevent the disorders 
which now subsist there.
A few months later the Board authorised John \7illes, Lindsay’s
successor in Sylhet, to distribute small presents among the
Hill Rajas and Khasis as a conciliatory gesture.
The new collector had already grown apprehensive, 
however, that a purely negative prevention v/ould not work.
1. Cleveland died in January 1784, aged 29. His work is 
best summarised in the following inscription on a monument 
erected in Bhagalpur by the Governor-General and Council: 
"To the memory of Augustus Cleveland, Esq., late collector 
of the Districts of Bhagulpore and Rajamahall, who, without 
bloodshed or the terror of authority, employing only the 
means of conciliation, confidence, and benevolence, 
attempted and accomplished the entire subjection of the 
lawless and savage inhabitants of the Jungleterry of 
Rajamahall, ... inspired them with a taste for the arts
of civilised life, and attached them to the British 
Government by a conquest over their minds,..." See 
L.S.S. O’Malley, Bengal District Gazetters: Santal
Parganas, 37-41.
2. Board’s Resolution, 18 Jan. 1788, BR Cons, R51, xv, 100-1.
3. Secretary to Government - V/illes, 28 May 1788, SDR iii, 39.
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On 12 May 1788 Y/illes warned the Board that if "the v;andering 
low Europeans, Moguls, Greeks and Armenians who infest le g the 
district" were to supply the . Khasis with arms and to show the 
tribesmen how to use them, a battalion of sepoys would not be 
adequate protection for Sylhet and even Dacca district would 
be exposed to attack.'*’ He noted that his predecessor had
2stopped several traders from bartering arms for Khasi goods 
and that the Mughals had thought it wise to maintain a check­
point on the main route to the hills. T/illes himself was 
beginning to take the view that strict supervision of the 
trade with the. Khasis was essential if good order was to be 
maintained • on the frontier. In July 1788, when an affray 
occurred at Pandua, Y/illes used the opportunity to argue that 
since the situation on the frontier was so delicate trouble 
was bound to arise so long as any unsupervised contact with 
the Khasis was allowed. Y/illes was especially concerned 
that the Drench, who had an agent called Champigny in Sylhet, 
might be planning to found a settlement in the hills at the 
back of the Company’s territory.^- The Board, though not 
appearing to share Y/illes’ alarm, ordered him to transmit 
any evidence he could obtain of Champigny*s dealings with the 
Khasis and declared the provision of military stores to the 
Khasis "illicit and contraband." Y/illes was authorised to 
search boats bound for Pandua and to confiscate any military
1. Y/illes - Board, 12 May 1788, SDR iii, 33.
2. Ibid.
3. Y/illes - Board, 26 July 1788, SDR iii, 61.
4. Ibid., 62. Not unexpectedly, Champigny accused Y/illes of
frying to corner the hill trade for himself; Y/illes solemnly
denied this. Ibid., 60.
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equipment found on board.1
In December 1788 a Bengali Khasi called Ganga Singh
who owned lands both in the hills and the plains murdered,
reportedly with his own hands, the widow of a Sylhet zamindar
and her children as the result of an old dispute with the 
2
late zamindar. Ganga Singh also laid low, as far as Y/illes 
was concerned, any hope that a policy of conciliation might 
work. Y/illes was moved to press for stronger measures against 
the Bengali Khasis than his superiors had been prepared to 
contemplate. "Nothing but coercion,” he declared on 18 
December 1788, nwill suit with the dastardly and savage 
disposition of the Bengalee-Cosseahs of the lowlands.” The 
tribesmen were subject to the Mughal government, he added, 
and ought to yield the same obedience to the Company which 
must convince its Hwild neighbours” that the smallest eneroach- 
ment on its territory would be punished.
Y/illes had begun in fact a serious campaign to prod
Calcutta into action. Revulsion at Ganga Singh's crime was
not the only nor the main reason: Y/illes was convinced that
the existing policy of defence only, with an inadequate attempt
at conciliation, was unsound and prejudicial to good administration
He elaborated this in January 1789 when he statedj
I think the policy to be pursued with all these 
hill people is first to establish the several 
limits, and then whenever the occasion comes to 
support our own authority within our own terri­
tories, and .not, as at present, having some lands
1. Board - Y/illes, 20 Aug. 1788, SDR iv, 19.
2. Y/illes - BOR, 18 Dec. 1788, SDR iii, 87. Ganga Singh 
called himself Raja of the Bar-Akhia hills. Y/illes - 
Board, 25 Dec. 1788, SDR iii, 89.
3. Y/illes - BOR, 18 Dec. 1788, SDR iii, 87.
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nominally the Company's partly subject to 
us and partly subject to the Cosseah, in which 
they claim a liberty of encountering one 
another, and in which your Collector is afraid 
to act lest he may have the discredit of 
involving the Company in a dispute about a 
trifling revenue or perhaps on a matter of 
less consequence, though his submission on these 
occasions establishes a further right on the 
part of the hill people and leads to endless 
encroachments.
The problem for Y/illes was to convince his superiors 
that the existing policy was costly and that if it were not 
altered the revenue administration of Sylhet would suffer.
In December 1788 and the early part of 1789 he submitted a 
series of letters to show how the steady and sometimes un­
noticed expansion of Khasi control in the district and 
especially in Ahmad Reza's lands had resulted in a loss of 
revenue to the Company. He stressed that if no positive 
measures were taken further encroachments would be encouraged
and that the process of Khasi expansion would be "ultimately
2
attended with the most serious consequences." IJore signifi­
cantly, he hinted that the hastobud or revenue survey which 
he was ordered to undertake and which was to form the basis 
for an authoritative settlement of the revenues was not possible 
in the existing conditions. He thought that there was a 
danger that the survey Y/ould be disrupted by the adherents 
of Ganga Singh; he also expeetedithe servants of Ahmad Reza, 
who were intent on defrauding their employer, to seek the 
assistance of the Khasis in preventing the survey.
1. Y/illes - Board, 12 Jan. 1789, SDR iii, 115.
2. Killes - Board, 25 Jan. 1789, SDR iii, 118.
5. Y/illes - Board, 25 Dec. 1788, SDR iii, 89.
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On 12 January 1789 Y/illes outlined what he thought 
ought to he done: the lands held by Ganga Singh and other
Khasis within the Company’s "defined limits* should be taken 
over and the alienated parts of Ahmad Reza's possessions re­
annexed and resumed if rent free.1 Por Y/illes there was no 
problem about the limits of Ahmad Reza's jagir; he simply 
followed Lindsay in considering practically the entire 
lowlands west of Jaintia as the zamindars rightful possession.^ 
Bearing in mind the Company's reluctance to transcend its 'legal' 
boundaries that was a useful point to make. But Y/illes also 
had to convince Calcutta that it would not be especially risky 
or costly to seize the lowlands and that the Company could 
expect tangible benefits at no great cost from merely taking 
the trouble to assert its authority. In January he told the
Board that he was satisfied in his own mind that the lowlands
•3
could be subjugated with little or no opposition; the Khasi 
chiefs were occupied at that moment with each other in one of 
their periodical bouts of conflict. As for holding the 
lowlands, that could be accomplished cheaply, Y/illes thought,
if a few mud forts were built in the plains and some invalid
sepoys settled in the area under a couple of "steady European 
sergeants."^ The real benefits which would accrue, according 
to Y/illes, were that "a den for villains" would be destroyed
1. Y/illes - Board, 12 Jan. 1789, SDR iii, 114.
2. Lindsay had given the dimensions of Ahmad Reza' s jagir 
as 40 miles by 8 miles. Lindsay - BOR, 14 Dec. 1787,
SDR ii, 205.
3. Y/illes - Board, 23 Jan. 1789, SDR iii, 118.
4. Y/illes - Board, 12 Jan. 1789, SDR iii, 114.
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while at the same time a number of ’’useful subjects” would be 
settled; also, the parganas adjacent to the lowlands would 
enjoy a further measure of protection at no extra expense.^ "
On 19 February 1789 Y/illes sent the Board of Revenue
a report on the state of the parganas which had been attacked
in October 1787. The report, prepared under the collector’s
2
instructions, by an amin, painted a desolate picture. Dacoits 
had follov/ed in the v/ake of the Khasis; in pargana Randiga 
they appeared to have established their own dominion. Large 
numbers of ryots had fled the plundered region; Bansikunda 
pargana, one of the hardest hit, bore no trace of cultivation, 
only ’’jungle grass.” The renter of Betal and Betal Lawara 
parganas had abandoned his farm and the more powerful land­
holders, with the total collapse of law and order, were taking 
advantage of their superior strength to usurp the rights of 
others. For example, Raja Raj Singh, holder of the ten-anna 
share of Silbaris, one of the looted mahals, had appropriated 
the whole pargana and had carted away the ryots of the six- 
anna division to cultivate lands which he owned further south 
in pargana Susang.
The report was \7illes 1 trump card: it substantiated
with the kind of detailed evidence which the Calcutta authorities 
always called for an earlier remark of his, that the attacked 
lands would yield ”no adequate revenue” for some years. The 
report also implied that the conditions it described could arise
1. \7illes - Board, 12 Jan. 1789, SDR iii, 114.
2. See ’’Investigation of Lund loll, Koonshy,” nd., encl. 
in Y/illes - BOR, 19 Feb. 1789, SDR iii, 126-8.
3. Y/illes - BOR, 18 Dec. 1788, SDR iii, 86.
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elsewhere unless preventive measures were taken. This 
implication was clearly not lost on the Board when they 
considered the report together with Y/illes' several recom­
mendations on 1 April 1789. A resolution was approved 
authorising Y/illes
finally to settle the boundaries between Sylhet 
and the Cosseah country, and to take possession 
of all such lands as he may ascertain upon 
enquiry to have been separated from the Company’s 
territories subsequent to the Diwani without the 
sanction of Government, and to assess the same 
according to the-, established rules and customs 
of the district.
To Y/illes’ disappointment Ganga Singh’s lands which apparently
we re alienated prior to the diwani grant were exempt from the
2repossession operations. Cornwallis did not think that the 
Company was entitled to the Khasi chief's estate; he felt, 
moreover, that the lands would not pay the expense involved 
in holding theur and neither he nor other members of the Board 
could be tempted to abandon their legalistic approach to the 
boundary problem. Yet the mood in Calcutta had changed somewhat.
Unnecessary complications were still to be avoided - Y/illes was
asked to strive for an amicable settlement and to convince the
1. Board’s resolution, 1 Apr. 1789, BR Cons R51, xxxiii,
695-6. The resumption of service lands, as proposed
by Y/illes, was shelved for the moment. Ibid., 696.
2. Y/illes had tried to make out a claim to Ganga Singh's 
lands on the grounds of "Mogul right," Ganga Singh's 
hostility to the Company and his murder of the family 
of a Sylhet zamindar, and the lands being inhabited
by Bengali ryots. Y/illes - BOR, 3 Feb. 1789, SDR iii, 
119.
3. Board’s Resolutions, 1 Apr. 1789, BR Cons, RR51, xxxiii, 
693. ------
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Khasis of the justness of the Company’s claims - hut where
earlier the Board had "been content merely to state their
claims they were now prepared to act and to use force, though
only as a last resort, in support of them.1
But it was the Khasis who took the offensive with
an attack on Pandua early in July 1789, destroying the fort
and killing ’’the Tannadar and 20 mofussil seapoys who were
2stationed..- there for its protection’.’ and ’’threatening further
depredations In June and July all the chiefs seemed ready
to ditch their internal squabbling and unite against the Company.^-
It is possible that they had learnt, either from the traders or
from their allies among the Sylhet zamindars, of the Company’s
intentions regarding the alienated lands and had determined
to strike first. Once more, Y/illes set to work to convince
the Board of the need for drastic measures. The policy of
working towards an amicable settlement was misguided: there
was "no dependence on agreements made with wild people of
15
such revengeful dispositions.”-^ The Khasis had acted, Villes 
declared, with "unbridled licentiousness” since the raids of
1. Board's Resolutions, 1 Apr. 1789, BR Cons R51, xxxiii, 693.
The Commanding Officer at Dacca was ordered to send a 
company of sepoys to Sylhet to act under Y/illes’ instructions.
2. Y/illes - Colonel A. Ross, 13 June 1789, SDR iii, 137.
3. Y/illes - Commanding Officer at Dacca, 12 June 1789, SDR
iii, 136.
4. Y/illes - Board, 6 July 1789, SDR iii, 151.
5. Y/illes - Board, 18 June 1789, SDR iii, 142. In September
1789 Y/illes added: ”Y/e have fully seen the inefficacy of
submission and conciliatory measures. The more we have 
given away, the more the Cosseahs have encroached.”
Y/illes - BOR, 15 Sept. 1789, SDR iii, 162.
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October 1787.^ They should he intimidated by a ’’speedy 
though temperate retaliation”; their confederates in the 
lowlands, especially around Pandua, should be burnt out and 
the zamindars who were in league with them should be dis­
possessed. Y/illes recalled the Jaintia expedition of 1774 
and noted the subsequent tame behaviour of the Jaintia Raja
who in fact had declined an invitation to join other chiefs
2in an alliance against the Company . Y/illes also pointed
out that the Company had sustained an annual loss of 5,000
rupees from the parganas raided in 1787 and that the lands
%
were still far from recovered. And lives had been lost too.
As Willes stated;
Y/hilst passive ourselves the Cosseahs have 
destroyed many of our people. Perhaps 
conduct more firm may be better calculated 
to preserve the lives of our subjects and 
also of the borderers, for if we will not 
agree to relinquish the country, ultimately 
we must make opposition /sic/.
Under Y/illes1 goading the willingness to employ 
force as a last resort was replaced by the decision to use 
force as the prime instrument of policy. Three companies 
of sepoys with a small gun were sent to Y/illes with instructions 
that they operate within the Company’s territories only and 
”in obliging the proprietors of the soil and the inhabitants 
at large to pay a due obedience to the laws.”-' The collector 
was ordered to subject to his authority all areas north of the
1. Y/illes - Board, 18 June 1789, SDR iii, 143*
2. Y/illes - Board, 6 July 1789, SDR iii, 151.
5. Y/illes - Board, 15 Sept. 1789, SDR iii, 162.
4. Ibid., 163.
5. Board’s Resolutions, 18 Uov. 1789, BR Cons R51, 1, 613-4.
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Surma ’’within the line of the Company’s frontier” with the
exception of Bar-Akhia, the possession of Ganga Singh. The
Khasis we re banned, as T/illes had sought, from holding lands
under any tenure whatsoever within "the Company’s limits”;
such lands, as had been resolved in April, v/ere to be annexed
to the district. The tribesmen, while free to enter the
Company's territories for trade, provided they conducted
themselves in a peaceful manner, were forbidden on pain of
punishment to descend from the hills in armed bands: this
was also Y/illes’ idea. The inhabitants of Bar-Akhia were
warned that they would be punished if they interfered with
shipping on the Surma or if they attacked the adjacent
parganas and that for a second offence Bar-Akhia would be
taken over by the Company.'1'
The subjugation of the lowlands was carried out
between December 1789 and July 1790. At one stage there
were 237 rank and file on manoeuvres along the border. In
the course of the operations, Y/illes had to restrain an over-
zealous lieutenant Ashe, who, commanding a company of sepoys
in the Pandua region, set about burning fields and hamlets.
Ashe took the view that the standing crops belonged to the
Company as revenue and should be destroyed if he could not 
"them
harvest -it and carry off the grain. He was replaced by
Lieutenant James Cheape, who was urged by Y/illes to treat
the inhabitants of the lowlands as the ’’Company’s ryots and
2not as public enemies.” Nevertheless, Chamtala was razed, 
Bar-Akhia was annexed after all, and Ganga Singh was captured
1. Board's Resolutions, 18 Hov. 1789, BR Cons R51, 1, 611-3.
2. Y/illes - Cheape, 21 Dec. .1789, SDR iii, 195*
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when he walked into Cheape*s camp to negotiate, and was sent
down to Calcutta.^
Apparently, the inhabitants of the lowlands were
given a choice, broadcast by tomtom, between submitting and
agreeing to pay the revenues on the one hand or suffering
confiscation or destruction of their grain. By 21 December
1789 Willes had already employed a darogha and a tahsildar
to collect the revenues of the pacified areas, and on 8
January 1790 he ordered the darogha to send to Sylhet the
zamindars and patwaris of the villages that were inclined
to submit. Y/illes did not trust the darogha to settle
matters on his own. As he told Cheape on 9 January 1790:
All arrangements respecting revenue and 
others to ensure obedience in future will 
properly be concluded and adjusted at 
Sylhet or Chattak by myself or Hr. Hyndman.
I have by no means that confidence either 
in the Darogah or Taseeldar as to entrust 
this business to their sole management, as 
I have no doubt they would sacrifice, if 
allowed, the Company’s^interest to their 
own private advantage.
On 3 April 1790 Y/illes summoned the muqadams or headmen of
Bar-Akhia to Sylhet and before the end of the month he was
writing as follows:
All the resubjugated districts,, excepting 
Barrakeeah, have entered into agreements 
and paid their revenue, which payments, 
trifling at first, is an acknowledgement 
of the Company*s authority, and promise that 
good order may be established.
The payment of revenues was symbolic of acquiesence
1. Y/illes - Board, 19 Deb. 1790, SDR iii, 213.
2. Y/illes - Cheape, 9 Jan. 1790, SDR iii, 202.
3. Y/illes - Cheape, 3 Apr. 1790, SDR iii, 222.
4. Y/illes - Cheape, 24 Apr. 1790, SDR iii, 230.
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in the Company’s rule. And in August 1790 when the frontier
seemed calm, the detachment in Sylhet was reduced to one
European officer and a company and a half of sepoys. Two
months later when Y/illes was on leave in Calcutta he submitted
a scheme for the defence of the district. This involved,
since the climate appeared to rule out a regular detachment
of troops, re-establishing the forts and manning them with
local corps dressed and armed like sepoys;'1' a fleet of
eight long boats with their crev/s to be kept in readiness
for trouble in the rainy season; and an arrangement enabling
the collector to apply immediately to the commanding officer
at Dacca and not through the Board for troops in case of need.
Y/illes recommended that the Company should bear the cost of
defence itself and pointed out that it could- be met from the
revenues of the subjugated service lands. (Ahmad Reza and
other jagirdars held service lands valued at 1,40,000 kahons
of which only 33,000 kahons had been resumed by Holland.
The outstanding sum was adequate, reckoned I/illes, for the
defence of the district.) Y/illes’ plan was approved in toto
2
by the Board on 27 October 1790 and he was entrusted with 
the raising of the local militia.
In 1790 Y/illes v/as occupied with the hastobud of 
the district and v/as unable to give much attention to the 
subjugated areas. They were not included in the hastobud 
measurements. In 1791 a demand of 12,500 kahons was levied 
on Bar-Akhia and Pandua, and 53,000 kahons on Ahmad Reza’s
1. The hill-men did not fear barqandazes, said Y/illes.
2. Sub-sec. to G-ovemment - Y/illes, 27 Oct. 1790, SDR iv, 232.
3. Shaw and Smart, 2.
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service lands.^ Y/illes considered the revenues of the re­
annexed lands uncertain, but the demand was low and was 
realized with little difficulty in 1791-2 and channeled 
towards defence provisions.
The mahals attacked in 1787 were also excluded from
the hastobud as the area was for the most part uncultivated.
These mahals had been held khas in 1788-9 at 26,548 kahons,
the jama of the previous year but as the amin’s report had
Indicated, a considerable balance v/as irrecoverable. In
1789 Y/illes recommended selling the lands instead of holding
them khas for another year but the Board of Revenue directed
him to find out if the proprietors would engage to pay the
2
revenues on receiving takavi loans. The talukdars agreed 
to a demand of 9,000 kahons and though v/illes doubted their 
bona fides^ the Board of Revenue ordered the demand to be 
settled at that sum for 1790-1: this v/as to be increased by 
rasad in the two succeeding years as far as circumstances 
allowed Mto an equitable jummah to remain fixed during the 
following seven yearsu in accordance with the regulations 
of the decennial settlement.^- Y/illes subsequently adjusted 
the demand as follows: 9,000 kahons for 1790-1; 11,000
kahons for 1791-2; and 17,000 kahons for 1792-3. But within 
two months of the opening of the second year the talukdars were 
holding back on the increase and were even demanding a deduction
1. Y/illes - BOR, 23 Mar. 1791, SDR iv, 283.
2. BOR - Y/illes, 14 Jan. 1790, BOR R71, xx, np.
3. Y/illes - BOR, 16 Mar. 1790, BOR R71, xxiii, np.
4. BOR - Board, 29 Mar. 1790, BOR R71, xxiii, np.
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on the jama of 1790-1, which apparently they had not yet fully
discharged.^* Y/illes remarked that their obduracy confirmed
his long held opinion that the state of the parganas would
not improve while in the possession of the present owners.
He suggested that the proprietors be dispossessed for not
complying with the rasad jama and that the lands be farmed
for ten years. He was obviously anxious that other zamindars
should not be encouraged to neglect their lands in the hope of
2securing deductions in their demand. In their reply on 13 
July 1791 the Board of Revenue directed Y/illes to sell the 
lands if the jama of 1790-1 was not fully discharged.^ No 
sale proceedings are recorded, however, and it seems that the 
talukdars in the end proved more tractable than V/illes had 
expected.
Thus, after 1790 the Khasi threat to the revenues 
was more or less eliminated. Two years later, willes 
attributedT,the ... tranquil state of the district to the lands 
under Cosseah rule of influence ... /Having been/ taken over 
and the Cosseahs /thereby/ prevented from exerting any authority 
within the Company's boundaries."^ The Ilughal system of 
defence by holders of service lands had given way to a firmer, 
more efficient arrangement. This was one aspect of a general 
reorganization of administration within the district effected 
during whiles' collectorship. The Ilughal defence system had
1. Y/illes - BOR, 5 July 1791, BOR R71, xli, np.
2. Ibid.
3. BOR - Y/illes, 13 July 1791, BOR R71, xli, np.
4. Y/illes - BOR, 26 Mr. 1792, BOR R72, i, np.
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never worked well on the Sylhet frontier partly because the 
sanad holders had been out on a long limb and could expect 
little help from the imperial government in Delhi or the 
viceroy in Murshidabad. They had therefore made their own 
bargains with the frontier tribes, or had been deprived of 
their grants by them. Nibbling at the outer fringes of the 
empire by the Khasis did not worry the Llughals unduly nor, 
at first, the British. But Y/illes in his capacity as the
official immediately responsible for the revenues of Sylhet 
v/as able to bring about a change in the Company’s policy 
towards the frontier by urging and then carefully directing 
Calcutta how to act. Considerations of revenue yield were 
the driving force, and not, however much it might have 
appeared from v/illes1 correspondence with his superiors, a 
desire to have the frontier sensibly adjusted. Hence, no 
boundary line was decided or drawn. Dor though the resolution 
of 18 November 1789 had spoken of the "line of the Company's 
frontier" and the "Company's limits" these were but vague 
abstractions, and so they were to remain for a considerable 
time. A map commissioned by the Company as late as 1828 
left the border west of Pandua unsketched.^ Subsequently, 
with the incorporation of the Khasi hills into the expanding 
empire, the frontier v/as pushed further north.
1. ."Original Map of Sylhet, 1828", 2 sheets, India Office 
library.
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CHAPTER VII ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM III SYLHET 1788-92.
The more forward approach inaugurated by collector 
John Nilles in relation to the frontier problem, discussed 
in the previous chapter, was evident too in other matters 
bearing even more directly on the revenue administration of 
Sylhet. These included a rearrangement of the parganas, 
the formation of a settlement on the basis of a survey of 
the district, and the introduction of a new collecting agency. 
Y/illes’ initiatives occupied the years 1788-92 and coincided 
roughly with important developments at the centre, where 
Cornwallis * reforms were taking root and where the drift 
towards a permanent settlement was gathering momentum.
These wider developments have been treated elsewhere'1' and 
it is not necessary for our purposes to examine them in 
detail here. Nevertheless, it is essential to bear in mind, 
for a better understanding of V/illes’ approach to administration, 
that he was operating in a general climate of reform and re­
organisation.
In July 1787 after the offices of collector, judge
o
and magistrate had been united and salaries had been upgraded,
Cornwallis informed the collectors:
The income which is now annexed to your station 
is liberal and such as with a prudent economy 
ought to provide a fund for your necessary 
expenses as well as a recompense for your 
services. To furnish supplies for needless 
extravagence is what no Government can, nor
1. See e.g., Aspinall, A., Cornwallis in Bengal, Gopal, S., 
The Permanent Settlement in Bengal and its Results,
Cruha, &., A Rule of Property for Bengal and Liahmood’s 
unpublished thesis on the RajsHahi Zamindari, chapter VI.
2. The monthly pay of a collector was increased from Rs. 
1,200 to Rs. 1,500. In addition he was allowed a 
monthly house rent of Rs. 150, and commission on his 
collections at the rate of one per cent for the first 
ten lakhs rupees and one half per cent thereafter.
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ought, to do ....
The very extensive influence, which you 
derive from your different offices of Collector,
Judge, and Magistrate, affords you the opportunity 
of widely promoting the public good and the 
Companyfs advantage, and this consideration alone 
will, he trusts, have the same influence upon 
your conduct with the most solemn restrictions 
or minute regulations. An abuse of this power, 
either actual or hy connivance, on your part, 
will be productive of consequences highly 
prejudicial to the Company and to the country.
Reward has nov/ been annexed to responsibility, 
and no occasion, it is to be presumed, will ever 
occur to render the infliction of penalties 
attending a breach of it necessary.
At the same time collectors had been "restricted from the 
exercise of any trade either directly or indirectly"; though 
they were told that the general prosperity required that 
internal trade should receive from them every possible en­
couragement, they were not to understand from that "that 
any individual, either European or native, is to avail
himself either of your name or influence for the assistance
" 2of his private commerce.
In conformity to the spirit of these reforms and in
contrast with his predecessor at Sylhet, V/illes made his public
duties his overriding concern. He had arrived in India in
October 1775 and had spent the next seven years in various
•5
positions at Calcutta. His mofussil experience dates from 
1783 when he was appointed resident at Earrukhabad, and though
1. Revenue dep’t circular - all collectors, 18 July 1787, 
SDR ii, 146.
2. Ibid., 146-7.
3. Appointed in 1778 asst, in Secretary’s office, General 
Dept; in 1780 asst, to Secretary, Secret Dep’t; in 
1782 remembrancer at the Criminal Courts. Bengal 
Civilians 0/6/29, 2065.
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his career there was quiet and relatively routine he had
already begun to acquire the character of a sympathetic and
conscientious civilian. Even so his appointment to Sylhet
on 28 November 1787 undoubtedly surprised a good many people
in the service: William Hyndman, for almost six years
Lindsay’s assistant collector, was generally regarded as the
first person in line for the Sylhet posting. He had foregone
more lucrative appointments elsewhere in the hope of succeeding
Lindsay at Sylhet. How V/illes instead of Hyndman obtained
the Sylhet collectorship is impossible to determine. When
Lindsay was campaigning on Hyndman’s behalf - he wrote personally
to John Shore (whose acquaintance he regretfully had never had
the pleasure of making), recommending Hyndman as more competent
to fill the Sylhet station than a "stranger"'*' - he v/as aware
that somebody in Calcutta wanted to "shove in a friend of
2
his own, a Mr. Willis." But just who this person was he 
did not say, and the records do not reveal his identity.
V/illes arrived in Sylhet in late January 1788 and 
on 1 February relieved Hyndman of his acting responsibilities.
In the next few years, he was to emerge as an administrator 
who genuinely cared about the welfare of the inhabitants under 
his charge; his attitude to their well-being, expressed in 
the following declaration, v/as reminiscent of the principles 
on which William Holland had based his settlement of Sylhet
1. Lindsay - Shore, 16 Jan. 1787, CM 30/5/9 1/2, folio 25.
2. Lindsay - J. Duncan, 27 Oct. 1786, CM 30/5/9 1/2, folio 15.
3. V/illes - BOR, 1 Feb. 1788, SDR iii, 3. Hyndman continued 
as asst, collector at Sylhet. r In October 1788 he requested 
a posting at Calcutta because of his wife’s ill health. 
Hyndman - BOR, 7 Oct. 1788, SDR iv, 33. (According to 
Lindsay, he had married the first European lady to set
foot in Sylhet.) However, his wife died soon afterwards,
and Hyndman was content to reimain in the frontier station.
He left Sylhet in 1791« to be(come commissioner for the 
suppression of dacoity.
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in 1775:
Every proprietor of the soil should he left to 
act therein agreeably to his judgement or 
interest but certainly equity and policy where 
the Government have so great a stake in the 
produce, require that we secure to the ryots 
and his family that part of the eventual profit 
or pay which v/as originally by some mode or  ^
other settled as the reward for his labours....
He believed that "No axiom can be more established than that
justice to the ryots will be beneficial to the landholders."
However, he was clear sighted enough to discern that custom
had so long sanctioned the oppression of the ryots that "the
landholder considers their emancipation therefrom as an in-
2fringement of his rights." He shared the contemporary 
conviction that "The natives of Bengal will willingly undergo
3
imprisonment, provided they can obtain an ultimate advantage"; 
yet, he saw his office in paternalistic terms. When in early 
1791 new criminal regulations proposed that collectors in their 
capacity as magistrates should themselves execute the death 
sentence, Willes tried to organise his fellow collectors 
against having to perform that function; he felt that "the 
public service may be materially injured by the office of 
collector becoming the terror of the natives and the collector 
himself odious."^ He understood his role to be more humane
1. Willes - BOR, 5 Oct. 1792, Proc. 5 Nov. 1792, BOR R72, 
ix, np.
2. Ibid.
3. Willes - BOR, 23 Mar. 1791, SDR iv, 283.
4. Also, said Willes: "Personally I dislike being the exe­
cutioner of the sentence of death ... nor do I imagine that 
it is consonant to the spirit of the times in England that 
apparently the power of life and death should be intrusted 
/sic/ with collectors of revenue." Willes - J. lumsden, 
collector of Rangpur, 23 Mar. 1791, SDR iv, 284. Cf. 
Willes - S. Bayard, collector of Dacca, 12 Peb. 1791, SDR 
iv, 276-8.
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than that? as he was to declare in April 1793, when writing
about the usefulness of petitions:
Such appeals are frequently beneficial. They 
teach a collector caution, shew him he is not 
to rely upon his integrity solely, but with 
vigilant attention to watch over the happiness, 
and attend the rights of those who are placed 
under his authority.
Though infected with the growing confidence of 
civilians in their ability to fulfil their responsibilities, 
Willes was a pragmatist in his appreciation of the difficulties 
that lay in his path. He recognized that his Indian sub­
ordinates were not primarily concerned about the Company’s 
profit and would "sacrifice, if allowed, the Company's interest 
to their own private advantage." He was aware, too, that it 
would require no great exertion on his part to make enemies in 
Calcutta: problems could easily arise from the centre, for, as
he put it to his colleague, the collector of Dacca, "situated 
as we are with many vexatious employments, even gnats can
3
molest
When Willes first arrived in Sylhet the district 
was in a desolate condition, suffering from the accumulated 
misery of the previous ten months. The floods Lindsay, had 
first reported in April 1787 had not abated until December. 
During this period, first Lindsay and then Hyndman had sent 
the most distressing reports to Calcutta. For example, on 
11 July 1787 Hyndman had written:
1. Added Willes: "They teach the Umlah /Imla, chief Indian
officers/ also, that the favour of a collector cannot
screen them, and that they are within the reach of 
punishment for acts of injustice and corruption." Willes 
BOR, 20 Apr. 1793, Proc. 24 Dec. 1793, BOR R72, xxiv, np.
2. Willes - J. Cheape, 9 Jan. 1790, SDR iii, 202.
3. Willes - S. Bayard, 5 Jan. 1791, SDR iv, 280.
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It is with great concern I have to inform 
you that all the low pergunnas are entirely 
overflown and the inhabitants driven from 
their houses and obliged to seek shelter 
on boats. The greatest part of their cattle 
are drowned, those that survive being 
preserved on rafts of bamboos /the inhabitants/ 
not being able to procure a spot for them to 
rest upon. Azmerygunge /Sjmiriganj/which is 
one of the highest spots in the district, is 
now totally inundated, one house only remaining, 
and the face of the whole country exhibits an 
open sea; and where villages formerly stood may 
be seen at a distance little mounds rising out 
of the waters which upon a nearer approach is 
/sic7 perceived to be wrecks of the habitations 
of the distressed rayaitem who are themselves 
and their families sent /set?7 up in boats on 
the spot where formerly stood their houses.
Already, Hyndman was saying that thewaters had risen higher
than at any time during the great flood of 1784. Though the
higher lands were not flooded, the cultivators there were
distraught, for whenever they attempted to sow their lands
during clear spells the rains had returned and they had "had
the misfortune to find that they have not only lost their
2
rising crops - but also the seed which is the greater loss."
In early September Hyndman toured a few parganas near to Sylhet 
town and found "scarce a village but has suffered some loss 
either in cattle or desertion of the ryotts who have retired 
to the hills for safety." On 12 September he reported that 
the inhabitants of the district capital itself had been without 
grain for the past six days and that in the district at large, 
"numbers of the poorer sort are daily carried off by famine."^-
1. Hyndman - BOR, 11 July 1787, SDR ii, 143.
2. To some this had happened three times. Ibid., 143-4.
3. Hyndman - BOR, 5 Sept. 1787, SDR ii, 168.
4. Hyndman - BOR, 12 Sept. 1787, SDR ii, 172.
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The floods of 1787 and the consequent distress had
been widespread. Early in September 1787, a cyclone swept
in from the Bay of Bengal, once again bringing torrential rain,
flood and destruction to the province. The centrally situated
district of Rajshahi was among the hardest hit areas On 13
September 1787, a correspondent of the Calcutta Gazette wrote
from Dacca in the east:
An excessive rain has caused the waters again 
to rise. This will add to the dreadful evils 
which have been already experienced by this 
unhappy province.
In the remote villages, famine has begun 
its ravages upon the aged, the infants and the 
infirm.
A crowd of poor wretches resort to the 
city, where the importation from distant countries 
has afforded some relief. I am told parents sell 
their children as slaves for a few rupees, an in^ 
controver ible proof of extreme misery and want.
A month later accounts from Burdwan in the west were suggesting
that the Damodar river "had risen to a height unknown to the
oldest inhabitants." Houses and villages in Burdwan districts
had been swept away, large numbers of people and cattle had
drowned, and "the high banks of tanks alone gave refuge to
the survivors.""^
In all his reports Hyndman (like other collectors 
whose districts had been affected) went to great pains to 
assure' his superiors in Calcutta that he was doing his best 
to secure the revenues. With his eye on the Sylhet collector- 
ship, he must have regarded the floods as a personal blow. On
1. Ilahmood, 261.
2. Seton Karr, Y/.S., Selections from the Calcutta Gazettes, 1, 203
3. Ibid., 210.
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20 July he spoke of using "confinement and still severer
punishment1 on the zamindars in an attempt to enforce the
collections hut with no effect. He acknowledged then that
it "would be inconsistent with reason to expect full payment
of their kists at this crisis," but declared, "still there is
a medium and it is unreasonable in them to withold the whole
By 12 September, however, with the collections totally at a
stand except for receipts from some of the higher parganas,
he was forced to solicit from the Revenue Board a temporary
suspension of the revenue demand. This he did, he said,
"with reluctance from the conviction that it is introducing
a bad precedent that is liable to much abuse even with the
2
greatest care taken to prevent it." The Revenue Board 
acceeded to Hyndman's request, though with the expressed hope, 
notwithstanding the graphic accounts which they had received 
from him of extreme distress in the district, that "the rentees 
,/sic7 and ryots will not require any further relief."^ Their 
optimism was communicated to Lindsay who had returned to Sylhet 
in mid-October from pre-retirement leave in Calcutta, and he, 
judging that mere words were lost on Calcutta, sent the Revenue 
Board a specimen of the only food available to the lov/land 
inhabitants. He described it as a small root procured from 
the bottom of the jhils, now filled 'with six or seven feet of 
water, and commented: "nourishment it has none and ... only
serves to clog the appetite." Three days later he reaffirmed
1. Hyndman - BOR, 20 July 1787, SDR ii, 148.
2. Hyndman - BOR, 12 Sept. 1787, SDR ii, 172.
3. BOR - Lindsay, 26 Oct. 1787, SDR ii, 186.
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the dreariness of the situation in a personal letter to John 
Shore, president of the Revenue Board, in which he estimated,
"At least one third of the inhabitants have been carried off 
by famine or /HiaveJ deserted the district since the commence­
ment of the year, nor does there remain cattle to cultivate 
the lands. As for the revenues, Lindsay wrote on 7 November
1787 that though some of the higher lands were paying, nothing 
v/as forthcoming from the low parganas; there were no crops to 
sell and no loans to be had either, for, said Lindsay, "Those 
who were possessed of any money have long since been ruined
p
from making advances."
By Becember 1787 Lindsay!s bleak reports had made 
the rounds of the Calcutta authorities and the Governor- 
General-in-Council asked the Revenue Board, in order to 
mitigate the distress in Sylhet, to ascertain if grain could
3
not be sent from Dacca or other places to the frontier district. 
But scarcity was widespread and other districts were in fact 
looking for exports from Sylhet, as they had done during the 
great famine of 1769-70. This hope was now misplaced for the 
district’s aman or November crop had been destroyed, except 
in a few scattered patches of higher ground. On 8 February
1788 Willes ruled out any possibility of grain exports from 
Sylhet until the boro harvest; this, he warned, would be 
gathered in later than usual and not before mid-May, and would
1. Lindsay - Shore, 26 Oct. 1787, CM 30/5/9 2/2, np.
2. Lindsay - BOR, 7 Nov. 1787, SDR ii, 193*
3. If grain could be procured it was to be sold at a price
that would secure the Company from any loss on the trans
action, unless the inhabitants were unable to pay that 
rate; in that case, the collector v/as authorized to 
sell below cost. Ext. Board - BOR, 7 Dec. 1787, SDR 
ii, 207.
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be less abundant than in previous years, for cultivation had
been reduced by a third, owing to the loss of ryots and cattle
and the lack of seeds. Neither rice nor paddy was available
in most parts of the mofussil, said Yfilles, echoing Lindsay's
statement that the inhabitants were surviving on roots.'*’ ffar
from being able to furnish other districts with grain, Sylhet
itself urgently needed supplies and Willes put in a request
for 20,000 maunds of rice and 3,000 maunds of salt "to be
?
disposed of as may be deemed best."
Three days later Willes wrote that if the boro 
failed, "our situation will be truly deplorable." Some of 
the cultivators, he added, were working hard from motives of 
self-preservation, but he was finding it difficult to persuade 
the people generally to return to their own villages. At the 
end of Pus (December-January) the revenue balance had accumulated 
to 19,932 rupees and Willes had expressed his fears that the 
arrears would continue to grow monthly.^- At the close of 
Magh (January-Pebruary) the total balance stood at 23,766 rupees.^ 
The sums collected, as ¥illes said on 11 Pebruary, had been 
received in general from the securities of the zamindars and 
they could not meet further demands as they had obtained no 
remittances from the mofussil. To this explanation he added:
1. \7illes - BOR, 8 Peb. 1788, SLR iii, 5.
2. Nilles - BOR, 8 Peb. 1788, BR Cons, R 51, xxi, 70.
3. Willes - BOR, 11 Peb. 1$88, SDR iii, 6.
4. Khalsa Report, 18 Peb. 1788, Proc. 7 Mar. 1788, B<XR R70,
xxxix, np.
5. Khalsa Report, 14 Mar. 1788, Proc. 25 Mar. 1788, BOR R70, 
xxxix, np.
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Rigorously to enforce the collection without 
regard to the present situation of the country, 
which has suffered severely hoth by inundation 
and the attack of the Cosseahs would be in want 
of policy....Since ray arrival I have carefully 
enquired into ^the/facts, nor do I find they 
have been exaggerated by former representations 
and indeed such is the general distress that I 
cannot stir out of my house without being beset 
by thousands claiming relief.
One of the representations made to T/illes was that
he should issue parwanas against any exportation of grain from
Sylhet. It appeared that without his knowledge merchants had
been hoarding grain in Sylhet town for export. Though the
policy of the Board was set against any restriction of the
inland trade, 7/illes, on 15 February, placed an official
embargo on grain exports from Sylhet. In reporting this
ban to the Board he assured them that he had taken into
account the prevailing scarcity in Dacca but the food prospect
facing Sylhet was "most alarming”; moreover, he was convinced
that given the extent of scarcity, only traders would benefit
2from an absence of restrictions. billes1 initiative bore 
the unexpected result of disclosing 10,000 maunds of rice which 
had been covertly stockpiled in warehouses in Sylhet town. 
\7illes directed the darogha of the bazaar to sell the rice at 
”a fair valuation”; the rate was fixed at one maund per rupee 
and the collector noted that some amount of relief would now 
be afforded to people living in and around the capital, but 
that the genearal distress would last until the next harvest.
1. Villes - BOR, 11 Feb. 1788, SDR iii, 5-6.
2. Willes - Board, 15 Feb. 1788., SDR iii, 7. The Board
were not happy over ■Tilles' restriction. They would
have liked him first to consult with them but they ratified 
his action as he had been complying with the repeated 
representation of Sylhettis. Board - \7illes, 25 Feb.
1788, SDR iii, 12-3.
3. ¥illes - Board, 19 Feb. 1788, SDR iii, 9.
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Villes nevertheless cancelled his earlier request to Calcutta 
for grain supplies."^
Considering the continuing distress, the accumulating
revenue balance and Y/illes1 hope that such orders might he
sent "as may tend to relieve the inhabitants ... and thereby
enable them to apply to the cultivation of their lands", the
Revenue Board on 7 March reminded the collector that they had
already invested his assistant with a "discretionary power"
of suspending the revenue demand. To this they added the
caution that Villes should not extend that suspension "further
than may be requisite for the welfare of the people and the
2
future cultivation of the country." In the event, the 
zamindars and farmers were allowed until early September 1788 - 
well into the new revenue year 1788-9 - to make up their 
deficiencies in payment. The accounts which were closed 
only on 8 September revealed total arrears of around 26,556 
rupees or about fourteen per cent of the jama. Villes 
strongly urged, and the Board agreed, that the people of 
Sylhet should be freed from all claims by government respecting 
the revenue balance for 1787-8.
The year 1788-9 began with dismal forebodings. The 
amount of hoarded rice discovered in Sylhet town had reached 
26,000 maunds by 10' April 1788 but this, Villes warned, would 
be totally inadequate if the boro failed. Sadly, the over-
1. The salt was received in June 1788 and sold at "a low 
price" (not specified.) Y/illes - Board, 12 June, 1788, 
SDR iii, 45.
2. BCR - Villes, 7 Mar. 1788, Proc. 7 Mar. 1788, BOR R70, 
xxxix, np.
3. Villes - BOR, 5 Sept. 1788, SDR iii, 74.
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abundant monsoon of the previous year was followed by delayed
rains, forcing Willes to write on 10 April:
At present the prospect is very unpromising.
For want of rain the cultivation has not been 
considerable, and what has been sown is 
burning up. lately it has been usual for 
t£ie rain to set in at Sylhet the beginning
of March. So uncommonly a dry season has 
never been seen by the oldest inhabitants of 
this place.
It was against this unfavourable background that 
V/illes had to make the new settlement. The Revenue Board 
wanted to ’’keep in view the recovery” of the 9*19,407 kahon 
jama of 1786-7 but doubted whether in the circumstances that 
could be realised in a manner consistent with the future welfare 
of the inhabitants and the ’permanent security of the public 
revenues.” They therefore set their sights lower. Observing 
that Lindsay had said on 24 November 1787 that Holland’s jama 
of 8,00,101 kahons was an equitable assessment, they told 
T/illes that they would like to see added to that figure the 
remission of 30,000 kahons which had been granted at the start 
of 1787-8. And in an attempt to control his assessment of 
individual parganas, they ordered him to compare his figures 
with those settled in 1786-7 and to give specific reasons why
2
any discrepancy should arise between the two sets of demands.
In forming the settlement Y/illes was advised to 
settle with the zamindars wherever possible and for one year 
in the first instance. There was nothing new in this; similar 
orders had been sent out to collectors throughout Bengal since
1. Y/illes - BOR, 10 Apr. 1788, SDR iii, 24.
2. Proc. 15 Apr. 1788, BOR R70, xl, np.
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Pitt’s India Act of 1784. In Sylhet, however, the system 
had developed, especially in the last years of Lindsay’s 
coliectorship, of making the collections through wadahdars. 
Y/illes had found, on his arrival in the district, more than 
eighty wadahdars residing in the capital, ’men of no res­
ponsibility, but generally connected with the Canongoes or 
principal officers of the cutcherry.”^  These wadahdars, Y/illes 
was later to report, performed no useful function whatever, but 
enjoyed nevertheless a rusum or perquisite amounting to five 
per cent of the jama* To provide for their relatives and 
dependents, the wadahdars appointed them as shiqdars, cash- 
keepers, or as other petty functionaries in the mofussil, thus 
adding a burden on the cultivators of more than twenty per 
cent of the jama. These extra unofficial imposts proved a 
heavy drain on tte public revenues, for the wadahdars and their 
officers naturally creamed off their perquisites before dis­
charging the government’s demand. Prom his experience since 
February 1788 T/illes noted that the subordinate officers sent 
into, the mofussil ’assumed the entire management of the
collections and might oppress ad libitum, as they were not
2responsible to any persons.” Convinced that it was improper 
to permit the district to be plundered (as he put it) by 
wadahdars, he resolved at the time of the 1788-9 settlement 
strictly to adhere to the letter of the Revenue Board’s orders, 
and as far as possible to extricate the landholders from the 
clutches of the wadahdars, and to settle directly with the 
zamindars.
1. Y/illes - BCR, 24 Oct. 1790, Proc. 26 Oct. 1790, BOR R71, 
xxx, np.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
346.
V/hile Y/illes was occupied in rating the parganas
and in removing the wadahdars, the grain situation showed,
at first, no signs of improving. The "boro crop was severely
hit by the continuing drought. On 12 June 1788 Y/illes
reported that a coarse mixture of rice and paddy was being
1
retailed in Sylhet town at seven seers per rupee - five times
the price of the best grain in a fair season. On 18 June
he asked for permission to close the diwani adalat for two
months from 1 July since the grain shortage made it "impossible
for the plaintiffs or defendents to support themselves in 
— 2Sylhet ^jown/.’’ However, some rain fell at last towards 
the end of June, raising hopes of a late aus crop in some 
parts of the district. Thus, though in Iviay Y/illes had been 
very pessimistic about obtaining the zamindars1 consent to 
Holland’s figures, when some of the more prosperous ones 
assembled in a delayed punya tuwards the end of August 1788 
they were as a whole not averse to agreeing to the medium 
between Holland’s moderate and Gayaram Llitra's heavier bandobast.^ 
The settlement for 1778-9 finally stood, after Y/illes 
had dealt with the intricacies of the resumed service lands, at 
8,49,764 kahons. The collector explained that short-falls 
should be expected, especially from some of the parganas where 
he had had to employ sazawals. Though these were generally 
the areas that had suffered most from the capriciousness of 
the monsoon, he explained, he had purposely fixed their revenues
1. Y/illes - Board, 12 June 1788, SDR iii, 45.
2. v/illes - Registrar, sadr diwani adalat, Pt. Y/illiam,
18 June 1788, SDR iii.
3. Willes - BOR, 12 May 1788, Proc. 31 May 1788, BOR R70, xli, np.
4. 7/illes - BOR, 5 Sept. 1788, Appendix, BOR R71, ii, np.
5. Y/illes - BOR, 31 Oct. 1788, SgR iii, 84.
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somewhat high, "lest a knowledge of my opinion of their distress 
should have afforded encouragement to the zemindars and segawuls 
^sazawals^ to unite in keeping hack under false prentences ... 
the revenues really produced from the lands." In all, he 
anticipated a balance for the year of 30,000 kahons or less 
than four per cent of the jama.'*'
The daily routine of the collections soon ceased
to occupy the forefront of Y/illes* attention, for in December
1788, after a good araan harvest, he commenced a revenue survey
of Sylhet district. The last such measurement had taken
place in 1764 and though, unfortunately, no records of that
survey survive, it is known that only lands then actually
under cultivation had been measured, and that they had been
registered according to parganas and in the names of the zamindars 
2
in general. Since the holdings of the coparceners had not 
been individually specified, the records of the 1764 measure­
ment were useless for resolving property disputes in the 
courts. Lindsay, who had complained persistently about the 
effect of property litigation on the revenues, had raised the 
idea of a survey in Sylhet under British direction, but rather 
obliquely and only in one of his .'last letters from Sylhet, 
written in November 1787. After a brief, general description 
of Mughal revenue management in Sylhet, he had advised the 
Revenue Board:
The constant disputes which subsist between the
1. Y/illes - BOR, 5 Sept. 1788, SDR iii, 71-2.
2. Lindsay - DPOR, 1 Feb. 1780, BR Cons R50, xxiv, 147-8.
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landholders of every denomination, and the 
boundaries of each individual being in a 
great measure undetermined, will always be
a bar to the general improvement of the ,
country by the extension of cultivation, 
until the evil is remedied by a general 
Hustabood, which I am convinced would not 
be objected to either by the zemindars or 
other landholders.
Technically, the term hastobud referred to the determining
of the total rent-roll of a fiscal division with reference
to past accounts and present assets; it was a more or less
summary method of assessment in which the assessor inspected
the village and, viewing good and poor lands together, made
an estimate of the total produce, on which basis he fixed the 
2
revenue. Evidently, what Lindsay had in mind and what his 
superiors understood him to mean, was something more like 
zabt - another Mughal method of assessment which involved 
land measurement and the determination of the revenue on the 
basis of crop rates. Nevertheless, the survey of Sylhet 
was generally spoken of as a hastobud.
At the start of the following revenue year, that 
is, in April 1788, the Revenue Board asked Y/illes to ascertain 
if a hastobud as conceived by his predecessor was indeed 
possible with the facility which Lindsay had anticipated, 
to estimate the probable- cost of such a venture, and to say 
"whether it would answer the principal end he ^Lindsay7 proposes 
by it - of terminating the disputes between the landholders of 
every denomination, which he states now to subsist to the 
prejudice of the improvement of the country."^ land surveys
1. Lindsay - BOR, 24 Nov. 1787, SLR ii, 198.
2. Habib, 198.
3. Ibid., 200-1.
4 . Proc. 15 Apr. 1788, BOR R70, xl, np.
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had often been considered by local officials as a prime 
requisite of sound management; they had been strongly 
recommended, for example, by successive collectors of 
Chittagong. In Sylhet, even the unsuccessful wadahdar,
G-ayaram Mitra, had become convinced after only a brief 
acquaintance with the district, of the desirability of 
measuring the lands. It was not surprising, therefore, that 
when Willes replied to the Revenue Board’s query on 5 
September 1788, he should have said that a hastobud was a 
most advisable measure and added that it was the "only one 
that promises'to terminate the numberless disputes respecting 
property!/" He was prepared to begin the task in December 
when the land was "free from water." Like Lindsay, he felt 
that the zamindars would not object, but he foresaw some 
amount of opposition from the qanungos and "the principal 
Mussalman inhabitants of Sylhet, who have enjoyed great 
profits by the depression of the zemindars." As to cost, 
Y/illes estimated an expenditure of 30,000 to 40,000 kahons; 
but this, he assured his superiors, "would be amply repaid 
by the advantages likely ... to accrue to Government."'1'
At the same time Y/illes suggested an overall re­
arrangement and streamlining of the parganas. Their haphazard 
dispersal, no less than their obscure boundaries, created 
confusion and difficulties for the collector and his staff. 
Y/illes had first mentioned this problem in July 1788 when 
he drew attention to Aurangpur pargana, which, though only
1. YTilles - BOR, 5 Sept. 1788, SDR iii, 73*
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half a day's journey from his headquarters and in the heart
of Sylhet district, was under the jurisdiction of Dacca where
its revenues were paid.^ In September Yfilles showed that
the problem was even more widespread than he had at first
indicated when he pointed out: " ... a custom which has much
prevailed in the district ... ^Is that7 lands lying in one
pergunnah are separated from it as to their jumma which are
annexed and paid in another." Dor example, revealed Y/illes,
Gaurhari Singh's pargana of Chaitannagar was comprised of
lands lying within eight or ten different parganas; the same
was true also of pargana Kursha, while others displayed a
similar if less complicated make-up. Added to this'*. some
parganas had shown a tendency to grow by division in the course
of time: Kusiarkul had been split into two parganas; so too
had Ita. "It is needless to point out to you" declared Y/illes
to the Revenue Board, "the evils springing from these two
practices. To me they appear as sources of our constant
2
dispute and dams against every investigation."
On 17 October the Revenue Board recommended the 
hastobud to the Gcv emor-general-in-Council who ordered on 
10 November that it should be undertaken without delay. The 
field work was begun at the start of December 1788; all 
judicial business in the diwani adalat was then suspended 
since while the hastobud was in progress the presence of the 
contending parties was more urgently required in the mofussil 
than at Sylhet town. By early March 1789, 60,000 kulbas
1. Y/illes - BOR, 1 July 1788, SDR iii, 53.
2. Willes - BOR, 5 Sept. 1788, SDR iii, 73.
3. Y/illes - Registrar, Sadr Diwani Adalat, 25 Dec. 1788,
SDR iii, 90.
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(about 375 square miles) of cultivated land had already been
measured.'*' Towards the end of April, however, the survey
2was interrupted by the onset of heavy rains.
Stoppages had also arisen in certain areas owing
to the territorial interlocking of the Dacca and Sylhet
collectorships, a relic of the days when these two districts
formed one administrative unit. Y/illes had pointed out
towards the end of December 1788 that since Aurangpur pargana
was outside his jurisdiction, "no exact or regular measurement
can be made or jumma fixed in the ten pergunnahs adjoining
thereto." This problem, he had said, would arise in other
areas too, such as pargana Satgaon which was "part ... under
■5
the authority of Dacca and part uhder S y l h e t . H e  had 
recommended certain parganas to be annexed to the Sylhet 
eollectorship and others to be transferred to Dacca, "so 
that all intermixture of the Company's lands is as much as 
possible corrected." To strengthen his case, Y/illes had 
made the point that not only was the hastobud impeded, but 
that difficulties also arose in routine administration. He 
had enclosed petitions from the zamindars and ryots of 
parganas adjacent to Aurangpur, attesting to raids committed 
on their lands by the zamindars of Aurangpur, and he had 
added;
The confusion arising from this intermixture of lands 
under different authorities is inconceivable and 
falls peculiarly hard on the zemindars under Sylhet, 
to whom I can afford no redress, and by the expence
1. 7/illes - BOR, 2 Mar. 1789, SDR iii, 129.
2. Y7illes - BOR, 1 May 1789, SDR iii, 132.
3. Y/illes - Board, 27 Dec. 1788, SDR iii, 9 1 .
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/sic/ /of applying to Dacca/ it is impossible 
that any adqquate redress can be obtained.
Persons remotely situated /that is, officials 
in Dacca/ are precluded from judging decisively, 
whilst counterpleas can easily be brought forward 
to confound them. This confusion further 
occasions a necessity of constantly stationing 
seapoys to protest /protect?/ our own ... ryjtts 
and prevent forcible seizure /of the crops/.
But the Calcutta authorities had not been impressed by Y/illes1
arguments. They were reluctant to do anything that would
evoke opposition among the landholders in the mofussil. They
had information that the zamindars of Aurangpur desired no
change in their position, and they no doubt believed that
to be true of the other landholders who would be affected
if Y/illes1 suggestions were implemented. Hence, they put
off any decision* But on 1 May 1789 Y/illes raised the
subject again; he claimed that very little progress had
been made in the survey of areas adjacent to Aurangpur and
other Dacca parganas, and wrote;
allow me to repeat my application for a speedy 
determination on the subject of the exchange of 
pergunnahs which I proposed. Before I took the 
liberty of making this proposal to your Board,
I was convinced of the propriety of the measure 
against which I believe no reasonable objection 
can be made. The principal zemindars who benefit 
by the present confusion, to the injustice of the 
ryotts of Sylhet, will undoubtedly petition against 
it, and endeavour by false statements to suspend 
your judgement till the season shall be so far 
advanced so as to preclude your adopting any pla^, 
even should it entirely meet with your approval.
This time 7/illes won over the Revenue Board and on 8 June
1789 they consented to the exchange of parganas which he had
proposed.
1. Y/illes - Board, 27 Dec. 1788, SDR iii, 91.
2. Y/illes - BOR, 1 May 1789, SDR iii, 132.
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Meanwhile the weather had cleared and work had re­
commenced. Good progress had heen made allowing Y/illes on 
1 June 1789 to reconvene the courts of law. By the end of 
June he could claim that the measurements were "nearly com­
pleted."^ This was a too favourable assessment of his work, 
however, and it was not until two months later, on 1 September
1789, that he repented; "I have as far as possible completed
2
the several measurements of the district." The major out­
standing task was now to examine the returns and impose an 
assessment on the lands; this, Y/illes anticipated, would 
take about five months. In fact owing to the necessity of 
checking and re-checking the records the task occupied a 
further two years.
The rapid pace at which the actual measurement of 
the lands was executed - in under one year - was remarkable, 
considering the various obstacles encountered in the course 
of the survey. Apart from problems inherent in the environment 
- the unpredictable weather and the swamps and marshes of 
western Sylhet in particular, which rendered some areas well- 
nigh inaccessible - Y/illes had to work under stringent 
financial limitations. No separate expenditure had been 
authorised for the hastobud, and whenever the collector needed 
money on this account he had to apply to the Board, giving 
the fullest details on every occasion. This constant application
1. Y/illes - Sub-sec., Board, 30 June 1789, SDR iii, 149.
2. Y/illes - BOR, 1 Sept. 1789, SDR iii, 159.
3. It inspired the comment that Sylhet was "measured up 
in a^very perfunctory way" (Imperial Gazetter of India 
xxiii, 199.) This was repeated Without question in 
the district gazetter.
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for funds, lie complained in September 1789, was a great
impediment and resulted in unnecessary delays.^ The. tight
grip kept by the Board on the purse-strings also affected
the composition of the staff with which lilies had to work.
For handling the paper-work, he would haYe preferred the
r
assistance of cleks specially deputed from the head qanungofs*
office in Calcutta, but that was ruled out by the Board on
2financial grounds. \7illes distrusted the local clerks he 
had ultimately to employ, viewing them, with good reason, as 
the creatures of the Sylhet q.anungos. This partly explains 
why he was to spend so much time in examining the returns 
from the field.
Willes 1 superiors expected him to hold expenses 
down to a minimum. He managed to keep the hastobud charges 
around 4,500 kahons per month, in his view an extremely 
moderate amount. It was perhaps too moderate, for from 
this sum were paid, in addition to other contingent charges, 
the wages of ten clerks employed in the district office and 
those of the field staff - thirty-six daroghas with their 
assistants and forty peons. There were also in the field 
a number of record-keepers and labourers acting under the 
instructions of the daroghas. These lesser functionaries, 
however, were paid for by the zamindars as was the local 
custom. They received two kahons one pun for every ten 
kulbas (about 39 acres) of land measured.^- Assuming that
1. Willes - BOR, 1 Sept. 1789, SDR iii, 159.
2. Willes - BOR, 5 Sept. 1788, SDR iii, 73 and BOR - Willes,
21 Nov. 1788, SDR iv, 40.
3. Willes - BOR, 2 Mar. 1789, Proc. 23 Mar. 1789, BOR R71, 
vi, np.
4. ibid.
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the clerks and the daroghas received equal pay they could
not each have obtained more than fifteen rupees per month.
Nor could the daroghas and their assistants in the field
claim their maintainence from the landholders, for Willes
had abolished this perquisite which he had thought ‘’likely
to prove a very heavy burden to which it was impossible to
offer any limitation or c h e c k . A n  ordinary clerk in the
Sylhet district office was paid ten rupees per month. Thus,
the remuneration accorded to the hastobud clerks and daroghas
was not really commensurate with the important venture in
which they were engaged. Allegations were later made that
these officers accepted bribes from some landholders to under
record their arable land. Though these charges were never
proven, bribes v;ere almost certainly offered, the temptation
to accept must have always been present, and doubtless some
succumbed to it. Y/illes certainly did not rule out the
possibility that “Injustice may ... have arisen sometimes
from the corruption of the native officers, as well as from 
2
other causes.” This also helps to account for his pains­
taking scrutiny of the records.
Y/illes had anticipated a great deal of opposition 
to the survey from the Sylhet qanungos - there were six of 
them^- and from the chief Muslim proprietors of the district. 
This latter group were for the most part descended from the 
favoured clansmen and servants of the former Mughal faujdars
1. Y/illes - BOR, 2 Mar. 1789, Proc. 23 Mar. 1789, BOR R71,vi,np.
2. Willes - BOR, 24 Oct. 1790, Proc. 26 Oct. 1790, BOR R71,xxx,np.
3. Qanungos with their rusum in brackets, to the nearest kahon:
Sham Roy (1,110), Radha Krishen Roy (756), Shrinath Roy (556), 
Musood Bakht (2,913), Ram Kanta Roy (423), Jewan ICrishen Roy 
(539). Apart from this they held an unspecified amount of 
land. Appendix for 1788, JjOg R71, ii, np.
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of Sylhet. It was commonly believed that they, like the 
qanungos, held more assets in land than they were entitled 
to possess. Doubtless, they were alarmed at the prospect 
of a survey, especially as in conjunction with the hastobud 
Y/illes had set up an office to investigate the credentials 
of holders of rent-free land. Hore than once during the 
survey T/illes charged these two groups with obstructing his 
work. However, these allegations were always couched in 
general terms, as for example, when he declared on 2 Ivlarch 
1789: “Should I, with every exertion, complete the business
before the commencement of the rains, I shall esteem it very 
fortunate, as the canongoes and principal Mussleman landholders 
are combined to retard its operation.”^  Thus, what forms the 
resistance took are not known and its effectiveness cannot 
accurately be gauged. Among the zamindars, too, there were 
some who were less than co-operative; this was only to be 
expected as there were among their ranks persons who held 
more land than that which they had declared for official 
purposes. But the only specific complaints here were made 
against the zamindars of Aurangpur and other Dacca parganas, 
and those of the remote pargana of Ram Singh.
Willes had instructed the hastobud daroghas strictly 
to adhere to the relevant patwari and qanungo’s papers in the 
measurement of lands adjoining the Dacca parganas and nall 
other places where there might be disputes.” The zamindars 
of the Dacca parganas v/ere not willing to see these instructions 
implemented, for they had forcibly acquired some of their
1. Y/illes - BOR, 2 Mar. 1789, SDR iii, 129.
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neighbours ’ property and would ”do everything in their power 
to prevent a restitution or discussion respecting it.”'*" In 
the case of Aurangpur, as Willes reported on 12 February 1789, 
had not the darogha Sadiq Beg, ’’with great propriety, tho* 
confident of the justice of his measures, given up the point, 
and left the measurement of the pergunnahs incomplete, affrays 
would have ensued between the Company’s ryotts.” The collector 
submitted to the Revenue Board the testimony of Sadiq Beg, who 
wrote that when he entered Aurangpur pargana, accompanied by 
his staff of one sepoy, two clerks, and several other function­
aries, and followed by the landholders and patwaris of a 
neighbouring pargana,
The chowdries of Aurungpore were assembled on the 
grounds with about two hundred men carrying bamboos, 
prepared to fight, quarrel, and create disturbance 
should I proceed to measuring. I, therefore, sent 
a person to call them, but they would not come, 
returning me the information that ... if I attempted 
&  0_ measure/ those /lands/ they had possessed, blood 
would be spilt.,..I have not thought it right ... 
to bring on a quarrel with them, and have, therefore, 
not measured the lands but have left the place....
The evil disposition of the people of Aurungpore is 
known to the whole world, and, agreeably to the 2 
directions I have received, I am going to Sategang.
Blood was actually spilt in Ram Singh pargana 
where occurred the only recorded instance of violence. This 
resulted in the death In early August 1789 of one of the 
hastobud daroghas. According to Willes there was clear 
evidence that the murder was committed at the instigation 
of the Ram Singh zamindars and he had them arrested and sent 
to the criminal court at Dacca for trial. Nevertheless, it
1. Y/illes - BOR, 12 Feb. 1789, SDR iii, 122.
2. Encl. in Willes - BOR, 12 Feb. 1789, SDR iii, 123.
3. Y/illes - BOR, 11 Aug. 1789, SDR iii, 156.
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appears that Willes got off more lightly than he had expected. 
The very speed of the survey was partly responsible for this, 
for zamindars whose lands had already been measured lost all 
incentive or inclination to combine with others, who were still 
awaiting the arrival of the daroghas, to'forestall the hastobud.
Evidently, too, the capabilities of the landholders 
to resist officialdom had been sadly impaired by their recent 
experience of flood and then drought. The effects of the 
flood in particularv had not yet worn off; this is quite 
clear from the reasons - flood and Khasi incursions - which 
Y/illes gave in April 1789 for a balance of 74,257 kahons or 
about nine per cent of the demand for 1788-9. When the Board 
replied on 25 May 1789 that they had had no knowledge of floods 
in Sylhet during 1788-9 and had already given ample relief 
for the destruction caused by the floods of the previous year,.^  
Y/illes rejoined:
in a country where the inhabitants are so 
very poor, it naturally follows that the calamities 
of one year should have an effect on many sub­
sequent, and that the assistance of Government 
must be peculiarly requisite to enable the ryot 
to recommence his labours... .the inundation and 
famine which affected our eastern provinces in 
1194 /I787-87 are not merely temporary evils.
The assistance of government may alleviate the 
misfortunes of the remaining inhabitants, but 
the loss of the numbers who died at that un­
fortunate period, by ... reducing the means of 
cultivation, will long be severely felt.
More positively, some landholders, though they were by no means
over-enthusiastic, nevertheless welcomed the idea of a hastobud.
Y/illes had gone to great lengths to make public that the measure
1. BOR - Y/illes, 25 May 1789, SDR iv, 69.
2. Y/illes - BOR, 23 June 1789, Proc. 14 Sept. 1789, BOR 
R71, xiv, np.
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merits were intended to settle boundaries and thus to encourage 
the spread of agriculture into waste and jungle land, and were 
not for the purpose of imposing an increased assessment. Y/hether 
this was generally believed or not is not known, but vdLth talk 
of a permanent settlement in the air there were landholders who 
felt that it would suit every good purpose if their shares were 
properly demarcated and the existing ambiguous boundaries clearly 
defined.
A word must be said about the field-work itself.
Far from proceeding with indecent haste, Y/illes appeared to 
have had a well-thought out set of arrangements, Unfortunately, 
he himself was very taciturn on this point and our information 
is therefore based on later reports and especially on the 
correspondence between the deputy surveyor-general and lieutenant 
(as he then was) Thomas Fisher, who in 1823 and again in 1826-7 
surveyed parts of Sylhet. The measuring base used in Sylhet 
was the dastidari hath - literally, the official hand. This 
was a rod 21 f- inches long, made of brass and lodged in the 
collector’s office.^ The nul or rod used by the darogha in
the field was, in theory, 12-J- haths or approximately 22-^- feet; 
however, the length of the darogha's rod was usually calculated 
on the basis of the darogha’s own ’hand’, or rather forearm, 
measured from the elbow to the tip of the middle finger. Other 
measures in use were the following:
1 square nul .....  1 Jet (approx. 37 sq. yds.)
7 Jet   1 Pao (approx. 399 sq. yds.)
4 Pao   1 Kiar (approx. 1,598 sq. yds.)
12 Kiar ..... 1 Kulba (approx. 19,184 sq. yds.)
The daroghas divided the ground into "a commodious number” of 
squares, rectangles and other regular-lined figures, measured
1. Fisher’s Report, quoted in Shawy Smart, 18.
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the sides and calculated the area. The procedure was in 
theory purely geometrical and rigidly exact, hut in practice 
decidedly less so,^ whether from corruption, carelessness, 
lack of training of the officials employed, or the relative 
unsophistication of the instruments used.
Each daroghars daily work was separately recorded,
and each day the field notes were transmitted to Sylhet town
by a relay of sepoys. Some idea of the work involved might
2
be obtained by looking at these notes, which were compiled 
in three separate statements - chitta, goshwara, tiri,j.
The chitta showed the number of shares in each taluk, the 
length, breadth and area of each share, and the type of 
land (that is, whether revenue-paying or revenue-free); 
in some cases the name of the share's occupant was entered.
The goshwara (an abstract compiled from, the chittas) was 
written on the back of the chitta and recorded the following 
information: the date and the pargana in which the measurements
were taken, the names of the darogha and his assistant, and 
the area measured, divided into revenue-paying or revenue-free 
land. The tirij (an abstract based on other detailed 
accounts) was a table arranged by estates of all the land 
measured on a particular day. It was headed by the date, 
pargana, class of mahal (revenue-paying or not) and the 
name of the darogha and his assistant. The table itself 
was in nine columns, as follows:
1. Fisher*s Report, quoted in Shaw and Smart, 19.
2. The information concerning these notes is based on a 
report of the Deputy Commissioner of Sylhet, 12 Aug.
1879 (quoted in Shaw and Smart, 10-12). Government
was then considering whether the hastobud records should 
be destroyed; they were by this time worm-eaten and 
almost undecipherable, and had already been superseeded 
by the revenue survey of 1859-65. The hastobud records 
o^ not survive.
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column 1 name of taluk
column 2 total area
column 3 area of ekfasli (land cropped once a year)
column 4 area of do fasii (land cropped twice a year)
column 5 charabhit
column 6 chara (in Bengal generally, pasturage; in
Sylhet, land on which plants are reared for 
transplanting)
column 7 bhit (homestead or house-site)
column 8 jungle and waste land
column 9 talab or revenue demand
From these records it is quite clear that the officers
in the field were involved in delineating the separate shares in
each taluk and thus in deciding on the owner (at least, for the
purposes of the record) of each share. This was a complicated
process and obviously justice was not always done. However,
since a great many coparceners were on a more or less equal
footing, glaring instances of injustice were generally absent.
One of the most intricate cases regarding ownership concerned
the neighbouring raja of Cachar. Apparently, he had made a
grant of devottar lands in a pargana in Cachar bordering on
Sylhet to one Gokul Das; in turn, the grantee had farmed the
lands to a Sylhetti called IJalik Chand Dutt who had then
proceeded steadily to encroach on other parts of the pargana.
Because of this the raja had stepped in to dispossess Malik
Chand Dutt, but had later reinstated him with a written lease,
for two maunds of abir (a red powder) in annual revenue. For
four years I.lalik Chand Dutt discharged this revenue, but during
the hastobud he declared 76 kulbas of land, about 300 acres,
held by him from the Cachar raja as Sylhet territory. Presumably,
he thought it was more advantageous to place himself under the
authority of the collector in distant Sylhet town than to be
362.
subject to the nearer jurisdiction of the Cachar raja, from
whom he held merely a lease, and that terminable at. the raja*s
will. The raja sent a vakil to Y/illes to complain about the
alienation of his territory and Villes despatched an amin to
investigate, but no decision was reached. The dispute was
still going on as late as 1807.^
The hastobud officers also had to classify lands
into revenue-paying and revenue-free areas.. This was only
slightly less complicated than the problem of settling ownership
rights. The landholders could make claims to rent-free land
to the daroghas in the mofussil, but these pretensions had to
be authenticated at the district office, where sanads had to
be produced in order that they might be examined and recorded.
This effectively reduced the scope open to the daroghas in the
field to collude with the landholders to transform revenue-
paying land into revenue-free grants, but did not deal with
collusion in the kachari itself between landholders and clerks.
Y.rilles quite correctly forecast that the holders of revenue-
free land would be averse to having their sanads investigated
and registered, but the alternative facing the grantees - of
having their lands assessed for revenue - was hardly appealing.
By 9 February 1789, less than three months after the commence-
2
ment of the hastobud, 5,500 sanads had already been produced.
It was difficult to decide which of these were legitimate 
claims, and which fraudulent; it was also difficult to
1. Petition of the vakil of the Cachar Raja, 28 Sept. 1807,
Proc. 13 Nov. 1807, BOR R76, x, np.
2. Y/illes - BOR, 9 Feb. 1789, Proc. 27 Feb. 1789, BOg R71,
v, np.
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determine the boundaries of grants, as in the sanads the lands
had been described in only the vaguest terms. Usually, all
that was stated was the total area of the grant. Confounding
the confusion was the large number of people who held grants -
usually of a religious nature - but who could not substantiate
their claims with sanads; these had either been lost or had
never been issued in the first place. The grants had been
sanctioned by long prescription, however, and had never been
questioned as the landholders generally felt it disgraceful
to withold an allowance once settled on the religious or poor.^
There were also a number of recalcitrant grantees, v/ho, \7illes
ing
reported on 9 February 1789, notwithstand/the repeated notice
given,"have not produced their sunnuds, or appeared, either
in person or by vakeel, to state their claims.1’ Two days
earlier he had publicly announced for the sixth time
’’that all persons who should not within a limited period
produce their sunnuds to be registered and examined, their
lands would be resumed for the benefit of the Hon’ble Company.”
He now sought permission to limit the time for the presentation
of claims to the end of February, since otherwise there would
2
be ”no chance of a termination of business.” This proposal 
was agreed to only on 23 March 1789, after the revenue authorities 
had consulted with the supreme Board, but Y/illes did not really 
begin resumption proceedings until he came to settle the 
district on the basis of the hastobud records. Even then, 
he was not to be strictly legalistic in his approach but was
1. Y/illes - BOR, 20 Apr. 1792, Proc. 16 May 1792, BOR R72, 
i, np.
2. Y/illes - BOR, 9 Feb. 1789, Proc. 27 Feb. 1789, BOR R71, 
v, np.
to take into account customary allowances which could not be 
backed by written titles.
The second part of the hastobud was the assessment
of the lands on the basis of the records sent from the field.
Y/illes began this task in September 1789 and declared then
that the work was very voluminous, that ’much time will be
required”, and that he could not hope to complete it before
the end of December. In the meantime, ”to secure the Company
from any loss”, he was receiving from the parganas payments
which were later to be adjusted when the hastobud was finalised
The landholders had not overtly objected to this arrangement;
some amount of confidence had been restored to them by a
favourable aus harvest. Thus whereas remittances to the
district treasury for August 1788 had totalled only 55,779
kahons, the landholders were able in August 1789 to push that
2
figure up to 1,07,533 kahons. The interim payments were 
based on the stand-by settlement Y/illes had made in July 1789 
for 1789-90, in conformity with the Revenue Board’s orders of 
15 June 1789. There was nothing new or startling in these 
orders. Y/illes had been advised to settle with all landholder 
and renters in good standing, as well as with those who owed 
small arrears and were able to deliver reasonable assurances 
of discharging their outstanding balances. The demand was 
to be the same as in the previous year, with an increase in 
those areas where the hastobud was already completed, and in
1. Y/illes - BOR, 1 Sept. 1789, SDR iii, 160.
2. Ibid.
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those wbere the remissions "bestowed in the last two disastrous
years could now "be resumed, in a manner consistent with the
Hcase of the ryots, and the future prosperity1* ofhthe district.
In finalising the hastohud itself Y/illes was given
a great amount of leeway. ho general guidelines were formulated
for his benefit, and he was allowed to fix the assessment, as
he had intended, solely on the abadi or cultivated lands.^
His rates, however, do not survive since for some inexplicable
reason he himself destroyed the original papers of his settle- 
2
ment. Y/henever Calcutta intervened, it was usually to malce
certain that the rights neither of the Company nor of the
landholders were being prejudiced. The Company was determined
to concede no claims of its own while at the same time
energetically to cultivate the zamindars’ goodwill. Thus,
when Y/illes proposed in September 1789 that the Company should
publicly declare that at no time would an assessment be imposed
on homestead sites, Calcutta was unwilling formally to renounce
all claims in that respect. Y/illes also suggested that the
waste lands should
be considered as absolutely the property of the 
Company, and that government will either grant 
themselves, or allow their collector to grant, 
sunnuds to whoever may offer to bring any part 
of it into cultivation, first giving to the 
landholders of the pergunnahs in which the junglah
1. Y/illes - BOR, 1 Sept. 1789, SDR iii, 16Q.
2. Allen in the district gazetter of Sylhet asserts without
giving any evidence that Y/illes "was fully conscious of 
the imperfections of his work, and for fear lest it might 
give rise to permanent and serious inconvenience, he 
caused most of the original documents to be destroyed.11215. 
This overlooks the collector’s lengthy and painstaking
attempts to minimise the chances of error.
5. BOR - Y/illes, 8 liar. 1790, Proc. 8 Liar. 1790, BCR R71,
xxii, np.
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^Jangli or vfaste and woody7 lies "the refusal 
of ’g'a'cH sunnuds - every such sunnud to express 
the number of kulbahs granted and the term of^ 
years for which they are to remain rent-free.
But before they would consent to this proposal the Revenue
Board wanted to know what the zamindars of Sylhet thought of
it, and in particular whether they would agree that the rights
2
to waste lay with the government. Y/illes in his reply on 
23 November 1789 side-stepped this issue by stating that 
under the Mughals, "the junglah lands were considered as the 
property of Government," and that the several faujdars 
"constantly exercised a power of granting ahbadee /^abadi7 
sunnuds, to their dependents 0r others." All the same, "to 
obviate any appearance of injustice" to the landholders, he 
had recommended that the sanads should first be offered to 
them. But, he added, the Sylhet zamindars were "generally 
so poor and so incumbered by a train of idle partners, that, 
if inclined, such exertions as are required to bring jungle 
land into cultivation could hardly originate with them." His 
main reason for proposing that the waste areas be regarded as 
government land was that "men of property and abilities might, 
relying on the faith of government, ^hereby/ be induced to 
attempt at their own expence, clearing and bringing into 
cultivation such parts of the country as at present solely 
afford an harbour for wild beasts." This, however, was not
1. Y/illes - BOR, 1 Sept. 1789, SDR iii, 160.
2. BOR - Willes, 5 Oct. 1789, SDR iv, 91.
3. Willes - BOR, 23 Nov. 1789, SDR iii, 183.
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good enough, for the Revenue Board and after further deliberation,
they replied to Willes on 8 March 1790:
We cannot agree to your proposition for rendering 
these lands the absolute property of Government or 
subscribe to any mode of bringing them into 
cultivation which might be,deemed repugnant to 
the rights of landholders.
The Revenue Boardrs solicitious regard for the rights of the
zamindars was to hinder, as Willes had feared, the reclamation
of v/aste lands. At the turn of the centruy a later collector
of Sylhet, on examining his records, v/ould be surprised at the
small number of sanads for waste which had been delivered by
his predecessors.
In other respects than those which have been noted,
Calcutta, preoccupied with the wider-ranging reforms of
Cornwallis, seemed to Willes unduly unenthusiastic about what
he was doing. Thus, when on 1 August 1789 Willes applied for
a further advance of 10,000 kahons to enable him to meet the
2
current expenses of the ha3tobud, the Revenue Board seemed to 
have second thoughts about the whole project; though approving 
the advance, they inquired whether the collector had "been able 
to form any opinion of the advantage that will result to 
Government" from the hastobud. . XIilles was dismayed by this; 
as far as he v/as concerned, the Revenue Board's query had been 
answered more than a year ago, when the decision to go ahead 
with the hastobud had been taken. Nevertheless, on 1 September 
1789 he listed for the benefit of his superiors the following
■1. BOR - Willes, 8 Mar. 1790, Proc. 8 Mar. 1790, BOR R71,
xxii, np. Best expressed in their President1 s' (John
Shore's) minute of 18 June 1789, quoted Mahmood, 282.
2. Willes - BOR, 1 Aug. 1789, SRR iii, 155.
3. BGR - Willes, 18 Aug. 1789, SDR iv, 85.
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advantages which he expected to flow from the hastobud:
ho revenue will be demanded from the natives which 
the apparent condition of their land does not justify. 
Government will know what they possess and by the 
knowledge, provided they do not exact too large a 
share of revenue, will have a right to insist on a 
punctual performance of their agreements. All 
other modes of settlement appear more uncertain and 
unsatisfactory. ... Though a hustabood be made 
with the greatest attention, there still remain 
many advantages to the landholders unknown to 
government. If, therefore, government affix a 
moderate revenue solely on the cultivated kulbahs 
agreeably to the returns given in by the hustabood 
darogahs, it is probable that the landholders will 
be able to make good their agreements and will not 
be overburdened .... By the hustabood the constant 
litigations in this district will be much less 
frequent, as property will be more easily ascertained, 
and respecting the direct advantage to the Company,
I imagine, it will be considerable - nearly a lac 
/lakh/ of cawns /kahons/....
But this generated no enthusiasm in Calcutta. Now
even more depressed, \7illes continued to work doggedly at his
task, complaining on 23 November 1789 that r,the various
minutiae of the hustabood papers to be attended to and completed
require much labour and prevent a speedy conclusion.” He hoped,
though, to have settled the parganas by the first week of 
2
December; the resumed service lands which for revenue purposes 
had continued to remain separate from the parganas, would be 
dealt with later.
Also contributing to Valles’ depression were the 
stratagems that Gaurhari Singh, former sarishtadar of Sylhet, 
and his nephew Premnarain Bose, the erstwhile peshkar of the 
district, had begun to employ. Gaurhari Singh had gone to 
Calcutta from Burdwan and coinciding with his arrival there,
1. Villes - BOR, 1 Sept. 1789, SDR iii, 159-60.
2. Y/illes - BOR, 23 Nov. 1789, SDR iii,' 183.
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complaints of high-handed dealings on Yfilles1 part had begun 
to filter through to the Board. Gaurhari Singh was particularly 
upset at the collector's re-annexation of the parcels of land, 
comprising his zamindari of Chaitannagar, to the parganas from 
which they had been separated. Willes had first cleared his 
proposal with the Revenue Board before dealing with Chaitannagar, 
and had been advised on 15 October 1789 to attach the lands to 
their respective parganas and to refer the claimants to the 
lands to the diwani adalat.^ When Willes attempted to re- _ 
annex the lands, Premnarain Bose, who was managing Gaurhari*s 
business in Sylhet, directed his agents in the mofussil to 
withdraw, taking their papers with them. This was done 
contrary to the collector’s written instructions that Premnarain’s 
agents should "regularly attend" on the person whom he had 
sent to record the daily receipts from the Chaitannagar lands,
and appeared to Willes "a subterfuge to occasion delay, and if
2
possible avert an investigation." Meanwhile the claimants 
to the Chaitannagar lands had taken their case to the diwani 
adalat and the whole business was showing signs of becoming 
extremely troublesome. Willes expected that Gaurhari Singh 
and Premnarain Bose would exert every chicanery "to secret 
the truth and elude justice," and that "Insinuations without
•5
number will be industriously circulated respecting" his conduct. 
Gaurhari Singh was already busy with the latter task in Calcutta, 
and in Sylhet, Premnarain Bose, who was himself well acquainted
1. BOR - Willes, 15 Oct. 1789, SDR iv, 94.
2. Willes - BOR, 23 Nov. 1789, SDR iii, 184.
3. Ibid.
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with the administrative system, appeared to he attempting to 
clog the wheels of the judicial machinery with excessive paper­
work. Already he had appealed against willes’ decision on a 
mortgage hond, ”tho’ throughout the whole proceedings the 
oppressive and illegal manner, hy which it has been obtained, 
is fully ^evident/,” As a result of this appeal alone, there 
were"upwards of 50 sheets of paper to be translated” and sent 
to the sadr diwani adalat. Vllles was certain that any other 
decision passed against Gaurhari Singh would similarly be 
appealed against. This, he said, ’will give me constant 
employ and entirely take off my attention to the Company’s 
revenue business.” To prevent him having to’heglect other 
more material parts” of his public duty, he requested the 
temporary assistance of a writer in translating of papers,"^  
but this favour was not granted..
Hence, it was not until the beginning of January
1790, almost a month later than he had at first anticipated,
that \7illes was able to settle the parganas and to send the
Revenue Board a tentative sketch of the jama. This put the
demand for 1789-90 at 10,61,644 kahons, an increase of 1,85,573
2
kahons or some twenty per cent upon the real jama for 1788-9. 
Willes quite frankly told the Revenue Board, "In making this 
settlement, I may have committed many mistakes.”  ^ ITo one 
in Calcutta could take exception to his list of the probable 
sources of such errors. The members of the Revenue Board
1. Y/illes - BOR, 23 Nov. 1789, SDR iii, 184.
2. Willes - BOR, 10 Jan. 1790, SDR iii, 204. (After the
jama of parganas separated from Sylhet and that of parganas
annexed to the district during 1788-9 are taken into account, 
the real demand for 1788-9 stood at 8,74,071 kahons.)
3. Ibid.
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themselves, said Willes, were well acquainted with the general 
want of integrity in Indian subordinates. Furthermore, it 
was only natural to expect that, since the settlement was 
based on returns from the field, it would be at fault where 
the darogha's notes did not correspond with reality. Deliberate 
falsification would have been difficult to detect by merely 
looking at the records; unless the entries were strikingly 
suspicious, they would have escaped attention among "the 
numberless minutiae in the Bengal mofussil papers." Willes 
was ready to concede that there might be instances, which he 
had not yet managed to unearth, of the concealment of cultivated 
land, resulting from collusion between his officers and the 
zamindars, or of the rating of waste as cultivated areas owing 
to "pique or some other motives". He considered the former 
case as "not so material, as the welfare of the chowdrie and 
ryot is ultimately and truly the advantage of Government."
Where the latter had happened, he felt that some allowance 
must ultimately be made, by a reduction in the assessment, 
since by "over-rating temporary profit is attained, at the 
expence of the country."*^  The only way in which over­
rating could possibly be discovered, save by another survey, 
was through on the spot personal inspection by the collector. 
Towards this end, Willes proposed to tour the district before 
the rains set in to "learn where the assessment bears too
p
hard"; on the basis of the information Acquired during 
his circuit, he would then be in a position to recommend
1. \7illes - BOR, 10 Jan. 1790, SDR iii, 204.
2. Ibid.
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certain adjustments in his tentative settlement. All the 
same, he expected the realisable demand to stand in excess 
of one lakh kahons above that of 1788-9; and he did not think 
that "the country in general will feel the increase, though 
the kanungoes and other principal persons about Sylhet are 
dissatisfied that the advantages they held concealed are 
brought to light.
Still not a word of approval or encouragement .was
forthcoming from Calcutta. Instead, as the days passed,
the central authorities seemed to Willes to be paying excessive
attention to the machinations of Gaurhari Singh, who in
January 1790 formally petitioned the Revenue Board over the
re-armexation of the Chaitannagar lands. Gaurhari gave
the impression that Willes was personally set on depriving
him of his property acquisitions in Sylhet. It was certainly
true that there was no love lost between Willes and the former
sarishtadar, but as the collector pointed out, it was not he
who had first raised questions about Gaurhari1s samindari
sanad. As he said, "The intricacy of a hustabood was
sufficient employment, and I did not consider that I had any
right to examine whether a sunnud, granted by the Govemor-
2
General, was properly obtained or not." The truth was that 
the hastobud had disclosed the extent of Gaurhari's holdings 
in Sylhet, and during the course of that operation people 
had come forward to complain about the way in which his
1. Willes - BOR, 10 Jan. 1790, SDR iii, 205.
2. Willes - BOR, 24 Feb. 1790, SDR iii, 217.
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properties had been acquired. Once Gaurhari*s underhand 
dealings had come to light, Willes pursued the complaints 
with some amount of righteous tenacity. But, as he pointed 
out, the hastobud "did not originate with me....Had I, in the 
smallest degree, consulted mine own ease in preference tt> my 
duty, I might have stated many a plausible objection." It 
was none other than Gaurhari *s former patron who had first 
suggested a hastobud and Willes who "thought from local 
circumstances ... such measures might be advisable ... /Ead7 
felt that it would be improper to argue to the contrary.
He had commenced "the disagreeable task" as soon as the 
weather permitted and in the execution of it had met great 
opposition, "independent of the litigiousness of every class 
of the inhabitants of Sylhet and the want of integrity of the 
native officers." He considered himself fortunate to have 
"effected the measure at a small expense to government, with 
a considerable increase of revenue." But he could not 
conceal his disappointment. He had fallen a victim to a 
system which still judged efficiency in terms of revenue 
collection figures. His district, though comparable in 
extent, could not hope to rival Rajshahi or Dacca for the 
attention of the Revenue Board. Thus, he disconsolately 
added:
Yet, Gentlemen, I shall even /ever?7conceive 
it peculiarly unlucky, that l”should have 
been so unremittingly employed for a year 
on an object of so little import to (Government
1. Willes - BOR, 24 Feb. 1790, SDR iii, 217.
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that any credit I might otherwise have attained 
is lost in its insignificancy.
Willes* disappointment, however, did not spring
from any illusions he might have had about the nature of the
public service. Ke knew full well that fulsome praise was
bestowed on the collector who could increase the level of
the collections, but to strive for attention and approval
in such a way he considered was both weak and dangerous.
As he remarked, "Governments in general, both in India and
England ... whilst in theory they repudiate an increase, are,
I am afraid, too prone to acquiesce in and sanction the
augmentation, and collectors, ever working for the approbation
of their superiors, may be inclined to stretch the abilities
of the landholders to the utmost, which ultimately must be
2
the ruin of the country." hilles, like some of his con­
temporaries, certainly realised that the British were in India 
for a long time to come. This feeling was perhaps not as 
yet very widespread, but it was becoming increasingly clear 
that new standards of administrative practice were required 
which could promote a wider sense of public duty. The old 
norms by which bureaucratic expertise and efficiency were 
judged were becoming more and more awkward and outmoded.
The oft-repeated phrase - the ease and welfare of the 
inhabitants and the best interests of the Company - stood 
in need of an interpretation more extensive and generous 
than that which had been attached to it by civilians of the 
previous decade; an interpretation, moreover, which would
1. hi lies - BOR, 24 Feb. 1790, SDK iii, 217.
2. Willes - BOR, 1 Sept. 1789, SDR iii, 159-60.
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take into account the demands of the future more and those 
of the immediate present less than hitherto. Already, a 
new phrase was intruding itself into government despatches 
- "the permanent security of the revenues" - hut official, 
practice v/as not yet in line with the new rhetoric. Y/illes, 
working in his remote corner of Bengal with little central 
guidance and less encouragement, and in the face of daunting 
obstacles, exemplified the new spirit and showed how it was 
possible for civilians to be motivated by new kinds of 
consideration. Even though his hastobud had resulted in 
an increase of about ten per cent in the jama, he was not 
willing to claim that as an achievement. In earlier years, 
to increase the revenue would have been the collector’s main 
aim. For Y/illes, the increase v/as purely fortuitous, a by­
product of the whole operation. His principal intention had 
been the more public-spirited one of removing the source of 
property litigation by defining the boundaries of holdings, 
and thus to encourage the expansion of cultivation into 
waste areas.^
Y/hen on 8 March 1790 the Revenue Board did comment 
on Y/illes* jama for 1789-90, it was simply to suspend any 
judgement until they had a chance themselves to examine the 
detailed papers of the settlement. Their caution v/as under­
standable, given the move towards a permanent settlement in 
Bengal, and the fact that Y/illes himself had mentioned the 
inevitability of mistakes arising in his work. But Y/illes
1. Y/illes - BOR, 20 Apr. 1793, Proc. 24 Dec. 1793, BQR
R72, xxiv, np.
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was as yet unable and unwilling to surrender his books for 
scrutiny: unable, because he had not yet completely drawn
up all the papers; and unwilling, because he felt that he 
could do still more than he had already done to eradicate 
errors in the settlement.
YYilles had in fact undertaken to multiply his paper­
work by embarking in January 1790 on the introduction of a 
new collecting agency in the district.*^  This experiment 
stemmed from his disenchantment with his attempt, following 
his dismissal of the wadahdars in 1788, to secure payment of 
the revenues direct from the zamindars - a plan inspired by 
the"idea that those persons, knowing the value of the lands, 
and having certain rights attached to their office, would 
probably see their ovm advantage in doing justice to those
placed under them, and at the sane time strictly adhering
2to their engagements with government." However, a short
experience demonstrated "the fallacy of these ideas and the
■3
impracticability of the s c h e m e . I t  was defeated primarily 
by the large number of petty zamindars in Sylhet, who were 
’generally inattentive in paying the revenue to the Company 
and solely intent on holding their own lands free by affixing 
an increased and exorbitant jumma on those of others." It 
v/as difficult and in some cases impossible for them to agree 
on a principal zamindar to represent an entire pargana, a 
function which had been performed at great expense by wadahdars.
1. Y/illes - BOR, 10 Jan. 1790, SDR iii, 206.
2. Y/illes - BOR, 24 Oct. 1790, Proc. 26 Oct. 1790, BOR
R71, xxx, np.
3 . Ibid.
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Y/illes therefore came to the conclusion that the public 
revenues might be more successfully secured by revenue 
officers appointed by himself than through zamindars. 
Accordingly in January 1790, he divided the district into 
seven zilas or divisions, each under a ziladar, and sent 
them out to enforce the collections.
This scheme worked well during the remaining
months of 1789-90 even though it was not then fully
operative. Remittances from the ryots which formerly
got no further than the wadahdars - ’’whose profit was a
clog on the country, as these they took first and only
what was further collected was paid to government”^  -
now found their way into the public coffers. The
weather was also kind to the new scheme, and the good aus
harvest of August 1789 v/as followed by more abundant aman
or winter and boro or spring crops than the district had
seen for a long time. It v/as not surprising, then, that
at the end of April 1790 the Sylhet collections stood at
9,48,716 kahons, much more than had ever been collected
in the district, even allowing for the territorial ad-
2justments which had taken place. Payments were still 
forthcoming from some areas, and Y/illes expected the final 
receipts for 1789-90 to stand at 10,16,652 kahons, only 
about 50,000 kahons less than his tentative figure of 
10,61,644 kahons.
1. Y/illes - BOR, 10 Jan. 1790, SBR iii, 206.
2. Y/illes - BOR, 29 May 1790, Proc. 30 July 1790, BOR
R71, xxvii, np.
3. Ibid.
On the premise that the lands were overrated 
where arrears had arisen, the returns for 1789-90 helped 
to unearth errors in the hastobud. Many mistakes had 
already come to the collector's notice during his travels 
through various parts of the district: for instance, he
came across villages which had been omitted altogether 
from the survey, and others which owing to rival claims 
had been measured and recorded in two different parganas.^" 
Row, further errors were disclosed. For example, the 
demand was not fully discharged in pargana Chhatak, where 
revenue-free land had been taxed; balances were outstanding 
from pargana Churkhair, because one piece of ground had 
been recorded in two villages and so taxed twice; in 
pargana Harinagar arrears arose since several acres of 
waste land had been classified as abadi by the darogha in 
the absence of the zamindar who was ill at the time of 
the measurement. In the new year 1790-1 Willes hoped to 
redistribute the demand to take account of these errors, 
reducing the imposition on those areas where he saw it bore 
too hard on the landholders and increasing it "where glaring 
falsifications have occasioned the jummah to be fixed too
p
low”. He was still unable, therefore, to send an abstract 
of the hastobud to Calcutta for "some time to come".
But his settlement had already been validated by returns 
that had never before been equalled in Sylhet. Moreover, 
time was at a premium; detailed instructions regarding the
1. Y/illes-BOR, 29 May 1790, Proc. $0 July 1790, BOR R71, 
xxvii, np •
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
ten year settlement of Bengal had already been circulated
to all collectors. The prevailing mood of impatience
v/as evident in these orders, as collectors had been
advised, v/here lands were in dispute or mortgaged or held
in joint ownership, to settle with the persons actually in
possession and to leave all claims to be adjusted at a
later date.'*' Hence, on 30 July 1790 the Revenue Board
were quite ready to recommend that Willes be authorized to
fix the decennial settlement of his district on the basis
2
of the hastobud papers which they had not yet seen. To 
this the Governor-General-in-Council readily consented on 
6 August 1790.
The decennial settlement of Sylhet now became 
inseparable from Willes' ziladari experiment, the main out­
lines of which had been clear since January. The Collector 
proceeded to take two separate engagements from the land­
holders - one to cover the net demand, and the other to 
defray the mofussil charges of his new collecting agency.
He increased the number of zilas to twelve and equipped each 
with an establishment of Indian officers. The ziladar or 
head Indian officer v/as hand-picked by the collector himself 
and was not drawn from among the ranks of the zamindars, 
whom Willes considered "men of no consequence, ... incapable 
and oppressive" and unsuitable to be entrusted with the 
collection of the public revenues. Also, since the
1. Sec. BOR - all collectors, with ends., 23 June 1790, 
SDR iv, 129-30.
2. BOR - Board, 30 July 1790, Proc. 30 July 1790, BOR 
R71, xxvii, np.
3. Willes - BOR , 24 Oct. 1790, Proc. 26 Oct. 1790, BOR 
R71» xxx> np.
decennial settlement was to be made with people in actual 
possession of the lands - which in Sylhet meant with a 
large number of inferior landholders - Willes thought it 
improper that zamindars should be appointed to collect the 
revenues, "till time shall have proved the talookdars are 
not to be subjected to future or increased exactions".^
In choosing his ziladars, Willes stated, "I did not embarrass 
myself with defining proprietary rights"; his main con­
sideration was simply "how the Company's demands might be 
best secured with the least oppression possible to the 
natives in general". He did make one exception, though: 
to the ziladar appointed over Ahmad Reza's zamindari of 
Baniachang, he associated the zamindar's eldest son, "so 
that the family which is respectable, might not be materially
p
lessened in the eyes of the natives11.
Willes estimated the cost of his ziladari plan 
at not more than 16 per cent of the final net jama. This 
sum, he conceded, might be thought too heavy an expense. 
However, he added, "when the great extent of the country, 
the numberless poor individuals from whom the collections 
are to be made, the great charges of transportation of
3
couries are considered, it will be found barely adequate".
In any case it did not approach the enormous expense (both 
to the country and the Company) of making the collections 
through wadahdars, and while it would be undoubtedly better
1. Willes - BOR, 24 Oct. 1790, Proc. 26 Oct. 1790, BOR
R71, xxx, np.
2 .Ibid.
3. Ibid.
if ziladars could be dispensed with, they were necessary 
"for the moment. For Willes believed it would require 
great care and attention to realize the revenues as it was 
"the nature of man to consider taxes as oppressions, and 
it can hardly therefore be expected that the native of 
Bengal should offer willingly what is so reluctantly given 
by British subjects for the support of a natural and legal 
Government".^
Willes1 ziladari scheme was explained in detail 
to the Revenue Board on 24 October 1790, when he was on 
leave in Calcutta. On the surface, his plan bore some 
resemblance to collector Bentley's chakladari experiment, 
which had been instituted in Chittagong almost two decades 
earlier in an attempt to resolve the special difficulties 
occasioned by the presence of a large number of petty land­
holders. The basis of the settlement v/as different in 
that Bentley's chakladars had been farmers of the revenue, 
while Willes was settling the lands according to the results 
of a revenue survey. But the idea of an agglomeration of 
holdings into grand divisions of a district for the pur­
poses of revenue collection was the same. Bentley's 
scheme had failed because of the strong opposition of the 
Chittagong zamindars; they had managed effectively to resist 
its full implementation, and in many instances to subvert 
it by having themselves appointed as chakladars. It was 
unlikely that Willes knew anything of Bentley's initiatives;
1. Willes - BCR, 24 Oct. 1790, Proc. 26 Oct. 1790, BOR 
R71, xxx, np. (In the margin Willes noted: "Have not
the customs been avoided? Have not the rate, the 
window and wheel taxes been avoided by persons of 
independent fortunes?")
lie made no reference to them. More probably, be was 
aware that in Bihar, collectors were grouping estates 
together under tahsildars - essentially the same as 
ziladars - with encouraging results. The Revenue Board 
themselves were quite pleased by developments in the Bihar 
districts, where the level of the collections now stood 
at its highest point, and where, according to the col­
lectors, cultivation had been expanding,noticeably.
Thomas Law, one of the members of the Revenue Board, was 
excited to see the encouraging trend produced by the 
tahsildari system in Bihar confirmed in Willes1 report on 
Sylhet. He declared that the benefits of the system were 
self-evident, and on 29 October 1790 proposed to his col­
leagues that it should be adopted throughout Bengal.^
Law's attempt to makeSylhet a model for the rest 
of the province was to receive scant support from the other 
members of the Revenue Board. His proposal was contained 
in a minute in which he suggested that the same "wise 
policy which induced government to delegate collectors into 
districts equally dictates the appointment of tehseeldars 
to pergunnahs". The primary function of the tahsildar 
was to collect and amass the payments of the landholders, 
and to despatch them monthly to the collector. But, 
argued Lawr, they would also serve as a source of reliable 
information from the interior, reporting on such matters as 
the presence of dacoits in the area, or the decline of 
agriculture. In addition, through them the collector would
1. Law's minute, 29 Oct. 1790, Proc. 29 Oct. 1790, BOR
R71, xxx, np.
be able to impose on his district tighter official control, 
and to narrow the scope available to landholders to evade 
their revenue obligations. "Only a few days ago we dis­
covered," said Law, n that a talookdar actually evaded pay­
ment of any revenue by residing in dubious jurisdiction and 
asserting backwards and forwards that he paid to this and 
that collectorship." That kind of thing, he stressed, 
could not happen with tahsildars stationed in the mofussil.^ 
Law's minute and Willes' letter of 24 October 
were circulated to the Revenue Board for consideration.
When the matter was taken up again on 20 December 1790 it 
was generally conceded that the tahsildari scheme had 
indeed been beneficial both to the Bihar districts and to 
Sylhet. But the majority were not keen to see the system 
applied to Bengal as a whole . Doubtless, they were aware 
that it would clash with their policy of cultivating the 
zamindars. The feeling was that in large zamindaris, the 
landholder should be able to appoint his own official to 
collect the revenues of his estate. No general plan could
therefore be implemented. Accordingly, Law's proposal 
2
was rejected. Willes, on the other hand, received a 
very favourable reception. His ziladari experiment was 
officially sanctioned - though for the sake of uniformity 
his ziladars were to be called tahsildars - and the 
Revenue Board deemed his suggestion that tahsildars should 
be prohibited from purchasing any lands within the circle
1. Law's minute, 29 Oct. 1790, Proc. 29 Oct. 1790, BOR
R71, xxx, np.
2. Proc. 20 Dec . 1790, BOR R71> xxxii, np.
of their authority worthy of a general regulation.^" In 
addition, he earned the following long overdue commen­
dation:
We cannot conclude this letter without 
expressing our satisfaction with the 
diligence and attention which appears 
to have been shown by you, as well as in 
ascertaining the actual state of your 
district, as in adopting measures for 
the future good management of it. 2
These measures were still far from finalised 
and it was to be a long time yet before the decennial 
settlement of Sylhet was completed. Willes, who returned 
to his station towards the end of 1790, could not summon 
the landholders to Sylhet to sign their engagements without 
risking the current year's revenues. As he explained in 
March 1791, ,fin so poor a district as this, if the pro­
prietors are put to any unnecessary expense, or called 
away from their business at an improper season, the Com­
pany’s revenue inevitably suffers, and, as the produce of 
the land is their sole property, is seldom ... recovered".
The sheer magnitude of the settlement was also a cause of 
delay, for there were around 50,000 taluks to be indivi­
dually assessed. In each case Willes had carefully to go 
over the hastobud papers. The collector also had to be 
on the look-out for instances where "the lands have been 
neglected since the hustabood, evidently for the purpose 
of obtaining a permanent deduction". Problems were also
1. Proc. 20 Dec . 1790, BOR R71, xxxii, np.
2. BOR - Willes, 20 Dec. 1790, Proc. 20 Dec. 1790, BOR 
E71, xxxii, np.
5. Willes - BOR, 25 Mar. 1791, Proc. 15 July 1791, BOR
R71, xli, np.
caused by violent rains in March and April 1791 which par­
tially destroyed the boro crop and instigated some land­
holders to claim not only a remission in the current 
demand, but also a permanent deduction in their jama.^
By mid-May Willes was reporting considerable 
progress with the settlement but he still doubted whether 
it could be finalised in less than four or five months*
In November 1791 he reported that 22,4-48 landholders had 
already signed their engagements with "the names of about
p
5,000 persons only remaining to be affixed”. At the same 
time, as an indication of the correctness of his allot­
ments, he stated, "The collections of this year have been 
unusually favourable ...,The unrealised revenue is ••• but 
trifling". In November alone he had collected over 75» 000 
rupees^ when in earlier years the instalment for that month 
had been less than 40,000 rupees. By the end of January 
1792 he had already collected nearly three lakhs rupees 
or about eighty per cent of what was to be the final 
demand. In February he reported that the number of out­
standing signatures had been reduced to a mere 485, and 
that so far only 65 taluks with a demand of 7>000 kahons had
had to be held khas, due to the refusal of their owners to
4
sign agreements. Two months later the settlement was
1. Willes - BOR, 23 Mar. 1791, Proc. 13 July 1791, BOR 
R71, xli, np.
2. Willes - BOR, 30 Nov. 1791, Proc. 12 Dec. 1791, BOR 
R71, xlvi, np.
3. Ibid.
4. Willes - BOR, 17 Peb. 1792, Proc. 30 Mar. 1792, BOR 
R71, 1, np.
finalised, and Willes was able to send Calcutta an abstract 
account of the jama, which placed the total demand (that 
is, including the mofussil charges of collection) on the 
twelve zilas of the district at 15,25,511 kahons.'*' Only 
140 signatures were now wanting - by any standard, a 
remarkable achievement. Of the estates whose proprietors 
had not signed the necessary papers, sixteen were held khas 
by order of the Court of Wards - their owners being minors, 
and sixteen were let to farmers because their proprietors 
who had been absent from the district had not returned 
within a given time limit. The remainder were for the 
most part entrusted to the management of "responsible people" 
who were all residents of the district; the revenues of 
these taluks, said Willes, "may be considered as assured 
,.. and the only deduction that will take place is the
o
moshaira [monthly allowance] to the dispossessed proprietors".
Thus, in Sylhet district - uniquely in Bengal - 
the decennial settlement, and later the permanent settle­
ment, was made on the basis of a revenue survey. The 
result, at first sight, appears to have been an exceptionally 
high assessment, especially when it is considered that 
Lindsay had pronounced a demand of 9,55,000 kahons over­
rated. Willes* assessment in fact surpassed all the esti­
mates he had sent to Calcutta. However, the extent of 
the mofussil charges, which he had now incorporated into 
the jama, so that they would be disbursed by the government 
after the collections had been made, and not, as had been
1. Willes - BOR, 20 Apr. 1792, Proc. 16 Hay 1792, BOR 
R72, i, np.
2. Ibid.
the case, deducted by farmers or wadahdars as profit or 
recompense for their services before the public revenues 
were discharged, was always an unknown quantity. If it 
were possible to calculate with any degree of exactness 
what these costs had been, it might be discovered that 
Willes* assessment did not represent too high a real . 
increase of revenue on the zamindars and ryots.
In Willes* assessment the mofussil charges of 
collection were fixed as a proportion - on average nine 
per cent - of the demand, and amounted to 1,53>858 kahons.
i
The percentage varied from zila to Zila, from 11.8 per 
cent at one extreme to 7*6 per cent at the other. The 
variation depended on a number of local circumstances and 
chiefly on the distance of the zila from Sylhet town, which 
helped to determine the cost of shipping cowries. The 
following is an example of the estimated costs of collection 
in one :Zila:^
Zila Latoo: gross jama •••
annual charges at 10 per cent
1,81,569 kahons 
18,166 kahons,
as follows -
Tahsildar 550 kahons per month
Sarishtadar 100 ” ” »
6 Huharrirs 180 * H ti
1 Tahvildar (cashier) 60 ” * t
1 Vakil 40 1 " t
1 Jamadar 50 '* * tl
15 Peons 180 " ” It
2 Chaukidars (watchmen) 52 « h It
Paper, oil, etc. 40 ” ” t
1012 kahons per month;
1. Willes-BOR, 20 Apr.1792, pr<oe.l6 Hay 1792.
BOR R72, i, np.
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or 12,144 kahons annually
Plus annual cowrie transport 
charges, kachari repairs etc. 6,022
Total: 18,166 kahons annually.
Willes tried to keep these administrative costs to a 
minimum and to avoid placing any unnecessary burden on 
the inhabitants.1 This was always expected of collectors; 
the careful tailoring of expenditure was a hall-mark of 
the Company’s administration. Willes believed, however, 
that it would be self-defeating to go too far in cur­
tailing expenses. He thought that the officials in the 
zilas, and especially the tahsildar, should be adequately 
compensated, or there was a danger otherwise that the 
whole system might collapse in a web of graft and corrup­
tion. As he explained, in what was simply an extension 
of the Cornwallis policy of a fair wage for collectors in 
the districts, the tahsildars in the mofussil ’’should 
receive allowances in some measure adequate to their trust, 
which if not sufficient to secure their honesty will at
least justify government in the punishment fo.r the breach 
2
of it". In any case, the mofussil expenditure was fixed 
considerably lower than his earlier estimate of sixteen 
per cent of the demand. Moreover, the district had pre­
viously been supporting a large number of wadahdars and 
their rapacious subordinates, so there could be no argu­
ment against the inhabitants now meeting the cost of the
1. Willes - BCR, 20 Apr. 1792, Proc. 16 May 1792, BOR 
R72, i, np.
2. Ibid.
389.
zila officers - an establishment which would perform with 
greater generosity to the ryots and landholders and in a 
more efficient manner the services hitherto executed by 
wadahdars.
Bor Willes, one of the real tests of his assess­
ment was the reaction of the people who had to bear it.
On this point the collector remarked: "I should hope that
the revenue allotted to each meerasdar [mirasdar or pro­
prietor] has been nearly as impartial as the nature of 
such an arrangement would admit and feel myself happy in 
considering how very few persons have refused to confirm 
by their signatures the valuation affixed to their portion 
of property...."1 There was genuine cause for self- 
congratulation here, but obviously, not all who had signed 
their names were equally happy. Unfortunately, it is 
impossible to calculate not only Willes’ real increase 
arithmetically, but also there is no clue as to its distri­
bution over the district* the territorial unit of com­
parison, the pargana, had ceased to have any significance 
with the division of the district into zilas. All the 
same, it seems improbable that the incorporation of the 
mofussil charges into the total jama could of itself have 
pushed up the demand to 13»25»5H kahons. Though there 
is no concrete evidence, apart from dissatisfied noises in 
some quarters, it was likely that a contributing factor 
was that some quantity of secreted arable land had been 
unearthed in the course of the survey, and that the exami­
nation of revenue-free sanads had revealed many grants to
1. Willes - BOR, 20 Apr. 1792, Proc. 16 May 1792, BOR
R72, i, np.
be of doubtful validity, and liable therefore to resumption.
The chief grumblers were the qanungos of Sylhet, whom
Willes did not consult at all either during the survey or
the settlement. He thought it would be improper to seek
their advice as they and their dependents were themselves
among the principal landholders in the district.1 Their
dissatisfaction could be taken as proof, according to
Willes, that "the interests of the lower class have not
2
been sacrificed to the benefit of the rich".
The absence of any significant degree of popular 
opposition to Willes' assessment is perhaps explainable in. 
the light of the factors that contributed to his out­
standing success with the collections of 1791-2. The 
assessment for that year was the highest the district had 
ever borne; moreover, the settlement had not been finalised 
until almost the very end of the revenue year. Yet, for 
the first time, a collector of Sylhet was able to speak 
of the ease with which the revenues had been realized.
But the deliverance of the district from the parasitic 
clutches of the wadahdars and their unscrupulous officials 
was only part of the story; the other part lay in a for­
tuitous combination of circumstances, produced by that same 
climatic instability that had brought the district in 
1784-5 and again in 1787-8 to its knees. As had spec­
tacularly happened towards the end of 1770, so again in 
1791-2 there was scarcity in Bengal as a whole, while in 
Sylhet the crops were unusually favourable. The ready
1. Willes - BOR, 20 Apr. 1793, Proc. 24 Dec. 1793, BOR 
R72, xxiv, np.
2. Ibid.
market for Sylhet grain exports in the rest of the province 
generally induced Willes to adopt an air of modesty about 
his success with the collections. Had not the 
season been so favourable, he said, he would have con­
sidered the ease with which the collections had been made 
"as a proof that the country has not been overrated in the 
general or particular settlement".1
Willes was to return to the fairness of his 
demands upon the several landowners in April 1793, when he 
sought to defend himself against a last ditch attempt by 
Gaurhari Singh to discredit him and his settlement.
Gaurhari had contended that the hastobud had resulted in a 
considerable loss of revenue to the district, and that 
except for fifty or so rich persons who had "bought exemp­
tion" from the payment of revenue, the landholders generally 
had suffered in various ways to the ruin of themselves and 
their family. This was linked to an accusation of cor­
ruption in the district office. In his reply, Willes con­
ceded: "that perfect equality of assessment has not been
effected, need not be denied...." But, he added, few 
people had complained about the assessment; 26,479 land­
holders had signed their engagements for the decennial
settlement and of those, 26,344 had regularly paid their
2
revenues for the last three years. And while the hastobud 
had not been conceived as a means of increasing the revenue 
yield, but rather of settling the boundaries of holdings
1. Willes - BOR, 20 Apr. 1792, Proc. 16 May 1792, BOR 
R72, i, np.
2. Willes - BOR, 20 Apr. 1793, Proc. 24 Dec. 1793, BOR 
R72, xxiv, np.
and promoting the expansion of cultivation, it was non­
sense to claim that the Company had suffered losses. In 
fact, argued Willes, the total collections for the four 
years 1788-9 to 1791-2 surpassed those of the previous four 
years 1784-5 to 1787-8 (after allowance had been, made for 
territorial readjustments) by 18,77,580 kahons1 - an 
average of over one lakh rupees per year. Though the 
figures spoke for themselves, Willes added:
I should take little credit to myself 
for this advantage accruing to the 
Company could I not also prove that 
the country has not been overburthened, 
that the affluent have not been 
favoured at the expense of the poor, 
and this is fairly deducible from the 
ready and increasing ease with which 
the collections have been made in the 
last four years. 2
During his collectorship, he continued, no land had been
given in farm,-' none in mortgage, and the total amount of
land (excluding the areas which had been attacked by the
Khasis) sold for arrears - covering a period of five years
- was only 1,416 bighas (about 450 acres), the property of
one person and the annual revenue of which was only about
1,000 kahons. The situation had been markedly different
in the years preceding the hastobud. Prom 1784-5 to
1787-8, lands now yielding 86,715 kahons had been sold for
arrears and lards now assessed at 3*48,228 kahons had been
1. Willes - BOR, 20 Apr. 1795* Proc. 24 Dec. 1793, BOR 
R72, xxiv, np.
2. Ibid.
3. Except for those of absent proprietors in 1791* These1 
proprietors subsequently returned and ’’gained repossession 
of the talooks by consent of those who had undertaken the 
management of them....” Willes - BOR* 30 Oct. 1793*
Proc. 26 Nov. 1793* BOR R72, xxiii, np.
farmed or mortgaged under terms which had been almost equi­
valent to outright purchase. The chief buyer, farmer and 
mortgager had been Gaurhari Singh.1
In his allegation of corrupt practices in the 
district office, Gaurhari had specifically cited the diwan 
Krishna Jewan Haidar, the sarishtadar Hari Chand and Anand 
Ram, a clerk. Willes' defence was that he had sworn his 
officers "to act faithfully and truly without demanding or 
receiving any unauthorized fees or rewards" and that during 
the examination of sanads and in the course of the survey, 
he had issued repeated statements that he would be available 
in the civil court to deal with complaints against any 
corrupt officer. He had not brought with him to Sylhet 
"a single person" as writer or clerk but had worked with 
those persons he found on his arrival. The diwan Krishna 
Jewan Haidar, he said, did credit to his office by his 
personal dignity but he was a native of Burdwan, and "as 
he knows nothing of moffusil accounts, he is not of much 
use to a collector, as whatever information he could give 
would be better learnt from those to whom he must first 
have recourse." The sarishtadar, on the other hand, did 
possess the relevant knowledge, but Willes found him unwilling 
to part-with it. Anand Ram was the most helpful officer, 
and Willes stressed that he had taken pains to keep him incor­
rupt. If he had been unsuccessful in this, he could not
2
in fairness be blamed. A foreign government, remarked
1. Willes - BCR , 20 Apr. 1793* Proc. 24 Dec. 1793* BOR
R72, xxiv, np.
2. Ibid.
the collector, could not dispense totally with the agency 
of the indigenous people, "whose merits however great they 
may be are seldom considered and whose services never ... 
receive an honourable and adequate reward".1
Gaurhari's campaign had not the slightest chance 
of success. His allegations were contained in a petition 
which he had drawn up in Calcutta in 1790 but which for 
some reason had not been brought to the Revenue Board's 
notice until early 1793• The people who signed his peti­
tion, where they could be traced at all, were either in 
his pay or disgruntled at the time of the survey. Por 
example, Chand Ram, who signed on behalf of the qanungos, 
was a youth of eighteen, "an idle dissipated character", 
the younger brother of Radha Krishen Qanungo; he had 
borrowed money from Premnarain Bose in order to abscond to
Calcutta when he fell in arrears with the revenues on his 
2
own estates. Sham Ram Sen, who signed on his own behalf, 
was a servant of Gaurhari Singh's when he did so; at that 
time he owned no land in Sylhet but had subsequently 
acquired an estate paying 160 kahons as revenue owing to 
the death of a relative. Muhammad Wall, another ser­
vant of Gaurhari*s, also signed; he had served as a cover 
for Gaurhari's purchases in Sylhet. Radha Krishen Chaudhuri, 
who had absconded to Calcutta when he was heavily in debt,
1. Willes - BOR, 20 Apr. 1793* Proc. 24 Dec. 1793, 
BOR R72, xxiv, np.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
swore to Willes on his return to Sylhet that he had been
paid sixty rupees to affix his name to Gaurhari’s petition.1
Among those who had been unhappy about the treatment of
their lands during the hastobud and who had signed the
petition were Gopal Ram, whose Jama had been increased
from ten kahons to 496 kahons, and Muhammad Zukhi, who
had been unwilling to pay revenue for land which he had
2
recovered owing to the shifting course of a river.
Other persons had fled to Calcutta to secure help, fearing
that a demand would be placed on their revenue-free lands;
in Calcutta they had been persuaded to sign the petition.
Bhaktia Singh had been one of these persons, but when he
received news that his lands were not to be assessed after
*
all he had calmly returned to Sylhet.^ As a matter of 
fact, most of the people who had signed Gaurhari1s petition 
had returned to Sylhet and had been punctually discharging 
their revenues. Clearly, Gaurhari Singh's authority in 
Sylhet had become only a frail shadow of what it once was, 
and whatever little influence he had remaining could not 
be effectively manipulated by remote control.
The Sylhet landholders at a group had nothing to 
complain about, and if Gaurhari wanted to present a 
genuine case of grievance, he would have had to champion 
the cause of the ryots. In exchange for their signatures, 
the landholders had been given a chit under Willes' official
1. Willes - BOR, 20 Apr. 1793, Proc. 24 Dec. 1793,
BOR R72, xxiv, np.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
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seal as collector, with their individual jama clearly 
specified in English and in Bengali.^ This was to enable 
them to resist any extra-legal impost which a corrupt 
tahsildar might be tempted to introduce. But the ryots 
were given no such guarantees. To the very end of the 
period covered by this study, it was found impossible to 
prevail upon the landholders to deliver pattas or leases 
to their cultivators. The landholders were reluctant to 
do so, for they feared that the copies which they would have 
had to lodge either with the collector or with the zila
2office might become the basis for an increased taxation.
The ryots of Sylhet would have welcomed such leases.
Unlike the peasants of other districts in Bengal, there 
was no need for them to fear that any measurement in conse- 
quence of patta rules would reveal their secret holdings;-' 
in Sylhet the lands had already been measured. Doubtless, 
the lyots agreed with Willes that some kind of written 
agreement was essential to secure them from oppression at 
the hands of the proprietors. The Sevenue Board, too, 
had come to realise this. But even if Gaurhari Singh had 
been able to make the most of this point, it was highly 
unlikely that he would have been able to secure his objec­
tive of removing Willes from the Sylhet collectorship.
It was unlikely, as a matter of fact, that he would have
1. Willes - BOR,30 Nov. 1793* Proc. 20 Dec. 1793,
BOR R72, xxiv, np.
2. Willes - BOR, 5 Oct. 1792, Proc. 5 Nov. 1792,
BOR R72, ix, np.
5. Islam, M.D.S., The Permanent Settlement and the Landed 
Interests in Bengal, unpublished London Ph.D. Thesis,
W 7T.  ------
"been able to damage Willes* position in any way, For
the revenue collection figures spoke eloquently in support
of Willes.^" The Revenue Board did not fail to notice
that, and when they referred Gaurhari Singh's petition
to the Governor-General-in-Council it was with the
following remark:
We think it but justice due to his 
conduct ••• to add our testimony to 
the zeal and ability manifested by 
Mr Willes whilst Collector of Sylhet, 
and in particular to point out to 
your notice the large permanent in­
crease of annual revenue which has been 
secured to the Company, by his success­
ful conclusion of the decennial settle­
ment of that district, 2
The weakness of Gaurhari*s campaign, and the strength of
Willes* position, was that the Company never confused its
priorities.
1. In Nov. 1793 Willes was able to claim: ’the total 
balance of several years [since 1790-1] does not 
amount to three hundred rupees.*' Willes - BCR,
30 Nov. 1793, Proc. 20 Dec. 1793, BOR R72, xxiv, np.
2. BOR - Board, 24 Dec. 1793, Proc. 24 Dec. 1793,
BOR R72, xxiv, np.
CONCLUSION
Upon the acquisition of the diwani the East India 
Company was content at first to rely on Mughal officers and to 
follow Mughal practice. By the early 1770s, however, a worsen­
ing financial situation, combined with pressure from civilians in 
India, led to the appointment of British supervisors in rural 
Bengal. Soon afterwards, the Company assumed direct control 
over the revenue administration, and the local British officials 
became the heirs to positions of power and responsibility in the 
districts. In subsequent years the Company undertook a series 
of experiments aimed primarily at maximising the revenue yield 
in an attempt to meet the pressing financial demands, both from 
England and in India, with which it was saddled. These experi­
ments were centrally devised and directed, but in the districts 
they took differing forms in practice. Though the diversity of 
conditions within Bengal had a part to play in this uneven imple­
mentation of official policy, the chief reason for the discrep­
ancy between central aims and local practice was the overriding 
influence of the district officer.
This discrepancy was perhaps more noticeable in Sylhet 
district than elsewhere. There the procession of early British 
responses to the task of revenue administration was marked first 
by reliance on the Mughal faujdar and then by the temporary 
deputation of John Sumner and so to the collectorship, beginning 
in October 1772, of William Thackeray. Friction between the old 
Mughal bureaucracy and the rising British power was overshadowed 
by this time by conflict between the Company1 s servants them­
selves. The central officials at Calcutta, led by Hastings, 
tried to impose restraints on the power and influence of the
junior civilans in the districts. But Thackeray in Sylhet and 
other collectors of a similar bent could not easily be curbed by 
frail central regulations, especially since there was no separate 
agency in the districts for their implementation apart from the 
very persons they sought to control. In any case, the regula­
tions were severely undermined by the contemporarily accepted 
standards of administrative conduct. Tougher moves - to recall 
the local officials altogether and thus to centralize the admini- 
tration - lacked teeth. The recall was never total, and though 
the impression might be obtained from the Bengal Government's 
regulations that through the 1770s and early 1780s the Board in 
Calcutta increasingly tightened their grip on the administrative 
system, the reality was quite the opposite.
Lindsay's career in Sylhet demonstrated eloquently the 
continuing strength of the collector's position, even though mid­
way through his term of office, more strenuous moves than ever 
were made towards centralization. In 1781, Lindsay, like all 
other collectors, was officially denied any part in the settle­
ment of his district; at the same time, a wadahdar was appointed 
to Sylhet to manage the collections. But these administrative 
charges were to prove only a temporary curtailment of the scope 
of Lindsay's influence. Following the failure and the subsequent 
cancellation of the wadahdar*s contract, Lindsay was able to regain, 
then consolidate and ultimately extend his authority over Sylhet.
By the time Willes came to the district in 1788 centralization as 
an official policy was dead. The impossibility of transacting 
the tangled business of revenue administration by remote control - 
which had always been tacticly recognized in the deputation of 
officers on assignments in the mofussil - was generally acknow­
ledged. The Company was willing now to accept the collector's
right to influence or modify the directives emanating from 
Calcutta as a formal variable in the final application of policy. 
Instead of trying to suppress or ignore that influence it was 
prepared to attempt to channel it - by providing better pay, for 
example - in the right direction.
It was not so much these central responses which 
invested each phase of experimentation in Sylhet with a dis­
tinctive character as the aims and horizons of the local 
officials and the assumptions on which they acted. Both Thackeray 
and Lindsay - the former perhaps unconsciously and the latter with 
decidedly greater deliberation - patterned themselves on their 
Mughal precursors and in so doing retained a kind of continuity 
with the Mughal administrative system as it had traditionally 
operated in Sylhet. The frontier district still seemed to be but 
tenuously connected with the centre, in so far as the implementa­
tion of official policy was concerned. The bent of these two 
men thus gave an archaic air to Sylhet. The same sense of the 
power of individual character to modify the Bengal pattern can 
perhaps be experienced by a process of might-have-been: by 
asking, for example, how different the administrative growth of 
Sylhet would have been had the 'progressive' Holland been appoin­
ted in 1772 rather than the less scrupulous Thackeray. The next 
five years would doubtless have taken a different course. Again, 
had the last collector in our period been Lindsay instead of 
Willes the stream-lining of the administration in the district 
would hardly have been so thorough. True, a man is to some 
extent a product of his times, and Willes in his reforming initia­
tives was aided by the favourable climate produced by the reorg­
anisation associated with the regime of Cornwallis. But there 
were similarities, too, between the period of his collectorship
and that of Lindsay's. If before 1788 all administrative changes 
in Sylhet had been temporary reactions to a falling revenue yield 
or alternatives to an abatement of the demand, after 1788 they 
were still tied up in the strait-jacket of financial stringency. 
The crucial new factor was Willes' attitude to change. The work 
involved might be disagreeable, but ought nevertheless to be 
undertaken. His predecessor, on the other hand, had believed that 
the inhabitants would resist all change and that their obduracy 
would threaten the collections on which his public reputation 
depended. Willes' bolder, less inhibited stand made possible a 
positive approach to the frontier problem, the successful execu­
tion of a revenue survey and the smooth introduction of a new 
collecting agency in the mofussil.
The issue that needs to be examined is what were the 
factors that allowed so free a rein to the collectors of Sylhet. 
The answer to this question lies in the nature of the revenue 
system. Paradoxically, in the first place must be recorded the 
intense and sustained concern of the central authorities with 
increasing the revenue yield, without - in theory - damaging the 
promise of future yields. This preoccupation stamped the system 
with a distinctive mark of rigidity, as was unmistakably evident, 
for example, during the second half of Lindsay's collectorship.
In that period, the Calcutta Committee of Revenue steadfastly 
refused to countenance any alteration in the total jama of Sylhet 
until they were compelled to do so by the floods of 1784. Even 
then they could bring themselves to allow a reduction of only
3,000 rupees. The Revenue Board which replaced the Committee in 
June 1786 were also reluctant in their turn to grant remissions 
until their adherence to the standing jama had brought about the 
total collapse of the collections. The known attitude of the 
policy makers to the collections bred a set of administrative
values and norms too perversely related to the revenue accounts.
It also created a situation in which a collector, by delivering 
the goods, in terms of revenue yield, or acceptable excuses in 
case of a poor yield, might ensure that he would be left well 
alone. Certainly, the independence which Thackeray enjoyed for 
the first years of his farm, and Lindsay for almost the whole 
duration of his collectorship, was explainable in these terms.
The alternative to a lessening of the demand and thus 
a lowering of the potential receipts was to strengthen the col­
lector1 s ability to enforce the collections. In this way, too, 
rigidity worked to enhance the collector's position. Also, 
since all concrete measures, from an expedition against the hill 
tribes to a survey and demarcation of boundaries, were considered 
in Calcutta usually in the light of positive material returns, the 
collectors had a ready-made formula by which to obtain approval for 
their proposals. Examples of the successful use of this formula 
range from the relatively trivial, such as Lindsay's showing how 
the addition of a writer to his staff would improve efficiency 
and therefore the collections, to matters of greater substance, 
as when Holland pointed out how a zamindari settlement based on 
a local investigation would be more profitable than any other 
form of settlement. The formula also allowed the interest of 
collectors to be paraded as the Company's advantage. For example, 
after Sylhet had been reannexed to Dacca in 1773 Thackeray was 
able to persuade the Board that the separate kachari in Sylhet 
should nevertheless be retained; he and his Indian assistants 
then continued to supervise the collections in which they had a 
personal stake. Even judicial arrangements could be upset by 
the profit argument. Lindsay secured the removal of the authority 
of the judge and magistrate at Suitansi from Sylhet and had it
transferred to himself when he insisted that that would improve 
the collections. This new arrangement of course further streng­
thened his personal control of the district.
Considerations of profit were therefore crucial, and 
the formula of increased gain worked more powerfully whenever 
the Company was in financial troubles. Admittedly, this emerges 
most easily from a revenue study. It explains why a district 
like Sylhet, yielding in 1772 less than two per cent of the total 
revenue of Bengal, never commanded much attention at Calcutta, 
although militarily vulnerable, and why the most important letter 
from a collector to Calcutta in our period - Willes1 of 24 Octo­
ber 1790 - ended with an apology for taking up too much of the 
Revenue Board's time with a district of so little worth! The 
merchant ethic of the Company was very much in evidence through­
out our period and doubtless much beyond it too.
Rigidity was something that came from the top; so too 
did a variety of general plans. These were based necessarily on 
some abstract standard situation. But administration by abstrac­
tion was unworkable in extreme conditions; it multiplied rather 
than suppressed the effect of the unique. Hence, the way was 
opened for collectors to plead the local peculiarities of their 
situation and to disregard official directives. Lindsay in par­
ticular played this game to full personal advantage.
Special circumstances demanded (but did not always 
receive) special attention. If the Board had to take a decision 
on some specific detail relating to a particular district, it was 
usually the collector who provided the necessary information.
The Board's impatience with minutiae notwithstanding, local 
officials were continuously expected to furnish comprehensive 
reports on a wide range of topics. We have seen how the
selective submission of data often enabled a collector to sway 
his superiors. Doubtless, this worked particularly well in the 
case of the Sylhet collectors whose district was little known. 
By careful reporting, Thackeray obtained the Sylhet collector­
ship, Lindsay secured the authority to order land sales, and 
Willes prodded Calcutta into action over the frontier problem.
In attempting to influence the Board collectors could 
also utilise ties of patronage where they existed, and exploit 
their contacts in Calcutta, if they had any. In our period the 
young civilian usually depended on such ties for his first 
appointment as collector. But patrons need not be an unmiti­
gated blessing, as Thackeray discovered to his dismay.
Thus, in their dealings with their superiors, the 
collectors could attempt to influence the directives emanating 
from Calcutta or contrive to ignore them. Though local advice 
was sometimes shunned, our study of the revenue administration 
of Sylhet over two decades has revealed not a single episode in 
which a collector implemented a decision about which he had any
A
significant reservation. This is an indication of the collec­
tor's potential for lobbying and the extent to which the Board 
allowed themselves, perhaps unconsciously, to be guided by the 
men on the spot, as well as the immense possibilities open to 
the collector to pervert official policy. It was relatively 
easy, as we have seen, for Thackeray and Lindsay, deeply com­
mitted to making their fortune as quickly as possible, to shape 
British policy to their own ends. But it was as easy for 
Holland and Willes to do the same, although their committment 
was to finding that mean between the welfare of Indians and
1. Except where what was at issue was the total demand figure.
the interest of their employers.
The crystallisation of revenue policy was the process 
of settlement. Here, ideas of good government, of Company gain, 
of justice to the inhabitants, all came together and had somehow 
to be resolved. With the notable exception of 1781, the Sylhet 
collectors formulated the mofussil if not the sadr settlement of 
their district. If the total demand was fixed in Calcutta, the 
collectors had to determine its distribution. Thus, the collec­
tors were imbued with an imposing amount of formal and informal 
leverage over the landholders.
Anything that facilitated the realization of the 
revenues was likely to strengthen the collector's position; any­
thing that jeopardised the collections was likely to weaken it. 
For the payment of their revenues, the people of Sylhet relied 
largely on the sale of their agricultural outturn. Khasi 
inroads or unsympathetic weather causing either floods or drought 
reduced the surplus grain available for sale; too abundant a 
harvest in other parts of Bengal glutted the market for grain. 
These factors were somewhat outside the revenue system, but 
what they implied were rapid changes in the value of the lands. 
This Lindsay clearly pinpointed in November 1787, when he 
declared that "in no part of the country, or perhaps in the 
whole world, are the lands so fluctuating in their temporary
A
value as the lower districts of Sylhet". One year out of
four, he added, he had found the revenues "greatly affected by
p
inundation." Rigidity in this situation was bound to pose a 
threat to the collections. Thus, though on the one hand an 
uncomprising attitude at the centre to the revenues could help
1. Lindsay - BOR. 24 November 1787, SDR ii, 199*
2. Ibid.
to fortify the collector's position in his district, on the 
other hand it could work to undermind his public reputation.
One of the chief requirements for success with the 
revenues was a balanced assessment. Within the framework of 
the total demand figure set by the Board there was ample room 
to manoeuvre for the collector, but overrating naturally posed 
problems. In the course of the settlement, both sadr and 
mofussil, not much could be done about fraud, collusion or 
deliberate concealment. The remedy was tiresome scrutiny, which 
made substantial demands on a collector's time and expertise.
All the Sylhet collectors complained about the unimaginable 
complexity and detail of the mofussil records. This was where 
the farming system first proved helpful; by holding out the 
threat of dispossession, it could be used to prise out from 
reluctant zamindars additional revenue. But when by 1773 it 
appeared that the farming of lands was counter-productive, it 
seemed necessary to turn to scrutiny, both of the revenue 
records and of the lands. These were ho:easy tasks, as Holland 
found out in 1775 and Willes in 1788-90.
Great store was set by precedent, as embodied in the 
revenue accounts of past years. Given the prevailing distrust 
of Indians, what revenue had once been realized was taken to be 
a good indication of the potential of the lands. The Company 
was trapped not only by an attitude of inflexibility but also 
by a reliance oh precedent into not making remissions. Senior 
officials were always anxious not to present the landholders 
with any pretext on which to claim a lower assessment. Both 
ryots and zamindars too believed that what they paid in any one 
year might set the demand in another. Suspicion thus fed on
itself, strengthening the conviction of both collector and revenue 
payer that they were working at cross-purposes. The resulting 
climate was hardly helpful for sound revenue or indeed efficient 
general administration.
Mistrust led to resentment and even harshness on the 
part of the local official in enforcing the collections. Indians 
responded with petitions, fraud and sabotage. For Indians written 
complaints direct to Calcutta, above the collector's head, were 
a powerful instrument of administrative politics. The success­
ful outcome of these discreet, deferential pleas usually depended, 
however, on the extent to which the collector could be embarrassed 
with the revenues. This involved the landholders in withholding 
the revenue, either by claiming remissions on the grounds of 
actual or invented floods or Khasi attacks, or by personally 
absconding or arranging to be absent from the district, or simply 
by refusing to pay. There was in Sylhet no entrenched class of 
Indian officials who might be looked upon as leaders and who 
might organize the resistance against the collector. Rather, the 
Indian officials in the J^achari were often the butt of the com- 
plaints, for in Sylhet in our period they were generally proteges 
of the collector. The organization of resistance was informal, 
and was based on a sort of demonstration or band-wagon effect.
If some landholders appeared to be getting away with refusing to 
pay their revenues, others were encouraged to do likewise.
Thus, the tremendous strength of the collector's posi­
tion was not unassailable, especially in a system marked by con­
tinuous flow and interaction. Petitions and recommendations went 
one way, and orders and directives the next. But the volume of 
this traffic, as well as the constant reference of the collector
to Calcutta tends to obscure the essential fact that the sys­
tem was ruled by men and not by regulations. Until some kind 
of esprit de corps or some consensus of aims had been achieved 
between the makers of policy and those responsible for its 
execution, the contradictions within the administration could 
not be resolved. By the end of our period the outline of such 
a consensus seemed to be emerging.
APPENDIX I
Growth of the Collector's Office: Sylhet District.
I. Establishment authorized by Committee of Circuit, 20 Oct. 1772. 
(Source: Proceedings of the Committee of Circuit, W. K. Firminger 
ed., 66.)
II. Office of Collector of Sylhet, 1793* (Source: Proc.
17 June 1793, BOR R72, xvii, np.)
monthly salary (rupees)
monthly salary (rupees)
Collector 
Public servants 
1 Diwan 
1 Naib 
5 Muharrirs 
1 Bengal Munshi 
1 Khazanchi (treasurer) 
1 Potadar
A Portuguese writer 
Paper, ink, oil etc.
150
150
100
50
57
15
25
5
50
12
Total 614
Collector
Assistant collector 
1 Diwan 
1 Sarishtadar 
1 Munshi
4 Muharrirs
3 Persian muharrirs 
1 Khazanchi 
10 Cowrie tellers
5 Coolies
500
(no separate allowance)
80
40
30
40
40
15
40
15
1 Naib (assistant)
10 Peons
2 Daftaris (record-keepers) 
Vakil at Jaintia
Paper and Ink
Godown (warehouse) rent
Hata (court-yard)
Nursery for Plants
1 Nazir (Officer to serve writs or take 
depositions) 10
7
30
6
12
20
100
2
Total 1,037
4-/o
G R O W T H  OF D I S T R I C T
6 0 0
TOTAL CORRESPONDENCE
LETTERS RECEIVED
LETTERS DESPATCHED
4 0 0
2 00 - J
1779 8 0  81 888 3  84 8582 87 88 89  90
* COMP IL ED FROM "CATALOGUE OF SYLHET RECORDS
1771— 1791 * SDR jy  , 2 9 4 - 4 2 0 .  <THE CATALOGUE REFERS TO
CORRESPONDENCE SURVIVING IN THE DISTRICT QFFICE IN 
1919, THE DATE OF PUBLICATION)
APPENDIX III 
ABSTRACT OF REVENUE ACCOUNTS
Sylhet
Year
1175
1176
1177
1178
1179
1180 
1181 
1182 
1185
1184
1185
1186
1187
1188
1189
1190 
1191
13 Sept. to 
12 Sept.'--
1765-6
1766-7
1767-8
1768-9
1769-70
1770-1
1771-2
1772-3
1773-4
1774-5
1775-6
1776-7
1777-8
1778-9
1779-80
1780-1 
1781-2
Demand Arrears at Year's 
end
(in Kahons of Cowries)
6,80,300
4,68,300
4,41,156
7,00,180
8,03,150
4,74,484**
4,84,484**
4,94,484**
8,00,101
* * *
66,000
64,360
56,977
9,35,297
♦ ****
1,58,750
14,000
3,877
10,055’
40,745’
26,484*
60,000*
87,683
* * ♦ *
* *  * *
***♦
* *
**♦
* * * *
*****
From Hastings* Papers. Figures questionable.
Farming system; figures represent net demand; expenses of 
collection defrayed by the farmer.
Zamindari settlement; gross demand; expenses of collection 
defrayed by the Company.
Figures suspect; Lindsay anticipating collections. 
Wadahdari system; accounts closed in April 1782.
ABSTRACT OP REVENUE ACCOUNTS (continued)
Bengal 14 Apr. to Demand Arrears at 1
Year 13 Apr. end
(in Kahons of Cowries)
1189 1782-3 9,35,207 58,353
1190 1783-4 11 46,765
1191 1784-3 9,19,^07 4,63,707
1192 1783-6 n 6,78,350
1193 1786-7 n 4,76,549
1194 1787-8 7,50,101 1,06,277
1195 1788-9 8,49,764 74,257
1196 1789-90 10,61,644* 1,12,928
119? 1790-1 10,16,652
1198 1791-2 15,25,511** ----
* First settlement according to the hastobud.
** Total gross demand (including mofussil expenses to be 
defrayed by the Company*)
GLOSSARY
abadi
abwab
amal-cpizar 
am an * 
amil
ami a 
arzi
asal jama
aurang
aus
bandobast
banian
barqandaz 
bazi zamin
biiaiyachara
blaatta
Wait
bji-gha
boro
bnrahmottar
clnak
cHakla
chiara
chauki
chitta
daik
darogha
devottar
diwan
diwani
diwani adalat
cultivated land*
miscellaneous taxes imposed on the ryots 
in addition to the regular assessment on 
land.
a collector of revenue, 
winter rice•
a collector or revenue employed by the 
government or by a revenue farmer.
Chief Indian Officers, collectively, 
petition, representation, 
original demand exclusive of subsequent 
cesses and imposts.
a place where goods are manufactured: a 
depot for such goods. 
autumn rice•
settlement of revenue to be paid by the 
gamindar, renter or farmer to the government, 
a man of business in the service of an 
European official or trader; a Hindu trader, 
matchlock man; guard, 
lands exempt from the payment of public 
revenue or very lightly rated.
Coparcenary estate, held in severalty, 
a term applied to western Sylhet, from 
bhat - uneven ground.
house site; land on which house stands, as 
well as immediate surrounding spaces, 
a measure of area; in Bengal a little under 
one-third of an acre, 
spring rice.
land granted revenue-free to Brahmins. 
a detached piece of land, 
an administrative division of a province, 
normally consisting of several parganas; 
hence chakladar - the superintendent or 
renter of a chakla.
a Sylhet term for land on which plants are 
reared for transplanting. (In Bengali, 
pasturage).
a toll, custom or guard station.
here, particular statement of the measurement
of an estate. (Also, a rough note or account,
rough journal or day-book).
post, or establishment for the conveyance of
letters and travellers; relays of men or
cattle for these purposes.
a superintendent or over-seer.
land granted for the support of a temple.
the chief officer in charge of the revenue
department•
the right of collecting and receiving the 
revenues.
a court of civil justice.
faujdar
faujdari
faujdari adalat
fil-khana
firman
gaz
gomastha 
goshwara 
haq
hastobud
hat
havildar
hoar
huda
huzuri
jagir
jagirdar
jama
jamadar
jangli
jhil
jum
kachari
kahon
kasid
khal
khalsa
kharij
khas
khazana
khilat
khudkasht
kist
kistbandi
kulba
a Mughal officer in charge of a frontier 
district, exercising both civil and military 
functions.
the office or post of a faujdar; a military 
district, 
a criminal court, 
elephant stables.
an order, grant or command from the Mughal 
emperor.
a measure of length - in cloth trade, approxi­
mately equal to an English yard, 
an agent, a steward employed by a merchant, 
an abstract compiled from chittas. 
right, fee, perquisite.
ascertainment of the total rent-roll of a 
fiscal division with reference to past 
accounts and present assets, 
a market held on certain stated days in the 
week.
a native officer of the Indian army, 
a lake•
a grouping of estates; hence hudadar - the
holder or renter of a huda.
applied to lands paying revenue direct to
government.
an assignment of revenue of a given tract of 
land to a servant of the state for the sup­
port of a public establishment, particularly of 
a military nature, 
the holder of a jagir. 
total revenue; valuation, 
an Indian subaltern officer, 
wild, woody, (from jangal, jungle), 
a shallow lake or morass, 
slash and b u m  cultivation.
an office where any public business is trans­
acted; a landlord*s office, 
a measure of value equal to 1,280 cowrie 
shells.
a courier, a running footman or messenger, 
a postman, 
a stream.
the exchequer or treasury; an office of
government in which the business of the revenue
department was transacted.
excluded or separated from.
applied to lands from which government
officials collected revenue direct from
the cultivators.
taxes; revenue.
a robe of honour presented by a superior to
an inferior as a mark of distinction.
resident cultivator.
an instalment of revenue.
list of instalments; agreement for the
payment of the kists.
a plough; in Sylhet a measure of around
3 acres 3 roods.
lakh
lakhiraj
madad-i-ma
mahal
mansabdar
manzil
mathaut
maund
mirasdar
mofussil
moshaira
muharrir9
mujrai
munsif
muqadam
mutahid
mutasaddi
aaib
nankar
nizamat
paikasht
pant
pargana
parwana
patta
patwari
peon
peshkar
potadar
pun
punya
qahuliyat
qanungo
one hundred thousand, 
revenue-free land, 
ash aid for subsistence; applied especially to
lands assigned for the payment of religious 
endowments.
a source of revenue; an estate regarded as a 
unit for the assessment of land revenue, 
a noble holding a mansab, or military rank 
of a certain number of Ihorse, although some­
times wholly engaged in the civil service of 
the state.
a stage, a station; a place where the travel­
ler suspends his march, 
impost; extra or occasional cess or tax 
levied on the cultivators for some special 
purpose, or under some incidental pretext, 
either by the state or the zamindar. 
a measure of weight, ordinarily consisting 
of forty seers; about 84 lbs. 
a proprietor.
the interior of the district; the country as 
opposed to the capital or headquarters, 
a monthly stipend, 
a writer or clerk in an office.
Sylhet service lands, 
an Indian civil judge, 
a village headman, 
a contractor, 
a clerk.
a deputy, a viceroy.
an allowance or an assignment of land for the 
subsistence of zamindars, qanungos, or others 
connected with revenue collection, 
the administration of police and criminal law. 
a non-resident cultivator.
from pana (Sanskrit), money in general; also, 
an agreement.
a revenue sub-division of a district, 
a warrant; a written order, 
a lease or agreement regarding revenue 
payment.
a village accountant.
a foot-soldier; an inferior officer of the 
courts of justice.
a personal assistant or secretary of an 
official.
a cash keeper; a treasury clerk for weighing 
money and bullion and examining and valuing 
coins.
a measure of value, equal to eighty cowrie 
shells.
the ceremony at which the settlement of the 
new year is made, 
a written agreement.
a district record keeper, entrusted with the 
duty of maintaining a register of all circum­
stances and documents relating to landed 
property and the collection of revenue.
rusum
ryot
sadr
sair
sanad
sanyassi
sarishtadar
sarkar
sazawal
sega
shiqdar
shroff
sibandi
sub ah
subahdar
sukti
tahsildar
tahud
tahvildar
takavi
talab
taluk
talukdar
tauji
thana
tila
tirij
vakalat-nama
vakil
wadabandi
wadahdar
zamindar
ziadat
zila
fees, perquisites, commission, 
a cultivator; a peasant, 
the headquarters, 
miscellaneous sources of revenue, 
a written document of authority, 
a religious mendicant.
the head of a department; superintendent 
of an office.
a sub-division of a province consisting of 
several parganas.
an officer specially appointed by govern­
ment to take charge of and collect the 
revenue of an estate, from the management 
of which the zamindar has been removed, 
a Sylhet term denoting service lands, 
a revenue officer or collector appointed 
either by the government or a zamindar to 
collect the revenue from a small tract of 
country.
a banker or money-changer, 
charges in the revenue accouhts for the 
expense of troops engaged in revenue duties, 
a province; the largest sub-division of the 
Mughal empire.
officer in charge of a subah. 
dried fish.
an officer in charge of the collection of 
land revenue from a specified area, 
stipulated rent, 
a cashier, a treasurer.
government loan to cultivators to assist or 
encourage cultivation given especially in 
times of natural distress, 
revenue demand.
a land holding, usually intermediate between 
a zamindari and ryot holding, 
a landholder, sometimes subordinate to a 
zamindar, though occasionally paying direct 
to government, 
monthly revenue accounts, 
a mud fort; hence, thanadar - official in 
charge of a fort, 
a hill
an abstract compiled from other detailed 
accounts.
power of attorney.
a person invested with authority to act for 
another; an attorney.
an agreement for the payment of money at a 
stipulated period, 
a farmer of the revenue, 
an occupant of land, a landholder, 
increase; surplus.
a territorial sub-division; hence ziladar - 
official in charge of a zila.
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